The mixed extension of a strategic game is said to exist if each joint mixed strategy yields a well-defined and finite expected payoff for every player. With finitely many players, a mixed extension exists if and only if all payoff functions are bounded. In contrast, the mixed extension exists for some but by no means all games with infinitely many players and unbounded payoff functions.
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