Abstract
As a theoretical framework in organization studies, institutional logics is immensely popular. It has been used in a large amount of highly contributory and enlightening empirical studies, and developed far beyond its original formulation in a classical paper by Friedland and Alford (1991). In our paper, we identify three key theoretical problems that have emerged in the development and use of institutional logics theory in the past three decades: the lack of uniformity and coherence in the definitions and empirical identifications of logics; the tendency of institutional logics theorists to attempt to build grand theory to connect micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis; and the difficulties to explain how institutional logics are reproduced and how institutional logics interrelate and evolve over time. To address these issues, we highlight the similarities between institutional logics theory and classical functionalist differentiation theory, drawing its legacy from Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton, and propose its use as a resource in further theoretical development. The aim of the paper is not to reject institutional logics theory, or merely to point out its weaknesses, but to demonstrate how a revival of some classics in sociological theory can be used to sharpen institutional logics as an analytical tool and thus assist in efforts to further improve the usefulness of institutional logics as a theoretical framework in organization studies.
Keywords
Introduction
In organization studies, the concept of institutional logics has become increasingly popular. Launched into prominence by Friedland and Alford (1991), it has subsequently been developed and used as a theory in its own right. Its popularity has grown remarkably in the past decades: A simple search in Google Scholar gives over 4,300 hits for “institutional logics” in 2020, compared to less than 800 in 2010, and less than 150 in 2000. Similarly, in the Web of Science, the search term “institutional logics” in Topic (which includes titles, abstracts, and keywords) yields 288 entries in 2020 compared to 23 in 2010 and merely 2 in 2000.
Institutional logics was put forward as an attempt to “bring society back in” to institutional analysis (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Mutch, 2018). It was developed as a critique of neoinstitutional organization theory (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which had contributed to a shift of attention from individual decision making and rationality to institutionalized structures and patterns of behavior, and a crowning of the latter as the main causes of social processes and phenomena. However, institutional logics theorists argued, this development had not clearly enough related institutionalized organizational phenomena to broader societal issues. Institutional logics theory has subsequently aimed to do just that. By acknowledging society as comprising different overarching institutional logics or orders (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), such as “bureaucracy,” “market,” “religion,” and “family,” it developed a view of how organizational phenomena reflect, reproduce, and transform such structures. Recent contributions to the theory of institutional logics remain in this tradition, but have also developed the theory to enable contrasting of different logics with each other in order to highlight complementary and competing norm systems and patterns that can give rise to conflict within organizations and in society as a whole (Thornton et al., 2012). Common to all the contributions, from Friedland and Alford’s (1991) original essay and to today, is the fundamental acknowledgment that “[r]ather than viewing society as monolithic, they describe it in terms of a variety of institutional orders, each with its own institutional logic” (Ocasio et al., 2017, p. 512).
Undoubtedly, institutional logics theory has reinvigorated the field of institutional theory in organization studies, not least through an impressive range of empirical studies. However, this popularity has also brought a series of theoretical concerns. In this paper, we draw attention to three such concerns in contemporary institutional logics theorizing: (1) the problem of empirically identifying institutional logics; (2) the tendency towards overly complex theoretical superstructures; and (3) the problem of understanding the reproduction of, and interrelations between, institutional logics.
We address these issues in an attempt at further theorizing with the help of functionalist differentiation theory, drawing its legacy from the sociology of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton, among others. This might seem surprising, as institutional logics theorists have often explicitly marked a distance to functionalism. Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 240) explicitly aimed to develop “a nonfunctionalist conception of society,” and Thornton and colleagues (2012, p. 170) argued that their conceptual work “significantly departs from the Parsonian legacy.” Lounsbury and Wang (2020, p. 3) claimed that the research program of institutional logics is characterized by “hostility towards . . . functionalist approaches,” and they also subscribe to such a view. However, as we will argue below, functionalist differentiation theory has more than a surface resemblance to institutional logics theory, and insights from this tradition may aid in addressing the theoretical conundrums we identify. Our objective is not a full-fledged theoretical integration, since this would require a far more extensive effort of achieving compatibility of the two theory frameworks, but to point at the potential of a more general conceptual inspiration, which in turn does not require compatibility—only a reasonable degree of resemblance.
In the following, we will first introduce institutional logics theory and in more detail identify the three problems in theorizing mentioned. Then, as many readers may be unfamiliar with functionalist differentiation theory, we will briefly introduce this tradition and its main theoretical ideas, together with a comparison to institutional logics theory. From this, we engage in a more in-depth discussion of how functionalist differentiation theory can help inform studies based on institutional logics, focusing on the three problems identified. In the final section of the paper, we present an overall argument for exploring the relationships between institutional logics and functionalist differentiation theory in greater detail.
We already at this point want to emphasize that while critical, the article should not be read as a one-sided critique or refutation of institutional logics theory. Quite to the contrary, our key purpose is to argue that functionalist differentiation theory can aid in sharpening the institutional logics lens and thereby increase the usefulness of institutional logics theory. In the discussion, we demonstrate how this can be done by using specific conceptual tools from functionalist differentiation theory to develop some central elements of institutional logics. As just mentioned, this does not amount to theoretical integration; such an effort is beyond the scope of this paper. Our ambition is more limited. The main contribution is to show the value of key ideas in functionalist differentiation theory and open up for further discussions on how these can be used by institutionalists of all flavors to (re)discover classics in sociology, and thereby also bring functionalist classics (back) into conversations on contemporary topics in management and organization studies. This paper should thus be seen as a starting point for a conversation, not a conclusive statement.
Institutional Logics
The term institutional logics dates back at least to Alford and Friedland’s (1985) Powers of Theory and Jackall’s (1988) Moral Mazes. Alford and Friedland contrast the “three institutional logics” of capitalism, bureaucracy, and democracy that coexist in the state and that secure “accumulation, rationalization, and participation” but also have partially contradictory relationships (Alford & Friedland, 1985, pp. 11, 389). In the publication often seen as the starting point for institutional logics theory, Friedland and Alford (1991) launch the idea of society as an “interinstitutional system” with a number of central institutions such as the capitalist market economy, the bureaucratic state, democracy, family, and religion. A key argument in Friedland and Alford’s article was that (neo-)institutional theory needed to reconnect to societal phenomena—in other words, making an effort of “bringing society back in.”
The original conceptualization of “institutional logics” by Friedland and Alford (1991) is consistent with the central tenet of neo-institutional organization theory that rationality is a myth (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and the social-constructivist interpretation of institutions as created by interaction patterns (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In later applications of the theory, the interest has been turned towards to using institutional logics as a tool to acknowledge and analyse conflicts between differing goals and tensions between different logics (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017; Lounsbury, Steele, Wang, & Toubiana, 2021). This shift does not mean that the two foci are necessarily mutually exclusive, as they still rely on an ontological realist position (Ocasio et al., 2017). Rather, it is a shift in what empirical phenomena researchers have sought to approach. Yet the shift in focus accentuates the three problems in institutional logics theory we have identified, in particular concerning the way in which logics are approached empirically. Early contributions include Thornton and Ocasio (1999) and Thornton (2004), where institutional logics are used to demonstrate a drift from editorial to market focus in the higher education publishing industry, thus highlighting contrast between competing logics in a transforming industry. A similar example is Battilana and Dorado (2010) who showed how the development of non-profit microfinance institutions in Bolivia forced organizations to reconcile between the logics of banking and social development, and subsequently the emergence of a new “commercial microfinance logic”. Pache and Santos (2013) showed how different belief systems—social welfare logic and commercial logic, respectively—in work integration social enterprises were reconciled by “selective coupling,” that is, by cherry-picking elements from different logics. Commonly these field-level studies highlight complex and contradictory institutional logics (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). It should also be noted, however, that different logics need not necessarily be understood as inherently conflicting (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). For example, Kodeih and Greenwood (2014, p. 31) showed how French business schools embodied different identities simultaneously, thereby reconciling conflicting demands without “severing their initial identities.” As several commentators have noted, there are multiple ways in which such tensions may be construed and what the outcome of conflicts might amount to, such as the dominance of one logic over others, or different forms of hybridity (Alvehus, 2018, 2022; Greenwood et al., 2011; Jancsary, Meyer, Höllerer, & Barberio, 2017; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). Institutional logics theory has here opened up avenues for understanding how complex institutional environments give rise to tensions in organizations, and the diverse ways in which such tensions are constructed, resolved, and balanced by organizations.
Institutional logics have also been drawn on in order to advance a more detailed understanding on an actors’ level. Here, institutional logics are often seen as something actors draw on in order to make sense of their circumstances, and logics also serve as a basis for action and as a justification of action. In a close-up study of reinsurance traders, Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, and Spee (2015) showed how these traders managed competing logics by separating, but not entirely compartmentalizing, them. Bévort and Suddaby (2016, p. 35) in a study of accountants argued that “individuals were highly reflexive and somewhat creative in interpreting the pressures for institutional change,” thereby actively constructing the relationship between professional and managerial logic. In a similar vein, Alvehus (2018) illustrated how lawyers in tax consulting were able to simultaneously replicate, revise, and reject the logic of human resource management and thereby retain the dominance of professional logic. Within health care, Andersson and Liff (2018) noted that physicians co-opt terminology from a managerial logic to advance their own interests, and Levay and Waks (2009, p. 523) identified the phenomenon of “soft autonomy,” highlighting how “professional autonomy . . . is mitigated by continuous external monitoring but still leaves considerable freedom for professionals.” In a study of talk in drug courts, McPherson and Sauder (2013) use institutional logics to show how actors in negotiations draw their arguments from different sources in order to advance their position. In all these studies, and many more like them, there has been much emphasis on agency and the way in which individuals and groups actively construct how institutional logics interrelate and impact organizations, thus problematizing deterministic views of how institutional logics impact organizations, as for example with deskilling and deprofessionalization arguments within the sociology of the professions (Alvehus, 2022). More generally, Furnari (2020) argues for a view on institutional logics as anchored in concrete social situations, subject to framing activities by different actors, thereby advocating a micro-oriented view of the foundation of institutional logics.
As noted above, the overarching motive for Friedland and Alford (1991) when launching the concept of institutional logics was to establish a way of “bringing society back in” to institutional analysis. To the extent that institutional logics has facilitated analysis of conflicting values and practices—logics—in organizational analysis, this has been successful. However, the plethora of locally defined logics also opens up the question of how to understand the connection between these local-level logics and the field level, and ultimately society (cf. Meyer, Jancsary, & Höllerer, 2021). Thus, while “remarkably well founded in understanding the relationships and frictions between different logics,” institutional logics theory has been “less concerned with the social consequences of these logics, beyond managerial and organizational processes” (Johansen & Waldorff, 2017, p. 52).
The idea of analysing conflicting interests on different levels of analysis has spawned a rich body of empirical work, of which we can only do justice to a fragment in this paper. It has also led to a vast number of institutional logics identified. Commonly appearing logics are bureaucratic/managerial, professional, and commercial/market logics, but we also find editorial, state bureaucracy, new public management, banking, medical, social welfare, community, criminal punishment—to name only a few (see Table 1). Clearly, the notion of institutional logics has become an important vehicle for empirical investigations, contributing with a way of drawing attention to local circumstances and varieties. But this has also led to a situation where it is difficult to more precisely see how different logics in different studies interrelate, what precisely qualifies as a “logic,” and it is not always easy to see why institutional logics would be a more informing theoretical concept than for example institutions, practices, socio-cognitive schemas, and similar. As Blomgren and Waks (2015, p. 81) argue, institutional logics “presents an integrated analytical tool that is applicable on all societal levels (society, field, organization, group, and individual)” and whereas this can be generative, it may also cause some confusion.
Varieties of definitions and logics in the literature.
Three Problems in Institutional Logics Theorizing
The term “institutional logics” is evocative, and it has proved to be empirically fruitful, and we find a wide range of phenomena brought under this umbrella. This, in turn, may cause institutional logics to become a catch-all term and thus, similar to “institution,” losing some of its empirical and analytical relevance by becoming too vague (cf. Alvesson & Spicer, 2019). In the following, we will point to three key problems in contemporary institutional logics theorizing. We start by discussing the problem of identifying institutional logics empirically. This in turn highlights problems in theoretical conceptualizations, which open for the next issue, the tendency towards complex theoretical superstructures that, paradoxically, seem to be of limited use in empirical research. The third problem regards the difficulty of understanding the reproduction of and interrelations between different institutional logics, despite the elaborate theoretical systems that have been suggested, and we here discuss current research on hybridity and the problems encountered within this field.
Empirically identifying logics
Looking at definitions of institutional logics, they broadly fall into two categories. First, studies oriented more towards a field-level analysis seem to characterize logics as recurring patterns of action, meaning, and interests. In such approaches, logics are phenomena in their own right, existing independently of actors’ or researchers’ knowledge of them. This was the approach taken by Ocasio and colleagues (2017, p. 511), who claim that institutional logics “exist independently of researcher’s analysis of them” and Friedland (2014), who similarly understood logics as “grounded in unobservable substances” (p. 245) that “center each institutional domain” (p. 246).
The second main type of studies characterize logics as tools that social actors draw on in order to make sense of situations and that in turn facilitate action (Lounsbury et al., 2021). This directly relates to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) conceptualization: institutional logics are “available to individuals and organizations as bases for action” (p. 253), and also shares similarities with Jackall’s (1988) early use. Studies then focus on how institutional logics are mobilized to interpret, enact, balance, translate (and so on) social reality. This does not have to be contradictory to the first approach (see for instance the definition of Ocasio et al., 2017, in Table 1), yet it clearly shifts focus from the overarching patterns towards a distinct actor orientation in analysis.
The question of how logics are identified empirically remains somewhat ambiguous. Reay and Jones (2016) illustrate the extensive variety in terms of both theoretical assumptions and empirical objects of study, and it is quite clear that the variety of approaches gathered under the institutional logics umbrella is vast and diverging. It is, for example, difficult to see what the argumentation analysis of McPherson and Sauder (2013) has in common with the minute analysis of everyday work and actions in Smets and colleagues (2015), other than the term “institutional logic,” and in turn what these studies share with field-level approaches highlighting changes in the publishing or banking industry (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Thornton, 2004).
Logics are sometimes inductively identified (see for example Jancsary et al., 2017; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015), what Reay and Jones (2016) refers to as a “pattern inducing” approach. But pattern-inducing approaches encounter difficulties as they often end up using the patterns identified as explanations for their very existence. For example, studies can focus on how institutional logics are mobilized in processes of translation, balancing, or enactment (e.g., Bévort & Suddaby, 2016; Currie & Spyridonidis, 2015; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015). But, if a logic is defined as a recurring pattern, it is difficult to argue that the very same logic (its translation or enactment) causes this pattern. If such studies would only claim to observe recurring patterns, this would not be problematic, but as they often seek to explain the recurrence of patterns by the existence of logics, the endeavor becomes theoretically complicated; it borders on tautology (Alvehus, 2022; Meyer et al., 2021).
Even when there are no such attempts at explanation, ambiguities arise regarding the identification of institutional logics. Studies that claim to identify recurring patterns of action often do so by drawing heavily on already established ideas. This is apparent in the many versions of professional logic represented in the literature. Sometimes, authors differentiate between different professional logics, such as Fincham and Forbes’ (2015) differentiation between the logics of care and medicine but, most of the time, professionalism remains professionalism, unspecified. The different versions of bureaucratic logics, such as new public management, managerial, or human resource management (see Table 1) present a similar case. They bear some resemblance, but the particularities will likely differ. The vagueness here risks creating superficial similarities between different patterns by labeling them the same, without more clearly specifying their similarities and differences. Granularity is therefore evident in the different empirical studies, which often embrace nuance and detail, yet when labeling logics, much of this granularity disappears.
There is thus great variety in what different authors mean by “logics” and how the term is studied empirically. This illustrates what Johansen and Waldorff (2017, p. 51) identified as a need for a deeper theoretical discussion of “what the unique properties of the ‘logics’ construct are.” Put in simple terms, what is it that is logical about a logic?
Increasing theoretical complexity: Institutional logics as metatheory
The problem of a tautology-like situation when explaining recurrence has of course not gone unnoticed (see, e.g., Alvehus, 2022; Meyer et al., 2021). One way of dealing with the problem is to explicate how institutional logics operate on different levels, and how these levels interrelate. Of particular significance in this regard is the efforts to develop institutional logics into a metatheoretical framework for understanding society by Thornton and colleagues (see, in particular, Thornton et al., 2012). This is the most extensive and ambitious project of its kind to date within the institutional logics field, and it has particular relevance as it explicates many aspects of institutional logics theorizing, relevant for the discussion at hand. To a large extent, Thornton and colleagues’ volume has, with its to date over 4000 citations on Google Scholar, become a cornerstone for institutional logics theorizing, as it outlines the metatheoretical framework of institutional logics and explicates “connections to other theories to explain the sources and consequences of logics” (Lounsbury & Wang, 2020, p. 9). In empirical studies, the work of Thornton and colleagues is often used as a source of legitimation for drawing on institutional logics theory, and the book therefore serves as a key reference point for discussions of the constitution of institutional logics theorizing.
According to Thornton and Ocasio (2008, p. 99) “the institutional logics approach” is “both a metatheory and a method of analysis.” Thus, they present institutional logics as an approach that incorporates structure, symbols, and normativity, and that accounts for both individual and organizational behavior under the guidance or coercive force of logics in a variety of contexts. The ambition is also for “institutional logics” to be a tool for analysis of contrast and contradiction between the logics of different societal sectors that may have influence over the same processes or situations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 104, 109). The consolidated volume titled The Institutional Logics Perspective (Thornton et al., 2012) reinforces the message. Note, first, that the book title bears the prefix “The,” not “An”—this indicates that there exists a singular perspective of institutional logics, which the book outlines. The purpose of the framework is to establish a “metatheoretical framework for analyzing the interrelationships among institutions, individuals, and organizations in social systems” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). The “interinstitutional system” (inspired by Friedland & Alford, 1991) is launched as a “typology” of conceptual descriptions of logics and their elements, consisting of “ideal types” of institutional logics, or with the system possibly itself, as a whole, functioning as an “ideal type” (Thornton et al., 2012, pp. 14, 16, 50).
In creating this approach, Thornton and colleagues aim to connect individual sense-making efforts and enactment, through notions of vocabularies of practice, frames, narratives, decision making, resource flows, identity, and so forth, to field-level institutional logics. The theoretical machinery they construct is impressive and all-encompassing, resembling similar efforts from Parsons (1952), Giddens (1984), and Luhmann (2012). Yet, the theoretical apparatus is simultaneously complex and intricate, and it is hard to see how it could be employed in empirical analysis. The kind of critique Mills (1959) leveled against grand theorizing comes to mind: “a seemingly arbitrary and certainly endless elaboration of distinctions, which neither enlarge our understanding nor make our experience more sensible” (p. 33). Thus, while the efforts at establishing institutional logics as a metatheory are theoretically impressive, the empirical usefulness of these is more limited. We have yet to see this entire machinery in operation.
We want to emphasize that Thornton and colleagues are not alone in making efforts of detailing the intricacies of micro–meso–macro connections in institutional (logics) theory. Similar efforts have been made in developments such as institutional analysis of situations, and inhabited institutions theory (Furnari, 2020; Hallett & Hawbaker, 2021; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) have started to address the problem of how activities “ratchet upwards” (Powell & Colyvas 2008, p. 278) and reproduce macro-structures (Alvehus et al., 2019). As of yet, however, the efforts to connect micro, meso, and macro remains unclear and they do not explicitly problematize system-upholding activities nor divergent behavior. The way in which the institutional logics framework actually delivers in tying levels of analysis together is confusing: critics have noted that institutional logics theorizing does not pay enough attention to the micro level (Zilber, 2013) and also that it is too focused on individual meaning-making (Meyer et al., 2021). There is, in other words, a need for theoretical development pertaining to both the question of identifying logics, on how logics’ different levels interrelate, and of individual agency in relation to logics—but the question is whether that development benefits from developing elaborate and complex theoretical systems.
Understanding the reproduction of, and interrelations between, logics
Partly connected to the problem of connecting levels of analysis is the question of how and why institutional logics, if defined as patterns of interaction, remain. As noted by Lounsbury et al (2021, p. 267), when “taking stock of the literature, it is surprising that more research has not focused on how logics, as complex phenomena, cohere and endure.” This question should, by any means, be key for the very notion of an institutional logic and for the identification of institutional logics as empirically existing phenomena.
One sub-field of theorizing that has addressed this more explicitly is that of hybridity, where institutional logics are featured as tools to acknowledge and analyse conflicts between differing interests within so-called hybrid organizations. In their influential essay, Friedland and Alford (1991) conduct a preliminary analysis of those institutions that they have identified as “central” in current Western society, pointing out that the institutional logic of capitalism is to accumulate value, the institutional logic of the state is to rationalize and regulate human action through legislation and bureaucracy, the institutional logic of democracy is to broaden participation in decision making, and the institutional logic of the family is to breed solidarity and loyalty. Coexistence of different institutional orders in society can give rise to tension and conflict in specific situations, write Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 255).
Such tension and conflict have been observed, not least in organizations operating in conflicting institutional environments (Greenwood et al., 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009). The issue has long been discussed in the area of professional organizations, and in particular those in the sectors of the welfare sector subject to competition, where logics of professionalism, bureaucracy, and market meet (Alvehus & Andersson, 2018). The outcome of such conflicts is not given. Some observers assume that they will inevitably lead to professionalism becoming subsumed to logics of bureaucracy and market. For example, Bejerot and Hasselbladh (2011) saw bureaucracy as slowly encroaching on professional work for medical doctors, and Evetts (2011) argued that professionalism is becoming redefined and more closely tied to management. Other observers have argued for a situation where professionalism and management peacefully coexist (Mintzberg, 1979) and where professionals seek the legitimacy brought by bureaucratic arrangements (Kirkpatrick & Noordegraaf, 2015). Others have argued that hybridity is maintained through loose couplings, where the different logics only occasionally come into conflict and where they are managed by employees on a day-to-day basis (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Smets et al., 2015). It might also be that organizations over time change in terms of how the differing logics relate (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013).
Yet, if institutional logics are patterns of action, as is often argued in these studies, the question arises as to what hybridity actually is. It is, clearly, something more than mere goal conflict, a condition long recognized in organization studies. If hybridity means different recurring patterns of action and/or meaning, different logics should comprise different patterns, and a hybrid pattern should encompass at least two such patterns. But when does such a hybrid pattern end being a hybrid, and start becoming a new pattern? For example, Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, and Brown (1996) identified the “managerial professional business” as a new form of organization—they used the term archetype—that was increasingly replacing the traditional partnership form in professional industries. Such forms are still, we would argue, considered hybrids, a quarter of a century later. But when does a hybrid become a new logic? Do logics disappear? Or how do they remain? Most studies of hybridity imply changes going on in the institutional logics, yet the very same logics seem to stay intact in the sense that they can still be identified as distinct patterns of action and/or meaning. This should be a key question as it concerns the foundation for talking about institutional logics as separate entities at all.
These problems are not primarily empirical ones. In fact, to the extent that institutional logics is seen as a vehicle for empirical inquiry, the theory itself has proven itself as it has spawned many interesting and insightful empirical studies. Yet, the diverse ways in which the concept has been theorized has led to a situation where the notion of institutional logics seem to be almost too useful. In many instances, institutional logics theorizing falls prey to the same criticism that has been leveled against institutional theory in general: “It is also difficult to agree what an institution is not—because institutions have become everything” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2019, p. 205). In the following, we will present some ideas from functionalist differentiation theory that we propose can be of help in refining institutional logics—in order to make it not a more complex theory, but a sharper analytical tool.
Addressing Problems in Institutional Logics: A functionalist differentiation view
We will in the following first briefly introduce some key elements in functionalist differentiation theory. This is necessary as this is a theoretical tradition that has lost much of its traction and is largely marginalized in contemporary social science, let alone in organization studies. Much of the critique that has been leveled against functionalist theory is relevant, yet here we want to draw attention to some elements of these theories we find useful and productive in this particular context. After this, we address the three problem areas identified above, in turn (see Table 2).
Problems in institutional logics and functionalist contributions.
Functionalist differentiation theory: A short introduction
Functionalist differentiation theory has roots in early economic theory of division of labor and its role in economic and social development on micro and macro levels (Ricardo, 1817/2004; Smith, 1776/2012), and an early sociological conceptualization of society as a set of differentiated yet interconnected and organically developing subsystems (e.g., Durkheim, 1893/1969; Simmel, 1890/2015;Spencer, 1862/2015). Twentieth-century functionalism was developed into an elaborate theoretical framework by followers of Max Weber, and Weber provided it with its theoretical fundament: In a short essay between sections 2 and 3 in his Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion (Weber, 1920, pp. 536–73), Weber described society as composed of six “value spheres,” internally consistent and mutually differentiated. The “value spheres” did not amount to a comprehensive sociological theory, but instead an ideal-type tool for identifying and describing value spheres and their Eigengesetzlichkeit (“internal and lawful autonomy” in Gerth and Mills’ translation; Weber, 1946/2009).
The six spheres in Weber’s enumeration were the economic, political, esthetic, erotic, intellectual, and religious, but he gave no motivation for this particular choice. Weber scholars have therefore, after some debate (e.g., Brubaker, 1984; Oakes, 2003; Schroeder, 1992; Swedberg & Agevall, 2016) concluded that a final classification of spheres, a specific number of spheres, or any ultimate and universal definition of the essence of particular spheres, make little sense (see syntheses of this discussion in Terpe, 2020; and Hallonsten, 2021). In other words, and as also explained by Weber himself in the original essay, the concept of value spheres must be understood ideal-typically, much like Weber’s other ideas and concepts. Ideal types aim for “the highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue of their complete adequacy on the level of meaning,” and moreover, “it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types” (Weber, 1922/1978, p. 20). Value spheres are, in other words, abstract constructs that can assist social scientists in bringing order to complex and contradictory empirical material.
Functionalists and neo-functionalists have argued that the concept of value spheres with Eigengesetzlichkeit should be viewed as one of Weber’s most important contributions to sociology (Scaff, 1989), because they can “yield a unified meaning” to his works and thus also provide functionalist differentiation theory with a common frame of reference and a conceptual basis (Münch, 1988, pp. 208–11). The ideal-type concept of Eigengesetzlichkeit means, among other things, that value spheres can both appear irrational from each other’s points of view, which puts the spheres in “irreconcilable tension” with each other (Weber, 1946/2009, p. 351), and that the spheres coexist in society and constantly “cross and interpenetrate” (Weber, 1949, p. 18).
Weber’s works strongly inspired functionalism, although in different ways. Talcott Parsons, who studied Weber’s works extensively, built on them in his attempts to construct an integrated and grand unified theory of society. Parsons’ grand ambitions compelled him to develop an elaborate conceptual apparatus that could explain both cohesion and organic development in spite of differentiation, which was a key concept in his view of modernity. Therefore, the famous AGIL scheme, that assigned modern society’s four crucial functions of Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, and Latent pattern maintenance to the economic, political, community, and social-cultural systems (Parsons & Smelser, 1956, pp. 46ff.), had to account for both disparity and integration, and a combination of these major forces in the development of society. Richard Münch, who made a monumental effort of reinterpreting and reinvigorating the works of Parsons in the latter half of the twentieth century, demonstrated that interpenetration is just as important as differentiation in Parsonian sociology (Münch, 1981, 1982, 1988). The emergence and development of modern society can, in a fundamental sense, be explained by differentiation of functions, value systems, and spheres, as shown by prominent sociologists (Habermas, 1984; Schluchter, 1985; Weber, 1946/2009). But differentiation itself makes spheres and value systems grow increasingly irrational from each other’s point of view, and would therefore lead to decomposition and fragmentation unless another process counters it, and so other conceptual tools are necessary in order to explain how differentiated spheres influence each other, and how they co-produce development and achieve unity and order in society. Interpenetration, writes Münch (1987, p. 67), is a process where “a system has such an influence on the environment, and the environment such an influence on the system, that the two transform each other at the margin, without mutually changing their central cores.” As shown by Parsons and Münch, interpenetration is what allows unity through variation, and order through functional differentiation. Parsons also developed and adapted his AGIL scheme in later works and demonstrated that it can be applied not only to society as a whole but also to lower levels of analysis, which means that adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance can also be identified within specific institutions and spheres, and that interpenetration similarly is a flexible concept that can be applied on many different levels and as a common (ideal-type) concept for many empirically distinct processes (Münch, 1988; Parsons & Smelser, 1956), perhaps even to describe the process that gives rise to hybridity in organizational contexts.
Though Parsons worked actively to bring Weber’s legacy into American sociology and continue in the same tradition, the kinship is in many ways greater between Weber and Robert Merton, the second major functionalist figurehead. Merton shared with Weber a fundamental suspicion towards rationalist explanations of societal order, and both of them actively sought to explain the unexpected complexities in social interaction, preferably from a historical approach. Moreover, Merton’s key approach to theorizing, namely the postulation that theories should be “of the middle range,” is very similar to Weber’s ideal types, in that it allows social scientists to focus on enhancing the explanatory value of their studies of specific social structures or phenomena, without attempting to build generally valid theories of society as a whole. Theories of the middle range “lie between the minor but necessary working hypothesis that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory,” and are used “to guide empirical inquiry” (Merton, 1949/1968, p. 39).
With this approach, Merton contributed to the widening of the explanatory power of functionalism, by explicating how institutions and their functions are reproduced. Building on Parsons, Merton distinguished between the latent and manifest functions of institutions, and he also closely studied the normative structures of institutions, and how deviance from norms contributes to the reproduction of institutions and their functions (Merton, 1949/1968). As theories of the middle range, these Mertonian contributions to functionalism added depth and detail to the concept of Eigengesetzlichkeit, and led functionalism away from the static or a priori identification of a specific set of spheres necessary for society to maintain, and towards the use of functionalist differentiation theory as a flexible tool for studying the role and function of particular spheres (or institutions, as Merton preferred to call them) on various levels of analysis.
Later functionalists and neo-functionalists built on this and made both theoretical and empirical advancements (e.g., Alexander, 1985; Alexander & Colomy, 1990; Münch, 1987, 1988), but after the introduction of other competing theory schools in sociology and social science (of which neo-instituitional theory is one), functionalism lost much of its momentum and has largely fallen into oblivion.
With this short exposition we want to illustrate that there is more than a surface resemblance between functional differentiation theory and institutional logics theory. A very general reading shows that both theories divide society into a distinct yet not necessarily limited number of spheres or orders, and address their interrelation, in a way that other theories of society do not. But similarities go deeper, which we will demonstrate in the following. The acknowledgment of this resemblance, we argue, is a formidable basis for opening up a conversation between the two theoretical traditions. Despite the explicit (and in no instance elaborated) refutation of functionalism by key theorists of institutional logics, there are a number of key ideas from functionalist differentiation theory that can help us explicate key assumptions in institutional logics theory. That this has not previously been done, and that theorists of institutional logics have marginalized functionalist differentiation theory in their works, could perhaps be interpreted as a case of “obliteration by incorporation” (Merton, 1949/1968, p. 35), that is, that a body of (theoretical) knowledge reaches a level of influence and maturity that leads scholars to take it for granted and even forget its origins and the substance of its original tenets. As Davis (1959) argued some sixty years ago, functionalism had been the dominating theory school in sociology in the first half of the twentieth century, and although it was both complemented and refuted by later alternative approaches from the 1960s onward, the dominating role it had had before must have left deep marks. Perhaps it can be concluded that the dismissal of functionalism thereafter remained on the level of a “ritual” (Münch, 1988, pp. 217–18) simply because it was unable to undo or abolish its substantial contributions to the foundations of social theory.
In the following, some ideas that have become widespread in the social sciences, such as ideal types and theories of the middle range, help us create a new way of theorizing based on institutional logics. Other concepts from functionalism, such as interpenetration and Eigengesetzlichkeit, are less commonly recognized, yet they help us address key problems that are specific to institutional logics theory. This resemblance is thus deeper than recognizing a number of spheres or orders. It also concerns key ideas in how the independence of spheres or orders is theorized, how they can be identified empirically, and how they interrelate. Concepts from functionalist differentiation theory here helps us identify, explicate, and to some extent resolve or redefine some of the problems we find in institutional logics theory (see Table 2). We do not argue that the theories are fully compatible, nor do we aim to integrate them. Instead, we turn to the three problems we have identified in institutional logics theory, and discuss how functional differentiation theory can help us approach these in new ways.
Logic and Eigengesetzlichkeit: Towards an ideal-type approach
As we have shown, the question of what an institutional logic is has received very different answers in the literature. Moreover, there appears to be great granularity of different institutional logics in empirical analysis, yet the way in which these detailed accounts relate to overarching logics is unclear. This becomes a problem, especially if the idea with institutional logics theory, as launched by Friedland and Alford (1991), is to bring society back into institutional analysis. The parallel critiques of institutional logics being too micro and not micro enough mirrors this ambiguity (Meyer et al., 2021; Zilber, 2013). As we pointed out above, these conceptual concerns also present problems when identifying institutional logics empirically and can even cause problems in terms of tautological reasoning.
Some authors have argued for a very different approach, drawing on Weber’s notion of ideal types, which contrasts sharply with institutional logics defined as aggregate patterns of action, as tools that actors use, or for that matter with understandings of ideal types as being “average” or “descriptive” types (Reed in Adams et al., 2020; Alvehus, 2022). It is the internal coherency—logic—that makes an ideal type valuable as it allows for approaching empirical phenomena and making sense of them and how they hang together; their Eigengesetzlichkeit.
The term “logic” is in itself evocative and draws attention not only to regularities but to something in these regularities that makes sense—they are logical. With an ideal-type approach, “logics” are not understood as empirically existing phenomena but as analytical tools. A classic example is Weber’s (1922/1978) analysis of bureaucracy. While inspired by what Weber observed in society, the ideal type is basically an experiment of thought. If we conceive of an organization based entirely on the form of legitimate domination called legal authority, what would it look like? In the field of institutional logics, a key proponent of this approach is Freidson (2001), who argues that studies of logics should start from a fixed model that “allows one to engage in systematic reasoning from its conditions to the varying circumstances of the real world and it can be grasped sufficiently well to be reasoned from” (p. 3). Freidson’s (2001) logics are founded on the answer to the question of who decides over work processes in terms of design, output, and quality. Freidson argues that the three logics of market (consumer choice), bureaucracy (managerial control), and profession (worker autonomy) constitute three mutually exclusive logics. Used as an ideal type, the term institutional logics becomes a powerful sensitizing concept (Blumer, 1954, p. 7) that “suggests directions along which to look” while at the same time being open to empirical nuances. An ideal type cannot be anything but a sensitizing concept, as it by its nature does not represent empirical phenomena directly and by its nature it never aims to capture an empirical phenomenon in its entirety. Such approaches also provide a point of comparison between different cases, and over time. If we want to claim that professions are moving from traditional to connective forms, an ideal type of professionalism would help us identify in exactly which aspects the empirical phenomenon of professionalism have or have not changed (see Noordegraaf, 2020, and the exchange in Adams, Clegg, Eyal, Reed, & Saks, 2020; Alvehus, Avnoon, & Oliver, 2021; and Noordegraaf & Brock, 2021).
Discussions of institutional logics have suggested different definitions anchored in different empirical phenomena, from “unobservable substances” (Friedland, 2014, p. 245) to pattern regularities and to actors’ tools—generally, an ontological realist approach (e.g., Ocasio et al., 2017). The ideal-type approach we advocate suggests that institutional logics is not an ontological category but an epistemological device. The specific use of ideal types in functionalist theorizing—we think here mainly of Weber’s use—also brings meaning to the term “logic” in institutional logics theory. The idea with ideal types, in this particular sense, is not to represent “average” or “commonly occurring” phenomena, but to formulate theoretical constructs with internal logical coherency. Thus, the ideal-type approach is also a key element in working from the idea of Eigengesetzlichkeit—internal and lawful autonomy or, for short, logic.
Abstract ideal types help us identify and discuss significant and interesting empirical phenomena but they make no claim to exist independently of any observer. This does not mean that they have no implications, of course. As noted by Freidson (2001, p. 2) they are in a sense “pipe dreams” yet such dreams underpin and legitimize policy choices. Therefore, using ideal types to understand their empirical instantiations has great value for the practically inclined, as it allows for identifying local idiosyncrasies and contextual conditions that will inevitably be part of any policy endeavor.
Using theories of the middle range to counter grand theorizing
As we argued above, the institutional logics perspective appears to develop towards something like a grand unified theory, ironically the same kind of theorizing that is generally attributed to Parsons and sometimes vigorously criticized by institutional logics proponents (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury & Wang, 2020; Thornton et al., 2012). There are signs that some authors have the ambition to make the “institutional logics perspective” into a comprehensive framework for understanding contemporary society, incorporating and explaining culture, organizations, institutions, individuals, cognition, and the interplay of these in the continuous shaping of social reality. Thornton and colleagues (2012, p. 55) argue that their theory is “disciplinary agnostic” (see also Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 103–104), which is no problem in and of itself, but the critique leveled by for example Mills (1959) against Parsons could just as well be leveled against Thornton and colleagues (2012). It aims to resolve the structure–agency problem in the social sciences by spanning different levels of analysis, from individual actors’ cognition and actions to institutional orders and to incorporate symbolic and material aspects of society (Zilber, 2013). The problem, however, is that this creates a complex theoretical framework with a large number of interrelated terms, ill-suited as a tool for concrete empirical analysis—and as noted earlier, the entire framework is of marginal presence in empirical work. Moreover, it may have “the same exhilarating challenge and the same small promise” (Merton, 1949/1968, p. 45) that so many similar grand theoretical efforts have had.
Evidently, the call for theoretical coherency has not had much impact on empirical studies drawing on institutional logics. As argued above, the institutional logics literature encompasses a broad range of empirically interesting and theoretically relevant studies, which in most cases have little to do with any grand theoretical superstructure. We might ask, then, what purpose does this superstructure serve? Arguably, a grand theoretical superstructure risks creating an impression of theoretical coherence. When inviting empirical work drawing from vastly different kinds of studies, the theoretical superstructure gives a common point of reference, but a vague such point. When “logic” can have many different meanings, the superstructure seems to make the studies about the same phenomenon—logics—whereas in practice studies may range from overarching institutional arrangements to micro-level interaction and argumentation analysis. In this regard, a theoretical superstructure may in fact undermine theoretical development by discouraging more precise characterizations of what an “institutional logic” is, in a particular instance, and thereby open it to the “everything can be an institutional logic” critique.
Granovetter (2017), in a discussion of the concept of institution, underscored that detailed definitional work should be left to those who study institutions empirically, to be accomplished separately in every instance. This is very close to Merton’s theories of the middle range, and we argue that this is exactly what has been going on in practice in many empirical research efforts in the area of institutional logics. Less sweeping and more midrange definitions of institutional logics are conducive to theoretical precision and open it to empirical curiosity. Thus used, institutional logic (possibly with an emphasis on the latter half of the term) allows for empirical studies without the weight of a massive theoretical superstructure, and without attempts to grasp everything from actors’ talk to structural patterns on the societal level. Midrange theories of institutional logics, limited in reach by design, could help delineate different uses of “institutional logics” from each other and prevent the creation of a false sense of theoretical coherency. Of course, Merton’s notion of midrange theorizing has wider applications and has certainly proven useful as an approach to theorizing far beyond the functionalist tradition, but it is still functionalist in origin: As already noted, sociology was nearly synonymous with functionalism in the first half of the twentieth century, and therefore both ideal types and theories of the middle range were developed as part of functionalist sociology. In addition, the notion of theories of the middle range built strongly on the Weberian concept of ideal types and was also a necessary development of the theoretical foundations for functionalism that enabled it to account for social change and social dynamics and thus renew itself so as to remain relevant and useful. Put differently, with his instruction to sociologists to engage in theorizing of the middle range, Merton revived the Weberian ideal type and adapted it to mid-twentieth-century sociological theorizing demands. This arguably makes it into one of functionalism’s key contributions to social science.
Latent pattern maintenance and interpenetration
Ideal types do, in and of themselves, not depend on empirical instances for their existence. However, an ideal-type institutional logic will likely lose much of its analytical relevance if we can no longer see traces of it in our data. Society is undergoing constant change and so the real puzzle in connection with institutional patterns is rather how they remain coherent over time, in the face of changes. Institutional logics would benefit from a way of explaining why they are reproduced and why they persist (Lounsbury et al., 2021). Following this question, it also becomes possible to address issues of change and hybridity.
A key element in functionalist differentiation theory is that society’s different spheres are independent yet interdependent. Thus, a fundamental tenet is to understand how their Eigengesetzlichkeit, “internal and lawful autonomy,” is maintained. We addressed this above, as a key element in the concept of ideal type in functionalist differentiation theory, and how this also aids in analysis of change and stability. Note that Weber’s brief descriptions of the Eigengesetzlichkeit of his value spheres—most notably the economic, political, religious, and intellectual ones (Weber, 1946/2009, pp. 331ff)—and Friedland and Alford’s outlining of the basic characteristics of the institutional logics of “the most important institutional orders of contemporary Western societies”—capitalism, the state, democracy, religion, and science (Friedland & Alford 1991, p. 248)—are strikingly similar. How can these “value spheres” or “institutional orders” have remained intact over the seventy years that passed between the publication of these two very influential essays, a time that has seen great social transformations of both constructive and destructive kind?
A useful source of inspiration for approaching this matter is Merton’s work on the normative structure of institutions, where he builds on vast empirical analysis to identify norms (and counter-norms) that hold institutions together (Merton, 1949/1968, pp. 185ff, 604ff; Merton, 1976). Moreover, both Parsons and Merton used the notion of latent pattern maintenance to explain the reproduction of social activity, as a function that enables any functionally differentiated subsystems (or spheres, or institutions) to maintain and reproduce stability (Parsons, Bales, & Shils, 1953; Merton, 1949/1968, pp. 73ff).
The use of Merton’s normative structure of institutions to fill Weber’s concept of Eigengesetzlichkeit with content has been explored in recent work (Hallonsten, 2022) and can be instructive also for similar explication of what institutional logics really consist of. Moreover, Alvehus (2022) has suggested that in the context of professionalism, functional ambiguity and opaque transparency are two functions that help differentiate professionalism from other logics and thus preserve its internal and lawful autonomy. The relationships between different institutional logics can in themselves differ and become expressed in various ways, causing different forms of complexity (Raynard, 2016)—the issue is seldom as easy, and the process not as linear, as discussions on for example “deprofessionalization” suggest (Alvehus, 2022).
As Münch (1981, 1982, 1988) showed, interpenetration is required as a key concept in the functionalist analysis of the development of modern society, and can be used to explain how spheres or institutions influence each other and develop organically, thus surviving as “organizing principles” that are “available to organizations and individuals to elaborate” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248) and also as basic points of reference for social scientists.
Interpenetration of for example the bureaucratic state and popular movements of equality, democracy, and liberty can perhaps explain not only how the bureaucratic state has survived and strengthened its role in Western societies with the breakthrough for the capitalist welfare state during the twentieth century, but also the tensions that both remain and show up as new in these Western societies. Interpenetration of professional and bureaucratic logics can perhaps explain not only how for instance universities and hospitals have retained their basic functions in Western society through the dramatic social changes of the twentieth century, but also how they have managed to expand and transform, for good and for bad (depending on viewpoint), and taking into account contentious issues today, such as the impact of globalization and New Public Management (Hood, 1991). Thus, interpenetration is a concept that helps us to address the seeming paradox in studies of hybridity: that institutional logics come into conflict and need to be reconciled, yet are able to maintain their distinct identities. Further work to explore the usefulness of the concept of interpenetration for accomplishing more stringent understanding of what hybridity is, generally and under various specific empirical circumstances, is clearly needed.
Discussion
We have in this paper identified a number of problems inherent in institutional logics theorizing. First, we identified the problem of empirically identifying institutional logics, and the way in which this risks creating tautological explanations and producing images of similarity that lack in empirical substantiation. We suggest drawing on the idea of theoretically coherent ideal types (Eigengesetzlichkeit) in order to move from seeing logics as substances, patterns or tools, to viewing them as theoretical concepts that help us see potentially interesting phenomena. Second, we discussed the problem of creating extensive and complex theoretical superstructures with limited analytical usefulness, and suggested a view of institutional logics as theories of the middle range that enable and encourage empirical curiosity. In this, we acknowledge the usefulness that institutional logics has proven in many empirical investigations, and are therefore able to downplay the problem of theoretical incoherence between various interpretations and uses of institutional logics in the literature, since this is only a real problem in light of influential attempts to create a theoretical superstructure, and not if the ambition instead is midrange theorizing. Third, we identified the problem of how to understand the reproduction of, and interrelations between, logics. To this end, we suggested drawing on the concepts of latent pattern maintenance and interpenetration to enrich the vocabulary of institutional logics theorizing. This, in turn, relies on the use of ideal types as these enable more precise discussions of how patterns change and are sustained over time.
Our suggestion to bring in concepts and ideas from functionalist differentiation theory is thus more than just adapting specific theoretical tools. At a more fundamental level, our approach suggests a shift in the understanding of institutional logics, from seeing them as empirical phenomena (such as patterns, substances or tools) to understanding them as epistemological devices by which we can make sense of patterns of action. The stability of ideal types enables us to ask questions around changes or inertia in patterns of interaction, as they allow us to systematically identify deviances from such patterns. Approaching institutional logics as theories of the middle range allows for empirical flexibility, combined with the theoretical precision of ideal types, and thus justifies the rich use of institutional logics in practice. This also goes hand in hand with a refutation of grand theorizing, something that arguably limits rather than encourages empirical curiosity—we have not been able to identify any empirical studies connecting all the theoretical components of this extensive approach. With a flexible adaptation of conceptual pillars of functionalist differentiation theory, such as Eigengesetzlichkeit, latent pattern maintenance, and interpenetration, all of which are both ideal-type and middle range, the problems of how logics remain yet transform, when and how they merge or stay separate, and what hybridity really means, can be constructively addressed.
At the same time, we acknowledge the rich and significant empirical work that has grown out of the institutional logics tradition. The way in which this has sensitized organization scholars to the complexities of everyday life—the work of Smets and colleagues (2015) stands out as exemplary in this regard—and of broader interaction patterns, truly enriches the field of study. It also helps us in re-discovering ideas from functionalism, often forgotten today. More important, this extensive empirical work encourages functionalism to re-orient to a world that is more complex and more empirically nuanced than what is often conveyed in many readings of functionalist differentiation theory. We here see great potential in revisiting early sociological classics in order to more precisely update them to contemporary society, taking changes in value spheres of institutional orders of the last century into account. The identification of new ideal types based on new forms of Eigengesetzlichkeit may be more apt at explaining contemporary society than those that were identified over a century ago, taking new technologies, new media, and new relations to knowledge and expertise into account (Alvehus, 2022). The classics deserve and need updating, and not only to be put on a pedestal, and in this the rich work of institutional logics scholars has paved a road forward.
Concluding Remarks
In the seminal work of Friedland and Alford (1991), institutional logics was put forward as a challenge to institutional theory, to bring society back in to institutional analysis. As we have argued in this paper, institutional logics has partly lived up to this promise, yet some of the potential of institutional logics theorizing has yet to be released. We have suggested that this can, to some extent, be addressed by turning to classic functionalist differentiation theory. We advocate a reconnecting of institutional logics with functionalist differentiation theory by the active abandonment of grand theorizing, and with the aim instead of making institutional logics into a flexible middle-range theoretical tool, in the spirit of Weber and Merton. This means acknowledging that functionalist differentiation theory actually includes several tools for resolving central problematic issues in the institutional logics perspective. This does not amount to a full-fledged theoretical integration, and we do not mean to suggest that functional differentiation theory can replace institutional logics theory, only that the latter can find inspiration in the former and perhaps should acknowledge their kinship. Furthermore, in this article, we have demonstrated how functionalist theory provides entry points on how to address a number of key problems in the theorizing in institutional logics. Of course, our exposition is sketchy; our ambition in this paper is to open up for a renewed discussion and to indicate ways of moving forward—not to provide an entire research program, nor to provide a conclusive argument to end discussion.
The efforts, nonetheless, have the potential of spurring a development of the institutional logics perspective into a theory of differentiation attuned to the needs of current analysis of organizations and organizational fields, including empirical studies of conflicting and hybrid patterns of behavior in organizations. This way, institutional logics can also enable functionalist differentiation theory to depart from the basic functionalist assumption that institutions or spheres exist because they fulfill a specific and crucial function in society, and instead be used to identify contrast between institutions, as well as the reproduction of dysfunctions and paradoxes. The connection between these theory schools, if acknowledged and explored, allows institutional logics to be a conceptual tool that can be applied to concrete situations and empirical materials, attuned to contemporary society and also making use of the vast theoretical and empirical advances in sociology and organization studies in the past half-century, a treasure unavailable to the original functionalists.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
