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Abstract

This research explores the interplay between extractivism, river pollution, and the proliferation of illegal oil refineries in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Positioned within the framework of the Capitalocene, the study highlights how systemic socio-ecological harm is not merely a by-product of economic activity but a fundamental component of the capitalist systems encouraged locally by power constellations and social dialectics. The paper examines the transformation of the Tanjero River, which became a symbol of ecological disaster, driven by the proliferation of illegal oil refineries and the region's deregulated extractive practices. Through fieldwork conducted in 2021 and 2022, including interviews with environmentalists, governmental officials, and community members, this paper argues that the ecological disaster in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is fundamentally driven by the dynamics of the Capitalocene and extractivism, which find fertile grounds in new frontiers marked by non-governance, fragility of the state and regulatory failures. Recently, however, environmental activists have mobilised to combat pollution and reclaim natural landscapes, highlighting both the destructive impacts of unchecked extractivism and the potential for community-driven resistance and restoration.

Keywords

Water crisis pollution rivers oil refineries environmentalism Capitalocene political ecology

Introduction

Mainstream narratives of climate and environmental catastrophe in the Middle East emphasise water scarcity due to lower precipitation, higher temperatures, and the gradual decline of great rivers of Mesopotamia (Barnes, 2009). Evidence is quoted to show increasing droughts, floods, and sandstorms, while diminishing groundwater levels suggest a bleak scenario for agriculture. Many experts argue that climate change significantly impacts Iraq and other Middle Eastern states, which would lead to ‘water wars’ and climate-induced migration (World Bank, 2022; WHO and UNFCCC, 2022; IOM Iraq, 2022). However, these narratives often overlook the political economy of the environment, and in particular the systemic socio-ecological harm caused by the region's transformation into a new ‘capitalist frontier’ (Kuruüzüm, 2022). In the Kurdish Region of Iraqi (KRI), we can see how the accumulation practices of the Capitalocene turn large parts of land and waterscapes into socio-ecological ‘sacrifice zones’, areas of dispossession, toxicity and waste, as discussed in detail by Jason W. Moore (2023) and Marco Armiero (2021).

The conversation on the Capitalocene highlights the mechanisms behind the making of ‘wasted people and places’ (Armiero, 2021: 2) and contamination of ecologies at multiple scales. Recent critical literature has focused on the interlinkages of extractivism, pollution, and toxicity as fundamental features of the Capitalocene. It demonstrates how the ‘new age of toxicity’ (Walker, 2011: xi) is embedded in power relations, issues of legitimacy, domination, injustice, driven by the capitalogenic flows (Armiero, 2021; Liboiron et al., 2018; Moore, 2023). As Armiero (2021: 2) argues, the inherent logic of the system involves the co-production of ‘wasted people and places’. The geopolitics of the Capitalocene matters, too. Fragility of the states, deregulation, ‘perpetual state of political transition’ (Kuruüzüm, 2022: 38) foster conditions for petrocapitalism to expand into new regions. The unfolding catastrophe of toxification, pollution and contamination is spatially manifested and ‘reproduced by systems of colonialism, racism, capitalism, patriarchy, and other structures that require land and bodies as sacrifice zones’ (Liboiron et al., 2018: 332).

The case of Kurdish semi-autonomy within the Iraqi borders is significant for understanding the mechanisms of the ecological crisis and the ‘encroachment on fragile ecosystems’ (World Bank, 2017) in the Capitalocene era. Literature on the KRI has underscored the pivotal role of extractivism, particularly oil and gas, in transforming the state, society, and identity (Kuruüzüm, 2022; Lange, 2022; Tinti, 2021). For millions of Kurds aiming at self-rule in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, fossil fuel revenues have been essential in establishing their petro-state. Still, despite Iraq recognising the KRI as an autonomous region in 2005, independence remains contested. Other recurrent issues in relevant scholarship are the complexity of the political field, the duopoly of two rival parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the role of informal power structures and patronage in the economy (Leezenberg, 2006). It has been argued that under such political configurations, the political elites of the landlocked country encourage the ‘petrolisation’ of the state, which brings them wealth and strengthens their authority in society (Tinti, 2021). As in other fossil fuels-rich Middle Eastern countries, oil has not only reshaped the development paradigm, but also restructured political and social relations, strengthening patrimonial ties and hindering democracy (Crystal, 2018: 75; Ross, 2001). Recent literature also underlines the resistance of people to the toxication and to the ‘slow violence’ within the restricting opportunity structures (Nixon, 2013; Wiktor-Mach et al., 2023).

This paper examines the interrelation of unrestricted oil extraction and the severity of water pollution in the KRI, investigating the conditions that facilitate the contamination of socio-ecologies. The study traces and contextualises the development of illegal refineries across KRI, highlighting their role in the deterioration of vulnerable land and waterscapes. Specifically, it explores the degradation of the Tanjero River, which was raised by our interviewees as a prime example of ecological disaster. In many ways, the dire environmental situation in the KRI resembles the developments in other petro-states, such as Venezuela (Coronil, 1997), Nigeria or Ecuador (Arsel et al., 2019; Watts, 1999). Moreover, our research shows how local extractive industries dispossess people of their land to establish refineries, examining the pathways of waste production and disposal from these operations. It analyses the logic behind this dispossession in the context of state-building, economic growth, and capitalogenic flows. It shows how the politics of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) neglects ecological issues, prioritising capital accumulation over human health issues and water crises. Despite the recent boom in illegal refineries causing escalating socio-ecological problems, this phenomenon is under researched.

Reflecting on our insights from the fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan, we engage in the discussion on the Capitalocene, political ecology of oil extractivism and pollution. Capitalogenic flows have often had a gradual impact on fragile landscapes, exacerbating the slow fading of ecosystems. Kali Rubaii (2023: 196) discussed the impacts of such flows on the Mesopotamian rivers: ‘Deregulation, privatisation, and globalisation – these big words were made into politics that invited private corporations to inundate the rivers with trash and sludge, or to mine the rivers, aquifers, and valleys for aggregate, minerals, and anything else’. As we show in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the pollution of the Tanjero River and other land and waterscapes is intrinsically linked with capitalogenic flows, enabled by a combination of historical and contemporary economic and political factors. The ruination of nature and landscapes in KRI can be attributed not only to the low priority of those issues in the context of decades of violence, but primarily to the local development of petro-capitalism and extractivism favoured by the ruling oligarchy in the context of contested Kurdish autonomy and a hope for rapid modernisation. Although the power structures are restricting pro-ecological transformation, we show that even in the unpromising context, people mobilise at the grassroots level to rescue and revitalise rivers polluted with toxic chemicals and waste.

Research informing this paper draws on the fieldwork conducted in various parts of the KRI, particularly in the main urban centres: Erbil (known also as Hewlêr), Sulaymaniyah (Silêmanî) and Duhok. The study included 28 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2021 and 2022 with the representative of the Kurdish environmental movement (experts, young members of environmental groups and NGOs), a person holding governmental position in the Ministry of Health and Environment of Iraq and a former member of the Iraqi parliament. Additionally, researchers took part in many meetings and informal conversations about the environment, politics, health and economy. Media coverages, reports of environmental organisations and other secondary sources were also used.

The next section introduces the theoretical framework, discussing the links between petrocapitalism and the contamination of the environment. Later, a short background on the KRI's oil and gas industry is presented as a context for a subsequent focus on the ecological disaster of one of the most polluted rivers in KRI. Then, the paper analyses the functioning of illegal refineries and the problems of non-governance, statelessness, and lack of monitoring which facilitate the anchoring of the Capitalocene in the region. Subsequently, the grassroots actions taken to address the pollution of the Tanjero River and oil spills are presented. The paper ends with a discussion on extraction, contamination and waste in the Capitalocene.

Extractive petrocapitalism and the contamination of nature

Jason W. Moore (2015, 2017) has directly linked the massive and severe contamination of natural landscapes and the socio-ecological infrastructure of life with the development of the Capitalocene. The concept of Capitalocene sheds light on the key role of capitalism in the global environmental crisis, which stands in contrast to the human-focused Anthropocene approach. From this perspective, sacrifice zones filled with toxicity and deepening precarity of life are inherent components of the capitalism system per se, whose logic is centred on unstoppable profit generation via exploitation and dispossession (Armiero, 2021; Tsing, 2015: 20). Slow violence against nature occurs gradually and out of sight and unfolds over long time spans in a cumulative manner (Nixon, 2013). The destructive encroachment of unrestricted capitalism is visible in particular in its new frontiers, where global capital finds opportunities to develop in less regulated markets where non-governance characterises the field of the environment. In many parts of the resource-rich countries of the global south, extractive unregulated capitalism thrives on dispossession of land and resources of the indigenous communities, causing havoc and leaving behind material destruction and ruination (Gómez-Barris, 2017: vi–vii).

As petrocapitalism (Watts, 2004) – a particular form of capitalism predicated on the extraction, distribution and consumption of hydrocarbons – expands into less regulated political geographies, it drastically changes local socio-ecological conditions. Many contradictions arise in the process of devaluation of human and beyond-human life. Whereas local population and ecologies often experience the most burdens and ruination, the money from the resource extraction goes somewhere else, ensuring ongoing capital accommodation and increasing inequalities (Watts, 2004). The environmental impacts do not end with an extraction project, but last longer (White, 2013) and leave toxins and other pollutants in the ground and water (Nuttall, 2017).

In petrocapitalism, huge financial gains from the ‘magical’ commodities and their development promises turn the state into the ‘landlord’ that establishes their own companies or grants concessions to international corporations to extract fossil fuels on its territory (Coronil, 1997; Huber, 2017). The role of the petrostate in the Capitalocene is thus an active one. State institutions, policies and practices interfere in the capitalogenic flows to some extent, enabling or restricting them, so the agency of the ruling elite should be underlined (Labban, 2008).

The Capitalocene frontier: Iraqi Kurdistan’s extractive regime

While the Middle East is often represented as a post-colonial region prone to conflict, wars and violence, to better understand the ecological collapse and capture its driving forces, it is useful to adopt the lenses of the Capitalocene. Sacrifice zones, filled with toxicity, waste, and leakage, are not just remnants of war and ruined infrastructure in the conflict areas but are also products of the preoccupation with economic profit and industrial expansion embedded in the global petro-capitalism (Kuruüzüm, 2022; Tinti, 2021). Local extractive regimes are part of a wider network and production chains which transcend state borders. Illegal refineries, which are the focus of this paper, increasingly occupy Kurdistan's geography of extractivism. They thrive on the rent-seeking practices of the Capitalocene encouraged by the oligarchic political system and party patronage. Operating in a regulatory grey area, these refineries exploit the lack of proper monitoring and control over the extraction sector, enabling oil spills and ecological harm.

The development of the oil and gas industry in the KRI, actively promoted by the political elites, rapidly transformed the Southern Kurdistan into ‘one of the most coveted energy frontiers worldwide’ (Tinti, 2021: 2). As in the case of Latin American governments, the magic of fossil fuels and its role in the legitimisation of political power led to ‘extractive imperative’ (Arsel et al., 2019). For a de facto state, as the KRI is often termed, the profits from natural resources ensure a relatively high level of independence in relation to Baghdad and international actors. Compared to other parts of Iraq, Kurdistan has gained international recognition as a safe place for foreign investors. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and in particularly after the end of Saddam Hussein's rule in 2003 and the subsequent recognition of KRI's autonomy in the Iraqi constitution, the region has entered its ‘golden decade’ taking advantage of fossil fuels¹. Thanks to the newly acquired resource wealth, the KRG was able to launch ambitious development projects aimed at rebuilding the region and its infrastructure. In 2006, the Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources was established, and after the energy law was enacted a year later, several international companies responded to new opportunities and the potential to profit from a new oil market, signing contracts with the KRG (Hasan, 2019). The petrostate began to flourish under the KDP-PUK duopoly, seeking to raise quick revenues from lucrative fossil fuel-related sectors. The Capitalocene found fertile ground in KRI profiting from the ‘symbiotic relationship between a dynastic political regime and the extractive economy inside the region’ (Tinti, 2021: 7). In other words, it is in the interest of the ruling parties and the fossil fuel companies to limit the scope of environmental monitoring and protection.

Oil is undoubtedly in the centre of the region's political economy linking it to transnational economic dynamics. The KDP and PUK are linked to the oil business through corporations and licences granted to them. According to the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources, the Kurdish region's oil reserves are estimated as 45 billion barrels (KRG, 2023c). KRI produced approximately 400,000 to 450,000 barrels of oil daily, and money from oil exports accounts for more than 80 percent of the KRG budget (Mills, 2023; World Bank, 2022). Besides, Kurdistan has vast reserves not only of oil, but also natural gas which are critical for the economic and political future. It has proven reserves of at least 25 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas and much more – presumably up to 198 Tcf – unproven gas resources (Baram, 2022; Zais et al., 2021), although there are also other estimations. The KRG used to present maps depicting the Kurdish territories as resourceful and open to extraction (Mills, 2016). It is crucial for the realisation of the long-held dream of Kurdistan, as the KRI is the only part of the greater Kurdistan with state structures, governance and international relations (although similar attempts and aspirations are seen in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria). Within this development paradigm, it is the oil and gas, rather than water that constitute the crucial natural resources and the pillars of statehood. Rivers are routinely sacrificed for political and economic goals, in particular for the quick profits generated by the petroleum industry. The lack of adequate guidelines, procedures and monitoring mechanisms as well as the grey sphere in which illegal refineries operate, makes it easier for businesses to treat nature as a cheap, exploitable commodity. Limited and ineffective enforcement of existing environmental regulations has also encouraged the encroachment of petrocapitalism on the Kurdish lands.

Alessandro Tinti (2021) has shown that the governing duopoly of the KDP and PUK adopted a mindset similar to the one of the previous Ba’ath regime. Under this logic, state legitimacy is embedded in oil-dependent growth. As observed in other cases, the extractivist regime is likely to rely on a non-transparent distribution of wealth retrieved from nature (e.g. Arsel et Al., 2019). In KRI, the dream of becoming a new Dubai has not materialised for large parts of the society (Lange, 2022). The system of patronage, which largely outlived the political transformation in KRI (Leezenberg, 2006), leaves many Kurdish citizens beyond the magical touch of the oil wealth and disillusioned about the future. During our fieldwork, people mentioned the long periods when public employees did not get their salaries which led to violent protests. At the same time, the feeling of injustice has grown as privileged groups continued to accumulate capital and invest in the country and abroad.

Fading of the river: The ecological disaster of the Tanjero

Unregulated capitalogenic flows and rapid industrialisation in many places across the world have had devastating impacts on socio-ecologies, including rivers, ecosystems and riverine communities (Nixon, 2013; Walker, 2011; Vos, 2024). In the Kurdish state, similarly, the natural environment has become a victim of the widespread preoccupation with progress, rent-seeking and capital accumulation, enabled by the power constellations and coupled with aspirations to a full independence and international recognition. During our conversations with environmental activists and academics, the Tanjero River was cited as an example of ecological catastrophe due to its heavy pollution. The Tanjaro emerges in the Silêmanî governorate, located northwest of the region's capital city, and flows for 120 km to merge with the Sirwan (Diyala) River. It then continues into the Darbandikhan reservoir and eventually becomes a tributary of the Tigris River, heading in the end to the southern marshlands in Iraq. The Tanjero is formed from the Chaq Chaq, Sarchinar and Qiliasan streams that originate from the Zagros mountains. At the point where the streams converge into Tanjero, the clear mountain water turns into dirty, murky mud (Waterkeepers, 2022a; VIM, 2020). The area used to be home to many birds, and people would visit to fish and swim (Interview 12, male, 30s, environmental activist, Silêmanî, November 2021).

The ecological disaster of the Tanjero ecosystem began in the 1990s and has worsened since. For almost two decades local activists, researchers and communities have raised the problem of pollution of the river and its harmful effects on health, wellbeing and agriculture. Although it is difficult to show a direct correlation between environmental pollution and health, exposure to water-based toxic chemicals and materials cannot be excluded as a significant source of illness. Meanwhile, the river became ‘undrinkable, non-swimmable and unfishable’ (Waterkeepers, 2022a: 2). Research conducted in 2022 by a non-governmental organisation, Waterkeepers Iraq, revealed 245 imminent threats related to economic activities, including energy production or gravel mining.

Pollution and the contamination of the water make it too dangerous to use for consumption. In some parts of Silêmanî water is too dirty to drink:

One of the problems is that you are using this water. In many places I have taken and tested water samples, I saw that drinking water and sewage are mixed, especially in the old neighbourhoods. When you turn on the tap water, it smells or is ugly in colour, but you don't know how much dirt is chemically in it (Interview 4, researcher and environmental activist, Silêmanî, November 2021).

The toxication of the Tanjero has been known to local activists and researchers for a long time. In summer 2008, Nature Iraq, one of the main conservationist organisations in the country, investigated water quality after the incident of death of numerous fish and other animals on the banks of the river. The analysis of water alongside discussions with water experts from Baghdad revealed that behind the ecological disaster stood high concentration of heavy metals, such as copper, lead, zinc and nickel, which were presumably coming from factories located in the upper part of the river. The toxicity of pollutants posed direct danger to people's health through fish consumption (Ararat et al., 2008). Research on the soil pollution with heavy metals in another location, Kasnazan District, has confirmed that oil refineries are a major source of the contamination in KRI (Ahmed and Ismael, 2019).

Kurdish activists and experts identified several sources of Tanjero's pollution. Sewage, waste, and toxicity enter the river mainly from local industries, such as cement plants, refineries, gravel mines, hospitals. Households and individual practices, such as car washing in the river, also add to the problem. Since the 2000s, the industrial area has expanded in the localities close to the river basin, and, in 2019 the majority of companies in the governorate were located there. The water is severely polluted with toxins from oil refineries which discharge their chemical waste directly into the water or when oil spills occur from the local open air dump where solid waste is stored (Rahman et al., 2021; Waterkeepers, 2022a). The industrial waste in particular has been polluting the water directly or indirectly (Tinti, 2019). An expert interviewed in our research argued that some materials used in the production process are ‘below global standards’, implying that they are not controlled in a sufficient way and harmful for the environment. Studies on the Darbandikhan Lake, which is formed from the conjunction of the Tanjero and the Sirwan rivers, confirms the grave conditions of regional waters. The water contains substances such as iron, arsenic, mercury which pose a danger to the ecosystem even in small amounts, as one activist told us. The excessive presence of other heavy metals and other toxic elements has been confirmed by analyses of water samples (Aziz et al., 2012; Ghafur and Abdulrahman, 2023).

Petroleum industries are sources of major and dangerous pollutants in the Tanjero watershed. Oil leaks that occur from time to time from refineries are particularly dangerous as oil mixes with water, contaminating fish and other animals. Toxic water then flows further downstream. When people eat fish from such polluted water they smell the oil in it, as some interviewees admitted. A person holding a high position in the Ministry of Health and Environment stated that in many cases, after oil companies finish exploiting a piece of land or produce oil, they do not clean those sites nor repair the devastation. One of the interlocutors, who is also a researcher in the environmental field, stressed the unethical practices of some factories which are supposed to enlarge their economic benefits, such as turning off the air filters at nights, when fewer people can spot them. In that way they can use expensive filters for a longer period. No effective regulation controls such practices. Refineries are rarely punished for illegal or unethical practices. In the following section, we will take a closer look at the mechanisms behind the functioning of illegal refineries in KRI.

War, capitalogenic flows and the proliferation of illegal refineries

Since the US-led Iraq war of 2003, KRI has been a magnet for local, regional and global extractive businesses which take advantage of the abundance of fossil fuels and conducive political opportunities. Not all the operations of those groups have been completely legal. There are two main legal refineries: Kalak (near Erbil) and Bazian (near Silêmanî) in Kurdistan. There are also smaller, mostly illegal refineries run by local companies throughout the region (Mills, 2016). There is uncertainty about the exact number of illegal refineries in KRI. Media reports estimate their numbers between 130 and 170, but the number might be as high as 200 (Kurdistan24, 2021; Rudaw, 2019; Sangar, 2018). These illegal refineries are part of a larger cluster of more than 1600 refineries in Northern Iraq (Zwijnenburg and Postma, 2017), which shows the scale of artisanal oil-refining economy and also the lack of transparency.

To describe the phenomenon of illegal, artisan refineries we adopt a definition by Onuh et al. (2021: 468): ‘small-scale crude oil processing or subsistent distillation of petroleum that is often outside the boundaries of the state law’. It appears that such refineries in KRI are built mostly on agricultural lands, as a former member of the Iraqi parliament suggested. The interviewee reported that doing so is illegal and he further elaborated:

It is prohibited for agricultural lands to be converted into industrial land unless there is consent by 19 official public bodies (that include various ministries and government agencies). Those agricultural lands were bought from the farmers and their families (Interview 17, a former member of the Iraqi parliament, online, June 2021).

It has been difficult to establish whether and what compensation the owners of agricultural land received in return for their lands to be used in such a way:

Companies operating legal refineries had provided a limited compensation to residents living close to those refineries. Those included employing a member of the families in the refineries as a driver, cleaner or guard=, etc. (Interview 24, civil society activist and researcher, online, January, 2022).

Limited compensation does not seem to apply to illegal refineries. Some interviewees indicated that there are cases when farmers themselves have been using their own lands to operate illegal refineries.

Illegal refineries emerged in the 1990s during a time of conflicts, sanctions and economic crisis. At the time, cheap Iraqi oil was bought to be later refined in the KRI for local use or to be exported (Daragahi and Solomon, 2014). The KRG actively encouraged, or at least tolerated, them due to tensions with the Iraqi government regarding the rights to oil export (Kurdistan24, 2019). In 2013, the KRG started selling its oil directly in international markets, despite protest from the central Iraqi government. This decision by the KRG increased the demand on local oil refineries (both legal and illegal) (Akyener and Kayael, 2016).

Around 2014, illegal refineries attracted international attention following reports about their role in processing cheap Syrian crude oil imported from ISIS-controlled territories. The Financial Times reported at the time that the revenues from such trade financed ISIS in Syria and Iraq (Daragahi and Solomon, 2014). Also, ISIS and other terrorist groups targeted refineries in their wars against the KRI resulting in oil spillage and environmental pollution (van Wilgenburg, 2022).

The ISIS link has apparently intensified efforts by the KRG to attend to the issue of illegal refineries. Prior to 2014, executive orders by the Prime Minister in this regard were largely ignored (Sangar, 2018). In 2015, at the peak of the ISIS crisis, KRG's Ministry of Oil started classifying the refineries into two categories: 164 are marked for closure for not meeting the conditions set by the ministry, and 28 of them were declared legal but still require compliance with the formal conditions (Sangar, 2018). Fines were imposed on illegal refineries that did not comply with regulations. The KRG also decided on a dedicated fund of $168,000 and parcels of land to store the remnant of the facilities after their planned disintegration (Rudaw, 2019).

However, KRG decisions remain largely ignored in practice. According to media reports, the KRG issued orders to close illegal refineries at least three times, but those orders were not implemented (Anwar, 2022). The Minister of Natural Resources confessed in responses to questions by MPs that he was unable to close those refineries (Ekurd Daily, 2015). The minister claimed that although they issued orders to close those refineries, implementing them was in the power of the security forces, who seemed not to enforce these orders. But an interviewee suggested that the failure to close illegal refineries is a manifestation of the KRG being a failed state:

The government also does not have the will to close them. This is not because of the ownership of these refineries and claims that they belong to powerful politicians. This is a statement that is repeated often, but is not very credible and accurate, but it is because the government has failed to develop the refining sector, and therefore there is a need to depend on the [illegal] refineries (Interview 24, civil society activist and researcher, online, January, 2022).

The same interviewee argued that illegal refineries are themselves a symptom of the inability of the Kurdish government to perform its basic functions as a state, such as providing its citizens basic public services, such as electricity or fresh water:

The government has failed to provide national electricity, therefore there are thousands of [private] electricity generators in neighbourhoods (Interview 24, civil society activist and researcher, online, January, 2022).

Electricity crisis is telling a lot about the functioning of the state. There is no 24 h a day electricity service in the KRI. The KRG can only generate 3500 megawatts of electricity, which provides eight hours of electricity (Hama-Aziz, 2021). Since an additional 6000 megawatts must be produced to provide electricity for 24 h, in order to overcome troubles with power cuts the deficit is met by private generators. There are about 6000 large diesel generators in the KRI combusting around 6,300,000 litres of diesel and releasing some 17,000 tons of CO2/day and contributing to high concentration of particulate matter. This process has taken place for over a decade, causing increasing harm to people and the environment (Aziz, 2022).

Most of the electricity generators in Kurdistan are cheap, locally produced machines that do not meet international standards (Wali, 2010). These generators use diesel from local illegal refineries that are of poor quality and questionable composition. They are a major source of pollution, particularly the emission of greenhouse gases including particulate matter, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, oxides of nitrogen or sulphur dioxide. They are also a source of contamination of local waters because of their need to cool down. Some of these generators operate on riverbanks, which directly affects water life (Abbas et al., 2017; Ageed et al., 2021; Hama-Aziz, 2021; Hassan, 2010). The regulation of the functioning of these generators has been limited – they are required to be silent as well as to plant trees to get licence to operate (Hama-Aziz, 2021).

Non-governance, deregulation and the grounding of the Capitalocene

The anchoring of the Capitalocene in the region would be impossible without a favourable political environment and specific forms of economic activities it promotes. We interpret the KRG's approach to the natural environment and illegal refineries as entangled with the politics of ‘non-governance’ which is conduicive to petrobusiness and the actors who benefit from it. Similar case where non-governance and deregulation favours the advancement of the Capitalocene has been described by Kuruüzüm in reference to the steel sector in the KRI. He argues that the lack of labour contracts for some groups of workers, as well as the bonded contracts for others, create the ‘zone of cheap labour’ for the benefit of the stell mills and their partners (2022: 111–128). Apparently, state actors have not yet undertaken necessary measures to tackle the widespread environmental pollution. Such a perspective was present in the narratives of some of the activists we talked to. One of them said that ‘the environment is not part of the system of governance in this country’. We approach non-governance regarding the ecological crisis as an element of a neoliberal system of the Capitalocene, which features the systemic devaluation of soil or hydrological resources. Unchecked market-led extractivism and non-governance of socio-ecological reproduction are some of the tools through which the Capitalocene exacerbates dispossessed ecologies. It dilutes responsibility among institutions, various actors and stakeholders, allowing easier commodification and exploitation of nature (Acara, 2019). Nature is a resource utilised to maximise profit, but also to get rid of consumption products in an easier and cheaper way. In addition to oil export, products from Kurdistan's refineries are used locally, mostly to get fuel for private electricity generators. An interviewed civil society activist and researcher explained the economic rationale as follows:

The need of the region [Kurdistan] for fuel is ever increasing. The small refineries in general produce diesel. This product is used for power stations and electricity generators (in neighbourhoods). In the last few years, several big refineries were built in Kurdistan, but they are not able to cover the internal needs for fuel. Therefore, small refineries have remained as a necessity. (Interview 24, civil society activist and researcher, online, January, 2022.)

In the oil-rich region, paradoxically, the economic necessity for illegal refineries has been on the rise, leading to adverse environmental and health consequences. For example, in response to calls from the public for the closure of illegal refineries, the owners argued that such closure would raise the prices of electricity generated from the products of the refineries, which are used to supply private generators (Rudaw, 2021b).

The KRG has primarily used oil as a source of revenues, but also as a tool in its political arsenal (Alkış, 2022). Senior politicians argued that the KRG's oil sector is key to ensuring the economic and hence the political independence of the region (Wahab, 2014). In other words, the national aspirations for independence have been appropriated to justify the land grab, environmental degradation, water crisis and adverse health effects of extractive activities. The question of legality of the entire oil enterprise of KRI, including illegal refineries, seems insignificant in comparison to the ‘bigger’ aspirations of independence. Similar patterns were observed in previous Kurdish nationalist movements, for example in the 1960s when landowners used nationalism to justify their revolt against land reforms introduced by the post-colonial government of Qasim of 1958 (Degli Esposti, 2022).

When confronted with the environmental and health consequences of the illegal refineries, some owners argued that they had not received any rules or regulation from the authorities to operate within environmental and health standards (Kurdistan24, 2019). Those same owners claimed that they would be happy to adhere to those rules if they are allowed to continue operating despite the higher cost that such rules and regulations would entail.

Non-governance does not mean opposition to environmental protection. Officials interviewed in municipalities and other institutions dealing with the environment stressed their willingness to improve the situation. There has been progress in developing environmental laws and guidelines in KRI, and there is no shortage of laws and regulation when it comes to environmental protection. Environmental issues have been debated by the Kurdistan Parliament since at least 2006, and the first topic was related to water (Abdulrahman, 2020). The KRG has one law, fifteen regulations, and a Board in relation to environmental protection and improvement (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2023a; Law Number 8: Protection and Improvement of Environment, 2008). Furthermore, in 2008 the President of KRG chose April 16^th a Day for the Environment. Even though there are still areas for improvement, a lot of work on the legal aspects of nature protection has been done. Some environmental activists have been engaged in that process and worked with politicians on specific issues related to nature protection. Moreover, there are individuals in the municipal institutions who care about environmental issues and would like to see less pollution. A young activist spoke of his father who was working in the waste management field at the Silêmanî municipality and raised the problem of waste dumping and a lack of proper standards and procedures in handling different kinds of garbage. To learn about good practices and scientific methods, a delegation of local officials went abroad to countries such as Japan, South Korea, Austria and Germany. The compatibility of KRI's environmental laws and regulations with international principles has also been highlighted (Abdulrahman, 2020).

Regarding refineries, however, laws, rules and regulations apply only to three refineries that are legally recognised (KurdsatNews, 2022). Even in this case the constitutionality of the oil operations across KRI has been questioned. Many argue that the KRG has exceeded its constitutional powers through, among other actions, waiving sovereign immunity for international oil companies. In general, the petroleum policy and the content of contracts are not transparent (Hasan, 2019) – an important factor for the regional expansion of capitalogenic flows.

Non-governance also manifests itself in the lack of effective enforcement of existing laws. Environmental activists perceive is as a key issue:

The biggest problem in our country is that environmental laws are not followed. The Kurdistan Parliament and the Iraqi government have passed very good laws. These laws have not been enforced (…). Otherwise, it is the most beautiful and best law that has controlled many aspects of many subjects. There are shortcomings, but in many ways, it has been worked on very well, but the law needs to be enforced (Interview 19, environmental activist, online, August, 2021).

Despite rapid urbanisation, the organisation of the Kurdish society in the KRI remains largely tribal (Kennedy, 2015; van Bruinessen, 1992). Applying the rule of law is particularly challenging in rural areas and villages where illegal refineries are usually located. In these landscapes tribal powers tend to be superior to the state. Non-tribal modern state structures, such as courts, in urban areas are also infiltrated by tribal norms and practices (Shekarchi, 2020). This has made regulating the owners of illegal refineries particularly challenging.

In addition to ignoring laws and regulations, owners of illegal refineries seem to have been able to find loopholes to continue operating their refineries. It appears that many of them originally got permission to operate as other facilities and then were converted into refineries (KurdsatNews, 2022; Kurdistan24, 2022), as our interviewee admitted:

Most of the refineries currently, particularly in Slemany, do not operate under the title of refineries. Rather, they are disguised as storage units. They claim that they are storing fuel. However, they mix the naphta with processing materials and then sell it (Interview 21, a former member of the Iraqi parliament, online, October, 2021).

Many illegal refineries only operate at night as refiners and as fuel storage during the day which makes it difficult for authorities to identify the problem. In some instances, they managed to get official recognition from the authorities:

Some of the legal and formal refineries, such as Lanaz, were illegal in the past but they were further developed and were given a legal status. They did that by legally converting the land they built on to industrial land (from agricultural lands) as well as introducing some advancement in the work and practices of the refineries to meet agreed standards (Interview 21, a former member of the Iraqi parliament, online, October, 2021).

Deregulation and trade liberalisation has facilitated the emergence, proliferation and sustainability of illegal refineries, demonstrating the Capitalocene link between unchecked market-led extractivism and non-governance in the field of ecology. The KRG introduced a new investment law in 2006 (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2023b), which has transformed commerce to largely ‘untaxed and unregulated activity’ (Kuruüzüm, 2022: 30). Deregulation might have helped in attracting foreign investment to the region. However, it resulted in transforming KRI into a landscape where resources are almost free to abuse by petrocapitalism and the support of the political elites which benefit from the fossil fuels’ wealth (Heshmati and Davis, 2007; Kuruüzüm, 2018, 2022). Limited tariffs and regulations on imports enable the entry of equipment needed for establishing illegal refineries. There is little control in this area which enabled buying necessary elements from Iran and Turkey.

Deregulation, however, has resulted in limited state capacity for market inspection and control, as an interviewee put it:

The inspection teams that visit the illegal refineries only test products rather than look into illegal practices or processes. Therefore, they have a limited role in closing or rising concerns about the refineries (Interview 24, civil society activist and researcher, online, January, 2022).

The Capitalocene's systemic degradation of lives and nature unfolds in such a context. Illegal refineries in the KRI are frequently cited in the media, civil society and academic circles as a risk to the environment and human health (Rudaw, 2021a). However, there seem to be no studies specifically investigating the link between oil refineries and the incidence of cancer and other diseases in the KRI. Illegal refineries operate with no adherence to minimum health and safety standards. They produce poor quality fuel with high levels of lead and benzene. According to doctors, these refineries are at least partly responsible for the cancer epidemic. Cancer is currently the second cause of death in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Our sources have reported that on one day in October 2022 alone, more than 1000 suspected cancer patients visited one of the only three public oncology hospitals in the region. Such high cancer rates have been attributed, at least in part, to the supply and waste of fossil fuels. The incidence of cancer has increased dramatically in parallel with industrialisation and economic growth, accompanied by pollution and toxicity. Between 2013 and 2019, cancer rates in the governorates of Erbil and Duhok increased two to three times, with the highest prevalence of lung cancer (M-Amen et al., 2022). Similar rates were found in the province of Sulaymaniyah between 2006 and 2014 (Khoshnaw et al., 2016). In 2022 alone, more than 9000 cases of cancer were diagnosed in the region (Erbil Governorate, 2023). Other studies look at the role of refineries in air pollution and the contamination of soil and groundwater (Al Manmi et al., 2019).

Rivers are also victims of the unrestrained Capitalocene, and the practices of deregulation, non-governance and lack of monitoring. The water used by the companies, households and other institutions ends up in Tanjero, which becomes intoxicated sewage. The water is then used by farmers, affecting food security and people's health. Farmers are often aware of the ‘slow violence’ against soil and water and resulting pollution. People living around Tanjero have reported numerous health problems, which suggests that they are more vulnerable to health risks. Activists monitoring the situation argue that the local population suffers disproportionately from skin and respiratory diseases due to the pollution. Cases of cholera occurring in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah have been linked to the water contamination (Rahman et al., 2021).

Several interviewees expressed concern about the medical waste from public and private hospitals and clinics which is often mixed with the general waste. Much of this solid waste containing contaminated, hazardous substances or medicines, such as expired items, ends up in the city's main dump, polluting the Tanjero riverbanks and the river itself. The problem persists due to lack of monitoring and sanctions. Hospital authorities do not feel enough pressure to change their practices to meet health and environmental requirements.

Activists stress lack of widespread awareness when it comes to protecting nature. Nature Iraq (2011) has also documented the practice of washing cars, including lorries, in the river. Even the nearby sign ‘Washing cars in public places is banned’ does not change much. Generally, the fading of the Tanjero is part of a wider economic process which has been unfolding across the region. As well as people's health and livelihoods, wildlife suffers. An environmentalist, fighting to save the river, recalled the lost biodiversity in the region:

In the 1970s, we had a footprint of a bear in Sulaymaniyah city. But now we cannot find any bear in the whole of Kurdistan. I took pictures of a tribe of flamingos in Qlyasan lake when I was a child (Interview 11, male, environmental activist, Silêmanî, October 2021).

The problem with the Tanjero continues down the river, affecting the water that flows out of it. All the waste, sewage and toxins that enter the Tanjero at Silêmanî flow downstream.

Non-governance in the field of ecology is often justified with the arguments about the harsh legacy of the past. It is said that decades of conflict and experiences of poverty have left no space for thinking about nature, ecology and health effects of polluted water and soil. Politicians and some activists present narratives of past wars as one of the main reasons behind the lack of the state and society's engagement with the challenges of environmental degradation.

Over the course of successive wars, water infrastructure was destroyed and, in many cases, not renewed or improved due to lack of funds and political crises, including the troubled relationship between Kurdish autonomy and Baghdad, and the recent war against ISIS. Preoccupation with wars, conflicts, poverty (sanctions) made environmental concerns a secondary issue. The Ministry of Health and Environment (based in Baghdad, but responsible also for the Kurdistan Region) has worked on projects such as radiation early warning systems and de-mining land after the war with ISIS. Although the ministry had a plan to set up a network of stations to monitor pollution, it is waiting for funding.

Those narratives focusing on the past and wars omit the crucial role of the Capitalocene in the contemporary transformation of landscapes and lives. They miss the harm done by capital accumulation turbo-charged by hydrocarbons, systemically disregarding widespread and persistent environmental costs. Non-governance and deregulation are part of the intricate web of relations which enable the expansion of petrocapitalism in the region. Moreover, the lens of political ecology makes us alert to the class dynamics of capitalism and the inequalities. As in many of the petro-states in the world, in KRI oil disproportionately privileges the elites, leaving a large segment of society in precarity, and water bodies in a state of catastrophic decline.

Emerging grassroots struggles

Almost non-existent environmental governance, deregulation and neoliberal practices, driven by the logic of petrocapitalism, do not promise a sustainable future for the KRI. However, although such a pessimistic diagnosis appeared in our research, it ignores an important area of human agency. Environmental activists have recently undertaken efforts to save the Tanjero and other rivers from dying and to regulate the problem of illegal refineries.

There are several civil society actors concerned about the degradation of the Tanjero, mostly scientists and people interested in nature who are organised in non-governmental organisations and networks. The non-governance in the field of environmental protection has energised the movement. Existing regulations and procedures have not reduced the level of pollution. Activists are trying to monitor the level of pollution and toxicity, raise environmental awareness in society and convince the authorities of the severity and urgency of the problems.

Silêmanî is perceived as a city with more grassroots activity and collective work than those parts of the country under the influence of the KDP. In many cases, academics from Silêmanî's universities form the core of the most active environmental organisations. Many of them have a background in science, and some have specialised in environmental protection. Schools are also engaged in environmentalism, and many events and activities have recently been organised with students. The most active in this sphere is the Waterkeeper organisation, which is part of the Waterkeeper's Alliance, a transnational network with a headquarter in New York. University students are also increasingly taking part in pro-nature initiatives or organising themselves in their own networks, such as such as ‘Jingedosty’ (The Friends of Nature), which emerged from a media campaign in 2019 and later transformed into a network of young activists volunteering across Iraqi Kurdistan and in the diaspora.

Activists, academics and doctors have been trying to push the government to undertake effective work and address the problems of pollution, toxicity and waste. For years, they have been documenting the proliferation of illegal refineries and the process of ecological collapse of the Tanjero river. They have informed representatives of the political elite, including people working in the municipality and environmental institutions about the severity of the problems. It can be argued that their activities, although recent and usually with limited resources, have contributed to a growing interest in environmental issues throughout the region.

Among the Kurdish environmentalists’ main concern is the situation of the Tanjero River. They have identified as a political priority the need to have accurate information on how polluted the water is and what is causing the pollution. The lack of data means the lack of problems, as many interviewees acknowledged. They keep asking the government for data, estimates and sources of pollution, putting pressure on those in power. An environmental activist from the Humat Dijlah Association, which works to protect the Tigris River, said that the data that is available to people is limited because some institutions are reluctant to share their information (Waterkeepers, 2022b). Many researchers from Silêmanî have conducted studies on pollution, and they also encourage their students to do similar work. In 2022, a detailed assessment of the Tanjero's ecosystem was carried out by Waterkeepers led by Nabil Musa, one of the key figures in Kurdish environmentalism. The team travelled some 120 km along the river to the Darbandikhan Lake to gather information on the visible dangers to the Tanjero. They have confirmed the existence of threats such as sewage and toxic waste. They also documented that the river has already become seasonal, which has far-reaching implications for the future of agriculture, fishing and other activities linked to the river (Waterkeepers, 2022a).

Civil society groups organise awareness-raising and educational activities. Earth Network, based in Silêmanî, is another important actor in the environmental field. They try to spread knowledge about the environment and pollution by publishing books, organising presentations, exhibitions, and other events. Its members have screened short films in the city at night to attract the attention of urban society. Occasionally, they organise clean-up campaigns, inviting people to join them in cleaning the riverbanks. The Waterkeepers, who are part of the network, often use the media in their activism. In 2016, they made a film about the oil spill observed at the Silêmanî dump, which mixed with other waste and reached first the nearby farmlands and then reached Tanjero. Apart from an unsuccessful attempt to stop the oil spill by digging a tunnel, no visible work was undertaken by the government. The documentary ends with a call to action to all relevant political actors – the municipality of Silêmanî, the Kurdistan Environment Board, the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the Environment, and the KRG. Using the media and bringing the issue of pollution into the public discourses proved to be an effective tool. In 2020, they organised a photo exhibition – the outcome of a journey along the rivers from the mountains in the north to the marshes in the south of Iraq, which highlighted the human side of the ecological collapse.

One activist noted that since Nabil Musa has been talking about the river, more people have become interested in the issue and aware of the impact of industry and the oil sector on the environment. The Waterkeepers in Kurdistan are raising the problems of pollution, toxicity and other urgent threats to nature, such as the large dams. For the Waterkeepers in KRI, cooperation with international media is especially important:

I believe that the media has a very important role here. Next month the BBC will come here, and we will make some reports. I concluded that decision-makers in this country are not watching local TV channels. The ‘yellow zone’ (under Barzani authority) are not watching the ‘green zones’ (Talabanis’ part of KRI) TV channels, and vice versa. But Nechirvan Barzani (President of Kurdistan Region since 2019) and Qubad Talabani (Deputy Prime Minister of Kurdistan Regional Government since 2014) are watching international media. Last month in an art gallery at the University of Sulaymaniyah, I saw Qubad Talabani, and he literally told me that ‘4 years ago we watched your report on the BBC about the catastrophic situation of the Tanjero dumping site in Sulaymaniyah. After that, we understood the extent of the disaster and tried to work on it. Continue in harassing us via sharing reports on international media so that it pushes us to work’ (Interview 11, Silêmanî, November 2021).

For activists, political advocacy is an important task. When the pressure comes from the international community, such as the foreign media, some politicians realise that the environment is an issue of global concern and cannot be neglected in the long term. Kurdish activists are aware that their commitment to social change cannot match that of the government. Although they can talk about the problems internally, the negotiations with both the Iraqi government and other states, especially Turkey and Iran, are the prerogatives of the state, not civil society. The transition to renewable energy sources must also be resolved by the state. Therefore, the Action Plan developed by Waterkeepers in 2022 included informing government stakeholders about the environmental threats to Tanjero and involving them in creating lasting solutions, such as eliminating the sources of pollution and regularly monitoring the situation (Waterkeepers, 2022a). Activists from many organisations have already interacted with political actors. They regularly visit government and municipal offices, present problems and talk about the need for action, although the meetings often fail to produce immediate solutions.

Jingedosty, run by the Kurdish youth, has carried out several activities in Silêmanî to promote recycling and clean public spaces. They have also constructed the city's first bike lane. Their aim is to raise awareness about the seriousness of environmental issues. The organisation also seeks to exert pressure on politicians by demonstrating that even a group of students can make a difference.

Environmental activism in KRI has arisen parallel to the growing awareness of the ecological crisis. Activists are committed to re-establishing connections with nature, land, and rivers, but in dominant political and economic context they do it in a ‘dutiful’ way (Wiktor-Mach et al., 2023), without challenging the logic of exploitation under petrocapitalism and extractivism.

Extraction, contamination and waste in the Capitalocene

When looking at natural ecologies in peril, the Capitalocene framework provides crucial insights. Ecological devastation can be then seen as an immanent feature of petrocapitalism unfolding in the new lucrative region of the world abundant with large deposits of oil and gas on which the Capitalocene depends. The new age of toxicity (Walker, 2011) causing havoc to the people and nature is enabled by the local embeddedness of petrocapitalism which has thrived in the KRI for the last two decades. The extraction of natural resources, and pollution in Iraqi Kurdistan is part of the global appetite for oil and gas which directs international oil companies to extend their geographical reach. Capitalism's focus on profit and accumulation makes the appropriation of ‘cheap nature’ one of its central strategies. Rivers, such as Tanjero, have become sacrifice zones in the uncontrolled progress of the Capitalocene in new frontiers of wealth (Moore, 2015). Pollution and toxicity are engendered by the economic transformations, industrialisation, urbanisation, and the expansion of capitalist networks (Liboiron et al., 2018). In the process of unregulated oil extraction, people and nature become devalued, subjugated and ‘wasted’ (Armiero, 2021: 2). Toxicity, contamination and pollution have unsurprisingly entered the vocabulary of river protectors.

Petrolisation of the state is enabled by the priorities, interests and decisions of the ruling elite. The lack of monitoring of environmental issues, which enables systematic harm to local socio-ecologies, could be reversed if it was in the interests of the privileged class. During the golden era of imagining Kurdistan as the ‘new Dubai’, a lot of people were captivated by promises of wealth, progress, new consumption, and global opportunities (Kuruüzüm, 2018; Lange, 2022). When the economic situation deteriorated and tensions with Baghdad erupted again, it became clear that oil does not create a welfare state which could serve its citizens equally.

Non-governance in relation to water and other elements of nature in KRI can be seen as a strategy of a petro-state and its elites who prioritise extractivism, growth-oriented ideology and perceives oil and gas industries as the main pillars of the state, nation building and recognition on the global stage. Extractivism feeds on deregulation and statelessness. Nature in this constellation is merely a resource that can be subjugated and exploited. It is a cheap and voiceless resource in the face of profit-seeking actors (Moore, 2023). The extractivist regime which has drastically reoriented the relationship between people and nature prioritises a narrow conceptualisation of development without considering sustainability. Even agriculture is no longer considered a profitable activity, as food can be imported from abroad using oil money. A thriving economy, in turn, strengthens the independence of Kurds in Iraq, which is the only part of the wider Kurdistan with a de facto state. As Tinti argues (2021), for Kurds oil is not merely a commodity that brings sudden wealth to the state budget and enables progress. The newly established petroleum industry in the region has a considerable impact on the collective identity, vision of modernity and state building.

The absence of environmental monitoring implies that the problematic issues remain concealed. Discussing oil, particularly illegal refineries, in relation to the environment, is considered a sensitive topic and a red line that many people are hesitant to cross. Releasing such data carries too much political risk. Additionally, environmental law has not been adequately enforced, and companies that heavily pollute often do so without facing any sanctions or penalties.

The impact of geopolitics on the water problem cannot be ignored. The construction of dams on the transboundary rivers, such as the Euphrates, Tigris or Sirwan, is a complex and controversial issue (Jongerden et al., 2021). Water scarcity is a grave problem, and there is growing awareness of the impact of climate change on the rivers in the region. However, the KRG lacks the negotiating power to prevent neighbouring countries from building dams and retaining water on their territories. From the perspective of Kurdish environmentalists, the government is not making an effort to negotiate the water problems with Turkey or Iran. Instead, KRI's decision-makers are intensifying their own efforts to emulate the neighbours and build dams on Kurdish territory, despite the negative socio-ecological impacts of such projects on areas downstream. From this perspective, local rivers, such as Tanjero, gain special importance as sources of freshwater under internal control.

In recent years, however, ecological catastrophes around the Tanjero River have been documented. The unresponsiveness of the ruling elite to the crisis of fragile ecosystems pushes an increasing number of people to act. Activists and researchers highlight the seriousness and widespread nature of pollution, waste, and toxicity. There is a growing concern about the impact of these issues on people's livelihoods, health, and food availability. These environmental concerns are prevalent across the Middle East (Sowers, 2018) and have pushed many people to act and resist the status quo. The question remains: how can individuals respond effectively to the ‘permanently and unevenly toxic world’ and its embeddedness in wider social, political, economic, and other forms of power relations (Liboiron et al., 2018: 332)?

Highlights

Socio-ecological devastation, pollution and toxicity in Iraqi Kurdistan occurs in the context of competition over the fossil fuels revenues

The expansion of the Capitalocene is enabled by statelessness and the lack of adequate regulatory and monitoring mechanisms encouraged by the political system

Illegal refineries and oil spills have contributed to the deterioration of land and waterscapes

Petro-capitalism and extractivism have reoriented people’s relationship with nature, prioritising capital accumulation and lack of care for the environment

Environmental activists mobilise to reverse the ‘slow violence’ against people and nature

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank everyone who helped us with our research in the Iraqi Kurdistan, especially those who offered their time and shared their knowledge and experiences. We also express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers and the editor for comments and suggestions.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2014–2021, project registration number: 2019/34/H/HS2/00541.

Notes

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From extraction to contamination: Illegal refineries,polluted waters and environmental activism in Iraqi Kurdistan

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Extractive petrocapitalism and the contamination of nature

The Capitalocene frontier: Iraqi Kurdistan’s extractive regime

Fading of the river: The ecological disaster of the Tanjero

War, capitalogenic flows and the proliferation of illegal refineries

Non-governance, deregulation and the grounding of the Capitalocene

Emerging grassroots struggles

Extraction, contamination and waste in the Capitalocene

Highlights

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Funding

Notes

References