In order to determine whether, and under what circumstances, adults would imitate their opponents in a competitive game situation when no feedback was given to either player, the effects of experimentally manipulating the riskiness of the opponent's strategy and the experience of S were examined. Both high- and low-risk opponents were imitated relative to a control group, but Ss' experience decreased imitation only when the opponent displayed high risk. Ironically, Ss pitted against a low-risk player evaluated their opponent more favorably and played less well themselves than did Ss in the high-risk opponent or control groups.
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