Non-ethnography and its discontents: Singular being,context,and the limits of extraction

Abstract

This article explores Albert Piette's idea of non-ethnography, which suggests that anthropology should shift its focus from relying on ethnography and assumptions of social relationality to concentrating on human existence as a unique entity – a volume of being. By situating this idea within sociological debates on individuality, structure, and analytical scale, the article investigates the epistemological implications of Piette's concept of ‘extraction’ in response to critiques about reductionism and decontextualization. Engaging with phenomenology and the tradition of interpretive sociology, this article argues that attempts to completely separate individuals from social relations encounter significant epistemological challenges, as human existence inevitably occurs within structured social contexts. Analysing works focused on individual lives shows that relationality does not necessarily obscure singularity; instead, it can be a condition that makes it analytically visible. Rather than being viewed as a strict disciplinary alternative, non-ethnography is proposed as a complementary analytical approach that temporarily sets aside structural explanations to enhance individual descriptions before reflexively reintegrating them into relational analysis. In this way, the article positions non-ethnography as a theoretical provocation, encouraging the social sciences to reconsider their foundational assumptions regarding the relationship between individuals and social structures.

Piette (2025) presents a thought-provoking article that introduces a bold epistemological shift: he contends that anthropology should detach itself from ethnography and, consequently, from social relationality, to focus on examining human existence as an individual entity – a volume of beings. This concept of ‘non-ethnography’ is deliberately designed to establish a clear distinction between anthropology and sociology by identifying a unique subject of study: the individual isolated from their social connections. This article aims to engage with and expand upon Piette's argument through three objectives: first, to place the idea of non-ethnography within both classical and modern discussions on individuality, relationality, and the scale of analysis in the social sciences; second, to assess the epistemological soundness of the ‘extraction’ claim in the context of critiques regarding reductionism and decontextualization; and third, to suggest interpreting non-ethnography not as the opposite of ethnography, but as a complementary analytical approach that can enhance anthropological discourse.

Relational trap and the promise of extraction

Piette argues that ethnography, whether in the traditional forms of Malinowski and Mauss or in the more modern reflexive and intersubjective approaches, still functions through the logic of accumulation. This involves continuously adding context, relationships, institutions, and social meanings to descriptions, which can sometimes obscure the individual who actually experiences these elements (Mauss, 2009; Malinowski, 2014). This critique aligns with Ingold's (2014) appeal to avoid reducing ethnography to simple cultural documentation and echoes concerns within symbolic interactionism about the tendency to hide individual actors behind social categories (Blumer, 1986). In the literature, this tendency is also described as a form of discursive ‘colonization’, where the effects of social labels are often assumed without being questioned, leading to ‘thin descriptions’ that fail to fully capture the richness of lived experiences (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2013). Scholars in these sources emphasise that identity and sameness are often created as mere ‘optical effects’ through researchers’ boundary work, while ontologically, human existence is a unique singularity rooted in a specific spatiotemporal position that no one else can occupy (Roth, 2006).

In this context, Piette positions non-ethnography as an ontological critique of what he perceives as the methodological merging of anthropology and sociology, emphasising being, substance, and continuity as central to anthropological knowledge (Coxon, 2009). This perspective implicitly questions Marx's famous assertion that the essence of humanity is found in the ‘ensemble of social relations’ (Wartofsky, 1982), while also distancing itself from modern relational theories that view individuals as products of networks, practices, and situations (de Castro, 2015; Strathern, 2018). Piette's idea of detaching the individual from their social networks aims to avoid the concept of the ‘over-socialised actor’ – an actor whose actions are entirely dictated by social structures – who, in total institutions, is often forced to become a ‘microcosm of the body politic’ through strict disciplinary embodiment (Jaffe, 1995). Piette thus encourages researchers to consider what might be missed when social explanations are pursued hastily, resonating with the call in the sources to understand the Other as an equivalent system of meaning rather than just an object of categorisation (Jia, 2024). This necessitates practices of ‘de-programming’, a retreat from excessive cultural immersion to prevent the risk of ‘going native’, which can obliterate the critical ability to see individuals beyond their structural roles (Jaffe, 1995; Jia, 2024). By disrupting the operational consensus or ‘Pfefferdigm’ which tends to perpetuate collective assumptions, non-ethnography provides a means to recognise forms of human existence that are often overlooked in dominant relational analyses (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2013).

The discontents of extraction: A critical engagement

Although Piette's notion of radical extraction is intriguing, it presents notable challenges in terms of epistemology and methodology. The idea that one can perceive a ‘volume of being’ independently, without any connections, requires thorough examination. From a phenomenological standpoint, the concept of ‘extraction’ poses ontological issues. In Being and Time, Heidegger (2024) famously contended that the core mode of human existence (Dasein) is being-in-the-world. This implies not merely existing within a neutral space but being inherently intertwined with the world – interacting with others (being-with), objects, situations, and temporal projects. People do not exist as separate ‘volumes’ that are subsequently placed into contexts; rather, they are shaped by and through these relationships and contexts. Trying to ‘extract’ an individual is like attempting to comprehend a wave without considering the ocean: the wave is defined by its connection to the surrounding water, the wind, and the shoreline's contour. By disregarding these connections, one does not achieve a ‘pure’ wave; instead, one loses the wave's essence. Merleau-Ponty (1982) further highlighted that perception is always mediated by a body engaged with the world, indicating that the subject is always intentionality that cannot be isolated.

Second, when compared with ethnographic studies centred on individuals, it becomes evident that context does not necessarily obscure existence, contrary to Piette's assumption. Context often makes individuality more understandable. The deeply personal portrayals in Crapanzano's (1980) ethnographic work on Tuhami, a Moroccan man, Biehl's (2013) account of Katia, an individual facing social neglect, and Pandian and Mariappan's (2014) study of Ayya as a distinct subject, demonstrate how individuality is emphasised through its interaction with social, institutional, and historical contexts. In Biehl's study, Katia's distinct suffering is incomprehensible without considering the specific ‘zones of social abandonment’ that influence it. Relationality does not diminish the essence of being; rather, it offers the analytical contrast necessary for recognition. Thus, non-ethnography risks substituting one form of reductionism (social) with another (ontological) if it views extraction as a complete detachment from the context.

Third, there is an inherent methodological issue. Even in Piette's proposed method of film shadowing, the observer's presence, recording device (camera), and descriptive language itself create minimal relational conditions that cannot be removed (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007). The observer is not merely a neutral shadow; it is part of the observational context and subtly influences its dynamics. Therefore, claiming entirely non-relational observation is a methodological fiction that risks creating an illusion of objectivity while concealing the researcher's inevitably involved position.

From antithesis to analytical moment: Re-reading non-ethnography

In light of these ‘discontents’, it would be unwise to completely dismiss non-ethnography. The main advantage of Piette's proposal is its ability to provoke thoughts and serve as a heuristic tool. When viewed not as a complete separation from or replacement of ethnography, but rather as a temporary methodological exercise, non-ethnography provides a valuable way to curb the tendency for overly swift explanations based on structure and relationships. In this context, non-ethnography resonates with Abbott's (2004) suggestion to decelerate conceptualisation and aligns with radical description methods that delay generalisation for the sake of empirical accuracy.

Instead of substituting ethnography, non-ethnography can be seen as a distinct analytical phase within qualitative research, a period of temporary withdrawal that enables researchers to concentrate entirely on the continuity of individual existence. This is a conscious phenomenological practice of bracketing, where judgments about social context are momentarily set aside to focus on how a ‘volume of being’ is expressed in movement, stillness, mood, and action. Following this phase of detailed description, the vividly portrayed ‘volume’ can then be reintegrated into a wider relational analysis.

This method creates opportunities for fruitful dialogue between Piette's existential anthropology and the tradition of interpretive sociology without enforcing strict epistemological divisions. This allows us to explore questions such as: How does an internalised habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) appear in the specific bodily movements of a person on a Tuesday morning? How is universal existential suffering shaped by specific state policies? By analytically distinguishing moments of individual focus from those of social reintegration, we can achieve a balance between attentiveness to individuality and understanding of structural influences.

Conclusion: A heuristic for the future of anthropology

This article contends that Piette's (2025) main contribution is not about the practicality of achieving an anthropology ‘without ethnography’, but rather in his ability to prompt the social sciences to reconsider their fundamental beliefs about what is being observed when humans are studied as subjects of knowledge. In this context, non-ethnography serves as an invitation to decelerate observation, enhance description, and reassess relational assumptions, which have long been implicitly accepted in the social sciences.

While Piette's proposal may be epistemologically flawed if taken literally, it serves as a heuristic, a tool for thought that encourages us to view things differently. This urges us to avoid simplistic explanations and to consistently question: But who is this person? What is occurring to them, within them, at this moment? The future challenge for anthropology is not to choose between ‘volume’ or ‘relation’, but to find new ways to understand both simultaneously, in a productive and dialectical tension. Non-ethnography is not a new discipline. Instead, we need improved ethnography – an ethnography enriched by non-ethnographic insights: an existential ethnography that can capture the essence of individual lives while acknowledging that this essence exists within a broader social context that provides it with meaning, form, and limitations. The conversation initiated by Piette is extremely valuable, and advancing it in this manner leads to more enriched and humane anthropology.