RETRACTED: What Limits the Benefits of Land-Lost Farmers in Chinese Courts? An Investigation of Chinese Land Acquisition and Resettlement Cases in the Yangtze River Delta
Open accessResearch articleFirst published online July, 2021
RETRACTED: What Limits the Benefits of Land-Lost Farmers in Chinese Courts? An Investigation of Chinese Land Acquisition and Resettlement Cases in the Yangtze River Delta
At the request of Sage and the authors, the following article has been retracted:
Zhou, W., & Bao, H. (2021). What Limits the Benefits of Land-Lost Farmers in Chinese Courts? An Investigation of Chinese Land Acquisition and Resettlement Cases in the Yangtze River Delta. Sage Open, 11(3). DOI: 10.1177/21582440211033268
The authors contacted Sage Open requesting revisions to their published article due to inaccuracies.
The proposed corrections were evaluated, and it was deemed that correcting the error would require substantive changes such that a correction is not appropriate.
The authors concluded, based on the assessment, that a retraction was more appropriate and requested this action. They also indicated further concerns in the reliability of their findings due to noting potential incompleteness of the dataset they used in their analysis.
Due to the noted concerns, this article has been retracted.
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