In April 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced the normalisation of diplomatic ties with China’s mediation. Notably, Saudi Arabia sought China’s mediation during Xi Jinping’s visit in December 2022. Why did Saudi Arabia seek reconciliation while maintaining hostility with Iran? This study aims to uncover this puzzle using a case study approach. It examines the case through two mechanisms: reconciliation with one’s enemy and reconciliation with a friend’s enemy. According to the first approach, Saudi Arabia had to manage external threats to achieve the objectives of Vision 2030, an economic and social reform initiative implemented in response to political and economic shocks in the region. The second approach highlights Saudi Arabia’s complex relationship with the United States. Through reconciliation, Saudi Arabia could attain considerable leverage in this relationship. Its approach to Iran serves as an effective example of foreign policy amid escalating tensions between the United States and China.
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