Contraceptives for Victims of Rape and for the Mentally Disabled: A Reply to Stephen Napier *

Abstract

In this paper I argue for the following claims. First, contraceptive acts are intrinsically wrong, and not merely always wrong within the marital context. Second, in consequence, the defense of the administration of contraceptives in case of rape must be understood under the rubric of the principle of double effect. Third, the existence or threat of rape is therefore not a sufficient condition for the permissible administration of contraceptives; the intention must be upright. Fourth, in the case as described by Stephen Napier, the intention with which contraceptives would be administered is almost certainly contraceptive; thus this administration would be an instance of an intrinsically evil act. Recognition of why this is so is the key to understanding why, despite a prima facie agreement, as noted by Napier, between his own position and that of Germain Grisez, there is nevertheless a rather deep disagreement. I articulate that disagreement, and indicate why I believe the question has not been fully resolved by Napier's essay.

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References

However, as I argue below, it seems to me that these acts which Napier characterizes as defensive are in at least some cases contraceptive in the strict sense.

This translation is from John C. Ford, S.J., and Grisez

Germain

, “Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium,” Theological Studies 39 (1978): 278, quoting from Corpus iuris canonici, ed. A.L. Richter and A. Friedberg, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 794. See the discussion of Si aliquis in John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. chs. 5 and 6.

See Noonan, Contraception: A History, 6.

Contraception: A History, 159.

Contraception: A History, 221.

Pope Paul VI, Humanae vitae (1968), n. 14. The translation is from the Vatican website: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals. However, the Vatican translation has “sexual intercourse” for coniugale commercium, rather than “conjugal intercourse.” As I suggest in the text, it is possible to read “conjugal intercourse” as meaning, in essence, “sexual intercourse.”

Pope Paul VI, Humanae vitae (1968), n. 13.

Noonan, makes clear that the link between contraception and abortion is recurring in the tradition. See, e.g., Noonan , Contraception: A History, 88–91.

10.

See Grisez

Germain

“Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life: Toward a Clearer Understanding,”

Thomist 52 (1988): 365–426.

11.

This is why, I believe, he appears to hold that if the Church were to teach the intrinsic evil of contraception she could not also teach the permissibility of using contraceptives in case of rape. See, for example, his discussion of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Quaecumque sterilizatio: Responses on Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals in Napier, “Contraception for the Mentally Disabled,” 306 note 31 above, a plain reading of which he believes is inconsistent with U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: USCCB, 2001), dir. 36.

12.

Napier denies this, holding that administering a sterilizing agent to another is not a contraceptive act. I believe the dictator example in the text reveals this to be mistaken.

13.

Grisez “Every Marital Act,” 369–370.

14.

The Si aliquis canon suggests contracepting as an end in its reference to hatred, and contracepting as a means in its reference to the satisfaction of sexual desire.

15.

As noted in Paul VI, Humanae vitae, n. 15, where emphasis is precisely on absence of the intention to impede procreation.

16.

Anderson

Robert

“What Is Right about the Contralife Argument Against Contraception?”

Linacre Quarterly 77 (2010): 74, original emphasis.

17.

Thanks to Germain Grisez for making this point.

18.

Grisez

Germain

The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 3, Difficult Moral Questions (Quincy IL: Franciscan Press, 1997), 252.

19.

The Way of the Lord Jesus., 253.

20.

The Way of the Lord Jesus., 255.

21.

And I thank Napier for making this point in a personal correspondence.

22.

Napier and I agree that the provision of abortifacients is not a permissible option here; the risk that some contraceptives will on occasion act in an abortifacient manner raises additional ethical and practical issues that I do not address here.

23.

Here I follow Grisez in distinguishing two possible wrongs: “[D]oing a tubal ligation on a woman who is retarded would be wrong if those responsible for her care neglect any of their duties with regard to her sexual activity. Moreover, if they allow sexual activity and seek only to prevent conception, a tubal ligation would be an instance of sterilization, and therefore contralife and an intentional mutilation.” Grisez, Difficult Moral Questions, 252, emphasis added. Comments by Napier have helped me see more clearly the distinction here.

24.

This is Napier's position.

25.

There are additional considerations, raised by Grisez, concerning the need for Catholic institutions to give appropriate witness and avoid giving scandal that I have not addressed here.