How can clientelistic politics be transformed into programmatic politics in a subnational state with a well-recorded history of patronage politics? We explore institutional pathways away from clientelism by systematically explicating clientelistic propensities with programmatic citizen-oriented ones in undivided Andhra Pradesh. This paper engages with a paradigm shift in policy from clientelistic to programmatic service delivery in rural development by exploring three major rural welfare programmes in undivided Andhra Pradesh: need-based redistribution, evolution of self-help groups and implementation of the right to work in India through the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) scheme. We argue that the capacity of the state to deliver owes a great deal to bureaucratic puzzling and political powering over developmental ideas. We combine powering and puzzling within the state to argue the case for how these ideas tip after evolving in a path-dependent way.
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