Demolition in China is normally described as a tired story of the confrontation between a muscular state and undercompensated residents. Based on detailed case studies conducted in a district in China, this article presents a different picture of demolition by clarifying how nail residents maximize their economic interests through unapproved constructions, procrastination, protests, and compensations. This study enriches our understanding of the contention of nail residents by setting out the whole range of their protest tactics. At the same time it casts further light on the characteristics of Chinese protests, which are often simplified by local authorities’ malpractice and protesters’ “rightful resistance.”
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