Theranos rose to prominence by selling a dream that a company could make blood testing less painful and more effective. The company strove to bring new technology to the laboratory industry that would make Americans healthier. After securing more than $700 million from investors, Theranos would eventually receive, at its height, a $9 billion company valuation. As it turned out, Theranos and its founder, Elizabeth Holmes, had mainly promised innovations predicated on proprietary technology that did not work. Eventually, Holmes, and former company president Ramesh Balwani, would be charged with fraud both by the SEC and the federal government. The Theranos scandal has multiple dimensions that make it an interesting case study for white-collar and corporate crime.
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