Why do some states abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons even when they have economic and technological capacity to manufacture them? Why do some states foreswear the nuclear option even when they are threatened by an enemy possessing nuclear weapons? South Korea is an interesting case in this respect as it has long been regarded as having sufficient technological proficiency to develop nuclear weapons. The case becomes more of a puzzle when we realise that South Korea is being threatened by North Korea and has a history of pushing ahead with a secret nuclear weapons program during the 1970s. This article conducts a historical comparative case study of South Korea under presidents Park Chung Hee and Roh Moo Hyun to explain its contrasting nuclear choices. It argues that the perception of top decision-makers is the key explanatory variable for South Korea’s contrasting nuclear choices.
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