The Idea of Democracy in Israel: Theoretical Explorations

Abstract

The standard meaning of democracy—a system of governance by the people, for the people, and of the people—has become a debatable narrative. The hesitation to enlarge the scope of democracy to all its beneficiaries or citizens is a major reason for several arguments on democracy. Israel, being a country in the Middle East wherein democracy has not yet been accepted as a mechanism of governance, makes an interesting case to be explored. Its history of democracy and dynamics is unique and has received much theoretical attention. The quintessence of the new argumentations on democracy is “will to democracy” on the part of all citizens in the sense that the will of the people constitutes a decisive factor in making democracy a system for everyone in inclusive form or unmaking democracy as a system for everyone in exclusive form as witnessed in most of the liberal democracies. One can observe that Israel as a society has the will to make the political system inclusive, given its treatment of various Jewish groups who came from different backgrounds and became part of a larger cultural and political society. This has to be and can be extended to the minority, which has the same emotional affiliation to geography and history.

Introduction

The standard meaning of democracy that it is a system of governance by the people, for the people, and of the people, has become a debatable narrative. States hesitating to enlarge the scope of democracy to all its beneficiaries or citizens is a major reason for several arguments on democracy. Every democratic state in the world has one or another problem regarding the non-fulfillment of basic rights toward its citizens. Thus, it is difficult to find a democracy that appeals to every citizen of the country in which he or she has every right to hold it accountable for its delivery mechanism. Democracies worldwide are in crisis-like situations, as many of them have problems dealing with certain sections of their citizens concerning the fulfillment of their political, economic, and social rights. There is a dearth of constitutional or legal guarantees to fulfill the rights of the people in some democracies; in some cases, there is no constitutional guarantee at all. Western democracies may legitimately claim that they are performing well in ensuring equal socio-political rights to all citizens, but not without lacunas. One could find the discrepancy between textual promises and praxis regarding implementation. The societies that were once under European colonial rule and were deprived of several rights became politically independent and began the journey of democracy by looking up to the democratic models as envisaged and constructed by Western societies. There are cases of reformulation of the Western type of democracy to make it suitable for their respective societies. However, in time, the reformulated democracies became accustomed to several changes in the state’s orientation toward socio-cultural existence, which, in reality, have made the model look more like a prototype of the original Western democratic model, wherein majoritarianism is understood as democracy. ¹

There are several misconceptions regarding the idea of democracy. It is generally understood as the rule of the majority in which political aspects, namely elections, are given prime importance, forgetting other equally important aspects of the democracy, that is, economic and social rights. Free elections “alone are not enough to establish, maintain, and guarantee a democratic regime” (Kremnitzer & Krebs, 2011, p. 4). Democracy cannot be effective as a model to be followed if there is widespread and deliberate ignorance regarding social, economic, and political inclusiveness of minorities with different social identities. The ignorance is witnessed not only in Western democracies but also in societies that have become part of the democratic world lately, especially countries from Africa and Asia. The developing world struggles to cope with democratic ideals while dealing with conservative aspects of their societies. Modernity poses a challenge to conservatism, and conservatism in turn poses a threat to modern democratic edifice. Western democracies are pretending to be scared of others who are socially and geographically different from them (Smooha, 2018, pp. 215–236). In contrast, democracies in the Afro-Asian part of the world are constructing the “other” within the societies. Unfair treatment toward others becomes a problem in democratic sustenance. It pushes the system toward more chaos and instability. Consequently, the result would always be the emergence of demagogy under the direction of narcissistic leadership, which itself is not sure what would happen to the system. ²

At present, in the international political system with varying political ideologies from liberalism to communism, some states are democratic, and some are not. Among such varying ideological states, a liberal democratic state extends equal socio-economic and political opportunities to a greater extent to all the members who are its citizens, irrespective of their social affiliations. However, there are several problems in the process of extension of socio-economic and political rights to the cultural minorities. For a long time, various sections, from intellectuals to policymakers, have debated the nature and functions of democracy toward its citizenry. ³

Liberal democracy has always had greater appreciation in the theoretical realm. ⁴ The appreciation went to such an extent that there would be no alternative political ideas and systems regarding feasibility and survivability. Human history has not ended, with Liberal democracy as the last and most accepted political imagination (Fukuyama, 2020). ⁵ Liberal democracy, due to its certain volatile tendencies, is getting democratized with alternate socio-political imaginations, which have not just emerged as an alternative but are the result of socio-political realities. As a result of new theoretical arguments, democracies are assessed and analyzed according to new indicators. Various concepts have been conceptualized regarding the functioning of democracies in different parts of the world (Coppedge et al., 2011, pp. 247–267).

This study makes an effort to explore the theoretical and conceptual argumentations on the evolution and dynamics of democracy in Israel. Israel, being a country in the Middle East, wherein democracy has not yet been accepted as a mechanism of governance (Sandler, 2021) makes an interesting case to be explored. Its history of democracy and dynamics is unique and has received much theoretical attention from scholars such as Sammy Smooha (1990), Alan Dowty (1999), Oren Yiftachel (1992), Assad Ghanem (2011), Nadim Rouhana (1998), A. H. Sa’di (2000), Ayelet Harel-Shalev (2013), and others who have made a significant theoretical contribution in understanding the democracy in Israel.

The founders of the Israeli democratic political system had several challenges before them that they did not consider unsolvable, including the deepening conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. Their deep faith in democracy, which was prevalent in theYishuv during the period of the British Mandate, made them continue with democratic arrangements for the future polity. The objective of the Zionist movement heralded by Theodore Herzl was to create a state for Jews guided by democratic principles (Dowty, 1998a, p. 26). Thus, the present democratic arrangement in Israel is guided by earlier experiences and ideas (Dowty, 1990, pp. 55–84).

Israel does not fulfill all the characteristics of liberal democracies like the United States and the United Kingdom (Cohen-Almgor, 2002, p. 120). If the absence of separation of religion is taken into consideration, Israel becomes a non-liberal country. Separation of religion from state has been the feature of liberalism from its classical version to contemporary understanding. Respect for the socio-political existence of everyone in the political system and the protection of individual liberty are common features of liberal societies. One could observe a combination of a culture close to such features of liberalism and a sense of community political culture in Israel (Neuberger, 1990).

In Israel, all citizens are guaranteed equality before the law irrespective of ethnic affiliation, religious beliefs, political standing, or gender difference. However, the status of the non-Jewish minorities is not well-defined. Nevertheless, on many accounts, Israel is a perfect political democracy because its political system is based on free elections and freedom for all citizens. The Declaration of Independence formally states that the State of Israel promotes the country’s development for the benefit of every inhabitant. It would uphold the socio-political equality of all citizens without any distinctions based on race, creed, or gender (Dowty, 1998b, p. 64). Thus, the declaration includes various democratic values (Neuberger, 2022, p. 111).

Consociational Features in Israel

The plurality of the Israeli society based on the presence of religions like Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Druze, and ethnic divisions like Western and Eastern Jews make the democratic political system unique in the comparative studies on democracies in the world (Ariely, 2021; Neuberger, 1989, pp. 67–75). Its success is linked to certain inherent features of Israeli society and is well-discussed in the theoretical literature on Consociational Democracy and Ethnic Democracy. Generally, differences due to social divisions are responsible for democratic instability. Nevertheless, for political theoreticians like Arend Lijaphart, it is not impossible to maintain democratic stability in a plural society (Daalder, 1974, pp. 604–621; Lijphart, 1969, pp. 207–225; Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). In examining the plural societies wherein the political system is democratic, he came up with a theoretical analysis of a particular form of democracy, namely consociational democracy.

The four major defining features of consociational democracy, according to Lijaphart (1977, p. 25), are grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and a high degree of autonomy for each segment of society. Participation and cooperation on the part of leaders from significant sections of society are well-practiced to govern the country in consociational democracies. The political protection to minority segments due to their presence in the grand coalition is not absolute and foolproof (Lijaphart, 1977, p. 36). Their presence allows them to present the case strongly to other coalition partners. However, there is also a possibility that on important decisions, the majority may disagree and outvote minority interests.

The other feature of consociational democracy is the minority veto. This arrangement could give each segment a complete guarantee of political protection (Lijaphart, 1977, p. 37). The mutual veto system would empower each segment of society on matters of vital concern. Another important feature of consociational democracy is proportionality. Proportionality “is a method of allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments” (Lijaphart, 1977, p. 38). Through proportionality, potentially divisive problems from the decision-making process can be avoided.

The fourth characteristic of consociational democracy is segmental autonomy, which entails minority rule (Lijaphart, 1977, p. 41), which means that the minority rules over areas of its exclusive concerns. Decisions on common interests are made with the involvement of all the segments with some kind of proportional influence, and the decisions and executions of matters other than common interest can be left to each segment. Together with proportionality, the delegation of rule-making and rule-application powers to the segments is a powerful encouragement to the various segmental organizations in their activity (Lijaphart, 1977).

Arend Lijaphart says the Western democracy “with sufficient consociational features to be called a semiconsociational regime is Israel” (1977, p. 129). The important basis for social and political life in Israel is major social divisions, which act as guiding factors for organizational life. Most of the political parties in Israel have their own wider social and economic network (Lijaphart, 1977, p. 130), and different sections of the society enjoy segmental autonomy. However, the Arab minority in Israel is granted only limited religious, linguistic, and cultural autonomy (Yiftachel, 1992a, p. 327). The consociational features of proportionality and mutual veto are strong in Israel. The proportional nature of political representation is reflected in its electoral system. In Israel, the whole country is treated as a single constituency, and its result is representation for even minor sections of the society having their political party. The role of religion is a contentious issue (Horowitz & Lissak, 1989, p. 51; Skorek, 2021). If there is an attempt to alter the role, it would face severe opposition.

As far as the coalition for governance is concerned, modifications have been made to the consociational model in Israeli democracy. From the beginning, it was mainly the Jewish-Zionist political parties that formed the coalition governments in which the Arab political parties were never allowed participation. In June 2021, Israel witnessed a change in this informal political practice due to the compulsions of support for coalitional survivability. A member of an Arab Political grouping was accommodated in the government (Elsana, 2021; Mahler, 2021).

Critical View of the Consociationalism

The theoretical observations on the consociational features of Israeli democracy are not devoid of critical counter-observations. These observations are made due to certain developments that happened in Israeli democracy. According to Reuven Y. Hazan, Israel has illustrated consociational mechanisms in its pre-independence and immediate post-independence period (Hazan, 1999, p. 114). Ideological and religious cleavages are recognized and strengthened. Such recognition has maintained social and political stability like in other European consociational democracies. Elites of socialist and religious camps grew familiar with the accommodation practices to avoid the dangers of separation. Compromise became responsible for the system’s survival (Hazan, 1999, p. 115).

The decline of consociationalism in Israel is traced to its success rather than failure. According to Hazan, the demise of consociationalism in Israel was because “the leadership and sub-cultural institutions of the main secular socialist camp became the official state leaders and agencies when independence was achieved, while the religious sub-culture remained relatively intact, but became financially dependent on the state” (Hazan, 1999, p. 121). To maintain consensus in the newly formed state, segmental autonomy was reduced for the minority religious camp, and the dominant subculture sided with the statehood. These developments are examples of the changing nature of consociational politics in Israel.

Hazan observed that the appearance of majoritarian politics in Israel was due to four major reasons, namely:

the Six Day War and its territorial consequences; (ii) the appearance of a two-bloc party system that altered party relations and systematic mechanics; (iii) changes within the religious sub-culture; and (iv) a new electoral reform law that transformed the entire regime. These changes extend over a period of 32 years, from 1967 to 1999, thus representing a gradual shift toward majoritarianism and away from consensus politics (Hazan, 1999, p. 124).

Before the June War of 1967, the ideological debate that Zionism had about its goals and means was not so active and was almost kept silent. Nevertheless, after the war, the debate reemerged. The idea of complete territorial occupation of the whole of Mandate Palestine started receiving attention on the part of right-wing political camps. The new perceptions regarding the territory resulted in new cleavage in Israeli politics. The left groups associated with the view that territories should be exchanged for peace, whereas the right was not willing to give up the territory (Hazan, 1999, p. 125).

The single-party domination in Israeli politics came to an end in 1977. Labour Party had dominated politics since in 1948 (Rais, 2005, p. 129). The 1977 election brought Likud under Menachem Begin to power (Tessler, 1986, p. 12). The gap in the political strength of the two major political parties started decreasing. Hazan observes:

Israeli party system thus shifted to a competitive bipolar structure, leaving the centrally-located religious parties as the brokers of political power. The ‘historical partnership’ came to an end, since the religious parties were now able to grant either side the necessary majority to form a coalition. While the two major parties competed ferociously for the support of the smaller religious parties, these, in turn, successfully played one off against the other- and not only demanded a much higher fee for their inclusion, but continuously threatened to bring down the government while constantly increasing their demands. (Hazan, 1999, p. 126)

The decline of strong political partnerships and arrangements resulted in the frequent occurrence of weak coalitions. Consequently, national unity governments were formed for the country’s governance, and these developments opened the need for reforming the political system (Hazan, 1999, p. 127).

In reforming the political system, the Knesset enacted a new Basic Law: The Government in 1992. The main provision of this law was the direct election of the Prime Minister. The impact of this law could be seen not only in the electoral system but also in the entire political system of Israel (Diskin, 1999, pp. 488–515; Edelman, 2000, pp. 1–27; Hazan, 1999, p. 127). As per the law, voters could cast two votes, one for the prime minister and another for the party list. The tenure of the prime minister was made concurrent with that of the Knesset, and the latter could remove the prime minister by a vote of non-confidence. If the prime minister was removed, the Knesset would have to be dissolved, and a new election would be announced. The direct election for the prime ministerial position had a huge effect on the overall democratic dynamics. It raised whether Israeli democracy was moving toward a majoritarian form (Hazan, 1999, p. 127). The changes in the electoral system did not meet the goals, so in March 2001, the Knesset scrapped direct elections (Dyduch, 2021; Ottolenghi, 2002, p. 88).

Ethnic versus Consociational Debate

The theoretical model for understanding and exploring the transition to democracy in ethnically divided societies was put forth by Sammy Smooha, which he terms Ethnic Democracy, which is distinct from the majoritarian and consociational models. Such democracies “combine the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutionalized dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups” (Smooha, 1990, p. 391). Smooha observes that the democratization of ethnic states, which have minorities, does not necessarily mean a shift toward either consociationalism or majoritarianism. “It is possible that a few of the democracies that are at present imprecisely defined as liberal or consociational are in fact ethnic democracies” (Smooha, 1997, p. 200).

Smooha’s understanding is that Israel’s claim to be both a democratic and ethnic state is a proclamation of ethnic democracy. According to him, Israel qualifies as a political democracy because of universal voting rights, fair elections, civil rights, professional press, independent judiciary, etc. It is ethnic because of Jewish orientation, which is reflected in many spheres of life for the benefit of its Jewish citizens (Smooha, 1990, pp. 392–393). The status of Arabs in Israel is an important and basic challenge to Israel. The Arab minority in Israel has grievances not only regarding equal socio-economic status but also about the nature of the state. The Arabs’ demands for a change of character of the Jewish state are not acceptable to the Jews (Smooha, 1990, p. 395). This raises a question about the way out for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state in the context of its Arab minority.

Smooha observes that Israel would not get away with its ideological belief in Zionism or transform itself into a secular democratic state or a consociational democracy (Smooha, 1990, p. 409). Control over the Arab minority is problematic because of its continuous crisis in the system. He suggests reformation in the form of changes to accommodate the minority. For him, an ideological change is required—the new ideology that is favorable to grant the Arab minority the status of a Palestinian minority with some national rights, removal of discrimination, tolerance of dissent, and sharing the power in the governance (Smooha, 1990, p. 410). As a democratic prescription, Smooha suggests that once the Palestinian question is settled, other problems can be solved, such as “the elimination of restriction over Arabs, Arab willingness to serve in the army, and recognition of Arabs as a national (and not just an ethnic) minority” (Smooha, 1990, p. 411). These reforms can be negotiated and implemented without presenting a threat to the Jewish majority in the state. He observes that the changes suggested are possible given the robust nature of the democracy in Israel (Smooha, 1990, p. 411).

The Responses to the Idea of Ethnic Democracy

There are several arguments regarding ethnic democracy, as discussed by Sammy Smooha. Oren Yiftachel observes that ethnic democracy requires further qualification and refinement. He brings in two vital elements, “the historical geography of ethnicity and the numerical structure of multi-ethnic states” (Yiftachel, 1992b, p. 127). He points out the difference between homeland and immigrant ethnic groups, which are distinct. Ethnic identity is more attributed and stronger in states composed of homeland communities than in immigrant societies. Yiftachel further explains that behavioral factors such as human territoriality and nationalism are related to the higher intensity of ethnicity in homeland societies. It is the perception on the part of Jews and Arabs in Israel that both of them are homeland groups in a plural or deeply divided society. Because of this, Yiftachel suggests that Arabs and Jews should not be compared to ethnic groups in immigrant pluralistic societies like the United States (US). “Bi-ethnic states, which are comprised of two main non-assimilating groups, are a special and particularly problematic type” (Yiftachel, 1992b, p. 127). Therefore, the peculiarities associated with bi-ethnic states are to be taken into account in any typological analysis of deeply divided democracies.

Yiftachel, in his analysis, tries to prove that only consociational experiences have realized political stability in bi-ethnic homeland states than other experiences such as ethnic democratic ones. In this direction, he gives successful experiences of Belgium and Switzerland. In societies with a homeland majority and an immigrant minority, such as Malaysia, the success of the ethnic model of democracy is partial. In bi-ethnic societies like Northern Ireland, the application of the ethnic model failed due to minorities’ grievances. In the countries where majoritarian policies were introduced, the result was instability due to conflicts (Yiftachel, 1992, p. 130). Yiftachel observed that “attempts to institutionalize majority domination over a homeland minority in dual (and partly democratic) societies have generally failed” (Yiftachel, 1992, p. 130). Thus, he questions the long-term survival of the ethnic democracy model for Israel because of factors like the bi-ethnic homeland nature of Israel and the unchanged nature of Israel’s policies toward the minority (Yiftachel, 1992, p. 131).

One of the major factors that need to be emphasized while analyzing the democracy in Israel is the nature of the governmental policies toward the socio-economic development of the Arab minority (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1998, pp. 321–346). The socio-economic development of the Arab minority is analyzed positively in the work of Smooha, whereas other scholars point out that there is no significant improvement in their status. The increasing political assertiveness of the Arab community in Israel indicates that there is no change in their status (Fleischmann, 2021). Mass mobilization in the form of general strikes is employed to show their dissatisfaction toward the authorities (Yifatachel, 2000, pp. 145–184). Apart from regularly holding days of protest “commemorating important events in their political history” (Lowrance, 2006, p. 174), Israeli Arabs “have staged protests and general strikes since the 1970s on other occasions, such as the demolition of illegal Arab housing, the expropriation of Arab land, and international Palestinian events such as the intifada” (Lowrance, 2006, p. 174). The response to the Arab protests against the system shows the growing intolerance toward the mobilizational efforts of the minority in Israel. Sometimes, the Arab protests turned into “violent confrontations with Israeli police and right-wing Israelis staging counterdemonstrations” (Berger, 12 May 2021). Huge protest demonstrations that occurred in October 2000 following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the occupied territories were put down by Israeli forces with lethal violence (Lowrance, 2006, p. 174).

Ahmed Sa’di, another critic of the ethnic democracy model of Smooha, is of the observation that in the model, the majority practices control the state and define its orientation. According to him, the conception of Smooha regarding democracy is alien to the idea of democracy as developed over centuries (Sa’di, 2000, p. 30). In a democratic political system, the state is viewed as a neutral arena, and all the component groups in the society have the right to organize themselves as political actors. They can become part of the government to fulfill their goals and aspirations. It is a widely accepted idea that if every citizen is empowered and encouraged as an equal political actor not only in enjoying the policy outcome but also in the policy-making process, the very idea and practice of democracy becomes enriched. Any democratic regime is supposed to ensure equality between all citizens and all constituent groups. In ethnic democracies, minorities are disadvantaged, but they can avail themselves of democratic means to negotiate better terms of coexistence, Sa’di responds that besides “the possibility of gains there is the probability of loss and marginalization. This happened during the Netanyahu government (1996–99), when the Palestinian minority lost most of its ‘gains’ acquired during the Rabin-Peres era (1992–1996)” (Sa’di, 2000, pp. 30–31). Sa’di brings in the idea of enrichment of the experience of citizenship in modern democracies (Sa’di, 2000, p. 31). In modern democracies, the groups that have not experienced citizenship fight for the enrichment of the same. Citizenship is not just a set of various rights but the ability of each citizen to enjoy these rights. The trend of continual improvement concerning the civil and political rights of the Arab minority, as discussed by Smooha, cannot enrich the Arab experience of citizenship (Sa’di, 2000, p. 31).

Regarding the state of a minority in an ethnic state, it is observed that a “minority in an ethnic state faces uncomfortable situations both politically and existentially” (Ghanem, 2000, p. 89). As pointed out by Ghanem (2011, pp. 21–27), the idea of ethnocracy is not accommodative toward minorities. Rather, it is moving in the direction of further Judaization. Examples of the process of Judaization are given to prove that there is no change in the process of democratization of the polity.

Judaization takes many forms, including the mass expropriation of Arab land, building only Jewish settlements, and the establishment of a highly centralized economy and a political system in which the Palestinians are marginalized and weakened. This is facilitated by the Israeli land use policy and planning systems, which operate consistently to transfer spatial control from Palestinian to Jewish hands, and which have legitimized, planned, and funded large-scale projects of Jewish settlement. (Ghanem, 2011, p. 23)

The Arabs of Israel believe in improving their situation through parliamentary politics (Harel-Shalev, 2013, p. 233). Parliamentary politics ensures representation for most social groups that are organized around political parties and participate in Knesset elections. Elections to local self-governing institutions are another arena for the Arab political parties for representative politics. “Despite its definition as an ethnic democracy, despite the restrictions that it has prescribed in the law, and despite repeated attempts to disqualify Arab parties, Israel paradoxically enables them to function as legitimate parties in Israeli politics” (Harel-Shalev, 2013, p. 233). However, mere presence may not augur well for any political system that claims to be democratic, which becomes meaningful when any uncomfortable idea is tolerated if it does not threaten the system. Of course, no democracy is exceptional in its track record of tolerating certain ideas. The wisdom of democratic human survivability can show the way to meaningful survival of everyone in the system.

A binational state or democracy in Israel has been one of the aspirations to ensure equal status for the Arab minority. There is a larger consensus on the part of the Arab community regarding the issue. All varieties of Arab political parties and the voluntary organizations to intellectuals associated with them have a kind of unanimity regarding the demand for change in the existing nature of the state. However, the demand does not go without criticism. The public perception among the Jews is that the demand for turning Israel into a binational state is unacceptable (Reiter, 2023; Smooha, 2009, p. 516). The other theoretical interpretation regarding democracy in Israel is Multiculturalism (Kymlicka & Cohen-Almagor, 2000, pp. 89–118; Yonah, 2005, pp. 95–116), which underlines facts about the efforts that were made toward accommodating different cultural communities. Multiculturalism is a new theoretical effort that became widely accepted in most liberal democracies in accommodating cultural minorities. As a defender of minorities’ rights, it favors cultural autonomy as a guarantor of unique identity (Kymlicka, 1995). Israel, as a democracy, has recognized and protected the rights of minorities in spheres such as education, language, and religion. It has not recognized the minority as a national minority, as has been the demand on the part of the Arab minority (Rekhess, 2007). Based on certain features and practices, Israeli society and polity can be interpreted as Multicultural. However, there are problems with such claims, given the realities associated with the treatment meted out to the Arab minority.

Thinking Anew on the Democratization

Comparison between different political systems is one of the academic exercises made by scholars to understand the merits, demerits, and lacunas of the systems. Democracy as a political system received much attention from the political scientists. When the comparison is made on the importance of universal values and their gradation, including democracy as widely accepted, it needs to be made between successful and unsuccessful cases. The comparison need not be made between democratic states and non-democratic ones because the very nature of the political system is different. If a comparison is made between the United States and China, of course, the result of gradation would be America as a well-performing state and China as a poor-performing state. Such a result is because the only political components of democracy are considered in the evaluation. Likewise, if a comparative evaluation is made between Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, Israel would naturally emerge as a well-performing state in ensuring democratic rights to the citizens irrespective of their social identities. Therefore, the comparison has to be always between democratic countries, how well and why they have been doing and not doing well in the performance of democratic principles toward their citizens. ⁶ There is a possibility of going beyond the binary ethnic and consociational democracies. Democracies can mature if they cross certain limitations, which sometimes seem to be constructed rather than natural. Natural socio-political coexistence for larger benefit can happen with civic maturity that comes from civil society, which can act as an agency in creating the benefits of democratizing the democracy for the well-being of everyone who is a stakeholder in the society and polity in which he or she resides.

The onus is on both Arab and non-Arab scholars from within and outside Israel to come up with several theoretical tools and suggestions to democratize not only the existing Israeli liberal democracy but also the neighboring Arab world to make their societies move ahead in the direction of bringing reforms first at the societal level and next at the political level. In place of a clash of civilizations. ⁷ there should be a dialogue between cultures and within societies. These observations may appear simplistic, but there is no alternative to idealism in a world dominated by realism, which not only puts “we” in anxieties and insecurities and “others” in existential predicaments. ⁸ Democracy as a value has to be followed by every individual, not only on the societal level but also on the political level.

Institutions created out of the social contract as an outcome of the democratic process play a significant role in nurturing and sustaining democracy in any given society. The institutions such as parliament, judiciary, and election commission are supposed to be the facilitators of democracy rather than act as stumbling blocks to the larger democratic process. The idea of democracy has created the institutions, and the institutions have not created democracy. Institutions in any democratic political system are to act as guardians of democracy. However, in the name of constitutionalism and the rule of law, several times, these institutions have failed to uphold the democratic spirit in many societies (Raja, 2020; Shah, 2020). This is due to the lack of respect for the separation of powers and the larger democratic process in general. In democracies like India, there has been a tussle between the legislature and judiciary in asserting their supremacy in exercising their powers (Chauhan, 2013, pp. 99–106; Mehta, 2007, pp. 70–83). In such a process of institutional supremacy, the common citizens become deprived of their stake in democracy.

This is true in the case of Israel also because recently, there has been an effort to curb the judiciary’s powers, which received much resistance from common citizens (Rosenman, 7 August 2023). Such developments force one to think of conceiving a fresh social contract for giving a new lease of life to democracy as an idea and existence for the benefit of everyone concerned. There is nothing wrong with having a new democratic framework for the future of a better society, which prevents the possible emergence of a state of nature that is characterized by constant political instability.

The specific reason for the above analysis related to the crisis in the larger process of democracy in Israel is the legislative process of the Knesset, which weakened the basic understanding of the democratic process (Kremnitzer & Krebs, 2011, p. 4). “Several recent examples of Knesset legislation processes suggest that Israeli democratic culture is being eroded, as some of democracy’s fundamental notions are abandoned in favor of national-chauvinism and intolerance” (Kremnitzer & Krebs, 2011, p. 4). One glaring example of such a process was the Nakba Law adopted in 2011 (Kremnitzer & Krebs, 2011, p. 5). The Palestinian people commemorate Israel’s Independence Day as a day of mourning, and the day is called Nakba (catastrophe) day. The law was intended to “meaningfully reduce the governmental funding given to groups or institutions that commemorate the Palestinian Nakba” (Kremnitzer & Krebs, 2011, p. 6). Instead of developing ideas to prevent certain practices, why do the institutions not make the aggrieved people forget the past and lead a meaningful present? It needs greater institutional democratic maturity and compromise in listening to the grievances of the aggrieved. ⁹

In most liberal democracies, the agents of democracy, such as political parties and identity groups, become enemies of democracy in several ways. In some democracies, parties based on religion act against democratic ethos by becoming sectarian. In other democracies such as India, identities like religion and caste are becoming reasons for the political parties to spoil the democratic environment. In the case of other democracies, racial identity is becoming the reason for the democratic exclusion of others who do not belong to mainstream ethnicity or race (Ezrahi, 2011, p. 28). Thus, overall, the agents of democracy are becoming enemies of democracy by exploiting social identities. This analysis is equally applicable to the democratic experiment in Israel in the sense that the constructed anxieties associated with identities are perceived as threats to democracy. The perception is actively supported and carried forward by many political parties in Israel. This perception is continued without meaningful and continuous dialogue among the social groups in society. Meaningful dialogue may or would pave the way for harmonious and equally competitive or argumentative democratic coexistence. Democracy without argumentation and argumentations without democracy cannot be considered a feature of a politically advanced society.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt observe the dynamics of democracy in America. The observation, to an extent, can be applied to the analysis of the dynamics of democracy in Israel, too. They observe that the “weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization-one that extends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019, p. 9). The supposed practice of democratic norms is reduced to existential conflict over religion and culture. In that case, societies that claim that they are moving toward political cognitive advancement would not receive appreciation, or one could say that there is something wrong with the very cognitive process.

Liberal democracy, the unique mix of individual rights and popular rule that has long characterized most governments in North America and Western Europe, is coming apart at its seams. In its stead, we are seeing the rise of illiberal democracy, or democracy without rights, and undemocratic liberalism, or rights without democracy. (Mounk, 2018, p. 14)

Application and practice of any theoretical framework in any given society which experiments with democracy as a political system ultimately depends upon the leaders of the nation and its enlightened people in a civic sense. If this is absent, the presence of democracy with any superficial arrangement does not contribute to the idea of democracy. Such absence might be one of the reasons for the slow death of democracy in many parts of the world with the garb of a superficial democratic political system.

“Democracy is a shared enterprise” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019, p. 230). If democratic values are not shared, the rift between majority versus minority, men versus women, and, above all, haves and have-nots increases. To avoid the rift, democratic creativity has to emerge among the citizenry about shared democratic values so that each one in the system enjoys her or his individuality and collective identity. The celebration of democratic values at individual and collective levels should go in tandem. “Liberal democratic performance is understood as the delivery of liberal democratic values, and not as regime longevity or government efficacy. Measuring it is a matter of how far liberal democratic governments achieve in practice the values they endorse in principle” (Foweraker & Krznaric, 2000, p. 759).

Barrington Moore’s observation that “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Mazaheri & Monroe, 2018, p. 523) is one of the widely discussed observations in comparative politics on the question of democratization.

Before and after Moore, a certain narrative on the selective affinity between the middle class and democracy has reigned as hegemonic. To drastically simplify Moore’s argument: as societies undergo industrialization and capitalism gains traction, the political and material interests of the middle class—defined provisionally as an educated, professional class that is neither the owner of large amounts of capital, nor major landowners, and does not earn a living through physical labor—push it toward democracy. (Krishna, 2015, p. 5)

In the case of Israel, the strong middle class is an outcome of the state’s preferential treatment toward its majority population. Due to this, the socio-economic status of the Arab minority is not on par with Jewish citizens. There is an improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the Israeli Arabs, but “they still lag behind their Jewish counterparts” (Ghanem, 2016, p. 38). Consequently, the Arab minority remains outside the activity of the democratic politics of Israel and cannot be an active player in democracy. It can also be observed here that apart from finding the linkage between the middle class and the success of democracy, one needs to look at the necessity of a linkage between an empowered society and the success of democracy. Any modern democratic state has to play a proactive role in creating an empowered society. Thus, the dynamics of any modern democratic state can become a journey of the interaction between the state and its citizens in creating a larger, empowered society. As an alternative to Moore’s observation that “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” it can be observed that no empowered citizenship, no democracy. Any citizen in any democracy deserves to be empowered socially, economically, and politically. It is the responsibility of any democratic state to provide equal socio-economic opportunities to every citizen to become politically empowered.

The application and practice of power-sharing in Israel is pursued well among Jewish groups, and this strength has made Israel considered a democracy; however, the minority has been excluded from this practice (Dowty, 1999, p. 11).The absence of comprehensive inclusion of the Arab minority in the system would further invite criticism of the claim that its polity is a liberal democracy. Another point to be mentioned here is the dissatisfaction expressed by the Arab minority regarding its Arab political parties (Smooha, 2022). Critical comments are made by the Arab minority about the conduct of their political parties and the conflicts between them (Rudnitzky, 18 October 2022). The political parties, as an agency of articulation of the socio-economic and political problems of the Arab minority, are expected to show more political maturity in their activity so that the matured interaction between the majority and the minority enhances the quality of democracy in Israel. The political leadership of the Arab parties is supposed to keep their support base convinced about the intent of larger democratization and the welfare of its constituency without compromising the grammar of democratic politics.

The Arab political leadership has to respond to the democratic consciousness from the below in the sense that the voice of the common Arab mass has to be heard. Listening to the unheard voice is as important as representing the unheard voice of the common people. “Given the depth of the ethnic division, lessons from experience elsewhere, and the particular strengths of Israeli politics, the extension of power-sharing consociational democracy- to Palestinians within Israel is clearly the preferred option” (Dowty, 1999, p. 11). There is a necessity for a comprehensive identity that goes beyond the division into Jew and Arab to make Israeli Arabs feel that they, too, belong (Dowty, 1999, p. 11). Including the aspirations of the minorities in the symbols of the state, such as the national anthem and name of the state, are recognized as best practices in contemporary theories like multiculturalism. Israel, being a democracy, has to show maturity to understand the necessity of such inclusions. “Though the name Israel is decidedly Jewish in origin, Arab citizens have often expressed interest in expanding the concept, as a territorial label, to encompass non-Jews as well” (Dowty, 1999, p. 11).

Dialogue and socio-political negotiation are essential for resolving any issues encountered in plural societies. “Total segregation - the lack of any interaction among groups - is inconsistent with social cohesion. On the other hand, the existence and recognition of lines of diversity are not necessarily adverse to socio-national solidarity; in fact, such lines sometimes facilitate coexistence” (Kop, 2003, p. 26). Diversity cannot be considered a hindrance to maintaining democratic stability; in fact, it makes democracy more enriched and empowered through various viewpoints of different sections of society. “The problem with ethnic states is the clash between the exclusivity of a particular ethnic group and the quest for equality from the other weaker ethnic group or groups. This causes conflicts if the issues are not dealt with and worked out to ease the tension in such communities” (Khalifa, 2001, p. 17).

The article has tried to discuss the theoretical perspectives on Israeli democracy, such as consociationalism, ethnic democracy, and multiculturalism. While discussing these perspectives, certain limitations or lacunas in dealing with the minority’s socio-political rights are highlighted. New arguments, as observed by scholars on democracy, which are sometimes close to consociationalism and multiculturalism, are discussed in the context of Israeli democratic experiences. The quintessence of the new argumentations on democracy is “will to democracy” on the part of all concerned citizens in the sense that the will of the people constitutes a decisive factor in making democracy a system for everyone in inclusive form or unmaking democracy as a system for everyone in exclusive form as witnessed in most of the liberal democracies of the contemporary world. One can observe that Israel as a society has the will to make the political system inclusive, given its treatment of various Jewish groups that came from different backgrounds and became part of a larger cultural and political society. This has to be and can be extended to the Arab minority, which has the same emotional affiliation to geography and history.

The absence of separation of religion from the state is one of the non-liberal features of Israeli democracy. Along with this, the preferential treatment toward the majoritarian ethnic community makes the claim for liberal democracy far from reality. As the Arab minority is kept out of the process of becoming the middle class, even Barrington Moore’s observation that the middle class plays an important role in the sustenance of democracy will not help in analyzing the democracy in Israel. Both the presence of certain liberal features and the continuous tendency to exclude the Arab minority, which is very much a feature of illiberal political systems, puts the Israeli liberal democracy in a theoretical dilemma because democracies can be liberal but can never be illiberal.