Decarbonization, or the replacement of fossil fuels by renewables or ‘cleaner’ forms of energy, is an essential response to global warming. A gap in the debate on decarbonization is its implications for fragile fossil fuel-producing states (FFFPs). Unable to implement strategies for planned decarbonization, FFFPs face the prospect of rapid, unmanaged ‘traumatic’ decarbonization. This paper examines the political economy of this phenomenon drawing on six countries that have experienced dramatic losses in carbon revenues in the recent past: Ecuador, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan and Venezuela. It also draws on two thematic papers – on peace-making during oil shocks and a review of the literature on energy transition in fragile states. The paper finds that in decarbonizing FFFPs, the rules of the political game tend to be ‘sticky’ and elites react to the loss of oil revenues by looking for alternate sources of rent and turning to coercion. Political settlements including peace agreements are structured around the allocation of oil rents to elites and their future viability is in question. We find only modest evidence for sustainable and democratic paths away from a carbon-based political settlement, despite the efforts of civic movements.
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