Rejection of thought by some behaviorists needlessly excludes valuable data from the realm of empirical inquiry. Their position is justified by arbitrarily defining thought as a special class of data not amenable to scientific study. It is argued that thought should be treated like other data and that the reliability of such data can be evaluated. Reasonable standards of reliability, which are used in other psychological areas, can be adopted.
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