Abstract
This article examines the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Albania and the Islamic Republic of Iran, culminating in the severance of ties in September 2022. It argues that relocating the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a long-standing adversary of Tehran, to Albanian territory was a critical turning point in bilateral relations. While the Western Balkans have experienced renewed geopolitical competition, Iran pursued a relatively sophisticated approach in the region, emphasizing cultural diplomacy and soft-power instruments. Drawing on qualitative analysis of official political statements, diplomatic correspondence, and Albanian media coverage, the article explores Albania’s acceptance of the MEK and the subsequent escalation of tensions with Iran. The findings show that Albania’s close alignment with US policy preferences, particularly regarding the hosting of the MEK, contributed to a significant recalibration of Tehran’s stance toward Tirana. This process accelerated the diplomatic breakdown and culminated in cyberattacks attributed to Iran against Albanian state institutions. The case highlights the vulnerability of small states operating within overlapping zones of influence and illustrates how external security alignments can rapidly alter bilateral relations.
Introduction
In the past three decades, the Western Balkans have undergone significant political and strategic transformations, driven by the transition from centralized economic systems to market-oriented economies and from authoritarian to liberal democratic governance. These changes have unfolded within a dynamic geopolitical environment shaped by both internal developments and external actors (Abazi, 2021; Huskić, 2023). While the USA has played a central role in the region, primarily through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led security frameworks, the European Union (EU) has sought to anchor the Western Balkans within its institutional and economic structures through the enlargement process (Beshku, 2025; Zorić & Stojarová, 2023). Recent scholarship, however, highlights a relative slowdown in EU integration in parts of the Western Balkans, particularly Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia, due to overlapping crises, including economic instability, migration pressures, and internal challenges within the EU itself (Bieber & Tzifakis, 2019; Jaćimović et al., 2023; Zogu, 2025). At the same time, strategic attention from the USA has increasingly shifted toward other global priorities, creating perceived openings for additional external actors to expand their engagement in the region. Within this evolving context, several non-Western actors, most notably China, Russia, Türkiye, and Gulf Arab states, have intensified their political, economic, and cultural presence in the Western Balkans (Abazi, 2021; Huskić, 2023). While Türkiye’s role has been widely examined due to its historical and confessional ties to the region (Zorić, 2024), Iran’s engagement has received comparatively limited scholarly attention. Recent scholarship only briefly mentions Iran, despite its historical ties to the Balkans and current cultural and political activities (Durguti, 2025; Stanković & Milosavljević, 2025). Although contemporary Iranian foreign policy is frequently analyzed through the lens of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s involvement in the Balkans dates back several centuries (Asayesh & Darmani, 2009).
Following the Cold War, Iran’s presence in the region has generally been characterized by a cautious, low-profile strategy that emphasizes cultural outreach and soft-power instruments rather than extensive political or economic involvement (Rrustemi, 2019). This approach was shaped, in part, by Iran’s awareness of the Western Balkans’ strategic sensitivity and the dominant influence of Western institutions in the region. This pattern of limited engagement became increasingly strained following Albania’s decision to host the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an important Iranian opposition organization. The relocation of MEK members to Albania, strongly supported by the USA on humanitarian and security grounds, marked a critical turning point in bilateral relations. For the Islamic Republic, the presence of an organized opposition group operating from Albanian territory was perceived as a direct challenge to its political and security interests.
Consequently, Albania assumed heightened strategic significance within Iran’s regional outlook, fundamentally altering the nature of bilateral interactions and setting the stage for escalating diplomatic tensions. These tensions culminated in a series of cyberattacks against Albanian state institutions in 2022, which the Albanian government formally attributed to Iran and which directly preceded the severance of diplomatic relations in September 2022. This series of events marked a significant shift from limited cultural engagement to open diplomatic confrontation and represents one of the most serious ruptures between the Islamic Republic of Iran and a European state in recent years. Given these circumstances, the article focuses more on Iran’s approach to Albania than on the Western Balkans as a whole. It examines the following research questions: (a) How did Iran’s engagement with Albania evolve from cultural and religious outreach to diplomatic confrontation, and (b) To what extent did Albania’s hosting of the MEK contribute to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries?
The overall argument is that while Iran’s initial overtures toward Albania relied on soft power and cultural diplomacy, the MEK’s establishment, coupled with Albania’s alignment with US security priorities, progressively transformed bilateral relations, prompting Iranian retaliatory measures that escalated to cyberattacks and diplomatic severance in September 2022. To substantiate this argument, the article chooses an organizational structure that is slightly conservative but effective and instructive. This structure is intended to clearly show both the analytical steps taken during the research process and the logical connections between its various stages. Thus, the first section outlines the methodological and conceptual approach guiding the research. The second section delves into Iran’s cultural and political engagement with the Western Balkans. The third section examines Iran–Albania relations after the collapse of the communist system, focusing on religious and cultural ties. The fourth section discusses the MEK’s establishment in Albania and its impact on bilateral relations. The fifth section examines the cyberattacks on Albania in 2022 and the subsequent breakdown in diplomatic relations. The conclusion summarizes the findings, answers the research questions, and discusses the article’s limitations and directions for future research.
Methodological Approach
The analysis presented in this article is based on a qualitative case-study approach, which is particularly appropriate for examining the evolution of Iran–Albania relations and the factors that led to the breakdown of diplomatic ties. This approach allows an in-depth understanding of political narratives, ideological positioning, and practices of cultural diplomacy that are highly context-dependent and not readily captured through quantitative methods (Clark et al., 2021; Creswell & Poth, 2016). The analysis focuses on the period from 2013 to September 2022, which corresponds to the MEK’s relocation to Albania and the subsequent deterioration of bilateral relations, culminating in the severance of diplomatic ties. This timeframe was chosen given that 2013 marks the beginning of the organized relocation of MEK members to Albania, and September 2022 marks the formal diplomatic confrontation between the two states as a result of cyberattacks attributed to Iranian actors, thus capturing both the phase of cultural engagement as well as the transition toward open diplomatic confrontation. Sources have been compiled in Albanian and English, enabling cross-linguistic comparison and reducing interpretive bias. All non-English materials were translated, and, where possible, translations were cross-checked against parallel English-language reporting to ensure accurate interpretation.
The article is further facilitated by qualitative document analysis from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official statements, policy documents, institutional reports, and public speeches issued by Albanian and Iranian state institutions, as well as communications and reports issued by the US government and NATO. The corpus was constructed by selecting documents that directly addressed bilateral relations, the MEK’s presence in Albania, cultural diplomacy initiatives, cybersecurity developments, or diplomatic escalation. Only documents with identifiable institutional authorship and verifiable publication records were included in the analysis. These materials are supported with verified reporting from nationally recognized Albanian media outlets. In the context of this article, major Albanian newspapers refer to nationally distributed media organizations with consistent publication records, established editorial standards, and accessible archives, such as Top Channel, Vizion Plus, and Balkan Insight. Media reports were used primarily for contextual corroboration and event verification rather than as independent evidentiary sources. Meanwhile, secondary sources include peer-reviewed academic literature and policy analyses (Bria, 2023; Zaimi, 2022) published in internationally recognized journals and research institutions. Opinion pieces, anonymous online content, unverified reports, and social media commentary not linked to verified institutional accounts were excluded from the analysis to maintain transparency, source reliability, and methodological rigor.
Functionally, this article combines thematic analysis and critical discourse analysis. Thematic analysis was used primarily to identify recurring patterns in cultural diplomacy, soft power initiatives, MEK presence, cyber incidents, and diplomatic escalation. The coding process followed an iterative procedure, beginning with open coding to identify recurring themes in the collected material, followed by grouping these themes into broader analytical categories, including cultural diplomacy initiatives, soft power framing, securitization language, cyber conflict narratives, and indicators of diplomatic rupture. Coding reliability was ensured through iterative review and triangulation across multiple independent sources, including Iranian, Albanian, the USA, and NATO documents, as well as independent media and academic analyses addressing the same developments. Critical discourse analysis enabled an examination of how key actors framed security threats, ideological influence, and legitimacy in official narratives and public statements.
In addition to these aspects, the article includes several key concepts. Thus, soft power has been defined as a state’s ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion (Kurmangali et al., 2025; Nye, 2004, 2008), while cultural diplomacy refers to state-sponsored efforts to promote cultural, religious, or educational engagement as foreign policy tools (Bria, 2023). In the context of this article, soft power is treated as the broader strategic capacity of attraction, whereas cultural diplomacy represents one of its operational instruments. The term proxies, for short, refers to non-state actors who receive financial, logistical, or political support from a state while maintaining formal autonomy, whereas zones of influence are geographic areas in which external actors seek long-term political, cultural, or security leverage without direct territorial control (Maddocks, 2025; McWeeney & Harrington, 2026). All these definitions serve to ensure conceptual consistency and analytical clarity throughout the article. However, quantitative methods were excluded from this article because they cannot capture the semantic depth, historical context, and interpretive dimensions central to Iran–Albania relations. The qualitative approach was therefore selected as a deliberate methodological choice aligned with the interpretive and discourse-oriented nature of the research question. In doing so, the article aims to provide a thorough and contextually grounded account of the events that led to the breakdown of Iranian–Albanian diplomatic relations.
Iran’s Cultural and Political Influence in the Western Balkans
Various foreign policy scholars have extensively examined Iran’s longstanding historical, political, and cultural ties to the Western Balkans (Asayesh & Darmani, 2009; Pugliese, 2015; Progonati, 2016). According to Ali Dawani (1992), while the Silk Road extended to Dubrovnik in western Bosnia and southern Croatia, Iranian traders and culture had already reached the region before the Fatimids arrived in Bosnia, leaving a lasting impression. Iran’s presence in the area dates back to around
Over the last three decades, Iran’s engagement in the Western Balkans can be understood through three interconnected factors that reflect different modalities of influence and align with the conceptual distinctions used. As mentioned, soft power refers to a state’s ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion or material incentives (Kurmangali et al., 2025; Nye, 2008). Cultural diplomacy, on the other hand, is a form of soft power that involves state-sponsored efforts to promote cultural, religious, or educational engagement abroad to shape perceptions and establish long-term legitimacy (Bria, 2023; Nomani & Husain, 2026). While soft power constitutes the broader strategic capacity of attraction, cultural diplomacy functions as one of its operational mechanisms (Nye, 2004). Likewise, military assistance and proxy engagement are forms of hard-power projection, while cultural outreach and institutional cooperation are instruments of cultural diplomacy operating within this broader soft-power framework. The identification of these mechanisms enables a more detailed assessment of Iranian activities in the region.
The first factor concerns Iran’s use of military and political instruments, reflecting hard-power strategies to influence local dynamics. This included logistical and advisory support to regional actors and the deployment of proxies. This approach was particularly evident during the Bosnian War (1992–1995), when Iran reportedly supplied arms and ammunition to Bosnian forces (Pugliese, 2015). Thousands of mujahideen participated on the Bosnian front in 1993, supported by personnel linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Progonati, 2016). While Iran’s intervention primarily affected the internal balance among Islamic communities rather than determining overall military outcomes, it contributed to Iran’s recognition as a regional actor. Tehran maintained this presence even after the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which sought in part to limit external military influence in Bosnia and the wider Western Balkans.
The second factor stems from Iran’s deployment of cultural diplomacy, emphasizing economic, educational, and religious engagement through a network of state-affiliated and non-governmental organizations in the Balkans. Here, Iran’s strategy has consistently relied on soft power instruments to cultivate influence and legitimacy in local Muslim communities. In Bosnia, for example, the Iranian Cultural Centre, established in Sarajevo in 1995, serves as a hub for cultural and academic outreach (Bria, 2023). At the same time, pro-Shia factions in Bosnia maintain intellectual, political, and business connections with Iranian elites, while institutions such as the Mulla Sadra Foundation, overseen by Iran’s Supreme Leader’s representative to the Balkans, focus on religious conversion and the dissemination of Shia Islamic thought (Berkolli, 2021). Though named after the Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra, the foundation has published more works by Ayatollah Khomeini than by its eponym, signaling alignment with Tehran’s political ideology. Similarly, the Ibn Sina Institute, based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducts extensive cultural, educational, and scientific activities in Croatia and Serbia, demonstrating Iran’s commitment to soft power projection in the region (Bria, 2023).
The third factor involves the strengthening of selective diplomatic and political ties. Iran has strategically invoked religious and historical affiliations to expand influence, adapting its approach according to local demographics. In this context, Serbia, a predominantly Orthodox Christian country, represents Iran’s closest Balkan ally, despite historical hostility during the Bosnian War. During that conflict, for example, Iran supported Bosniaks against Serbian forces under Slobodan Milošević, whom Tehran held responsible for atrocities against Muslims. In the post-war period, however, Iran and Serbia developed closer cooperation, reflecting shifting geopolitical dynamics and Serbia’s cautious engagement with the EU. Measures such as Serbia’s 2017 abolition of visa requirements for Iranian nationals illustrate Tehran’s growing access to the Serbian market and political environment.
In North Macedonia, Iran has additionally leveraged religious and ethnic tensions to expand its influence, supporting Albanian political movements such as the Alternative party and select Albanian imams in Skopje (Berkolli, 2021). Meanwhile, Kosovo presents a particularly complex case because Iran considers Kosovo’s independence to be a US-led initiative and does not formally recognize it. Nonetheless, Tehran has targeted Kosovo’s Shia communities through proxy institutions such as the Cultural Centre at the Iranian Embassy in Belgrade and the Cultural Association of the Quran, which was previously affiliated with Al-Mustafa University. These institutions have translated religious and political texts into Serbian and engaged with communities in Prizren and Gjakova, despite representing a small number of Shia believers, estimated at fewer than 50 individuals (Berkolli, 2021). Moreover, between 2005 and 2015, Iranian-backed organizations in Kosovo reportedly received hundreds of thousands of euros, prompting authorities to ban several institutions in 2016 due to concerns over political propaganda, Shia proselytism, and connections to Iran (Progonati, 2016).
To summarize, this section argues that Iran has consistently maintained a prudent approach in the Western Balkans over the past three decades. While direct military intervention has been limited to rare cases, such as Bosnia during the war, Tehran has prioritized cultural and religious outreach, trade initiatives, and the development of proxy networks. These strategies are intended to maximize influence while minimizing conflict with Western actors such as the US, the EU, and NATO (Palik, 2021). Iran’s Balkan approach differs significantly from its methods in other regions such as the Middle East or the Caucasus, where it combines trade, cultural influence, and organized proxy networks to secure political leverage and protect Shia communities (Jahanbani & Levy, 2023; Monshipouri & Heiran-Nia, 2021). As will be discussed in the following section, these networks sometimes draw on the legitimacy of Shia Islamic tradition or, more accurately, Persian cultural heritage, particularly in Albania.
Iranian Cultural Approach Toward Albania
The previous section has been dedicated to proving that Iran has maintained consistent, if nuanced, political and cultural ties with the Western Balkans. Conventional interpretations of Iranian foreign policy often frame it as primarily ideologically driven, frequently taking the Islamic Republic’s official rhetoric at face value (Akbarzadeh & Barry, 2016). However, a closer examination of Iran’s engagement in Albania suggests a more complex, multi-layered strategy that combines historical consciousness, cultural diplomacy, and soft power, rather than overt political coercion. Historically, Iran positions itself as the heir to a pre-Islamic civilization that contributed significantly to the broader development of Islamic culture and civilization (Clark, 2012; Cohen & Shamci, 2022). This civilizational perspective informs Iran’s contemporary foreign policy, particularly in regions such as the Balkans, where cultural and religious connections can complement strategic interests. Within this framework, Iran, alongside other regional actors such as Gulf countries and Turkey, has adopted a calibrated approach toward Albania following its transition from a communist regime, emphasizing cultural and academic engagement while maintaining a low-profile political presence.
On top of this, in the early 1990s, Albania and Bosnia emerged as critical hubs for Iranian clerical and cultural initiatives in continental Europe. Unlike in Bosnia, where Iranian policy combined military, economic, and cultural dimensions, Iran’s engagement in Albania has remained largely symbolic and cultural, focusing on fostering academic networks, cultural awareness, and soft-power initiatives rather than on direct military involvement or economic investments (Bria, 2023). Bria (2023) further elaborates that this policy of soft power has allowed Iranian institutions, including the Islamic IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), to extend their influence indirectly through cultural and educational organizations, operating in ways that avoid overt confrontation with Western institutions or Albanian authorities. In this respect, the Saadi Shirazi Cultural Foundation, established in Tirana in 1995, represents the earliest organized manifestation of Iranian cultural diplomacy in Albania (Berkolli, 2021). The foundation was designed to promote awareness of Iranian cultural heritage, strengthen historical and civilizational ties between Iran and Albania, and foster intellectual and scholarly exchanges. Its activities include publishing Perla, a scientific–cultural journal widely recognized within Albania’s academic community. Over the years, the Saadi Shirazi Foundation has cultivated extensive networks among Albanian intellectuals, academics, and cultural actors, and has also facilitated collaborative projects with the Iranian Embassy in Tirana. By their very nature, these initiatives reflect Iran’s strategic use of soft power, seeking to establish influence through culture, education, and civil society rather than through coercive measures.
In addition to educational and cultural outreach, Iran has cultivated relationships with Albania’s Sufi communities, particularly the Bektashi order, which has historically been a prominent religious group in the country. Along this line, Iranian support has included the importation of Shi’ite icons depicting Ali, Hussein, Hassan, and the Twelve Imams, symbolizing religious and cultural solidarity (Bria & Mayerà, 2017). Despite these overtures, the Bektashi community has consistently preserved its ideological and organizational independence. Thus, Bektashi leaders have publicly rejected radical and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, including those associated with Iran, framing their religious identity as a progressive, democratic “third way” positioned between Islam and Christianity (Clayer, 2006). Indeed, this dynamic demonstrates the limitations of Iranian soft power in a context marked by long-standing local religious traditions and secular national values. However, Iran’s cultural presence in Albania must be viewed in the context of larger regional competition. In this regard, Elbasani et al. (2015) provide evidence that Iran’s efforts intersect with those of other Muslim actors, particularly Saudi Arabian and Turkish organizations, which have invested in mosques, schools, and scholarships to cultivate influence. For instance, Saudi funding and Turkey’s investment in educational infrastructure, particularly since 2000, illustrate the competitive environment in which Iran operates (Öktem, 2010).
These dynamics are important because they underscore that Iran’s cultural diplomacy in Albania is not merely unilateral but operates within a complex, multi-actor regional landscape, where religious, political, and educational instruments are leveraged to exert influence. Moreover, the limited penetration of Shi’a Islam in Albania also reflects the country’s deeply secular national identity. While approximately 65% of Albanians identify as Muslim, religious adherence is often secondary to national identity, assumed as a personal choice, or regarded as a vestige of historical tradition rather than a defining social norm (Bria, 2023). In this case, secularization, reinforced during the socialist period through atheistic and anti-religious propaganda, has contributed to an Albanian national identity in which language, ethnicity, and civic values often outweigh religious affiliation. Hence, the spread of Iranian-backed Shi’a networks remains constrained, and soft power initiatives operate primarily within academic and intellectual spheres rather than broad societal adoption.
Economically, Albania and the Islamic Republic had an asymmetrical and modest relationship, with Iranian exports dominating. Trade exchanges between the two countries reached their highest value over the last 7 years in 2021. Iran exported about $5.9 million worth of commodities to Albania in 2021, which was significantly higher than the figure for 2020. Iran’s exports to Albania in 2020 were about $2.2 million. According to the Tehran Times (2022), the top Iranian goods exported to Balkan markets, particularly Albania, are foodstuffs, dates, dried fruits, pistachios, saffron, carpets, construction stones, glass and crystals, petroleum, petrochemical and chemical materials, textiles, metal products, and electrical machinery and tools. For the year 2024, statistics indicate that the imports from Iran were $3.95M (Trading Economics, 2024). But there was no recovery scheduled for 2025, as severed ties, sanctions, and cyber hostilities obstruct formal channels, highlighting trade’s vulnerability to security-driven foreign policy shifts.
However, geopolitical considerations significantly shape Iran’s approach to Albania. Thus, since the late 1990s, the USA, as an invested actor, has sought to prevent the expansion of radical Islamic networks, including Iranian-linked initiatives, through its dominant presence in the region. From this perspective, Albania’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, from NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1992 to full NATO membership in 2009, demonstrates the country’s gradual alignment with Western security and political norms (Hendrickson et al., 2006). Despite these alignments, Albania has continued to act as a bridge between Western and Eastern actors, maintaining relationships with both European and Islamic countries. For example, its membership in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation since 1992 exemplifies this nuanced foreign policy approach (Kullolli, 2009). Although the USA has historically tolerated Iran’s limited cultural presence, this tolerance has become conditional and increasingly constrained by geopolitical developments, particularly US military activities in the early 2010s and shifting dynamics in the Middle East (Mazhar & Goraya, 2014). These developments, combined with Albania’s pro-Western orientation, paved the way for heightened tensions that ultimately shaped the trajectory of Iran–Albania relations through the years 2013–2022, laying the groundwork, as will be shown in what follows, for political confrontations.
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq and Its Establishment in Albania
Building on the prior analysis of Iran’s cultural diplomacy in the Western Balkans, this section will further examine the MEK’s role in shaping Albania’s contemporary political and security landscape. Tehran’s broader foreign policy has generally concentrated on fostering cultural and political influence through civil society organizations and proxies (Barzegar & Divsallar, 2017; Martin, 2003). Albania, like other Balkan states, has gone through profound political, economic, and socio-religious changes over the last three decades. These shifts from a closed, authoritarian system to a more open society have created opportunities for external actors, including Iran and the MEK, to perceive the country as strategically significant for advancing ideological, political, and security objectives.
Following this line of analysis, the MEK was founded in 1965 by Tehran University students who opposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, viewing him as a US-backed leader who brought Western influences to Iran (Abrahamian, 1992; Goulka et al., 2009). In essence, the organization’s ideology merged Islamic principles with Marxist thought, advocating for armed resistance to the Shah’s regime. The name Mujahedin-e-Khalq, which means “People’s Holy Warriors,” reflects this combination of religious and revolutionary rhetoric (US Department of State, 1994). Following early confrontations with the Shah’s secret police in the early 1970s, which resulted in the execution of the group’s founders, the MEK continued to target both domestic and Western interests, demonstrating organizational resilience and ideological adaptability. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the MEK first sided with Ayatollah Khomeini before being put down by the new theocratic government, which targeted its leadership and barred MEK members from holding public office. Throughout the 1980s, the organization gained prominence as an anti-regime force, ultimately relocating many of its supporters to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of 1981–1988 (US Department of State, 1994). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, after renouncing terrorist activities, the MEK was removed from the US list of designated terrorist organizations in 2012, enabling greater international mobility and legitimacy (US Department of State, September 28, 2012). The MEK’s relocation from Iraq was precipitated by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the ensuing inability of the Iraqi government to provide protection from Iranian pressure (Thomas, 2025). The USA, in coordination with the UN, sought European states to host the organization, but Albania was the only state to fully accommodate the MEK, reflecting Tirana’s close alignment with US policy objectives in the Western Balkans. Between 2013 and 2014, the Albanian government admitted approximately 200 MEK members; this population has since grown to roughly 2,500 members under subsequent agreements with US authorities (International Committee of Jurists for the Rights of Ashraf-3 Residents, 2026). The largest contingent, approximately 1,900 members, relocated to Tirana in 2016 under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2017, the MEK leadership, supported by the US Embassy and the Albanian government, established a new operational base in Durrës, the country’s principal port city (International Committee of Jurists for the Rights of Ashraf-3 Residents, 2026). Taking these factors into account and using data from Spahiu (2018), we present the MEK’s organizational structure in Albania for 2013–2025 in Table 1.
Organizational Structure of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in Albania (2013–2025).
Undoubtedly, the facility’s construction included commitments to deradicalization and rehabilitation programs, which were requirements of the US–Albania partnership (US Department of State, 2013). Albanian authorities have publicly declared that the MEK does not constitute a domestic security threat. As Albania’s Interior Minister Sandër Lleshaj stated in an interview with Vizion Plus, the organization is “a friendly gesture” whose political activities are separate from domestic concerns (Lleshaj, 2018).
Figure 1 illustrates the Ashraf-3 compound, which serves as the primary settlement and operational center for the MEK in Albania. The compound comprises several residential and functional buildings organized around a secure perimeter. The layout incorporates both residential and administrative structures, with areas likely reserved for training, logistics, and cultural activities. Satellite imagery reveals the building’s huge footprint and strategic location near Durrës, Albania’s main port, which facilitates both accessibility and security oversight. As an exiled opposition group, the MEK considers Albania a safe haven, insulated from Iranian retaliation. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran treats the MEK’s presence as a direct challenge to its influence in the Western Balkans. For the Albanian government, hosting the group reinforces its alignment with US policy and enhances its international credibility, particularly in Washington’s eyes (US Department of State, 2013). The MEK’s establishment in Albania, therefore, represents a critical intersection of humanitarian, security, and geopolitical considerations. However, as we shall see in what follows, while providing the organization with a new operational base, the settlement raised tensions in bilateral relations with Iran, laying the groundwork for future diplomatic confrontations.
Iran–Albania Diplomatic Relations
Given the heightened tensions with Iran and the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East, the construction of Camp Ashraf III and the establishment of the MEK in Albania represent significant advances in the US strategy to curtail Iranian influence in the Western Balkans. Concurrently, Iran’s engagement with the Balkans and Albania declined in parallel with the exponential growth of the MEK population and, more importantly, their political influence within various US political circles. For instance, some Members of Congress have remained engaged in MEK-related issues (National Council of Resistance of Iran, US Representative Office, 2016, September 2). On July 13, 2019, numerous dignitaries attended the MEK’s annual conference at Camp Ashraf III, including Rudolph Giuliani, Joe Lieberman, former US Senator Robert Torricelli, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and former French Interior and Defense Minister Alain Juppé, among others. Delegations from France, Italy, and the UK also participated (Bria, 2023). In her opening remarks, Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the MEK, condemned the Iranian government’s terrorist actions against the MEK (Siragusa, 2022). According to Bria (2023), the involvement of these political figures from Western and European nations should be understood as expressions of partial Western political support for the US geopolitical strategy in the region, which remains complex and multifaceted. Moreover, the USA and its diplomatic allies have framed the MEK cause as a humanitarian issue, employing rhetoric centered on equality and human rights to garner international support (US Department of State, 2013).
Aware of this, the Iranian Embassy in Albania strongly opposed the MEK’s presence, attempting to discredit the organization by labeling it as a terrorist organization and engaging in hostile propaganda. In response to these activities, Albania expelled Iranian Ambassador Gholam Hossein Mohammadnia and several of his associates on December 20, 2018, declaring them personae non grata for alleged terrorist operations targeting the MEK on Albanian soil (Rusta, 2018). Albania’s Foreign Minister, Gent Cakaj, stated that the two diplomats were expelled for engaging in activities incompatible with their diplomatic status, citing violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Balkan Insight, 2020). The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, condemned the expulsions as “intolerable,” accusing Albania of manipulation by a US-Israeli narrative. More concretely, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bahram Qassemi claimed that the expulsions were conducted in cooperation with terrorist organizations opposed to Iran and in response to pressure from the US government and “the security services of the Zionist regime.” He also asserted that Albania, which had originally enjoyed cordial relations with Iran, had fallen victim to malicious schemes that fabricated false accusations against Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2022).
Prior to this diplomatic rupture, allegations surfaced of an Iranian-planned terrorist attack during the 2016 Albania–Israel football match, leading to the detention of several Iranians and Albanians. However, the Albanian government has never publicly disclosed evidence of any terrorist activities involving the Iranian ambassador. Following escalating diplomatic tensions, on January 8, 2020, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described Albania as a “troublesome European state” that provided sanctuary to Iran’s adversaries. He accused Albania of collaborating with “Iranian traitors” and engaging in conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran (Top Channel TV, 2020, January 8).
In response, Albania’s President Ilir Meta asserted that Albania is a democratic country that had endured a brutal dictatorship and now cherishes human rights as sacred values (Meta, 2020). Subsequently, in 2021, Albania expelled three Iranian journalists, Firouz Baghernejad, Mohammad Heydar Allauddin, and Muhammad Alavi-Gonabadi, who were reportedly operatives of Iran’s MOIS, assigned to surveil MEK activities (Zaimi, 2022). These developments precipitated shifts in Iranian foreign policy toward Albania. In 2022, the annual MEK summit, initially scheduled for July 23–24 at Camp Ashraf III in Manëz, was postponed to September 5 amid credible threats of terrorist attacks against the event. This decision followed warnings from the Albanian government and the US Embassy, which cautioned that Iran was preparing violent disruptions (US Embassy in Albania, 2022). Shortly thereafter, the IRGC-affiliated news agency Fars reported that Iran might employ missiles and drones to attack the MEK facilities in Albania (Fars News Agency, 2022). Over time, mounting evidence emerged implicating Iran in special operations targeting Albania. In August 2022, Albanian authorities arrested Batool Soltani, an Iranian–German dual citizen, and her spouse, Afshin Kalantari, who were suspected of planning terrorist attacks on Albanian soil. In a video statement on September 7, 2022, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama announced the government’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran in response to a series of state-sponsored cyberattacks targeting the nation’s digital infrastructure earlier that year (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022, September 7).
In retaliation, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani described Albania’s decision as unfounded and a product of a US and Israeli conspiracy. He criticized immediate political and media responses following Albania’s announcement, highlighting statements from the US administration and allied media as evidence of a calculated effort to vilify Iran. Kanaani expressed regret over Albania hosting a “marked terrorist cult” and accused Tirana of succumbing to external influences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2022, September 8). A hacker group linked to Iran, known as Homeland Justice, launched cyberattacks against official Albanian government databases, leaking stolen data on the Telegram platform (Zaimi, 2022). Here, “cyber incidents” refer broadly to unexpected disruptive events; “cyber hostilities” indicate politically motivated but not necessarily destructive operations; and “cyberattacks” denote deliberate acts intended to harm, disrupt, or compromise critical infrastructure (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2025; Prescott, 2012). The events involving Homeland Justice clearly constitute cyberattacks, given their targeted and destructive nature. This group was already familiar in Albania prior to the summer cyberattacks, as acknowledged by Prime Minister Rama. Homeland Justice hacked into confidential communications between diplomatic missions accredited to Tirana, as well as email correspondence between the Prime Minister and Albanian citizens, and released them on Telegram.
In response, Albania engaged US cybersecurity firms Mandiant and Microsoft to investigate the incidents (Mandiant Report, 2022). Concurrently, investigations conducted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) corroborated these findings, identifying Homeland Justice as an Iranian state-sponsored cyber actor responsible for the July 2022 removal of Albanian government websites and services (The Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2022, September 21). Mandiant experts concluded that the attacks were motivated by Iran’s desire for retaliation in response to Albania’s hosting of MEK members (Mandiant Report, 2022). Furthermore, NATO strongly condemned these cyberattacks, calling them “criminal cyber activities aimed at disrupting the daily lives of citizens and destabilizing the security of an ally” (NATO, 2022). Likewise, the US Department of State stated on September 9, 2022, denouncing the cyberattacks and imposing sanctions on Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib and the MOIS for “malign cyber activities” (US Department of State, 2022, September 9). For Shay (2020), Iran has been the world’s largest state sponsor of proxy groups for nearly four decades. Its primary targets include Iranian dissidents in Europe, Israel, and the global Jewish community, the USA, and the EU. Tehran has consistently adapted its definition of “enemy” in response to shifting domestic and international political contexts, and has distributed approximately $1 billion annually to its proxies worldwide (Shay, 2020). Cybersecurity experts increasingly recognize Iran as a formidable cyber warfare actor, capable of conducting campaigns comparable to those of historically advanced nations such as China, Russia, Israel, and the USA (Amaliya, 2025; Assoudeh, 2020). Iran frequently employs cyberattacks in retaliation against sanctions or perceived provocations, as evidenced in the case of Albania, which Iranian authorities blame for providing sanctuary to the MEK.
Nevertheless, the main beneficiaries are Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Palestinian groups; the Houthis in Yemen; and Shia militia networks in Iraq and Syria. Following the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, Iran-aligned militias did not disappear from the regional security landscape; instead, their operational footprint shifted as Tehran’s proxy forces adapted to changing circumstances. In this context, the US Department of State has categorized multiple Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as foreign terrorist organizations, reflecting the US official assessment that these networks remain active and integrated into Iran’s broader regional strategy. Moreover, Iran continues to be listed by the USA as a State Sponsor of Terrorism due to its enduring material, financial, and operational support for such armed actors across the Middle East (US Department of State, 2025). In the region, Albania and other Balkan countries represent confirmed targets of Iranian terror plots as part of Iran’s declaration of retaliation for the killing of Al Quds commander Qassem Soleimani (Tabatabai, 2020). Therefore, Iran’s strategic position in the world, linking the East to the West and offering a geographical alternative to Russia and other actors, naturally extends to the Western Balkans (Rrustemi, 2019). Moreover, in a context of rivalry, there are differences between Albanian and Iranian foreign policies. In this manner, it becomes apparent that the two countries are in radically different positions and that normalization of their relations is unlikely to occur soon.
Conclusions
This article has examined the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Albania and the Islamic Republic of Iran, triggered by the relocation of the MEK, Tehran’s principal opposition group, to Albanian soil. Using a qualitative case-study approach, the analysis focused on Iran’s historical and cultural engagement in the Western Balkans, the hosting of the MEK in Albania, and the resulting diplomatic consequences. The findings indicate that Iran maintained a strategic presence in the Balkans through cultural organizations (Saadi Shirazi Foundation, Mulla Sadra), intelligence, MOIS, and proxy coordination, leveraging the region to advance its broader geopolitical objectives. Albania’s hosting of the MEK, which aligned with US policy priorities, hampered Iran’s diplomatic and intelligence networks in Tirana. The article argued that subsequent Iranian-attributed cyberattacks on Albanian state institutions between September and December 2022 were directly related to the MEK presence and accelerated the formal termination of diplomatic relations.
The article also highlighted Albania’s reliance on USA and NATO assistance to combat hybrid threats, including cyber operations. While Iran’s influence in the Western Balkans remains limited, it continues to pose security challenges, emphasizing the strategic importance of small states in multipolar geopolitical contexts. Despite these contributions, the article recognizes methodological limitations, including reliance on declassified statements, secondary sources, and publicly unavailable reports, which limit access to original diplomatic archives. Taking these factors into account, future research should concentrate on cyber trajectories after 2022, the long-term implications of the MEK settlement in Albania, and the varying responses of other Western Balkan states to Iranian influence.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflict of Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
References
