Fighting Back? The Contradictory Effects of Anti-DEI Laws on DEI Centers and Student-of-Color Groups at U.S. Colleges and Universities

Abstract

A growing number of states have passed laws that ban or restrict diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives in higher education; however, little is known about how such laws affect the prevalence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups, which are often housed within DEI centers. Through logistic regression analyses of longitudinal data on DEI centers and student-of-color organizations across 1,756 U.S. colleges and universities, the authors find that anti-DEI laws are associated with schools losing DEI offices between 2020 and 2024. Yet schools in states with anti-DEI laws were more likely to gain Black, Latinx, and Native American groups and less likely to lose existing Black and Latinx student groups. Additionally, anti-DEI laws were not associated with gains or losses in Asian or Asian American student groups. Our study thus suggests that students are organizing to create new inclusive spaces in response to anti-DEI legislation.

Keywords

race ethnicity DEI centers student organizations student engagement higher education sociology of education

Diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) centers have become commonplace at U.S. colleges and universities, and many of these centers have historically supported student-of-color groups (such as Asian or Asian American, Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups) by providing them with advisors and funding (Schachle and Coley 2022). In the wake of recent state laws targeting DEI initiatives in higher education, might anti-DEI laws be leading to closures of not only DEI centers but also student-of-color groups?

Ample past research has found that many campus cultures, particularly at predominantly white institutions, do not foster an appreciation for cultural diversity and fail to properly support students of color (Guiffrida 2003; Koo 2021; Lewis, Chesler, and Forman 2000). The alienating environment of many college and university campuses creates unique challenges for students of color, who are more likely than their white counterparts to report feelings of isolation and experience decreases in well-being while enrolled at their schools (Cabrera et al. 1999; Koo 2021; Samek et al. 2024). Students of color are also more likely than white students to consider dropping out of school (Cabrera et al. 1999; McClain and Perry 2017).

To improve campus climates for students of color, many U.S. colleges and universities have established DEI centers and have become home to student organizations that affirm diverse racial and ethnic identities (Harper and Quaye 2007; Tichavakunda 2024). For example, DEI centers, which are college- or university-funded centers that are staffed by trained professionals and integrated into the college or university bureaucracy, became fixtures on more than half of all U.S. campuses (both public and private) by 2020 (Schachle and Coley 2022). DEI centers have the potential to serve as a vital resource for students of color because they facilitate cultural events, programs, and provide funding and advisors to student-of-color groups (Reyes 2015; Suarez, Anderson, and Young 2018). Additionally, student-of-color groups, which are run by students themselves, were found on more than half of colleges and universities by 2020, with Black student groups representing the most common type of student-of-color organization, Latinx and Asian or Asian American student groups being the next most common, and Native American student groups being the least common (Schachle and Coley 2022:391). Students join student-of-color groups for various reasons. For example, some students use their organizations solely to socialize and support others who have a similar identity, and other students use student organizations to engage in protest or attempt to change campus policies (Reyes 2015). Participation in student-of-color organizations can, in turn, improve feelings of belonging and decrease feelings of depression and anxiety among students of color (Maramba and Velasquez 2012; Reyes 2018). Furthermore, students who are involved with student-of-color groups are more likely to stay or become politically involved after they graduate (Bowman, Park, and Denson 2015; Chang 2002; Rojas 2006; though note variance by racial group in Yi and Todd 2022).

Despite the potential importance of DEI initiatives on college and university campuses, DEI centers in particular have increasingly been subject to critique. For example, some scholars have found that diversity-focused institutional efforts can exacerbate (or at least fail to address) racial inequities on college and university campuses (Lerma, Hamilton, and Nielsen 2020; Thomas 2018). As noted by Thomas (2018), some colleges and universities might establish DEI centers and organize diversity training but then stop short of acknowledging that power and resources are unequally distributed across racial categories. Similarly, Hamilton, Nielsen, and Lerma (2023) argued that colleges and universities frequently enact diversity logics that minimize the importance of structural changes and highlight individualistic, color-blind solutions to racial inequity. Finally, DEI centers are often underresourced and understaffed, leading schools to outsource some DEI initiatives to faculty members and students of color (Lerma et al. 2020). Thus, even when schools maintain DEI offices, students often receive little institutional support and may manage racist situations on their own because the staff is overextended (Hamilton et al. 2023). In sum, although DEI centers can provide important resources for students of color and student-of-color groups, a school that is not invested in addressing systemic racism may not prioritize funding or resources for their DEI centers, resulting in negative implications for the students who use these spaces.

These scholarly critiques of DEI centers notwithstanding, perhaps the most visible attacks on DEI centers have come from conservative activists and lawmakers who oppose any attempts to address racial inequity in education. Initially, conservative lawmakers began by passing laws that targeted initiatives within K–12 educational contexts; yet by spring 2024, nine states had passed laws that banned or curtailed DEI initiatives in higher education (Williams Institute 2024).¹ According to the Williams Institute (2024), these anti-DEI laws prohibit bias-related training, bar spending on DEI programs and majors, and dismantle DEI centers. The dismantling of DEI centers is particularly troubling in light of the aforementioned research showing that, among other things, the presence of a DEI center is strongly associated with the presence of at least one student-of-color group at a college or university (Schachle and Coley 2022:397). Given the demonstrated role of DEI centers in supporting student-of-color groups, we return to the research question we posed at the beginning: how has recent anti-DEI legislation affected the presence not only of DEI centers but also of student-of-color groups on college and university campuses?

To address this question, we draw from our original, longitudinal, and comprehensive database of DEI centers and four officially recognized student-of-color groups (Asian or Asian American, Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups) across 1,756 four-year, not-for-profit U.S. colleges and universities from 2020 and 2024.² Using binary logistic regression analyses, we first find that, unsurprisingly, anti-DEI laws are associated with schools losing DEI offices. However, we also find that colleges and universities in states that passed anti-DEI laws had a higher likelihood of gaining Black, Latinx, and Native American groups and a lower likelihood of losing existing Black and Latinx student groups compared with states that had not passed anti-DEI laws. Our study thus advances prior research on DEI issues in higher education by suggesting that students may be succeeding in creating or maintaining diverse spaces in response to anti-DEI legislation. We further highlight our contributions in the discussion and conclusion sections, but first we detail our data and methods and present our results.

Data and Methods

To construct our dataset of DEI centers and student-of-color groups, and thus assess whether recent anti-DEI laws have affected the presence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups at U.S. colleges and universities, we began by downloading a complete list of four-year, not-for-profit, public and private U.S. colleges and universities as of the 2022–2023 school year from the U.S. Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS; National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). The initial list of schools contained 1,822 schools. After we removed 27 schools that had shut down since the Department of Education published its data and 39 schools that were online only, our final database included 1,756 colleges and universities.

Our first set of dependent variables measures changes in the presence of DEI centers at U.S. colleges and universities between 2020 and 2024. We define DEI centers as college- or university-run centers or offices that promote DEI related to race, ethnicity, and (sometimes also) gender, sexuality, and social class.³ To collect these data on DEI centers, in July and August 2024, we followed Schachle and Coley’s (2022) methods by first conducting Google searches containing the exact name of each college or university, along with the keywords diversity, equity, inclusion, and multicultural. We then visited the webpages of any official centers or offices associated with that college or university that focused on promoting DEI initiatives on campus. Because not all schools use the actual words diversity, equity, and inclusion in the names of these centers or offices—for example, many schools have developed offices of “inclusive excellence” or “belonging”—we paid close attention to whether the relevant centers or offices were indeed focused on DEI issues, especially issues pertaining to students of color. Using this method, we were able to record information indicating whether a school had a DEI center or office. Next, we compared our data with data collected by Schachle and Coley in summer 2020. We then created a dependent variable indicating whether a school was home to a DEI center in 2020 but was no longer home to a DEI center in 2024. Finally, we also created a dependent variable indicating whether a school was not home to a DEI center in 2020 but became home to a DEI center by 2024.

A second set of dependent variables measures changes in the presence of Asian or Asian American student groups, Black student groups, Latinx student groups, and Native American student organizations between 2020 and 2024. We define student-of-color organizations as student-led, student-focused groups that are dedicated to supporting a particular racial or ethnic identity. To construct these variables, in July and August 2024, we began by accessing the student organization databases or lists at each school’s website and, following the process outlined in Schachle and Coley (2022), used the search terms Asia(n), Asian-American, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Africa(n), African-American, Black, Chicano, Hispanic, Latino, Latina, Latinx, American Indian, Indigenous, and Native American to look for evidence that a school was home to each of these four main types of student-of-color organizations. If those searches did not yield evidence that each of these student groups existed at a school, we then continued following Schachle and Coley’s procedures and conducted Google searches containing the name of each school and the keywords Asian, Black, Latino, and Native American. (Note that Google’s algorithm is constructed in such a way that the search term Latino, for example, will also lead to pages containing terms such as Hispanic, Latina, and Latinx.) Using both of these search methods, we were able to record information on whether schools were currently home to each of the four student-of-color groups. Next, similar to our procedures for DEI centers, after comparing our information with data collected by Schachle and Coley, we created four dependent variables indicating whether a school was home to each of these four types of student-of-color groups in 2020 but no longer had them in 2024. Additionally, we created four more dependent variables indicating whether a school did not have each of these four student-of-color groups in 2020 but had them by 2024.

Our primary independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the state in which a college or university is located had adopted a ban on DEI centers, programming, and/or initiatives in higher education as of spring 2024. We draw on information from the Williams Institute (2024), which identified nine states that had passed anti-DEI laws or executive orders beginning in 2023 and by spring 2024: Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.

One set of control variables measures institutional characteristics that past research has linked to the presence of DEI-related centers, student-of-color groups, and/or other types of student organizations at U.S. colleges and universities. First, because DEI-related initiatives are under greater scrutiny and legal restrictions at public universities compared with private universities (Williams Institute 2024), we constructed a variable indicating whether a school is public or private using data from IPEDS (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). Second, schools’ institutional reputations for serving students of color could plausibly shape their willingness to engage in DEI-related initiatives or likelihood of being home to student-of-color groups (Schachle and Coley 2022). Thus, using data from IPEDS (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a), we constructed another variable indicating whether a school is any type of government-designated “minority-serving institution” (i.e., an Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander–serving institution, a historically Black college or university, a Hispanic-serving institution, or a tribal college). Third, because religious colleges and universities in the United States have even more latitude than public and other private universities to place restrictions on campus groups and programming (Mireles and Bumgardner 2022), we constructed a variable indicating whether a school is religious or secular using data from IPEDS (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). Fourth, because past research shows that elite schools are more likely to engage in DEI-related initiatives (e.g., Davis 2018), as well as be home to a wide range of student organizations (Coley et al. 2025), we include a variable for a school’s selectivity measured by the percentage of applicants it accepts (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a).⁴

Another set of control variables measures student body characteristics that could be associated with the presence of DEI-related centers and student groups at U.S. colleges and universities. First, because research shows that schools with more students are more likely to have DEI-related centers and student-of-color groups (Coley et al. 2025; Fine 2012; Schachle and Coley 2022), we include a variable measuring the number of students at a school using IPEDS data (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). We log this variable, as it is highly right skewed. Next, because schools with higher percentages of women often have more inclusive campus cultures (Coley and Das 2020), we include a variable measuring the percentage of students who identify as women (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). Additionally, on the basis of past research showing that schools with higher percentages of students of color may be more engaged in DEI efforts (Schachle and Coley 2022), we include a variable measuring the percentage of students of color at a school.

Finally, we include control variables that account for a range of sociopolitical contextual characteristics that might affect the presence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups at the schools in our dataset. First, because conservative-leaning states are typically more skeptical of DEI-related initiatives (Williams Institute 2024), we include variables measuring the percentage of state residents and county residents who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 U.S. presidential election (U.S. Election Atlas 2021). Next, because areas with higher percentages of people of color might plausibly be more tolerant of DEI-related initiatives (see mixed evidence in Schachle and Coley 2022), we include variables measuring the percentage of state residents and county residents who are persons of color (i.e., who identify as a racial or ethnic group other than non-Hispanic white) (U.S. Census Bureau 2023). Third, because of the historical conservatism of the region, we include a variable indicating whether a school is in the South using the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2023) regional classifications. Finally, because some research shows that schools in rural areas or small-towns are less likely to support DEI-related efforts or be home to student groups that support marginalized students (e.g., Coley et al. 2023; Fetner and Kush 2008; though see Fine 2012), we include a variable indicating whether a school is in a rural area or small town using IPEDS classifications (National Center for Education Statistics 2023a). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Gained DEI office	Whether a college or university that was not home to a DEI office in 2020 was home to a DEI office in 2024	.14	.34	0	1
Lost DEI office	Whether a college or university that was home to a DEI office in 2020 was no longer home to a DEI office in 2024	.12	.33	0	1
Gained Asian student group	Whether a college or university that was not home to an Asian student group in 2020 was home to an Asian student group in 2024	.11	.32	0	1
Lost Asian student group	Whether a college or university that was home to an Asian student group in 2020 was no longer to home to an Asian student group in 2024	.06	.24	0	1
Gained Black student group	Whether a college or university that was not home to a Black student group in 2020 was home to a Black student group in 2024	.13	.33	0	1
Lost Black student group	Whether a college or university that was home to a Black student group in 2020 was no longer to home to a Black student group in 2024	.05	.22	0	1
Gained Latinx student group	Whether a college or university that was not home to a Latinx student group in 2020 was home to a Latinx student group in 2024	.12	.32	0	1
Lost Latinx student group	Whether a college or university that was home to a Latinx student group in 2020 was no longer to home to a Latinx student group in 2024	.09	.29	0	1
Gained Native American student group	Whether a college or university that was not home to a Native American student group in 2020 was home to a Native American student group in 2024	.09	.29	0	1
Lost Native American student group	Whether a college or university that was home to a Native American student group in 2020 was no longer to home to a Native American student group in 2024	.03	.17	0	1
Anti-DEI law	Whether a state had implemented some type of ban or restriction on DEI offices or activities by August 2024	.18	.39	0	1
Public	Whether a college or university is public (rather than private)	.32	.47	0	1
Minority-serving institution	Whether a college or university is designated by the U.S. government as a “minority-serving institution”	.18	.38	0	1
Religious	Whether a college or university is affiliated with a religious denomination or tradition, or otherwise self-identifies as religious	.42	.49	0	1
Number of students	Number of students at a college or university	6,297	11,257	9	164,091
% women students	Percentage of students at a college or university who identify as women	55.54	17.72	0	100
% students of color	Percentage of students at a college or university who identify as a race other than white	45.19	23.76	0	100
Selectivity	Percentage of applicants admitted	73.97	22.94	1	100
% state Trump vote	Percentage vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election for the state in which a school is located	47.21	9.78	5.4	69.94
% county Trump vote	Percentage vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election for the county in which a school is located	44.93	17.19	5.4	85.78
% state persons of color	Percentage of persons of color in a state	33.71	14.73	5.1	63.7
% county persons of color	Percentage of persons of color in a county	34.27	21.73	2.4	99
South	Presence of school in the southern region of the United States	.33	.47	0	1
Rural or small town	Presence of a school in a rural or small-town area	.25	.43	0	1

Note: DEI = diversity, equity, and inclusion.

In the analysis that follows, we begin by providing descriptive statistics on the prevalence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups in 2020 versus 2024. Then, we present results from a series of binary logistic regression analyses regressing our independent variable and control variables of interest on our 10 separate dependent variables. We use binary logistic regression because all of our dependent variables are dichotomous, and we highlight the substantive significance of our findings by calculating both odds ratios and predicted probabilities.

Results

Descriptive Analyses

Table 2 compares the prevalence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups in 2020 versus 2024. As the table shows, whereas approximately 54 percent of U.S. colleges and universities were home to DEI offices in 2020, only a slightly larger 55 percent of schools were home to DEI offices in 2024. However, we note that because a number of U.S. colleges and universities had shut down between 2020 and 2024, the absolute number of schools with DEI offices was actually smaller in 2024 (n = 973) compared with 2020 (n = 1,022).

Table 2.

Prevalence of DEI Offices and Student-of-Color Groups in 2020 versus 2024.

Variable	% in 2020	% in 2024
DEI office	53.51	55.41
Asian or Asian American student group	36.44	43.51
Black student group	55.18	64.58
Latinx student group	40.79	45.62
Native American student group	12.20	18.85

Note: The 2020 database included 1,910 schools; the 2024 database included 1,756 schools. DEI = diversity, equity, and inclusion.

By comparison, the increases in student-of-color groups in 2020 versus 2024 were larger in both absolute and percentage terms. Black student groups saw the largest jumps: whereas 55 percent of schools existing in 2020 (n = 1,053) were home to Black student groups, 65 percent of schools still in existence in 2024 (n = 1,134) had such groups. However, other types of student-of-color groups still witnessed increases: whereas 36 percent of schools (n = 696) had Asian student groups in 2020, 44 percent of schools (n = 764) had such groups by 2024; whereas 41 percent of schools (n = 779) had Latinx student groups in 2020, 46 percent (n = 801) had them by 2024; and whereas 12 percent of schools (n = 233) had Native American student groups in 2020, 19 percent (n = 331) had them by 2024.

Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of DEI Offices

Table 3 shows factors associated with schools that gained DEI offices (model 1) or lost DEI offices (model 2) between 2020 and 2024. In model 1, we find that being in a state that banned or restricted DEI activities in higher education was not significantly associated with whether a school gained a DEI office between 2020 and 2024. However, public schools, which are generally more vulnerable to political efforts to restrict DEI offices, were significantly less likely to gain DEI offices between 2020 and 2024, while larger schools and schools with higher percentages of women exhibited greater odds of gaining DEI offices between 2020 and 2024.

Table 3.

Binary Logistic Regression Models for Presence of DEI Offices.

	Model 1: Gained DEI Office	Model 2: Lost DEI Office
	b (SE)	b (SE)
Anti-DEI law	−.333 (.243)	.525 (.220)*
Public	−.504 (.219)*	.520 (.252)*
Minority-serving institution	−.092 (.264)	.399 (.264)
Religious	−.044 (.189)	.174 (.221)
Selectivity	.001 (.003)	−.007 (.004)⁺
Number of students (log)	.267 (.053)***	−.155 (.056)**
% women students	.012 (.005)**	.009 (.005)
% students of color	.001 (.005)	.000 (.005)
% state vote for Trump	−.018 (.011)	.043 (.016)**
% county vote for Trump	−.001 (.007)	.007 (.007)
% state persons of color	−.013 (.009)	.015 (.010)
% county persons of color	−.003 (.006)	.003 (.006)
South	.248 (.202)	−.378 (.243)
Rural or small town	.070 (.197)	−.098 (.204)
Constant	−3.234 (.797)***	−4.116 (1.038)***
χ²	45.72***	65.87***
Nagelkerke R²	.047	.071

Note: N = 1756. Values are unstandardized coefficients.

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

As expected, model 2 shows that schools in states that have banned or restricted DEI activities exhibit greater odds of losing DEI offices. Specifically, schools in states with anti-DEI laws exhibit 69 percent greater odds of losing DEI offices between 2020 and 2024 (odds ratio = 1.69). Put another way, holding all other variables at their mean, schools in states with anti-DEI laws had a 0.18 probability of losing DEI offices between 2020 and 2024, while schools in states without anti-DEI laws had a 0.11 probability of losing DEI offices over this time period. Additionally, public schools and schools in states that cast a higher percentage of votes for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential election exhibit greater odds of losing DEI offices, whereas larger schools were less likely to lose DEI offices between 2020 and 2024. A variable measuring a school’s acceptance rate was marginally significant, indicating that more selective schools exhibit lower odds of losing DEI offices.

Binary Logistic Regression Analyses of Student-of-Color Groups

Table 4 presents results from binary logistic regression analyses of whether schools gained Asian or Asian American student groups (model 1), lost Asian or Asian American student groups (model 2), gained Black student groups (model 3), or lost Black student groups (model 4) between 2020 and 2024. By “gaining” a student-of-color group, we mean that a particular student-of-color group that was not present at a U.S. college or university as of 2020 is present as of 2024. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that anti-DEI laws are not associated with whether schools gained Asian or Asian American student groups over this period; however, larger schools and schools with higher percentages of women exhibited higher odds of gaining Asian or Asian American student groups, while unexpectedly, schools with higher percentages of students of color exhibited lower odds of gaining Asian or Asian American student groups between 2020 and 2024.

Table 4.

Binary Logistic Regression Models for Presence of Asian or Asian American and Black Student Groups.

	Model 1: Gained Asian or Asian American Student Group	Model 2: Lost Asian or Asian American Student Group	Model 3: Gained Black Student Group	Model 4: Lost Black Student Group
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
DEI ban	.324 (.252)	−.283 (.320)	.609 (.235)**	−.801 (.362)*
Public	.353 (.239)	−.247 (.340)	−.044 (.230)	−.550 (.367)
Minority-serving institution	−.013 (.312)	.205 (.379)	.044 (.281)	.105 (.400)
Religious	.001 (.218)	.090 (.282)	.072 (.197)	−.135 (.291)
Selectivity	−.003 (.003)	.009 (.004)*	.001 (.003)	.011 (.006)⁺
Number of students (log)	.254 (.061)***	.189 (.071)**	.150 (.055)**	.093 (.089)
% women students	.013 (.006)*	.003 (.008)	.015 (.005)**	−.001 (.007)
% students of color	−.015 (.007)*	.007 (.007)	.002 (.005)	.017 (.007)*
% state vote for Trump	−.016 (.013)	−.005 (.018)	−.007 (.014)	.017 (.020)**
% county vote for Trump	.003 (.008)	.005 (.011)	.008 (.008)	.008 (.012)
% state persons of color	−.002 (.009)	−.005 (.013)	−.012 (.010)	.002 (.015)
% county persons of color	.003 (.006)	−.004 (.009)	.004 (.006)	−.005 (.011)
South	−.058 (.219)	.148 (.281)	−.318 (.213)	.330 (.338)
Rural or small town	−.330 (.224)	.233 (.261)	.316 (.199)	.439 (.260)⁺
Constant	−3.670 (.908)***	−4.999 (1.168)***	−3.969 (.935)***	−6.028 (1.539)***
χ²	55.94***	14.37	33.74**	29.86**
Nagelkerke R²	.062	.022	.036	.008

Note: N = 1756. Values are unstandardized coefficients.

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Similarly, model 2 in Table 4 shows that being in a state with an anti-DEI law made no significant difference in whether schools lost Asian or Asian American student groups between 2020 and 2024. The model simply shows that larger schools and more selective schools exhibited higher odds of losing or Asian American Asian student groups. We reflect more on these findings in the discussion.

In contrast to the previous models, model 3 in Table 4 shows that schools in states with anti-DEI laws were at greater odds of gaining Black student groups between 2020 and 2024. Specifically, schools in states with anti-DEI laws exhibited 84 percent higher odds of gaining Black student groups (odds ratio = 1.84). Or, in terms of predicted probabilities, the probability of schools in states with anti-DEI laws gaining Black student groups was 0.19, compared with 0.11 for schools in states without anti-DEI laws. The model also shows that the variables measuring school size and percentage of women students were significantly associated with gains in Black student groups between 2020 and 2024.

In model 4 in Table 4, we see that anti-DEI laws are significantly and negatively associated with losses in Black student groups, as schools in states with anti-DEI laws exhibited 55 percent lower odds of losing Black student groups between 2020 and 2024 (odds ratio = 0.45). Put another way, the probability that a school in a state with an anti-DEI law lost a Black student group was just 0.01, compared with 0.06 for a school in a state without an anti-DEI law. Here, we also find that variables measuring the percentage of students of color at a school, a school’s selectivity, and the percentage of state votes cast for Donald Trump in 2020 are significantly and positively associated with schools’ losing Black student groups between 2020 and 2024. The variable indicating whether a school is in a rural area or small town is marginally associated with losses in Black student groups as well.

In our final table (Table 5), we examine characteristics of schools that have gained Latinx student groups (model 1), lost Latinx student groups (model 2), gained Native American student groups (model 3), and lost Native American student groups (model 4) between 2020 and 2024. Model 1 in Table 5 shows that schools in states with anti-DEI laws were at significantly higher odds of gaining Latinx student groups, with anti-DEI laws associated with 111 percent higher of odds of schools gaining’ Latinx student groups during this time period (odds ratio = 2.11). In terms of predicted probabilities, schools in states with anti-DEI laws had a 0.18 probability of gaining a Latinx student group between 2020 and 2024, compared with a 0.11 probability for schools in states without such laws. Larger schools and schools with higher percentages of women students were also at higher odds of gaining Latinx student groups.

Table 5.

Binary Logistic Regression Models for Presence of Latinx and Native American Student Groups.

	Model 1: Gain Latinx Student Group	Model 2: Lost Latinx Student Group	Model 3: Gain Native American Student Group	Model 4: Lost Native American Student Group
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Anti-DEI law	.745 (.267)**	−.483 (.290)⁺	.658 (.293)*	.349 (.412)
Public	−.012 (.230)	−.411 (.272)	.782 (.251)**	.081 (.366)
Minority-serving institution	−.331 (.252)	.175 (.336)	−.693 (.331)*	−.535 (.561)
Religious	−.057 (.206)	−.047 (.221)	−.277 (.270)	.096 (.434)
Selectivity	.000 (.003)	.010 (.004)*	−.009 (.004)*	.000 (.006)
Number of students (log)	.204 (.056)***	.235 (.061)***	.363 (.070)***	.438 (.098)***
% women students	.013 (.005)*	.007 (.006)	.003 (.007)	.000 (.012)
% students of color	.005 (.005)	.004 (.006)	−.003 (.007)	.014 (.009)
% state vote for Trump	−.019 (.013)	−.011 (.013)	−.007 (.016)	−.016 (.021)
% county vote for Trump	.005 (.008)	.002 (.008)	−.006 (.009)	.002 (.016)
% state persons of color	.003 (.009)	−.003 (.010)	.009 (.012)	−.018 (.019)
% county persons of color	−.009 (.007)	−.002 (.007)	−.005 (.008)	−.002 (.013)
South	−.248 (.225)	.128 (.234)	−.659 (.271)*	.240 (.406)
Rural or small town	−.247 (.210)	−.032 (.233)	.124 (.241)	−.315 (.384)
Constant	−3.540 (.884)***	−4.709 (1.027)***	−4.396 (1.051)***	−6.313 (1.695)***
χ²	43.43***	27.36	120.57***	24.79*
Nagelkerke R²	.047	.034	.145	.061

Note: N = 1756. Values are unstandardized coefficients.

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Conversely, model 2 in Table 5 shows that schools in states with anti-DEI laws exhibited 38 percent lower odds of losing Latinx student groups (odds ratio = 0.62); by calculating predicted probabilities, we find that schools in states with DEI restrictions had a 0.05 probability of losing an existing Latinx student group, compared with a 0.10 probability for schools in states without DEI restrictions. Larger schools, as well as more selective schools, exhibited higher odds of losing Latinx student groups.

In model 3 in Table 5, we see that anti-DEI laws are significantly associated with gains in Native American student groups; specifically, schools in states with anti-DEI laws exhibit 93 percent higher odds of gaining Native American student groups between 2020 and 2024 (odds ratio = 1.93). In terms of predicted probabilities, the probability that a school in a state with DEI restrictions gained a Native American student group was 0.13, compared with a 0.08 probability for a school in a state without such restrictions. We additionally find that public schools and larger schools more typically gained Native American student groups, while minority-serving institutions, more selective schools, and Southern schools less typically gained Native American student groups.

Finally, in model 4 in Table 5, we see that DEI bans are not linked to losses in Native American student groups. Only one variable, student body size, is related to losses in Native American student groups.

Discussion

Prior research has identified that DEI offices organize cultural events and provide funding and advisors for student-of-color organizations (Reyes 2015; Suarez et al. 2018). Considering these offices’ demonstrated importance in sustaining student-of-color organizations (Schachle and Coley 2022), it is crucial that we understand how recent anti-DEI laws have affected the presence of not only DEI centers but also student-of-color groups at U.S. colleges and universities.

Our results show, first, that states that have passed anti-DEI laws have greater odds of losing DEI offices. This finding is unsurprising because many of these bills and executive orders target DEI centers both indirectly (by prohibiting bias-related training and spending on DEI programs and majors, which are often managed by DEI offices) and directly (by outright dismantling DEI centers). By using logistic regression, we also find that public schools and counties that voted for Trump had greater odds of losing DEI offices. Much of the recent anti-DEI legislation has been inspired by a prior executive order issued by Donald Trump. Executive Order 13950 canceled diversity training programs and prohibited the teaching of “divisive concepts,” such as race, gender, and sexuality, by federal contractors. Even though this executive order was rescinded by President Biden (U.S. Department of Labor 2021), state lawmakers continue to pass legislation that directly targets multicultural teaching practices and educational resources (e.g., UCLA School of Law 2023). It is likely that the residents in states and counties that voted for Trump were generally critical of DEI initiatives, which may have led them to support politicians that targeted these initiatives. Furthermore, public schools are more likely to be curtailed by this legislation compared with private universities.

Although the passing of anti-DEI laws resulted in greater odds of schools losing DEI offices, these laws were associated with a higher likelihood of schools gaining certain student-of-color groups. Our analyses revealed that schools where states had passed anti-DEI laws were more likely to gain Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups and had a lower likelihood of losing existing Black and Latinx student groups. This finding is surprising considering past literature has identified that DEI centers often provide key resources, such as funding and faculty advisors, to student-of-color organizations, which might lead one to assume that the dissolvement of (or restrictions on) DEI centers would result in the disbanding of student-of-color groups. Instead, we find that students of color are organizing in spite or perhaps because of recent anti-DEI legislation. Why might this be the case? Because both federal law and these anti-DEI laws still protect students’ ability to form their own organizations at U.S. public colleges and universities,⁵ we believe that the best explanation is that in states where DEI centers have been banned, students are increasingly recognizing that the work of supporting other students of color now primarily falls on them.

However, it is worth considering other possible reasons that students of color might be creating new groups. For example, it could be the case that, following the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, some students were inspired to create new student-of-color groups, and this growth may have occurred primarily in conservative areas that were previously not home to such groups. However, this explanation by itself does not address why schools in conservative states that passed anti-DEI laws were also more likely to retain existing student-of-color groups. Next, the 2023–2024 school year also saw an increase in student mobilization, with many students organizing protests on their campuses over Israel and Palestine. It is possible that the number of student-of-color organizations increased because of this broader student movement wave, because of what social movement scholars call spillover effects (Isaac and Rose 2024; Meyer and Whittier 1994). Still, if this were the primary reason, it is similarly not clear why growth in student-of-color organizations (or preservation of existing student-of-color organizations) would have occurred especially in states with anti-DEI laws. Finally, recent scholarship has highlighted that some students are feeling jaded by higher education’s emphasis on DEI initiatives because they bureaucratize issues of discrimination and racism rather than address the root of these issues within the organization (Confessore 2024; Okuwobi, Faulk, and Roscigno 2021; Ray 2019; Thomas 2020). Colleges and universities often focus on individual issues, fail to acknowledge that systemic racism is embedded in higher education, and are resistant to structural change (Lerma et al. 2020; Thomas 2018). This approach results in universal solutions, such as DEI centers, which are often underfunded and understaffed. Ultimately, the labor for maintaining these resources falls on students of color who invest both time and money to ensure that their peers have access to an inclusive meeting space (Lerma et al. 2020). Even though DEI centers have dedicated administrators and/or staff, students of color still take on the labor of advocating for funding and mediating racist situations because the staff are overextended (Hamilton et al. 2023). It could be the case that students are creating or preserving these groups to take back control of addressing racism and discrimination in higher education, or because they are already engaging in this work in the first place. However, if this were the primary reason for the growth in new student-of-color groups, we would still need to know more about why such increases occurred primarily in states with anti-DEI laws.

Our analyses also showed that larger schools and schools with higher percentages of women exhibited higher odds of gaining Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups from 2020 to 2024. Ample research has found that schools with more students are more likely to have a DEI office and a variety of student organizations, likely because there are more students to mobilize to create diverse student groups (Coley and Das 2020; Dixon, Tope, and Van Dyke 2008; Van Dyke, Dixon, and Carlon 2007). Gender is also important to consider because scholars have identified that women are more supportive of diversity-related initiatives (Coley and Das 2020) and are more likely to be involved in political activism (Staeheli 2004), even activism around social issues that fall outside of their own experiences (Fisher, Dow, and Ray 2017).

Finally, despite our general finding that anti-DEI laws were associated with gains in Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups, we find that anti-DEI laws are not associated with gains or losses of Asian or Asian American student groups from 2020 to 2024. Larger schools and schools with higher percentages of women were more likely to gain Asian or Asian American student groups, likely because of the reasons we outlined previously. Interestingly, we find that schools with higher percentages of students of color were less likely to gain Asian or Asian American student groups between 2020 and 2024. What might explain these findings? Much of the literature regarding Asian or Asian American students has examined Asian student experiences in relation to the “model minority myth,” or a prevailing stereotype that Asian students are hardworking and high achieving (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Dhingra 2021). This stereotype has been used to draw comparisons between racial groups to frame Black and Latinx students as underperforming compared with their Asian counterparts. It is possible that this cultural narrative may contribute to the exclusion of Asian American experiences when discussing issues of DEI. Despite the rise of anti-Asian racism during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, research found that discussions of anti-racism generally centers the experiences of Black and Latinx individuals. In their research exploring how Asian American youth develop social consciousness, Lee et al. (2022) found that their participants consistently engaged in critical conversations regarding Black Lives Matter but were less likely to discuss their own experiences of discrimination. Similarly, Chan (2020) found that Asian American college students believe that they are not represented in diversity initiatives introduced by their colleges and universities. It is possible that we are identifying similar themes in our data. Schools that have higher percentages of students of color may focus on issues of diversity that directly affect Black, Latinx, and Native American students, which then exclude critical discussions of anti-Asian racism and discrimination. If Asian American students are noticing these trends, they may feel less inclined to organize Asian student groups because they believe their campus is not as open to understanding their experiences.

Conclusion

DEI centers have been a key feature on many college campuses because they organize multicultural events and programming, supply funding and advisors to student-of-color groups, and provide an affirming and supportive space for students of color (Reyes 2015; Suarez et al. 2018). Despite their importance, nine states had passed legislation that banned spending on DEI programs, dissolved DEI centers on college and university campuses, or otherwise restricted DEI initiatives on U.S. college and university campuses by spring 2024 (Williams Institute 2024). Our research examines how this recent legislation has shaped the presence of DEI centers and student-of-color groups at U.S. colleges and universities. Drawing from our original, longitudinal, and comprehensive database of officially recognized student-of-color organizations and DEI centers across 1,756 four-year, not-for-profit U.S. colleges and universities, we find that, as expected, anti-DEI laws are associated with schools losing DEI offices. Surprisingly, we find that colleges and universities that are located in states that have passed anti-DEI laws were more likely to gain Black, Latinx, and Native American groups. Moreover, these colleges and universities have a lower likelihood of losing existing Black and Latinx student groups. Our findings provide some evidence that students are continuing to organize diverse spaces despite (or even because of) recent anti-DEI legislation.

Our research advances empirical understandings of student-of-color organizations and DEI centers in two distinct ways. First, we provide a longitudinal analysis of how the presence of student-of-color organizations and DEI centers at U.S. college and university campuses have changed over the past four years. This finding provides key insights into the formation and longevity of Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups. Second, our findings reveal how students might mobilize to create inclusive spaces in response to legislation that eliminates DEI policies or centers. Although scholars have identified that DEI centers provide resources that contribute to the creation and functioning of student-of-color groups (Reyes 2015), our findings suggest that students continue to mobilize to create inclusive spaces even though they no longer have access to this form of institutional support. In this manner, our research aligns with recent work about how other marginalized groups, such as queer people, are forming new, inclusive spaces in response to the closure of older, established queer institutions (such as “gay bars”) (Ghaziani 2024).

Our research does have limitations, each of which suggests potential avenues for future research. First, we have shown that anti-DEI laws are linked to a decline in DEI centers. However, we have not examined other on-campus programs, initiatives, or trainings that may have been affected by these recent anti-DEI laws. Future research is needed to further establish the wider variety of ways that campuses are being affected by anti-DEI laws.

Second, our study specifically focuses on how anti-DEI laws may have affected the presence of DEI centers and student-of-color organizations. However, there are other potential ways that anti-DEI laws, and the broader anti-DEI climate, might be affecting DEI centers. For example, past scholars have noted that many colleges and universities have not sufficiently funneled funding or staff into these centers in the first place (Hamilton et al. 2023; Thomas 2018), and it is possible that some colleges and universities are further cutting funding for DEI centers in response to anti-DEI laws. Future research might consider how institutional support, such as allocations of funds and staff, may have changed in relation to the passing of anti-DEI legislation.

Third, although our quantitative data do strongly suggest that new Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups were more likely to be formed in states with anti-DEI laws, the anti-DEI laws we examine are fairly recent, and it is possible that there is a lag in the effects of these anti-DEI laws; future research might examine the prevalence of student-of-color groups in a few years to determine whether our findings still hold. Even if future researchers arrive at similar findings about the increased prevalence of student-of-color groups in states with anti-DEI laws, we also note that we cannot definitively show that any new given new group was formed because of this legislation. As noted, an alternative explanation to this finding could be that students are organizing to create these groups because they are frustrated by how their colleges and universities are handling issues of racism and discrimination, issues that could potentially be more intense in the conservative states that tended to restrict DEI centers. Future researchers could interview members of these groups to understand how the removal of DEI centers has directly affected student-of-color groups, and if students are creating these groups because of the legislation or because they do not agree with how colleges and universities navigate DEI issues even when they did have DEI centers (Thomas 2020).

Finally, in examining how anti-DEI laws have affected student groups, we have focused on officially recognized student organizations, and we have relied on online listings of such student groups. Still, we know that some students organize informal groups that are not recognized by their schools, and other students become active in off-campus groups. These types of groups are not captured by our analysis, but future research could analyze the impact of anti-DEI laws on these unofficial student organizations. Furthermore, because we have relied on online listings of officially recognized student organizations, future research could use other methods, such as surveys, as another way of establishing the impacts of anti-DEI laws on student-of-color organizing.

We conclude by reflecting on the broader implications of our study. As noted, students may have formed new Black, Latinx, and Native American student groups either in response to anti-DEI legislation, or because they were disillusioned by how their colleges and universities handled issues of racism and discrimination. Student mobilization is on the rise across many campuses, which suggests that students may also mobilize to create and protect inclusive campus spaces. As students continue to create student-of-color organizations, they may begin to advocate for the return of DEI centers or similar campus organizations that can provide them with support. It is possible that these demands could result in legislative changes. For example, della Porta, Cini, and Guzmán-Concha (2020) found that students in Chile and Quebec were able to persuade lawmakers to partially meet their demands and issue reforms. Notably, these successes were obtained because the students had developed alliances with influential social and political actors that bolstered their demands. In the event that students mobilize to demand the reinstatement of DEI centers or similar organizational structures, local and institutional leaders may also need to rally behind student organizations to support their demands. However, it is important to acknowledge that these efforts may not benefit all students equally. Past research identified that Asian students felt especially excluded from existing DEI policies (Chan 2020; Lee et al. 2022) and, relatedly, we find that anti-DEI laws are not associated with gains or losses of Asian American groups. It is also important to note that the recent Supreme Court decision overturning affirmative action could have indirect effects on the presence of Asian and Asian American student groups. Over the next few years, we could see an increase in the number of Asian or Asian American students on some college and university campuses, which would result in an increase in Asian or Asian American student groups (Liptak 2023). Ultimately, our study illuminates the importance of centering specific groups to ensure that all student-of-color organizations are represented and benefit equally from movement efforts.

Even if students mobilize, it is likely that colleges and universities may not support students because they do not have the means to oppose state-level legislation. With this in mind, colleges and universities in states that have passed anti-DEI legislation could also expand existing campus resources and prioritize student-of-color organizations when considering resource allocations. For example, campuses could designate existing spaces to be exclusively used for student-of-color organizations, scholarships and grants could prioritize applications from student-of-color organizations, and campuses could establish mentorship programs specifically for students of color. These efforts could allow colleges and universities to continue to provide the necessary resources to student-of-color organizations without directly violating some of the anti-DEI laws.

Footnotes

ORCID iDs

Jessica L. Schachle-Gordon

Jonathan S. Coley

1

Note that some additional states, such as Idaho, passed anti-DEI laws after the time period we analyze in this study ().

2

We use the terms Asian or Asian American, Black, Latinx, and Native American for brevity, but we acknowledge that some student-of-color organizations adopt names that reference specific countries of origin (e.g., Asian or Asian American organizations often referred to themselves as Chinese, Japanese, or Korean student organizations) or alternative panethnic terms (e.g., African American instead of Black, Hispanic or Latino instead of Latinx, Indigenous or American Indian instead of Native American).

3

We do not count centers whose websites lack discussion of race-related issues as DEI centers or offices for the purposes of this article (Thomas 2020). Centers focused solely on women’s issues or LGBTQ+ issues, for example, are better conceptualized as more specific “women’s centers” or “LGBTQ+ centers,” particularly as they often exist alongside more general DEI centers (Coley, Muniruzzaman, and Islam 2025; Fine 2012). Similarly, centers focused on only one racial or ethnic group, such as Black cultural centers, are best conceptualized as culture centers that are distinct from more general DEI centers ().

4

However, found that although elite colleges and universities are likely to signal the importance of diversity in their initiatives, they do not necessarily have a greater share of diverse students compared with nonelite colleges and universities.

5

See U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Widmar v. Vincent (1981) and Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010).

Author Biographies

Jessica L. Schachle-Gordon is an assistant professor of sociology at Stephen F. Austin State University. Her areas of interest include education, social movements, race and ethnicity, and gender and sexuality. Her most recent work examines contestation over gender, sexuality, and critical race theory in Oklahoma’s public schools. She has published her research in journals such as Sociological Forum, Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, and Work and Occupations.

Jonathan S. Coley is an associate professor of sociology at Oklahoma State University and editor-in-chief of The Sociological Quarterly. His research examines activism and inequalities within U.S. higher education. His first book, Gay on God’s Campus, was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2018. His research has also been published in journals such as the American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Mobilization, Sociology of Religion, and Sociology of Education.

Daniel Tetteh is a graduate student at Oklahoma State University. His research interests include criminology, deviance, social movements, and social inequality. His current research project, “Religious Individualism vs Authority: Influencing Attitudes towards LGBTQ Rights,” seeks to understand how deferral to religious authority may influence attitudes toward religiously based services refusal, antidiscrimination laws, and same-sex marriage.

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