Credit Risk Control at Cameroonian Banks’ Board of Directors: The Problems of the Presence of Directors Representing the State and the Nationality of Chairman
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online September, 2018
Credit Risk Control at Cameroonian Banks’ Board of Directors: The Problems of the Presence of Directors Representing the State and the Nationality of Chairman
The evolution of fears related to possible crises reinforces the search of governance, guaranteeing the prudence of banks notably in developing countries. This article discusses the board of directors by proposing to explore the conditions under which it can master the control of bank credit risk. The mobilised conceptualisation pleads for a systemic vision of governance and rejects the relevance of evaluating in isolation the effectiveness of the board of directors. Data used are from a sample of 12 Cameroonian banks for the period 2006–2015. Results highlight that the presence of directors representing the state, unlike the existence of a chairman who is an expatriate, promotes the credit risk. The managerial implication of these results, for possible reforms, is the depoliticisation of the functioning of the board.
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