Learning from Hamlet: The Case for a National Safety and Health Board

Our criteria for including disasters in this discussion was based upon information availability. We emphasized disasters for which Congressional hearings and OSHA investigation reports were available over disasters for which such information had either never been produced or was missing. Among the tragedies that have disappeared almost without a trace from federal records was the 1979 Horizon Stadium collapse in Illinois. In that disaster, a huge stadium collapsed during final completion killing five workers. The disaster garnered $62,730 in OSHA fines. In response to our Freedom of Information Act request, the agency said it could find no files on this event. This example of OSHA's negligent maintenance of key information reflects the federal government's weak commitment to preventing repeating disasters.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, US Department of Labor, The Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex Explosion and Fire: A Report to the President, at 21–22 (April, 1990).

Adequacy of OSHA Protections for Chemical Workers: Before the Employment and Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1990). Statement of Gerald F. Scannell, Asst. Sec. of Labor, OSHA, US Dept. of Labor.

Public Hearing on Proposed Standard on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Vol IX: Before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, US Department of Labor, Houston, Texas, at 2422 (February 27, 1991). Statement of Robert Wages, Vice President, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers.

55 FR 9150 (1990).

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549; 104 STAT 2565.

S. Rep. 101–228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. No. 1OD, at 3612 (1991).

Public Law 101–549; 104 Stat. 2565(6) (c) (ii).

Public Law 101–549; 104 Stat. 2565(6)(1).

S. Rep. 101–228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. No. 10D, at 3613-3614 (1991).

Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992: Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (February, 1991).

National Transportation Safety Board, “National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations Involving Commuter Air Lines and Carriers from 1980 to Present” (1992). Available from NTSB, Washington, DC.

Because aviation accidents are most likely to occur during take-offs and landings, commuter flights having frequent stops between relatively short distances generally provide the most sensitive barometer for accident trends.

National Transportation Safety Board, “NEWS, Table 4” Accidents, Fatalities and Rates, US Air Carriers Operating Under 14 CFR 135, All Scheduled Service (Commuter Air Carriers) 1979–1980.

National Transportation Safety Board, “NEWS, Table 6: Accidents, Fatalities and Rates, US General Aviation 1980–1990” (Jan. 17, 1991).

Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for FY 1992: Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 9 (February, 1991).

The Governor's Building Construction Advisory Committee, State of Connecticut, Oversight and Safety on Construction Sites, at 8 (Jan. 15, 1988).

CONN. GEN STAT Section 2–58 (1988).

55 FR 42306 (1990).

55 FR 42325 (1990)-.

Meeting Notes of the Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health (Nov. 4, 1987). Available in OSHA Standards and the L'Ambiance Plaza Connecticut. Building Collapse Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (April 26, 1988).

A Staff Report on the Oversight of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration with Respect to Grain Elevator Fires and Explosions Before the Subcomm. on Health and Safety Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.2 (1980).

1) National Materials Advisory Board, National Academy of Sciences. “The Investigation of Grain Elevator Explosions” (1980) NMAB 367–1 (hereinafter cited as “The Investigation of Grain Elevator Explosions”). 2)National Materials Advisory Board, National Academy of Sciences. “Pneumatic Dust Control in Grain Elevators: Guidelines for Design Operation and Maintenance,” (1982) NMAB 367–2 (hereinafter cited as “Pneumatic Dust Control in Grain Elevators: Guidelines for Design Operation and Maintenance”). 3) National Materials Advisory Board, National Academy of Sciences. “Guidelines for the Investigation of Grain Dust Explosions” (1983) NMAB 367–2 (hereinafter cited as “Guidelines for the Investigation of Grain Dust Explosions”).

“The Investigation of Grain Elevator Explosions,” supra note 23, at 1.

“Guidelines for the Investigation of Grain Dust Explosions,” supra note 23, at 2.

“The Investigation of Grain Elevator Explosions,” supra note 23, at 1–4.

US General Accounting Office. Grain Dust Explosions — An Unsolved Problem. Report to Congress, US Gov't Print. Off., March 21, 1979. HRD-79-1 at v.

Prevention of Grain Elevator and Mill Explosions, supra note 23, at 130.

Id, at 131.

29 CFR 1910.272(i)(ii).

52 FR 49611.

Statistics available from the Federal Grain Inspection Service, US Dept. of Labor.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, US Dept. of Labor, Grain Handling, at 1 (1991) Reprint.

“The Australian bulk grain-handling industry has had relatively few dust explosions compared to experience in the United States and elsewhere. I consider that the primary reason for this is that facility hygiene is vastly superior in Australia.” Letter from E. Woodly, Managing Director, NSW Grain Corporation to Lily Whiteman (January, 1991).

Public Law 91–173; 83 Stat. Section 302.

Public Law 91–173; 83 Stat. Section 303.

Public Law 95–164; 91 Stat. 2190 Section 303(y).

Public Law 91–173; as amended by Public Law 95–164, Section 101(9) (c).

Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. A Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984 Oranaeville. Utah (Comm. Print 1988) at 15 (hereinafter cited as Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984).

Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984, supra note 39, at 16.

Id, at 12.

Id, at 7–12.

MSHA Task Force on Longwall Mining, Mine Safety and Health Administration. “Two-Entry Longwall Mining Systems: A Technical Evaluation.” (June 12, 1985) at 3.

“Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984,” supra note 39, at 3.

53 FR 2382 (1988).

Two-entry mines are relatively cheap and fast because they require less time-consuming, profit-eating preliminary excavation before operations commence than do conventional mines.

MSHA initiated a policy in 1980, upon United States General Accounting Office (GAO) recommendations, to conduct investigations of multiple-fatality accidents from the national office instead of from local offices that are in charge of regular inspections. This division of labor, designed to maintain objectivity, ensured that accidents were not investigated by the same inspectors who had conducted pre-disaster surveys. But without explanation, the national office stopped investigating major disasters in 1986. Oversight of the Mine Safety and Health Administration: Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 159 (March 11 and 12, 1987) Testimony of Herschel Potter.

Oversight of the Mine Safety and Health Administration: Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 159 (March 11 and 12, 1987) Testimony of Herschel Potter.