The article considers the scope of Pareto improvement through an inequality-inducing income transfer in a society where multiple pure public goods are provided by voluntary contribution only from the rich individual. In contrast to the case of single public good, here we show that in presence of only one poor individual in the society such an income transfer can never be Pareto improving.
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