This research examines the relationship between political connections, board interlock, and the quality of financial reporting of the listed companies on the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISE) with ISIS's mediating role (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). This research is about the mediating part of ISIS in the relationship between board interlock, political connections, and financial reporting quality. The study attempts to reveal whether or not political connections and board interlock can improve financial reporting quality. A multiple regression model is used to test the research hypothesis. The samples consist of 245 (firm-year) companies listed on the ISE from 2012 to 2018, and the hypothesis is tested by multiple regression based on integrated data models. The results demonstrate a significant and negative relationship between political connections, board interlock, and financial reporting quality. Thus, higher political connections reduce the quality of financial reporting. The results also conveyed that ISIS contributes to the decline of this relationship. This research expands the literature review on ISIS’s impact on these engaged countries' economies.
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