Abstract
This paper examines the underlying factors that contributed to the marginalization of radiation hormesis in the early and middle decades of the 20th century. The most critical factor affecting the demise of radiation hormesis was a lack of agreement over how to define the concept of hormesis and quantitatively describe its dose-response features. If radiation hormesis had been defined as a modest overcompensation to a disruption in homeostasis as would have been consistent with the prevailing notion in the area of chemical hormesis, this would have provided the theoretical and practical means to blunt subsequent legitimate criticism of this hypothesis. A second critical factor undermining the radiation hormesis hypothesis was the generally total lack of recognition by radiation scientists of the concept of chemical hormesis which was markedly more advanced, substantiated and generalized than in the radiation domain. The third factor was that major scientific criticism of low dose stimulatory responses was galvanized at the time that the National Research Council (NRC) was organizing a national research agenda on radiation and the hormetic hypothesis was generally excluded from the future planned research opportunities. Furthermore, the criticisms of the leading scientists of the 1930s which undermined the concept of radiation hormesis were limited in scope and highly flawed and then perpetuated over the decades by other ‘prestigious’ experts who appeared to simply accept the earlier reports. This setting was then linked to a growing fear of radiation as a cause of birth defects, mutation and cancer, factors all reinforced by later concerns over the atomic bomb. Strongly supportive findings on hormetic effects in the 1940s by Soviet scientists were either generally not available to US scientists or disregarded as part of the Cold War mindset without adequate analysis. Finally, a massive, but poorly designed, US Department of Agriculture experiment in the late 1940s to assess the capacity for low dose plant stimulation by radionuclides failed to support the hormetic hypothesis thereby markedly lessening enthusiasm for research and funding in this area. Thus, the combination of a failed understanding of the hormetic hypothesis and its linkage with a strong chemical hormesis database, flawed analyses by prestigious scientists at the critical stage of scientific research development, reinforced by a Cold War mentality led to marginalization of an hypothesis (i.e., radiation hormesis) that had substantial scientific foundations and generalizability.