Abstract

If the United States wants credibility as a world leader, it needs to become known as more than the country that drops bombs and sells weapons. Offering real economic assistance to help rebuild Kosovo and its Balkan neighbors would be a good start–as would reinvigorating U.S. support for peacekeeping and conflict prevention.
But the ink was barely dry on the June 10th peace accord that brought an end to NATO's air war in Kosovo before the world's major economic powers started passing the buck about who should pay for post-war reconstruction.
In his first major statement after the war, President Bill Clinton argued that since the United States picked up the bulk of the costs of the NATO bombing campaign, European nations should shoulder most of the cost of rebuilding the Balkans.
But–surprise!–no one stepped forward to take the lead. By early July, nearly a month after the formal end of hostilities, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had received less than half of the roughly $400 million it was seeking to help return Kosovar refugees to their homes.
“I find it unacceptable that the international community is not in the position to give us the necessary funds,” said UNHCR Deputy Commissioner Soren Jessen-Petersen. “After the international community spent billions, billions of dollars on a military campaign which was intended to pave the way for the return of refugees … it is a pity they are not prepared to spend what we have asked for.”
A few days later, World Bank President James Wolfensohn sounded a similar note at the inaugural meeting of the High-Level Steering Group–a coordinating body for post-war aid to the Balkans, which includes representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the finance ministries of the world's seven largest industrial nations. He urged potential donors not to let their contributions to a rebuilding fund for the region come at the expense of urgently needed aid for victims of less publicized conflicts in places like Sierra Leone, Azerbaijan, and Central Africa.
In late July, the United States pledged $500 million toward a $2.1 billion international fund for Kosovar refugees–still a far cry from the estimated $20 to $30 billion needed to rebuild the Balkans.
The perceived shortage of funds to rebuild the Balkans and other war-torn areas needs to be put in perspective. A grudging $2 billion rebuilding fund stands in flinty contrast to the $4 billion the United States and its NATO allies spent bombing parts of Serbia and Kosovo into rubble.
The problem isn't a lack of resources; it is misguided spending priorities. If the United States had invested a modest amount in diplomacy and conflict prevention before the war, the killing in Kosovo might have been stopped without launching a multi-billion dollar bombing campaign.
The Clinton administration should shore up U.N. peacekeeping capabilities by paying its back dues to the international body, which would cost less than the price of just one of the $2 billion B-2 bombers used in Kosovo. And the conflict prevention budget of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could be doubled for the price of just one of the hundreds of the $2 million Tomahawk cruise missiles that rained down on Serbia.
These investments pale in comparison with the Pentagon's Tiffanyesque $290 billion budget, and they provide a cheaper, more effective way to build the foundations for international peace and stability than spending more money on high-tech weaponry.
A more balanced approach to U.S. security also would put more funds aside for foreign economic aid. According to a recent United Nations Human Development Report, at one-tenth of one percent, the United States ranks dead last among major industrialized nations in the share of its gross national product devoted to official development assistance.
But shifting U.S. budget priorities from preparing for war to preventing or containing potential conflicts will require principled political leadership. Otherwise, the Pentagon and its allies in industry will soak up most of the available funds to promote their version of the lessons of Kosovo: the need to restock the U.S. arsenal with cruise missiles and smart bombs, and to reinvest in a new generation of intelligence gathering, communications, and transport equipment needed to fight the “next” Kosovo.
