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Abstract

Contracting for retirement village residence is viewed as a conflict game. The administration amortizes its mortgage through substantial entrance fees and meets operating expenses through monthly maintenance charges. Administration “bets” on a stable death rate producing adequate turnover. Residents bet on living long enough to realize a good investment, but short enough to allow funds for monthly charges. Both parties require estimates of life-expectancy; and parties are seen in conflict. Departures from strict rationality are assessed from documents, observational, and interview data. The conflict stemming from “bad bets” is assessed historically in terms of “moves” by administration and residents. Applicability of the game framework for the understanding of broader theoretical issues in gerontology is explored, giving particular emphasis to social-psychological causes of non-rationality.

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Game-Analyzable Dilemmas in a Retirement Village: A Case Study

Abstract

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