Populist appeals resonate in contemporary India because of political inequalities. These inequalities persist because political parties are stuck in a reciprocity trap that favours local elites, who provide the party with financial support and resources. This reciprocity trap not only perpetuates political inequalities but also leads to the systematic marginalization of the poor by political parties who remain less receptive to populist appeals by a political leader. This article shows that the middle class, not the poor, were more receptive to populist messages in the 2024 elections. Even though Modi remained immensely popular, the middle classes found Rahul Gandhi’s populist message more compelling. The analysis is based on the pre-and post-election surveys from 2024 and other NES surveys.
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