Using stock ownership and stock options as indices of CEO hegemonic power, this study examined their effects on the growth of 37 Canadian corporate executives' compensation in 1995–96. While options granted for exercise did not show any significant influence, stock ownership showed a significant negative influence on the growth of executive compensation.
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