The Precarity of Women’s Short-Term Migration: A Case Study from Nepal

Abstract

This article explores precarity in short-term women’s migration using the case study of Nepal. Women migrate from Nepal for short-term contract work mostly in the domestic care sector. This research has used both focus group discussions and key informant interviews with returned and prospective migrants, as well as NGO staff and others supporting migration. A picture of the precarity of women’s short-term migration from Nepal to the Middle East has emerged, with the motivation for women’s migration being complex, and while it is primarily financial and for some an economic necessity, there are also broader implications, and the argument that migration can expand women’s choices and opportunities, and possibly be empowering. The research found that this applies to relatively few women migrants. Nepalese women face considerable risks, and migration is precarious due to restrictions and controls along each step of the migration pathway.

Introduction

This article explores precarity in short-term women’s migration using the case study of Nepal. Short-term migration of women is an increasing phenomenon and, in Asia, women’s migration is now eclipsing that of men (Silvey & Parreñas, 2020). For South Asia, gender norms and attitudes can restrict women’s migration, thus making their migration process and experience much more precarious. This is the case for women migrating from Nepal for short-term contract work mostly in the domestic care sector. The motivation for women’s migration is complex, and while it is primarily financial and for some an economic necessity, there are also broader implications and the argument that migration can expand women’s choices and opportunities and possibly be empowering (de Brauw et al., 2021; Shrestha et al., 2020; Tuccio & Wahba, 2018).

The precarity of migration occurs along the migration pathway, which can restrict women’s choices and opportunities, from recruitment to the workplace abroad, to return and reintegration back at home (Silvey & Parreñas, 2020; Wu & Kilby, 2022). Some countries seek to reduce or manage this precarity through well-structured and supported migration programmes where the migrants are supported along this pathway, such as the Philippines where migrant women are supported through the Overseas Worker Program (Tigno, 2019). Nepal discourages the migration of young women to many countries, while at the same time depending on remittances not only for the household economy but also for the national economy (International Labor Organization [ILO], 2021; Shivakoti, 2020; Sijapati et al., 2019), the effect being that migration is very precarious for Nepali women. As Paret and Gleeson (2016, p. 281) note:

[T]he migrant existence is often precarious in multiple, and reinforcing ways, combining vulnerability to deportation and state violence, exclusion from public services and basic state protections, insecure employment and exploitation at work, insecure livelihood, and everyday discrimination or isolation.

Referring to internal migration in South Africa, Schierup (2016) argues that this is ‘a toxic trap of a predatory extractionism that continues to drive poverty and precarity of work and citizenship’ (p. 1052). The role of citizenship and residence status is an important element of precarity, which we will return to.

This article will limit its discussion of the range of views on precarity and its theoretical bases ¹ but uses Paret and Gleeson’s more straightforward definition: ‘[P]recarity as being synonymous with uncertainty and unpredictability’ (2016, p. 280). In the migration space, precarity manifests itself in the range of both immediate and structural violence the migrant workers experience. Parreñas et al. (2019) argue that structural violence occurs when migrant workers with low education and limited capital are excluded from permanent residency in almost all destinations and face ‘forced deportation … reliance on migrant recruitment agencies in the selection of the destination country, government moratoriums against emigration and an absence of networks’ (p. 1235; MLESS, 2022; UN Women Nepal, 2022); restricted movement in the workplace (Wadhawan, 2022); and limited power to negotiate due to ‘a dispossessed status’ (Schierup, 2016, p. 1057). This leads to the phenomenon of circular or serial migration where migrants, after completion of a contract of two or three years, return home and then migrate again. This becomes a cycle of migration and remittances to support their families and most importantly, the education of their children for a better life (Parreñas et al., 2019). Through what can be decades of migration, the migrant women live in a series of precarious situations in which their lives can be disrupted at a moment’s notice. They are often poorly educated, most not completing high school, which limit their opportunities within their home country (Grossman-Thompson, 2023). A part of the problem is also the poor education opportunities, beyond high school especially the technical and vocational education and training (TVET), where the minimum entry requirement for most of the programmes is high school completion. Due to distance, cost and other sociocultural barriers, girls’ access to TVET programmes is even more challenging, so ‘the school-to-work transition gap is bigger for girls, which then increases their vulnerability to early and forced marriage, domestic slavery, and trafficking’ (Paudel, 2019, p. 1). While a basic education is required, migration of poorly educated women remains precarious and subject to exploitation more so than for those with higher levels of education.

This article will use the ‘precarity chain’ framework (Silvey & Parreñas, 2020, p. 3458) to understand how precarity exists throughout the entire migration process, from before migration at the aspiring women migrant workers’ home and community environment, then recruitment, the journey from origin to destination country, the actual work in a foreign place, and finally the migrant’s uncertain future on their return. Our case study shows that women often undertake precarious travels along the migration chain to the destination country with risky intermediate stops, especially for irregular migration (Abramsky et al., 2018; Shivakoti, 2020). In short, these migrant domestic workers face mostly economic precarity at home and social precarity abroad, which is offset by women migrant workers’ feeling of hope and optimism, as ‘[these] hardships may even open up new opportunities’ (Silvey & Parreñas, 2020, p. 3460).

Nepal Migration and Women’s Experiences

Women’s motivation for migration is mainly economic, but other drivers include family and intimate partner violence, the desire for a good education and future for the children, and the opportunity to see the world (Abramsky et al., 2018). The cost is measured in the many years being separated from their children apart from brief visits every few years. For people in the hill areas of Nepal, men’s migration for livelihood is a tradition, as the land does not provide enough for year-round subsistence, but now women from these areas are migrating as well (Jaquet et al., 2019).

Remittances from migration are an important part of the Nepalese economy, and, in 2020, remittances amounted to one-quarter of the national GDP (World Bank, 2022), and Nepal was the third largest remittance receiver globally (Shivakoti, 2020). Given the importance of remittances to the economy, Nepal’s restriction on young women’s migration is both complex and perplexing: The idea of women’s migration is a highly political subject, in which the government has actively discouraged young women’s migration to certain Middle Eastern countries over 20 years and at times has banned them from working there, most recently in 2017 (Khatiwada & Basyal, 2022; Shivakoti et al., 2021). These restrictions were partially lifted in 2021, but there still remains a ban on migration for women under 40 years of age to the Middle East (Mandal & Baral, 2021; MLESS, 2022). As Shivakoti (2020, p. 23) observes:

[With the] migration ban, which does not allow women migrants to go to these [Middle Eastern] countries, the government protects them from possible abuse and exploitation… [but] it also excludes them from any legal protection in case of problems as they are unable to access it.

The result of this is a paternalistic policy (Pande, 2014) that does not protect young women but leads to a higher level of irregular migration using India as the transit point, which is made possible by an open border between the two countries. The process is that the women are facilitated by migration agents to cross the open border into India from where they transit to the Middle East destination on a visitor visa to a host family who has agreed to take responsibility for them under the Kafala system. From crossing the border to arrival in the host household until returning home some years later, the women are in a vulnerable position, and are very much dependent upon the goodwill of the migration agencies and host households for their welfare. ²

The private migration agencies, which are collectively referred to in Nepal as ‘Manpower companies’ ‘are a necessary part of the process … [as] the process of obtaining the right documents is time-consuming, costly, complicated and prone to corruption, [but] have the opportunity to interpret the condition of work, the agreements, the rules and regulations to maximise their own and the migrant’s benefits’ (Kern and Müller-Böker 2015. p. 159/161).

Some are willing to ‘bend’ the law (Abramsky et al., 2018), for example, in India, a Nepali migrant woman requires a No Objection Certificate from the Nepal Embassy in Delhi to leave India for a third country, and such certificates can be obtained by Manpower companies (Khatiwada & Basyal, 2022). While there are no formal measures of the level of migration through India, estimates made in 2011 found women travelling through India made up almost 30% of total migrants, a much higher figure than that of the government reports that is 6%–7% (MLESS, 2022; Wadhawan, 2022, p. 196). Frantz (2014, p. 11) notes:

[M]any migrants resort to dealing with middlemen who engage in illicit recruitment practices, creating fake itineraries, planning transit routes through third countries, or paying bribes. The vast majority of Nepali migrants who participated in this research had travelled to Lebanon via India rather than flying directly from Kathmandu.

This lack of protection leads to a range of other issues, including the risk of sex trafficking in India (Abramsky et al., 2018; Gurung & Sharma, 2020; Rai & Rai, 2021). The effects upon Nepalese migrant women are both mental and physical trauma, with exhaustion, headaches, anxiety and even clinical depression:

Those who worked for unlimited periods of time (beyond a 12-hour day), who were illiterate, physically and sexually abused, and even tortured at their workplace, and who were denied payment, were factors independently associated with increased likelihood of developing a variety of health problems. (Simkhada et al., 2018, p. 6)

The migration process is driven by the Manpower companies, which are registered agents who facilitate the migration (MLESS, 2022):

Recruitment agencies are gatekeepers as they select the employees and employers. But at the same time they have to compete on the national and inter-national labour market with other recruitment agencies, and on [a] national level with agents. (Kern & Müller-Böker, 2015, p. 159)

Manpower companies charge high fees while transferring the risk, particularly in transit, back to the migrant workers. The fees are based on migrants’ ability to pay rather than any transparent process, which means that migrant women with low or no education, and those who are experiencing greater poverty and need to work overseas, will be charged a higher rate. Then on arrival in the Middle East (the destination), the kafala system ³ of workers’ contracts makes migrant women effectively serfs to the employer, who is legally responsible for them, and so controls their movements within the host country as well as their travel documents, all of which adds to the precarity women experience (Wadhawan, 2022).

On the migrants’ return there is further uncertainty as while some are welcomed back others face suspicion, stigma and a poor economic future for themselves and their families as the skills learnt abroad are not readily useful on return. Therefore, the migrant enters a life of precarious and risky circular migration (Shrestha et al., 2020; Yea, 2020).

Methodology

The purpose of the study was to gain an insight into women’s migration experiences from districts representing a cross-section of Nepali women’s migration. Three districts—Morang, Rupandhei and Dolakha—were selected for the study. Morang is located in the eastern part of the Terai (plains) region and is comprised of people with diverse ethnic backgrounds. In 2017–2018, a total of 13,893 people migrated overseas for work, around 10% of whom were women who went through migration agencies. An indeterminate, probably much larger, number used India as transit unofficially. Dolakha is situated in the hilly central part of Nepal. In 2017–2018, a total of 1,968 people departed for foreign labour migration. Among them, 1,504 were men and 464 were women, mostly through migration agencies. The Rupandehi district is located in the Lumbini Province. A total of 7,878 people went abroad for foreign employment in 2017–2018, among them 7,676 men and 202 women.

Data were collected in April 2022 through four focus group discussions (FGDs) and four key informant interviews (KIIs) in each of the three locations. The research team (moderator, note taker, recruiter) visited the representatives of the rural and urban municipality administrative bodies, explained the objective of the study to the officials there and gained their consent. Recruiters in each district reached out to community leaders, local government representatives, teachers, health workers and others and created a local database. Snowball sampling was used to identify participants. In the women’s FGDs, 45 were aspirant migrants and the other 46 discussants were returnee migrant women.

Orientation was provided to the Nepali core team members by the ANU team via Zoom. Following the orientation, two days of training for the field team was held in Kathmandu by the Nepali core team. The training focused on the methodology of the study, study objectives, sampling frame, identifying respondents, interviewing techniques, data collection guidelines, research ethics, obtaining consent, maintaining quality of data and data collection procedures. Each topic in the FGD and KII guidelines was discussed during the training, where roleplay and mock interview exercises were held. The training was followed by two days of pre-testing in the suburbs of Kathmandu. Following the pre-testing, the guidelines were modified. After two days of pilot testing, a debriefing session was held where the identified issues were discussed. Both IFPRI and the ANU ethics review boards approved the research.

The Results According to Themes

The findings have been arranged in key themes that emerged from the data analysis and literature review, and follow the links in the precarity chain of migration. These are reasons and motivation for migration, information sources, the process and cost of migration, working conditions abroad and their return. Finally, there will be a discussion of the effectiveness of training programmes and the effects of COVID-19.

Reasons for Migration

The main reasons given by the women in the focus groups and key informant interviews for short-term domestic work overseas were poor employment opportunities back at home and a sense of obligation to support their families. Gender inequality is another contributing factor, where there is little priority by the state to support women and girls’ education and development: ‘Work that women do is not considered as productive work. The jobs that illiterate people do are mainly domestic work’ (KII 05), which earn very little money in Nepal. This particularly applies to uneducated single women (KII 03), and ‘they feel shy about working in other Nepalese people’s houses and feel their self-respect will be lost’ (KII 09). This leads many of these women to take the irregular pathway of transiting through India, as they are banned from migrating to destination countries directly from Nepal. We do not know the exact number that transit via India for domestic work, although it is estimated around 50 women and girls are trafficked from Nepal to India each day for purposes including sex work (Nigam, 2018). However, this carries a higher risk, as Nepal Embassy permission is required for Nepali women to travel from India, and there is the stigma attached due to the assumption that the reason for migrating to India is for sex work (KII 02).

The main reason for this precarious migration is the higher rates of pay involved abroad, especially for poorly educated women: ‘The income here was in the thousands while there it was in the lakhs [hundreds of thousands]’ (KII 04). Another reason is that official migration is difficult, as women under the age of 30 cannot migrate and those over 30 also require permission from ward-level local government (KII 02). Hence Nepalese women transit through India to reach their destination country and, at the Indian airport, officials ignore the incomplete documentation being presented (KII 06, KII 08). The risk is that there is no official protection through this route, and women feel that they have been ‘tricked’ in some way.

One of the risks is being trafficked for sex work and forced to spend time working in a brothel as part of the migration chain. This was reported by a woman in one of the FGDs, and supported by anecdotal evidence from Indian activists (Nigam, 2018). We did not pursue the topic of sexual slavery in India during the FGDs, given the sensitivity and the lack of ethics approval for such a line of questioning. However, this explanation explains the lower cost of Indian transit, and why some women spend between 1 month and 1 year in India (FGD 02, FGD 03, FGD 05, FGD 08). But even if all goes well in the transit through India, there are high levels of uncertainty along the whole pathway (FGD 07 and KII 12).

The economic pressure from the ongoing economic difficulties facing the country is a major driver (FGD 04, FGD 05), and added to this is that the ‘attraction of foreign employment is high, people think everything will get better after foreign employment’ (KII 05) as well as seeing others going abroad and wishing to do the same (KII 05, FGD0 9, KII 11). There are also those interested in exploring and seeing what other countries are like (FGD 06), and others simply aim to make money (KII 07). Generally, however, the women want to provide good health, education and even good food for their children and families (KII 03, KII 08, FGD 05, FGD 07). In the hill areas of Nepal, food security is dire where agricultural production can only provide for 3 months’ subsistence per year, and the money earned also goes to feeding the family. However, women have fewer educational opportunities in the hill areas as the menfolk believe there is no benefit in educating daughters, which restricts what sorts of overseas employment are available (KII 06).

The related issue is that, for uneducated women, there is little work available within Nepal, and domestic work is not respected (KII 02). In some more religiously conservative areas, where there are restrictions on women’s mobility, young women may make their own decision to go, without consulting with the family (FGD 04), as these women feel the burden of household responsibility and educating their children or siblings, but are without any livelihood options locally (FGD 02, FGD 04, FGD 07). In some cases, there was the idea of going abroad and then returning and paying for their education, but as KII 10 noted ‘[but] once they got the taste of earning, they aren’t able to come back and study’. Many also go abroad to pay for medical procedures for family members, which can be very expensive (KII 12, FGD 02, FGD 03, FGD 05)

Most men do not support women’s migration and are dismissive towards the idea (KII 09), while ‘[other] family members do not care [about you] if you don’t have a husband on your side’ (FGD 04). Added to this is the societal expectation of having more children ‘which will eventually cost more’ (FGD 06). The other issue is the prevalence of domestic violence, and high levels of alcoholism among men, so that women resort to overseas migration and work (FGD 01, FGD 05, FGD10): ‘I went abroad leaving behind my two-and-a-half-year-old daughter for money […] as my husband was a drunkard’ (FGD 09). In these cases, the children are placed in the care of a relative, which is not always satisfactory, and the women worry about their children’s well-being and education (FGD 05, KII 02).

Information Sources

Influencing women with the idea and attraction of labour migration is a very lucrative practice, as the Manpower agencies can charge high fees to facilitate the process (FGD 02, FGD 03, FGD 04, FGD 05, FGD 06), but some of these agents cannot be trusted for accurate information (FGD10). Rather, it is the initial news and insights from friends, relatives and agents that lead women to local government information desks and NGO booths at the ward level through the District Development Committee (KII 01). Word of mouth is a major source of information, but newspaper advertisements as well as text messages through mobile phones and letting women know what jobs are available and where are aimed to generate curiosity and questions (FGD 03, KII 01, FGD 10, KII 06, KII 08). Those that have gone abroad earlier (KII 07) as well as ‘women in the village who act as agents and search for aspiring migrants’ (FGD 03, FGD 10) are also information sources:

The friend who has already been in another country guided us, as well as brother who helped me throughout the process [as]…he knew somebody in Manpower [company] in Kathmandu [because there were] no agents in locality. Foreign employment has never been seen as reputable work to any female. (KII 04)

While many use relatives or Manpower companies for migration information and to initiate the process, others are more secretive: ‘They never reveal what process they are using, because when people know a woman is going abroad, they will have a negative opinion about her’ (KII 05). This is due to the gendered stigma of women travelling overseas, as well as an indication of poverty. Due to this stigma from the community, women prefer to proceed with the migration alone. For some, women would get help from their families at first, before reaching out to a migration agent:

It is better to get consultancy from people which will make the process easier [and safer] (FGD 07).

If something happens to us abroad like we get scammed or we get into some accident, then our family can contact the agent and ask them to being us back [and] some [women travel] without letting others know about it…they do not let anyone know, not even family members… [sometimes they] leave saying they are going shopping or to a relative’s place but they were going overseas. (KII 09)

Because many women have little information or access through formal migration channels, they go via India as a transit country and many have complained about the problems and exploitation encountered. ⁴ In one case, a woman left without telling anyone including her children and spent 14 days in a Mumbai brothel, but in the end, made it to Saudi Arabia, and worked as a housemaid for some years, to save enough to purchase land for her daughters. These women are kept in Mumbai or another part of India for about a month before being moved to the destination country, and what happens in India is unclear, but these arrangements are not known to the women in advance, and it creates uncertainty and very exploitative situations. While migrating to India is legal due to the open border from Nepal, using India as a transit is illegal, but Indian customs officials turn a blind eye to the migrant women.

In one example, a teacher went to Kuwait in 2004, which was managed by friends, and stayed for 2 years. On return, she was held at Kathmandu airport as she was believed by officials to have illegally migrated but was released. She stayed in Nepal for 3–4 months then went to Saudi Arabia for 3.5 years, and after that went to Dubai as a domestic worker for an Indian family, using a visitor visa under the guise of visiting friends:

Going through India we have to go secretly, with police checks everywhere on the train and if they catch us, we have to bribe them. If we go from Nepal, the government will look out for us but if we go from India who will search for us? If they make it easier to go for freeing employment from Nepal then nobody will go secretly from there. (KII 07)

Women do not bargain on most issues ‘because most of the time they are desperate to get jobs’ (KII 05, FGD 02), and so they are vulnerable to exploitation. The relationship between migrant women and agents is complex: most agents are also from the same village and possess migration and work knowledge that migrant women depend upon. The level of trust is higher because of existing connections with each other, and some women are also related. At the same time, the agents are keen to profit from the transactions and may embellish stories of migration to convince the women (KII 05). The agents do inform women about financial, physical and other forms of abuse that they may experience while abroad, however, for women who suffer from intimate partner and family violence already, this is not a deterrent against migration because they have become desensitised (KII 05). Therefore, the challenge that confronts NGOs and other service providers is ensuring that women are fully aware of the risks involved in overseas migration.

Adding to the precarity is that while the women are discussing migration prospects with agents, they are also being influenced by family members. As one key informant observed: ‘Those who have returned after earning money are appreciated by society as well… [while] some go because of husbands and family members’ (KII 01). Although the women may be warned about the risks and challenges ahead of them in overseas labour migration, they are also pressured by their families. As mentioned above, we interviewed women who have experienced family and intimate partner violence. This means that any decisions made about migration may be coerced directly by family members and partners, or through indirect pressure because the women see very little choice beyond leaving their homes and going abroad.

There is a chain of agents in many cases, and very little transparency: Because the registered Manpower agencies are not located in every part of Nepal, women will contact local agents who take a commission and then send the women to a Manpower agency, although the agency may not be an official registered one (FGD 05). Therefore, a woman may go through the migration process without knowing whether their travel authorisation was officially sanctioned by the Nepalese Government, and they can still be trafficked through India (as the transit hub) without knowing that this is an illegal process, as well as the high risks involved (KII 02).

Cost of Migration

While in principle there is no cost to the migrant if they use official channels, in practice this is not the case, even to the point that some say going through India is in fact cheaper, where only Rs 25,000 (Nepalese currency) was asked for (FGD 02), but this may have been the exception, as others in the groups paid as much as Rs 120,000 to local Manpower companies. The range of Rs 100,000–Rs 150,000 seems to be the norm (KII 04, KII 06, KII 08), and, for KII 07, Rs 150,000–Rs 200,000 is common. The agents charge for the cost of an application to be written; and while having a national identity card issued can normally take months, with payment to an agent this can be shortened to days (FGD 03). The fact that people and organisations are more willing to loan money for migration than for local investments, as they think repayments will be more reliable, also makes it easier to use agents. As a result, the cost of migration can rise if agents know funds are more readily available (FGD 03), for what is often a no-cost visa.

Single women cannot get loans from most local village cooperatives so they are forced to use higher cost loan sources such as from agents (FGD 04) or relatives (FGD 06), or women’s cooperatives, but this latter source is not assured (FGD 07, FGD 09). Manpower companies charge more than local agents, but invariably migrants have to pay both for their services (FGD 03, FGD 06). The costs vary and depend on the willingness of the migrant to pay and their prior knowledge of the costs. The cost can range from Rs 30,000 to over Rs 150,000 ($230–$1,150), depending on the country they are going to, which is determined by demand. Malaysia and Dubai are more sought after so the cost is higher. ‘My agent took Rs 10,000 for my passport. Later when I got there, I came to know it cost Rs 130,000 … after I started earning there [in Saudi] I paid him back Rs 170,000 [$1,307]’ (FGD 17).

In many cases agents are taking money from the women migrants later, even if they don’t ask for money right away: ‘They will take it from their monthly salary’ (KII 05). For many women these arrangements are not made clear in advance. Generally, there are fewer collateral items available for women such as land and houses (FGD 06), where they require the agreement of the man of the house, as the land title will be in the man’s name. Many women use jewellery as security (FGD 07, KII 04), or they sell cows and buffalo (KII 06).

There is training, but it only reaches very few. ILO provides two days of orientation training prior to going abroad. Returned migrant women (RMW) provide advice/advocacy on foreign employment (KII 02). This has led to networks, and it seems to be effective, providing technical support and coordination:

For women going through India, we ask them to leave the details about whose house they are going to. We tell them that it is legally banned but don’t tell them not to go. We stay at the border. They helped a woman who had gone to Jordan but then has visa delays so she the left documents with them, so they were able to help. (KII 05)

There are 1-day orientations and training programmes for aspirants, and some are selected for a 2-days orientation training. They are told about the opportunities in their own country and that going abroad is an alternative option. Most of the people who took the training have engaged in productive activities. They are taught some language skills, how to calculate incomes and about machines used in households (KII 05).

Work Abroad

The work abroad this article is concerned with is domestic work and the issues that can arise from that. This work includes caring for children, and if migrants can teach children, they can earn more (KII 04). The real issue is the precarity of the process and the work itself. The work can be monotonous and the initial four months are usually quite tough with no language skills, which takes around 6 months to acquire, though for some it can be years (FGD 06, FGD 09). At the place of work in those early months, there is a struggle ‘to adopt to the ways of society where everything was new like food, culture, friendships, relations, perspective and so on’ (FGD 06). There is also abuse, they are kept indoors (FGD 07), and for one woman:

They used to scold and even didn’t give food as they thought she would get fat. While looking after the children. I stayed a year and 9 months. I came back to 15 days holidays but did not return. They did not give my salary in time and they were fretful. Used to shout when children cried. (KII 08)

For the work, the women ‘assume it is the same as household chores that they do in Nepal but it is totally different’ (KII 04). This is a difficult period but for most after the first few months the situation is more settled.

Pay is always a vexed issue: A woman was promised $200 but was paid only $150 as she was illiterate (FGD 03), and for another ‘I carried my contract with me and it said $150 but the boss tried to pay $125. I showed them the contract and they paid the full amount’ (KII 04). In another case the worker was defrauded by a medical institution, which said she was cleared to travel, but at the workplace she was found to have typhoid and had to be sent home (KII 04). ‘A lot of women go to foreign countries blindfolded without any prior knowledge or information. So, they may be compelled to return empty-handed’ (KII 07). But if they do return empty-handed, they can be the victim of mental and physical abuse. On the other hand, if they remit money there is the risk: ‘Their husbands go to hang out with friends, have fun and don’t give money to their wives’ (from a migrant daughter; KII 08).

There are many cases of domestic violence and even beatings by employers (FGD 10), but sexual harassment is the main issue many women face (FGD 04). In one case, a worker changed houses three times because the owners were bad, with sexual assault from boys in the houses. They are also watched and constrained in their movements: ‘We may be [able to get] lost in Nepal but there we cannot get lost’ (FGD 01). Their pay gets docked for minor infringements such as scorching clothes while ironing (FGD 05), and they may get beaten and molested while working, as they don’t know how to use appliances (KII 10). There is also a clear household power hierarchy, for example, in Kuwait Nepalese women were paid 50 dinar, Indians paid 60 dinar, Indonesians 70 dinar and Filipinos 80 dinar (FGD 01), and it can be very demoralising seeing these inequities. In another case, a woman spent 3 months in gaol in India as the employer held her paperwork and passport (FGD 02). There were also positive stories about employers, where one even paid to bring a child over so they could be with their mother (FGD 05, KII 06).

Remittances are used for a variety of purposes, but for many, at least half is used for household expenses, and the rest mainly for children’s schooling; there is no real environment for women to use them for investment, as that is seen to be the domain of men (KII 06). Men’s remittances tend to be saved while women’s remittances are used to run the household (FGD 03, FGD 04, FGD 06). Many women use all of it to cover household expenses, depending on the situation of the household back home, but the key expenditure is to send the children to school (FGD 02, FGD 03, FGD 04, FGD 09). There are often medical and hospital expenses back home as well, which can also be a motive for migration (FGD 06). These findings on the use of remittances are in line with the government’s findings: ‘Remittances have contributed to an increase in consumption levels and enabled households to obtain better health care, nutrition, education and housing’ (MLESS, 2022, p. 119).

Women tend to stay abroad for three to five years after their first contract, then return for three months and travel again (FGD 03, FGD 05, FGD 06). ‘When they return, they find themselves inactive and for many the only option is to re-migrate’ (KII 01, KII 05). Many women can spend more than 10 years abroad through several contracts (FGD 05, FGD 06, FGD 08, FGD 09, KII 02, KII 10). Over time, they lose touch with their children and the rest of the family. For one woman, ‘I lived there for eight years, [and] I failed my medical test in the ninth year and then came back’ (FGD 09). In all of these cases, the women were responsible for the family back home, from education to health and even day-to-day expenses, and this went on for many years.

For many women, the employer remits the funds (FGD 10) and they tend to use IME, a local transfer agency like Western Union. Some use Hundi and informal systems, but these are riskier (FGD 04). They send the money to their husbands, to children, parents and even to their agents (FGD 09).

Reintegration

Once the work placement is over, the migrant then faces the issue of reintegration. Nepal does not have a specific programme to support reintegration and the experiences of these women are very mixed. The key factor for successful reintegration is the ‘success’ of the migration:

Women who earn money and are appreciated have an improvement in their financial conditions, but in other cases, she has to ask for her own money back from her husband but if there are unwanted pregnancies or suspicion of other relationships women get harassed, and the family can abandon such women, but even more generally become a victim of violence. (KII 04)

On a positive note, a few women have started their own businesses such as a cosmetic store, a beauty parlour, and a small grocery shop, while others rear animals such as chicken and goats, or engage in agricultural production. However, most resume domestic work at home (KII 01), or invest in their houses through renovation and improvements (FGD 02) and are respected by their family and community. In general, though, remittances for women are mostly spent on daily household expenses and children’s education.

Many women reported that there is little reason to return and remain in Nepal because of limited employment options, so re-migration for overseas work is the only choice. Some women have returned due to concerns that their children are not being looked after properly, but the main reason was the expiration of their visas (KII 01, KII 02), the renewal of visas, and the search for new overseas contracts. As one key informant attests: ‘I have not seen any female working as per her acquired skill set here in Nepal’ (KII 04), as they learn nothing abroad, just washing dishes (KII 12). Official migrant workers, who are mainly men, have access to pension funds, health insurance and other support from the government, while women who face severe migration restrictions resort to informal channels and are denied this social welfare.

NGO Support

As noted above, some support is available for returning migrants but as many if not most transit through India, they are not officially recognised, so are dependent on NGOs for support. The NGOs that do offer support only reach a small percentage of the returned migrant population and so women are left to their own devices, or they re-migrate into a cycle of precarity through much of their working lives. For example, the NGOs WOREC Nepal and Returned Migrant Women (RMW) both maintain booths in front of some district offices to support migrant women (KII 04). WOREC helps with economic help for re-establishment, providing Rs 10,000 ($77) per person (KII 07), as part of their safe migration programme, but this is limited and only reaches the most vulnerable women who approach them for assistance.

NGOs offer vocational training skill development for returning migrants and training in domestic work for prospective migrants. The Safer Migration (SaMi) Program, supported by the Government of Switzerland, is a bilateral project through the Nepalese government that teaches skills for migrants, but not for irregular migrants (KII 02). The NGO Pourakhi helps women with skills training after returning to Nepal and in some cases, provides work to returned migrants to compensate for the salary they were denied by overseas employers. Pourakhi also provides vegetable and poultry training when women come back, and some have opened a tailoring shop after sewing training (KII 06). The central issue, however, is that the skills learnt abroad are not properly used in Nepal (KII 06). Tailoring is the main training done locally by the government, but if the aim was to work in the garment industry it was not very useful. There should be levels of training to cater to women’s different needs, such as small business management, loans for starting a business and pathways into the various industry sectors and employers. Because the government does not have a coherent policy for Nepalese women’s employment, current measures are mostly delivered by NGOs, which are constrained in what they can do.

COVID-19 Pandemic

The global pandemic had a profound effect on migration. A small number of migrants were stranded abroad and other suffered indignities at quarantine camps, but the big issue for women has been the drying up of work and the longer-term impact this brings. During the first year of the pandemic, when a woman returned to Nepal, she was shunned by the family, who ‘[did] not accept her in the [home]. Some family isolated the women for fear of COVID’ (KII 01). The pandemic also resulted in visas being cancelled so women were stuck in Nepal, unable to travel but still obliged to repay loans (used for the migration and visa process). There were mental and financial stresses of having to pay back loans (KII 02). In other cases, on return women ‘stayed in quarantine, but relatives could not go near, they could not work, and Nepal government did not look after them’ (KII 07). There was not much social interaction after COVID, but those who were vaccinated did not have to remain in quarantine. Those that went via India were kept there for two or three months then received their visas and went to Lebanon. Now they can go without a negative test (KII 04).

After the earthquake it was a problem but now with COVID there is even worse debt. Women who wanted to go abroad had increased quite a bit after COVID. (KII 05)

After COVID people more interested in Europe than the Gulf [as destination]. Now there are the risks for housemaids stuck in the house, etc. After COVID people [in Nepal] are also a little scared. When women came back, they were shunned and not allowed to leave their house. Mental pressure. Now more women than men going abroad as existing situations post COVID are worse. (KII 06)

It is clear that COVID has increased women migrant workers’ precarity. There is more uncertainty and less work due to the economic crisis facing most of the Middle East, and more uncertainty in travelling due to increased risk of contracting COVID and the longer-term health effects it can have.

Discussion and Conclusion

The Nepal case study shows that precarity in labour migration has been exacerbated by the global pandemic. Moreover, Nepalese women face even greater risks and precarity due to government restrictions on women’s migration, which force women to resort to irregular channels of migration. The key informants and women have consistently highlighted the dangers of using India as a transition hub for overseas migration, which leads to greater chances of trafficking, sexual violence and exploitation; this is in line with existing literature (Pande, 2014; Silvey & Parreñas, 2020). These interviews also found periods of exploitation for many women while they wait to travel beyond India (also see Rai & Rai, 2021). It is very difficult for women and NGOs to speak up on these issues, due to the illegality of unofficial migration as well as social norms which stigmatise survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. In that sense, women are doubly punished: first by the state and then by their family and community.

Another contributor to precarity is the role of migration agents: Many have some legitimacy as being ‘registered’ with Manpower agencies, but there is little regulation and accountability (Kern & Müller-Böker, 2015; MLESS, 2022). These agencies negotiate deals that mainly benefit themselves, and, if the migrant women have a poor education and are in difficult family circumstances they wish to escape from, they can fall vulnerable to these agents as they are the only way necessary documentation can be obtained to cross borders and enter new counties. The issue here goes beyond migration agents: With 25% of women in Nepal experiencing some form of violence during their lifetime and 32.8% experiencing child marriage (UN Women, 2022), combined with our interviews with women, it is safe to say that a significant number of them are choosing migration to escape, and are exploited by agents in the process.

Upon arrival at the destination country, if the kafala system is in place there, the host family/employer has complete power and control over the women, including their visas and passports. Some women in our interviews disclosed that they were at the complete whim of their employer, and having the house as both the site of work and accommodation opens them up to exploitation and abuse with impunity from the perpetrators (see Wadhawan, 2022). While the kafala system can be circumvented and women can broaden their work opportunities, this is still with the agreement of and payment to the host, and mostly occurs on second and subsequent migrations.

Although the remittances are important for children’s education and the family back home more broadly, migrant women are unable to utilise the skills and knowledge gained from overseas, due to limited employment opportunities. Their only option is to migrate once again, where there are better prospects, but this is at the expense of being away from their children and family. Missing their children’s childhood and ensuring that they have a good education are some of the key things that women worry about, in addition to experiencing stigma as the society overall does not support women migrating alone, regardless of marital status, and they can suffer social ostracism.

The study found that preparing women for migration through information and training sessions does make a difference, but the issue is that the reach of these programmes is limited and any official programmes exclude support and advice about the migration route via India. Whilst transiting via India is not official, women still take this option, and the government has a duty to support its citizens through accurate and relevant advice and information. Although information and training will not solve all of the problems, such as the feminisation of domestic work and the global demand for cheaper migrant workers, the knowledge that women gain from pre-departure programmes can make a difference and put them in stronger bargaining positions on the cost of migration, helping them to avoid the more dangerous elements during the migration journey as well as at the destination.

We conclude that the insights provided in this study have significant policy and programmatic implications for Nepalese women’s migration, and the ‘chain of precarity’ throughout the entire migration process is driven by gender inequality. Our research has provided a fine-grained case study of women migrants from Nepal from their own views as well as those of key informants that work with them, and gender norms and limited job options for women compound to the situation. There is an urgent need to further explore the connection between gender inequality and circular migration where women will travel three or four times per year, over the duration of a decade or even longer.

In all instances, women said circular migration arose out of necessity: the lack of job options back home which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic; the need to escape unsafe and unhappy family homes; as well as the self-perpetuating cycle of stigma. Women migrants are simultaneously celebrated for their remittances, but they also experience shame and suspicion from the community. The latter means that women do not feel able to remain in Nepal, and overseas work provides a greater degree of freedom and autonomy, although it is not entirely risk-free, as women also experienced abuse, violence and exploitation in the transition to their workplace. What is urgently needed is not paternalistic policies to deter women from migrating, but holistic, gender-sensitive policies and programmes that recognise the different forms of gendered discrimination against migrant women in both origin and destination countries, as well as ensuring all migrant workers, including domestic workers and other vulnerable occupations, are given full labour protection.

Interview Schedule

Focus Group Discussions: 2022 FGD 01 Returned migrants Morang/Lethang, 19 April. FGD 02 Returned migrants, Morang, 20 April. FGD 03 Aspiring migrants, Morang, 23 April. FGD 04 Aspiring migrants, Morang, 24 April. FGD 05 Returned migrants, Dolakha, 19 April. FGD 06 Returned migrants, Dolakha, 24 April. FGD 07 Aspiring migrants, Dolakha, 25 April. FGD 08 Aspiring migrants, Dolakha, 28 April. FGD 09 Returned migrants, Rupandehi, 19 April. FGD 10 Returned migrants, Rupandehi, 20 April.

Key Informant Interviews: 2022 KII 01 Province Coordinator WOREC Nepal, Morang, 18 April. KII 02 Programme Manager WOREC Nepal, Morang, 18 April. KII 03 RMW’s chairperson, Morang, 29 April. KII 04 Lebanon Returnee, Morang, 25 April. KII 05 Social Mobiliser, Dolakha, 21 April. KII 06 Social Mobiliser (2) Dolakha, 21 April. KII 07 Teacher, Dolakha, 24 April. KII 08 Lebanon Returnee, Dolakha, 24 April. KII 09 Teacher, Rupandehi, 19 April. KII 10 SAMI project Volunteer, Rupandehi, 26 April. KII 11 Immigrant Women Workers Group, Rupandehi, 26 April. KII 12 Male Farmer, Rupandehi, 5 May.