Challenges of Combating Terrorist Financing in the Lake Chad Region: A Case of Boko Haram

Abstract

Does counterterrorist financing (CTF) support the entire process of the global fight against terrorism? Finding answers to this question helps to address the difficulties facing relevant actors in defeating the Boko Haram (BH) terrorist group. This article examines the various funding strategies used by BH as well as the state, sub-regional and regional responses that have proven difficult in stemming the expansion of this terror group across the northeast and Lake Chad region. The study adopted qualitative research techniques through the use of Key Informant Interviews (KII) to gather data to address its central question. Findings of the article reveal that, regardless of the efforts toward containing the funding of this terror group, challenges remain in terms of the inability of relevant actors to operationalize the various CTF policies. Challenges include the institutional and techno-scientific challenges, the cui bono and prodest effect by beneficiaries of terrorism, uncoordinated CT strategies, the lack of political will by the relevant actors to address the challenge of TF and the structural conditions which render the CTF policies ineffective and help sustain the funding operations of this terror group. The study, among other things, suggests the implementation of various CTF policies and initiatives. Above all, effective border management and control besides effective intelligence and counterintelligence gathering systems to monitor and track the illicit flow of cash for terror-related activities should be an essential part of the initiatives. The strengthening of relevant institutions to address issues related to financial crimes, transnational threats, the arrest, and prosecution of sponsors of terrorism would enhance CTF. However, the CTF policies and initiatives require revitalization of the willingness of relevant actors to address the structural and systemic conditions facilitating BH funding activities across the Lake Chad region.

Introduction

Countering the sources used by terrorist groups to fund their activities is a major difficulty facing state and non-state actors in the fight against terrorism (see Financial Action Task Force [FATF] Report, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2018; Lee, 2018). This is because terrorist organizations depend on a wide range of resources to carry out their activities and to constantly recruit members (Clarke, 2015; Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013; Lee, 2018; Myres, 2012). These terror groups also heavily rely on resources for several reasons. These reasons and/or variables, as put forward by Freeman (2011, pp. 463–465), give a terrorist organization its classification. The first of these reasons is quantity, which gives the terrorist organization the ability to be more effective and allows it to operate and expand its activities across different borders. The second reason is legitimacy, to gain popular support from other sympathizers as these groups are most often perceived to be illegitimate by states and the international community. The third is security, to avoid unwanted attention from the state and security forces. The fourth is reliability, in terms of predictable or consistent resources. The fifth is control, as a source of power and influence to appeal to the hearts of its members and to sustain the effectiveness of the organization. The sixth is simplicity, which ensures that the processes for acquiring resources are simpler and less costly. It could be said that given the continued impact and danger posed by terrorist groups, states, and non-state actors are increasingly searching for ways to counter the sources and channels through which terrorist groups raise funds to support their activities.

Even though the concept of terrorist financing (TF) is regarded as ambiguous, due to the lack of a universally accepted definition of the term, attempts have been made to define and explain what it entails (Moten, 2010; Sorel, 2003). The most commonly used conceptual definition of TF refers to the various sources and avenues through which licit and illicit means are used by terror groups and their sponsors to raise resources for terror-related activities (Baffoe, 2017). These sources include donations from charities, contributions from members and sympathizers to their cause, support by rogue states, money laundering, and other forms of black-market operations such as trafficking in persons, narcotics, engaging in kidnapping, and hostage-taking (Freeman, 2011).

The growing literature and debate following the 9/11 attacks increasingly showed that any counter-terrorism strategy should also incorporate measures aimed at combating how terrorist groups raise funds to finance their operations given that their survival and operational capacity rely on these aspects (Hoffman, 2002; Wittig, 2011). It is in this light that this article attempts to address the challenges of countering TF within the context of the Boko Haram ¹ terror group active in northeast ² Nigeria and the Lake Chad region ³ . Despite the various measures taken by states and non-state actors to counter the activities of Boko Haram since its resurgence in 2010, it has carried out several coordinated attacks on state institutions and civilians (Onuoha, 2013). These attacks are conducted through suicide raids, kidnappings, and the deployment of Improvised Explosives Devices (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015). Reports revealed that attacks by this group led to over 100,000 deaths, destroyed properties and investments amounting to $9 billion, and over 2,400,000 persons were displaced making the group one of the deadliest in the world (Agency Report, 2017; China Global Television Network, 2017; Doherty, 2017; Premium Times, 2017; Sergie & Johnson, 2015; Tukur, 2017; see also Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015, 2017, 2018). The article will attempt to focus on the following key research questions: What is known about TF? What are the sources and methods used by Boko Haram to fund its operations? How should stakeholders respond to Boko Haram’s funding? and What are the difficulties facing relevant actors (stakeholders) in combating Boko Haram’s funding?

This article begins by providing a general overview of the understanding of TF and the threat it poses in today’s global politics based on the impact of the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency. The next section details the qualitative research methodology adopted in the study and the data collection process. Then, the article provides a theoretical background and a literature review on the countermeasures used in combating TF and Boko Haram’s funding strategy. The following section elaborates and analyzes measures used by actors at the national, sub-regional, and regional level to combat Boko Haram’s funding strategy. The final section examines the challenges facing stakeholders in stemming the funding of Boko Haram. The concluding part of the article puts forward the findings of the study and offers practical policy recommendations on how relevant stakeholders involved in combating Boko Haram’s funding should respond to these challenges. It also points out to avenues for further studies by researchers interested in counterterrorist financing (CTF) and Boko Haram’s funding.

Methodology and Data Collection

This article uses a qualitative research technique based on triangulation ⁴ to assess the challenges encountered in combating terrorism financing (TF) with a special emphasis on the Boko Haram terror group. This process involves the use of official documents from governments and multilateral agencies, academic and non-academic publications in addition to key informant interviews (KIIs) with experts familiar with issues related to terrorism, TF, counterinsurgency, and the Boko Haram conflict. As shown by Golafshani (2003), Christ (2009), and Mertens and Hesse-Biber (2012), this method is a powerful tool in research due to its emphasis on cross-validation and the verification of facts from multiple sources, thus further strengthening the credibility, objectivity, and reliability of findings in the research process.

The study draws key informants from academia, security sector, civil society, non-governmental organizations, community leaders, and residents in areas affected by the presence and activities of this terrorist group. These informants were selected based on their expertise, competence, objectivity, and scientific contribution to the focus of this study. They have also been targeted due to the credible knowledge and information they possess regarding the activities of this terror group. In specific terms, the informants were asked questions on how Boko Haram funds its operations, the measures taken by relevant stakeholders in combating Boko Haram’s funding, and the challenges confronting these stakeholders in combating TF within the context of Boko Haram. The views of the key informants were used extensively to support the study, at times directly quoting some of the statements made by the key informants for clarity. However, the authors respect and maintain the anonymity of the respondents, only referring to their affiliations and areas of expertise in accordance with the permission received from those interviewed.

TF, CTF and Boko Haram’s Funding Strategy: Theoretical Discussions and Review of Existing Literature

As put forward by Freeman (2011, p. 456), TF has no universally accepted definition and interpretation. This is because terrorist groups have diverse networks and channels through which they fund their operations. However, despite the non-monolithic and universal theoretical stance on TF, the growing literature on TF suggests four critical theoretical lenses through which this phenomenon can be studied (Clarke, 2015). The first theory that explains terrorist funding is through state sponsorship. This approach examines the situation through which state actors directly or indirectly facilitate and support acts that promote terrorism (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2018). Studies have increasingly shown that through acts of commission or omission, countries like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria are considered to be sponsors of terror-related activities (Raj, 2017; Shear & Sanger, 2017; U.S. Department of State, 2009, 2018).

The second theoretical lens that explains TF is the fact that terror groups fund their activities through illegal/illicit activities. These illegal activities are based on the narrative that terror groups engage in several networks of transnational criminal activities that involve extortion, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling of contraband and counterfeit goods, and other forms of petty crimes (Acharya et al., 2009; Picarelli & Shelley, 2007). The growing literature on TF suggests that terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, the Taliban in Pakistan, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, among other terrorist organizations, often engage in these kinds of illicit acts to fund and carry out their operations (Acharya et al., 2009; Freeman, 2011; Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007; Silke, 1998). It was revealed that the Palestinian Liberation Organization made over $10,000,000 through illegal activities, while the Taliban made a profit of over $160,000,000 through the sale and distribution of opium (Freeman, 2016). This strategy is said to be a common channel through which most terror groups around the world sustain themselves (Levy & Yusuf, 2019).

The third approach that theoretically explains TF is the narrative that terror groups engage in legal/licit activities to fund their operations (Freeman, 2011). Studies have shown that in their formative years, terror groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, engaged in legitimate businesses, which included farming, bakeries, and honey factories, as well as copying and printing shops for profit-making (Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013; Jason, 2003; Metraux, 2000). The fourth theory that explains TF is the approach that looks at popular support. This perspective explains the process through which terror groups depend on individuals and groups sympathetic toward them for funding (Baffoe, 2017). Several studies on TF have suggested that most terror groups rely on this strategy to fund their activities and ensure their sustainability (Levy & Yusuf, 2019).

Within the context of Boko Haram, this article will theorize the sources and methods used by this terror group from the lens of state sponsorship, where there are studies that suggest that Boko Haram is indirectly funded by some elements within the state. By paying ransoms to Boko Haram, the Nigerian government was said to be tacitly enabling this group to further consolidate its power (Brantly, 2014; McCoy, 2014b). The second lens through which this study will look at Boko Haram’s funding is through the group’s engagement in illegal activities such as the trafficking of counterfeit goods, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of citizens, and other diverse transcontinental criminal networks engaged by the group (Blanchard, 2014; Zenn, 2013). The third perspective is the involvement of the group in legitimate activities to fund its operations. This can be contextualized within the lens of the group relying on micro-finance contribution to fund its activities, daily membership contributions, and the involvement of the group in the fishing activities of the Lake Chad (Ewi & Salifu, 2017; Magrin & De-Montclos, 2018; ZAMUN, 2015). The fourth theoretical lens situates Boko Haram’s funding through the lens of popular support from local and international sympathizers (Comolli, 2015a; Cooper, 2016; McCoy, 2014a; Sommerlad, 2018; Zenn, 2018).

Many of the studies on TF attribute a special place to James Adams’ study on “The Financing of Terror” that was published in 1986: this study is largely considered to have opened the “Pandora’s box” to the study of TF (Byman, 2005; McCulloch & Pickering, 2005; Naylor, 2004; Raphaeli, 2003). His analysis focused on the sources and instruments used by terror groups to fund their operations which in most cases involves a mix and deployment of licit (legitimate businesses) and illicit means such as racketeering, extortions, armed robberies, and trafficking in narcotics (Freeman, 2011, 2016; Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013; Levitt & Jacobson, 2008; Vittori, 2011). However, it is important to note that, TF and CTF has gained more traction in the literature in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States (Barrett, 2012; Birkland, 2004; De Koker, 2006; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Keatinge & Keen, 2019; Levi, 2010; Rock, 2016; Salami, 2018; Whitaker, 2010). These studies are said to offer a comprehensive and clearer perspective regarding all aspects of TF and to reveal the various channels used by terror groups in funding their operations. These channels were contextualized within the framework of state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, popular support, and donations through individuals and groups sympathetic to their cause (FATF Report, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2018). The study by Freeman (2011) offered a very comprehensive analysis putting forward the reasons why terror groups rely on resources to finance their operations. These reasons are seen within the context of expanding the group, strengthening its recruitment capacity, buying fighting equipment, attracting support from its members, guaranteeing its legitimacy, preserving its security, and exerting membership loyalty and territorial control.

The studies by Wittig (2011) and Romaniuk (2014) offered a counter-narrative that challenges the conventional debates regarding TF by exploring other instruments and emergent methods used by terror groups to fund their operations. This position was also advanced by the growing literature and studies that suggest that the advancement in information and communication technology, particularly the internet and its tools, not only provide a platform used by terror groups to recruit and disseminate their propaganda; this also allows them to fund their operations (Carroll & Windle, 2018; Conway, 2006a, 2006b; Jacobson, 2010; Keene, 2011; Myres, 2012; Ogun, 2012; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2017; Theohary, 2011). These studies revealed that terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Hamas, ISIS, and Mujahideen among other jihadist groups receive funding and support through digital payments from groups and individuals sympathetic to their cause (Ashley, 2012; Basile, 2004; Brill & Keene, 2014; Choo, 2015; Irwin et al., 2014; Levy & Yusuf, 2019; Whyte, 2019). Examples of such digital payments include internet banking, mobile funds transfer, online trading, and the increasing use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (Keatinge & Keen, 2019; Salami, 2018). Consequently, this new frontier of terrorist funding calls for appropriate responses by relevant actors if the fight against TF is expected to make any meaningful inroads (Salami, 2018).

The growing literature on countermeasures to terrorism has put forward analysis through different perspectives (Clarke, 2015), also elaborating on the various legal instruments and conventions under international law that seek to combat the funding of terrorism (Bantekas, 2003; Duffy, 2005; Pieth, 2002). The main focus of these studies have been international conventions such as the “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” which eventually led to the establishment of the FATF in 1989 (See FATF Report, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2018). The FATF was mandated with the responsibility of countering terror funding, money-laundering, among other actions that facilitate the sponsorship of terror-related activities (see FATF Report, 2018). Some of these studies critically analyze the efforts of the FATF in CTF through its recommendations, ensuring compliance by states, and also the challenges confronting the Taskforce in achieving its stipulated mandate (Biersteker & Eckert, 2007; Donohue, 2005; Gardner, 2007; Gilmore, 2004; King et al., 2018; Levitt, 2003).

There has also been significant contributions within the context of countermeasures on the role of the state and non-state actors, notably international organizations such as the United Nations, and the European Union, in stemming the illicit funding of terrorism (Kaunert & Giovanna, 2010; Masciandaro, 2004, 2017). These roles are reflected through various conventions, policies, and legislation (Beekarry, 2011; Schott, 2006). Examples of these conventions include the “1988 Vienna Convention,” which focused on combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics and other forms of transnational crimes (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 1988). The “2005 Merrida Convention” led to the establishment of the “Egmont Group Financial Intelligence Unit” ⁵ , which further aimed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the United Nations (UN) and its members in combating money laundering and the sponsorship of terrorism (see International Monetary Fund, 2010).

In Africa, the growing debate on countering the threat of TF places special emphasis on the level of compliance by African states with the policy guidelines set out by the FATF, other global best practices in combating the financing of terror-related activities and the challenges confronting African governments in combating the funding of terror (Whitaker, 2010). Studies by several scholars critically examined the various strategies governments in Africa can use to disrupt the funding of terror-related activities in the continent (Detzi & Winkleman, 2016; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Solomon, 2012, 2015). With respect to countermeasures on Boko Haram’s funding, studies by Innocent and Chibuike (2016), Ray (2016), and Ewi and Salifu (2017) emphasized the various ways and measures taken by relevant stakeholders including various administrative, legislative, and prosecutorial instruments used to prevent the funding of Boko Haram (Rock, 2016).

As the main claim of this article rests on the challenges confronting state and non-state actors in countering the funding of Boko Haram, an elaboration detailing the literature on Boko Haram, especially concerning the sources and methods of its funding strategy, will be important. As has already been emphasized, a terrorist organization cannot operate effectively without the capacity to finance its activities (Clarke, 2015). It will be difficult for it to recruit fighters, buy the equipment needed for operations, expand its activities, and consolidate its power, legitimacy, and support from members without the human and material resources (Clarke, 2015). Therefore, the life cycle of any terrorist group depends on the resources at its disposal (Combs, 2017), which also applies to the Boko Haram terror group.

The emphasis on CTF intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as most studies on TF indicate, eventually leading to the freezing of over $147.4 million that was suspected to be intended for funding terror-related activities (Clarke, 2015). That effort to stem the illicit flow of cash to terror groups resulted in these groups becoming secretive in their sources of funding and financing their activities through formal financial institutions (Clarke, 2015). With that informed perspective, Boko Haram has also been secretive in revealing its sources of funding to its members as well as members of the public (Magrin & De-Montclos, 2018; ZAMUN, 2015). However, like most terror and extremist groups, Boko Haram finances its activities through tacit state sponsorship, legal activities, illegal activities, and popular support (McCoy, 2014a). These instruments involve a diverse network of black market operations such as the trafficking of persons, narcotics, armed robbery, kidnapping, support from local and international sympathizers, engaging in micro-finance funding, registration of businesses, and the collection of taxes across the Lake Chad region (Murdock, 2014; Weber, 2014).

Legal activities constitute a major channel for Boko Haram’s funding strategy. In the period between 2002 and 2009, the relatively unknown Boko Haram organization financed its activities by relying on micro-finance contributions from members, as well as a loan scheme started by the group (Comolli, 2015a). This scheme was established to enable members to have access to loans to start small businesses and to provide members with financial help to support their businesses. Through that process, members could access loans ranging from $32 to $10,000 (Comolli, 2015a). This scheme attracted members given that the demands for accessing the loan were not strict compared to the loan facilities provided by the banks and other financial institutions. This loan scheme involved a zero-interest rate and only required personal loyalty from members (Ewi & Salifu, 2017). Consequently, it encouraged struggling businessmen and other people willing to start-up businesses to not only contribute, but also enjoy the benefits of this financial scheme (Phone Interview with a Journalist Armed Groups and Violent Armed Groups in Central and Northern Nigeria, December 30, 2018). Related to this is the reliance on the daily contribution (Adashe) from members. Members were expected to make daily contributions of $0.80 (Zenn, 2020). These methods of daily contribution helped to fund the activities of the organization in its early days and even continued after the demise of its founder (Phone Interview, 30 December, 2018).

According to reports by the Financial Action Taskforce, Boko Haram has engaged in the buying of goods and invested in for-profit business ventures and also supported their activities. These businesses include the purchase of motorcycles (achaba) for commercial transportation and the opening of phone business centers. The proceeds realized from these commercial activities are used to fund the group’s activities (see Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa [GIABA], 2015, p.18). Furthermore, the control of the fishing business and agricultural produce in the Lake Chad region is another avenue that the organization uses to fund its operations (Anonymous Interview with a Senior Research Fellow on Countering Violent Extremism and Transnational Threats, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg, S.A. January 7, 2019). They sell these products at exorbitant rates and the profits accrued are further used to finance the activities of the group (Ibid. Interview, January 7, 2019). This position was further corroborated by a report which attributed the increase in attacks by the insurgents to their control of the agricultural activities of the Lake Chad Basin, which enabled them to recruit more fighters and buy more fighting equipment to attack military bases of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) ⁶ (Salkida, 2019).

Popular support is another strategy through which Boko Haram funds its operations. This includes support and contributions from charity organizations as well as local and international sympathizers (Cooper, 2016; Kingsley et al., 2015; McCoy, 2014b; Sommerlad, 2018; Zenn, 2018). Studies have shown that in 2002, Al Qaeda donated the sum of $3,000.000 to groups and individuals sympathetic to their jihadi expedition in Nigeria through an emissary. That money was believed to have been received by Boko Haram (McCoy, 2014a). Furthermore, in 2012, an intelligence report received by the Nigerian government suggested that the organization received over $40,000,000 from the Islamic State (ISIS) group to fund its operations across the northeast and the Lake Chad region (Sommerlad, 2018). It was this commitment and contribution that saw Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, pledge allegiance to ISIS (Agence France Presse, 2015).

At the local level, Boko Haram was said to have received financial support from unscrupulous charity organizations (see GIABA, 2015) and funding from prominent politicians and businessmen from the northern part of Nigeria (Nigeria Senator Ali Ndume “Linked to Boko Haram,” 2011). These individuals, civil society organizations, and charity organizations are believed to be sympathetic toward the cause pursued by the terror group (Iroanusi, 2019). The case of the former commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno State, the late Alhaji Buji Foi who was believed to be a major financier of the group through the provision of money, motorcycles, and other logistics needed for the terror group to carry out its activities in the state, was a high profile example of a public figure supporting and facilitating acts of terrorism (Walker, 2016).

The illegal activities, largely the black-market operations, created an alternative economy and source of funding for Boko Haram to carry out its activities (see also Murdock, 2014; Author’s Interview with a Conflict Resolution Researcher with expertise on Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups in Nigeria, Lake Chad and Sahel regions, University of Manitoba, Canada, October 11, 2018). These channels included bank robbery, illegal trafficking of persons and drugs, extortion, kidnappings, and other forms of transnational crimes (Murdock, 2014). It was reported that in the period 2010 to 2013, the group made over $6,000,000 as proceeds from bank robberies (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium [TRAC], 2016; Wasswa, 2014). They mostly performed these robbery attacks in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe (TRAC, 2016). Kidnapping for ransom has become an important strategy used by Boko Haram to fund its operations (Cooks & Abrak, 2014; Ndahi, 2013; Salkida, 2016; Smith, 2015). Depending on the personality kidnapped, the group usually demands a ransom ranging from $10,000 to $1,000,000 (TRAC, 2016). This medium has become a prime source of funding for Boko Haram, which is not only worth millions of dollars, but is another strategy used by the group to force the government into concessions and negotiations (In-print interview with an adjunct Professor on Violent Non-State actors, Georgetown University Security Studies Program [SSP], who has contributed extensively to the literature on the Boko Haram and its affiliates such as Ansaru, and Islamic State West Africa Province [ISWAP], January 2, 2019). This was further revealed, when the group was said to have received the sum of €50,000,000 for the release of 104 out of the 106 girls kidnapped from the Government Secondary School, Dapchi in Yobe State in 2018 (Haruna, 2018; Ibrahim, 2019; Salkida, 2019). In addition, the release of 82 of the over 200 abducted girls from the Chibok Girls Secondary School through a prisoner swap deal was another trump-card used by the group in its negotiations with the Nigerian government (Onuah & Kingimi, 2017).

Trafficking of persons, narcotics, arms, contraband products, stolen cattle, and other unverified sources such as cryptocurrencies, and other forms of transnational crimes represent another flourishing avenue through which Boko Haram finances its operations (FATF Report, 2016; Innocent & Chibuike, 2016; Ndahi, 2016; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). As argued by a respondent during an interview, it should be emphasized that the poor state of Nigeria’s border creates a channel through which Boko Haram launders and moves contraband products across the Lake Chad region without being detected by immigration and security operatives (In-print Interview, January 2, 2019). This was further fuelled by the negative effect of the 5-year blockade by the MNJTF on the “Dikwa-Maiduguri-Gamboru-Ngala routes.” This measure was intended to deter the movement of illicit products across Lake Chad, but it was said that it also further created an avenue for Boko Haram to not only serve as the guarantor of security in these ungoverned areas, but also to continue to launder contraband products and increase its funding (Samuel, 2019).

It may well be argued that there are other unverified sources through which Boko Haram finances its operations (Anonymous interview with a Retired Air vice Marshall, with the Nigerian Air Force, November 9, 2018; Anonymous Interview with a Retired Military General and former Commander of the MNJTF, November 6, 2018). These sources can be seen within the context of the communities perceived to be under their control, where the group set up instruments for collecting taxes (haraji) from members of such communities. In the Abadam, Guzamla, and Monguno communities, for example, Boko Haram established state-like structures of governance and members of such communities are forced to pay a daily compulsory tax of $2.8. Consequently, it has been reported that through these multiple channels of criminal activities, Boko Haram has secured funds amounting to approximately $70,000,000, which has further bolstered the group’s operational capacity to carry out attacks and remain relevant (TRAC, 2016).

It is important to note that Boko Haram, like other terrorist organizations, depends on resources to carry out its activities. Several methods, instruments, and strategies have been used by Boko Haram to finance its activities across the region. These sources, as detailed above, include membership contributions, granting loans to members, support from local and international sympathizers, as well as other black-market operations such as the trafficking of persons, narcotics, arms sale, armed robbery, kidnapping, and other unverified sources such as the collection of taxes in areas perceived to be under their control, and the control of the agricultural activities in the Lake Chad region. These methods and channels have assisted the organization with recruiting more members and consolidating its position.

Measures Taken to Curb Boko Haram’s Funding: National, Sub-Regional and Regional Responses

The activities of Boko Haram across Lake Chad present a complex regional security challenge (Comolli, 2015b). This is because the insurgency has not only impacted negatively on the peace, security, and progress of the northeast and Lake Chad, the continued presence of this terror group has further implications on the security and stability of the region if the group is not contained. It is important to note that, since the emergence of this terror group, several counterinsurgency/terrorism initiatives have been implemented by states and non-state actors at the national, sub-regional and regional levels to contain and prevent this group from carrying out further attacks and expanding their activities (Agbiboa, 2015; Asanvo et al., 2016; Ogbeide, 2011; Oyewole, 2015). One such measure involves restricting the funding capacity of Boko Haram (Torbjörnsson & Jonsson, 2017). It is within this context that this section of the article examines the measures taken by actors at the national level and the sub-regional and regional level responses aimed at stemming the funding capacity of Boko Haram.

National Level Response and Efforts

Countering terrorist finance requires relevant actors and stakeholders to adopt a series of measures that will target the sources of funds, arresting and prosecuting groups and individuals suspected of facilitating acts of terror and denying terror groups the space to expand their activities (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007). This approach also applies to Boko Haram given the fact that most of the measures taken by the Nigerian government and other relevant stakeholders involved restricting the sources of Boko Haram’s funding, arresting, and prosecuting persons and groups suspected to be supporting and denying the group the space to further expand its territory (Rock, 2016).

At this level, the Nigerian government adopted and initiated several administrative, statutory, and legislative measures through its agencies that are intended to address the challenges associated with TF (Interview with a member of the GIABA committee and Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit [NFIU], October 13, 2018). These initiatives have been adopted to regulate, monitor, and detect the illicit movements and laundering of funds for terror-related activities (Ibid Interview, October 13, 2018). For example, the “NFIU”, established by the National Assembly 2011 Act which prescribed the laws governing anti-money laundering and TF activities in the country, draws its mandate from the recommendations of the FATF and the Egmont Group. Consequently, being a member of the GIABA ⁷ , Nigeria further showed its commitment in the fight against terrorist financing as one of the compliant states in Africa in terms of monitoring, reporting, and sharing intelligence regarding the sponsorship of terror-related activities (see GIABA, 2015). These mandates and memberships encourage multi-agency cooperation in the monitoring, detecting, and reporting of illicit movements and the transfer of funds to facilitate terror-related acts (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2011).

Furthermore, under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2011 and the NFIU Act (2018), financial institutions are required to report local transactions exceeding $10,000 for individual accounts and $20,000 for corporate accounts to relevant agencies. International transactions exceeding $10,000 should also be reported to such agencies (NFIU Act, 2018). In addition to this, in line with the Foreign Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1995, the NFIU Act also requires foreign travelers to make currency declarations to the Nigerian Customs Service. These laws are implemented in line with global best practices to stem the illicit laundering and provision of funds to facilitate terror-related acts. Therefore, through the activities of the NFIU and these legislations, terror groups such as Boko Haram are finding it increasingly difficult to fund their activities through formal institutions because these funds can easily be tracked (Interview, October 13, 2018).

To further strengthen the operationalization of these laws against terrorist financing, Abubakar (2015) stated that the Nigerian government responded with the creation of an avenue for multi-agency synergy involving financial organizations and security organs to stem cash-flows to terror groups. This position was further corroborated by the former director of Defense Intelligence, Rear Admiral Gabriel Okoi, who urged for greater synergy between Nigerian banks and other relevant security agencies in intelligence gathering, sharing and reporting of suspected financial activities supporting terror-related activities, especially with respect to Boko Haram (Arseneault, 2015). As a result of reports suggesting that there was collaboration between Boko Haram and certain unscrupulous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to launder funds and finance its operations, the Nigerian government mandated the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the NFIU to profile, watch and investigate the activities of NGOs (Iroanusi, 2019; Nwezeh, 2019). This action led to the investigation of 40 bank accounts of NGOs flagged and linked to Boko Haram (see “Magu Tasks Bankers On Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing,” 2019). These measures were intended to ensure compliance and stop any action that would encourage the illegal movement of funds by Boko Haram (Nnochiri, 2018; Nwezeh, 2019; Orioha, 2015).

In addition, as observed by a respondent, following the arrest and trial of individuals and groups suspected to be funding the activities of Boko Haram, effectiveness of the group was decreased as it is dependent on these individuals to fund its operations (Anonymous interview with a committee member established by the Nigerian government on Small Arms and Light Weapons—PRESCOM, January 23, 2019). Prominent among them were the late Alhaji Buji Foi, Alhaji Bunu Wakil, Mallam Saidu Pindar—Nigeria’s former Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe—and Senator Ali Ndume, who were suspected to have ties with Boko Haram (Barna, 2014; “Court Fixes July 4 to Rule on Ndume’s Terrorism Trial,” 2011; Mbaya, 2011; “Nigeria Senator Ali Ndume ‘Linked to Boko Haram’,” 2011). It can therefore be said that the arrest and subsequent trial of these individuals not only affected the group’s capacity to fund its operations, but also forced them to resort to other avenues to fund their activities. What is more, these arrests and public humiliation forced certain unidentified sponsors to retrace their steps knowing that the moment they were profiled and seen to have ties with this terrorist group, their fate would be sealed (Ibid Interview, January 23, 2019).

Interviews revealed that experts regard the efforts by the government and other relevant stakeholders in curbing the funding capacity of Boko Haram via the establishment of the “National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Extremism (NAPPCVE)” as a comprehensive and holistic strategy for the prevention of terrorist financing. The National Action Plan addresses the factors and conditions giving rise to terrorism and other forms of violent extremism witnessed in the country; however, its implementation by relevant stakeholders remains the main challenge (Anonymous Interview with a Senior Research Fellow on Countering Violent Extremism and Transnational Threats, January 7, 2019; In-print Interview with a Conflict Researcher, with the “Policy Think-Tank ACODE”—Kampala, Uganda, January 3, 2019).

Therefore, it can be said that continued emphasis on multi-agency cooperation between security agencies, financial institutions, and civil society organizations is needed to consolidate some of the gains and achievements in the fight against terrorist financing. It is also important for these agencies to understand and explore these new frontiers and channels of terror funding such as Bitcoin and other forms of cryptocurrencies, which Boko Haram and other terror groups are said to perceive as a viable alternative channel to fund their operations given that they are difficult to trace, track, and block.

Sub-Regional and Regional Responses and Efforts

The transnational impact of terrorist threats and the fact that Boko Haram and its operations spiraled to other parts of the continent has warranted the response of stakeholders and other players at the region to stem its funding capacity (D’Amato, 2018; Onapajo et al., 2012). Nigeria is a member of various counterterrorism initiatives including the “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Being a member of these forums, the Nigerian government, its agencies, and other member states in the Lake Chad region have benefited from various training programs organized by the United States Department of Counterterrorism Finance aimed at restricting the operational capability of Boko Haram to raise, move, and store funds. This includes effective cross-border synergy with other neighboring countries on ways to curtail Boko Haram’s funding (see Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2018).

These sub-regional and regional actors continue to show their commitment to the fight against terrorist threats across the continent by encouraging inter-state and agency cooperation to combat terror financing through the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the GIABA, and the FATF; See GIABA, 2018; This Day, 2018). Several workshops such as “Combating the Financing of Terrorism for Financial Institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions in Nigeria” have helped to further equip and prepare financial and non-financial institutions, to understand the current trends in CTF considering the threat of Boko Haram across the region (GIABA, 2018). Because of the continuous attacks by Boko Haram, there has been increased collaboration between GIABA and ECOWAS member states, who have agreed to install scanning machines across national borders to effectively monitor and detect terrorism financiers as well as the illicit movement of contraband used by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups for terror-related purposes across borders (European Union, 2019; Momoh, 2015).

In addition, the AU continued to support member states in the fight against terrorist financing in the region through various counterterrorism initiatives such as the “African Union Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism” in 2002 and further amended in 2010 (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018b). This position was further reflected during a high-level conference on “Countering Terrorism Financing in Africa” held between April 9 and 10, 2018 in Algeria. Conference participants discussed issues relating to the various methods used by terror groups such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other jihadist groups to fund their operations, the threat of terrorist financing, responses by state and non-state actors and the challenges confronting actors in combating terrorist financing (see African Center for the Study & Research on Terrorism, 2018). Consequently, the AU urged members to devise a “continental strategy” to counter the threat associated with the funding of terror-related activities. In addition to that, members were encouraged to ensure better inter-state and agency cooperation, effective information and intelligence sharing, and the integration of various forces, and to pursue policies that will strengthen economic and social development, modernization of the continent’s economy, and transparency and good governance (see African Union, 2018). These measures, if implemented by members, will contribute immensely to countering Boko Haram funding and terrorist financing across the Lake Chad and the wider African continent.

Another strategy used to prevent terrorist financing is denying terror groups the opportunity to govern territories (Rock, 2016). This strategy led member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission under the MNJTF to implement several counterterrorism strategies aimed at preventing the territorial expansion of Boko Haram, to reclaim territories earlier captured by Boko Haram and to restrict its ability to fund operations (Barnes, 2015; Foucher, 2016). Again, initiatives such as the “five-year trade blockade” on the “Dikwa, Gamboru-Ngala, and Maiduguri” road to stop the illicit movement of products across the Lake Chad region affected the financial strength of Boko Haram in terms of funding and expanding its territorial base (Anonymous Interview January 7, 2019). The MNJTF further banned the production, marketing, and distribution of smoked fish, cattle, and other agricultural produce in the “Diffa area” and other parts of Lake Chad to control the flow of cash to Boko Haram (Akum et al., 2019). It can be said that the efforts by the MNJTF resulted in restrictions on the ability of Boko Haram to occupy territories, extend its control beyond the Lake Chad region, carry out coordinated attacks, and transnationally engage in illicit activities to fund its operations, forcing the group to re-strategize its rules of engagement (Interview, Executive-Assistant Commissar, ECOWAS Secretariat, FCT-Abuja, Nigeria, October 22, 2018). As such, these measures and initiatives by sub-regional and regional actors in the continent limited the operational capacity of the group to carry out coordinated attacks and expand their activities beyond the Lake Chad leading the Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari to claim that the group remains “technically defeated” (see “Boko Haram Technically Defeated, Buhari Insists,” 2016).

What are the Challenges in Curbing Boko Haram’s Funding?

Combating terrorist financing is complicated as relevant stakeholders and actors are increasingly being confronted with several challenges in the fight against CT and CTF despite various institutional, legislative, and policy initiatives (Anonymous Interview with a Retired Military General November 6, 2018). This section of the study focuses on the challenges and problems facing actors in countering Boko Haram’s funding.

Failure to operationalize CT and CTF policies to combat terrorism is considered to be a major challenge confronted by stakeholders in countering terror-related activities and terror groups’ sources of funding (Felter, 2018; Innocent & Chibuike, 2016; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018a). The views put forward by the key informants suggest that the efforts by state and non-state actors to counter Boko Haram’s funding capacity are failing to achieve the desired results. This is because of the inability of national and regional actors to implement the various policies and measures with regards to countering terrorist financing in the region (Interviews with key informants, October 11, 2018; January 3, 2019; and January 7, 2019). For example, initiatives such as the “National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism,” the “African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA),” the “NFIU,” and the “National Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (NACTEST) are yet to make any meaningful inroads in addressing the fundamental threat of terrorism and terrorist financing as Boko Haram and other radical jihadist groups in the continent continue to carry out several attacks and expand their operations (Interview with a Non-Resident Fellow, “Institute for Peace and Security Studies,” Addis-Ababa-University, Ethiopia, January 18, 2019). Another example of CT and CTF policy challenges was the initiative taken by the MNJTF in which certain trading routes were blockaded to stem the funding capacity of Boko Haram. This initiative was argued to have yielded a minimal impact as the group continues to operate in these areas with little resistance from the Task Force (Idris & Leo, 2018). This view was further put forward by a respondent who argued that the decision by the MNJTF to block the “Maiduguri-Dikwa-Gamboru Ngala” roads did not stop the transnational criminal activities or the illicit flow of cash by Boko Haram: despite the blockade by the government, Boko Haram continues to collect money from the few motorists plying that route and confiscate their goods (Interview with a Conflict Resolution Researcher, October 11, 2018). Another key informant and a former resident of Gwoza and member of the Civilian Joint Taskforce in Maiduguri, also supported this line of argument stating that

In fact, I can tell you, the decision by the government to stop the attacks and the laundering activities of Boko Haram, in the Maiduguri-Dikwa, Gamboru Ngala and Damboa axis further complicated the situation because Boko Haram became totally in control of these routes. They stop passengers at will, kidnap women at will and forcefully snatch food items at will. (Phone Interview, November, 17 2019)

Consequently, as put forward by a transnational threat expert,

fighting Boko Haram’s funding requires a serious concerted effort by actors to move beyond theory or policies to effective policy implementation. As it stands today, both the Nigerian government, the ECOWAS and the African Union still rely on these textbook initiatives while negating the practical steps in actualizing these CTF policies. (Anonymous Interview with a Senior Research Fellow on Countering Violent Extremism and Transnational Threats, January 7, 2019)

Therefore, the lack of operational capacity by the relevant stakeholders to implement these policies remains a challenge in countering Boko Haram’s finances.

Another challenge confronted by stakeholders in CTF against Boko Haram is associated with the lack of an institutional and techno-scientific framework to block the various channels and instruments used by this terror group to fund its operations (Aluko, 2018). This is because relevant agencies are said to be increasingly non-cooperative in the sharing of financial intelligence and reporting suspected activities related to the sponsorship of terror-related activities in the country in line with the recommendations and guidelines prescribed by the FATF (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2018; Mentan, 2017; Mentone, 2018). A respondent put forward during an interview that the non-compliance and non-cooperation among stakeholders can be attributed to the history of mutual suspicion among agencies, weak institutions, and lack of coordination by these agencies to implement the various techno-scientific instruments that require them to monitor and report the illicit funding of Boko Haram (In-Print Interview with an Assoc. Professor—Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nssuka, Enugu State, November 12, 2018). An example of such failure is the suspension and subsequent expulsion of Nigeria by the Egmont Group in 2017 for failing to provide, report, and share information related to money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit flows of cash suspected of facilitating terrorism (Ibekwe, 2018; “Nigeria: Lessons from our Egmont Group Suspension Saga,” 2018).

The lack of effective intelligence and scientific monitoring systems by relevant stakeholders to monitor, track and prevent the flow of funds by Boko Haram further affects the various measures aimed toward countering the funding ability of this terror group (KIIs October 22, 2018 and December 30, 2018). This view was further corroborated by the sentiment put forward by the United Nations Security Council that “Boko Haram do not have any physical asset that can be traced and confiscated” (UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Nigeria’s Boko Haram, 2014). This is because the group relies on various informal channels (e.g., the collection of taxes, contributions from members, engaging in illegal activities and other black market operations) to fund its operations and this is making it increasingly difficult for formal institutions (banks and other anti-money laundering agencies) to monitor, track and freeze such funds (UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Nigeria’s Boko Haram, 2014). As Boko Haram avoids these formal institutions, and due to the fact that the technology needed to counter these unverified and informal sources of funding terror-related activities is either non-existent or operationally non-functional, countering its finances remains extremely problematic (Interview with a Professor and a former Director of Research, NIIA, Nigeria, November 14, 2018). Therefore, for effective monitoring of these informal funding streams of Boko Haram, a combination of conventional intelligence gathering systems that rely on “technology assets” with “native intelligence” which relies on “human assets” is vital in combating CTF (Ibid Interview, November 14, 2018).

The “Cui-bono and Cui-prodest effect” of terrorist financing and the asymmetric nature of “Arms Trade Negotiations” is another challenge confronted by stakeholders in countering Boko Haram’s funding. Many terrorism experts argue that terrorism is a “big business” and many are attracted by the huge financial benefits associated with terrorism judging by their capacity to attract resources through illicit means (Enders & Sandler, 2011). A key informant revealed that the efforts by stakeholders regarding counterterrorism and CTF within the context of Boko Haram were unsuccessful due to the fact that the “beneficiaries and profiteers” from the activities of this terrorist group do not want it to stop: Whether they are state or non-state actors, they will continue to frustrate any effort that will counter the activities of Boko Haram (Anonymous Interview with a Senior Research Fellow on CVE and TT, January 7, 2019). This paradox explains the fact and narrative that, despite the huge budgetary allocations designated to counter the activities of this terror group, Boko Haram continues to show its resilience by expanding its activities, recruiting fighters, buying high-firepower equipment and attacking military bases with little resistance (Munshi, 2018). Closely linked to this is the asymmetric nature of arms negotiations that normally place developing countries in a disadvantaged position. For example, the “2011 United Nations Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations” on arms trade and illicit financial flows put Nigeria and other developing societies in a difficult negotiation position. This is simply because the developing countries do not control or influence the global movements of arms, weapon sales, and their proliferation. In that regard, those enjoying the proceeds from arms and weapons sales are not prepared to stop their illicit transactions with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. Moreover, it is argued that “illicit arms trade comes alongside the control of territory, and enough territory keeps the flow of cash for Boko Haram” (In-print Interview with An adjunct Professor on Violent Non-State actors, January 2, 2019).

Border porosity is another challenge confronting stakeholders in countering the funding of Boko Haram’s activities across Lake Chad. Some studies suggest and support the argument that terrorist organizations thrive in countries and regions characterized by unsecured borders (Ramdeen, 2017). This narrative can also be considered to be true for Boko Haram given that the group takes advantage of the absence of a national, sub-regional and regional policy regarding border control, the absence of a well-structured and organized cross border intelligence system, and the lack of capacity of political actors and agencies to implement effective border policies (Onuoha, 2012, 2013) The absence of these mechanisms has created the avenue for Boko Haram to not only fund its activities, but also use its vast resources to attract and recruit fighters from other violent extremists and jihadist groups across the Lake Chad/Sahel regions as well as other foreign terrorist fighters from the Islamic State (“Boko Haram Recruits ‘Were Promised Lots of Money’,” 2016; Cronin, 2019; Enobi, 2016; Mensah, 2017). What is more, the problems associated with the poor state of Nigeria’s borders can be seen in the group’s ability to carry out various transnational criminal activities efficiently: a report by the United Nations suggested that border porosity contributes to 87% of pharmaceutical opioids controlled by Boko Haram across Lake Chad (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). As further argued by a respondent, the trafficking of “tramadol tablet” and “condoms” in commercial quantities across the Lake Chad region by Boko Haram with no formal checks by the Nigerian immigration authorities speaks volumes in terms of how poor border management fuels the illicit movement of contraband and the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram insurgency (Interview and Discussion with a Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo-Adama University of Technology—Yola, Adamawa, June 24, 2019). Therefore, any countermeasures against Boko Haram’s funding should also address the challenges associated with poor border management.

Another challenge confronted by actors in countering Boko Haram’s funding stems from the absence of a well-structured counterterrorism strategy to fight terrorism with all its elements (Interviews with a Clergy with Church of Christ in Nations [COCIN] and Expert on Inter-Group Relations October 15, 2018; and an Assistant Comm. ECOWAS-Secretariat, Abuja, October 22, 2018). This is because defeating Boko Haram’s finances requires a comprehensive and wholistic counterterrorism approach (In Print Interview with an Assoc. Professor—UNN, November 12, 2018). The absence of that makes it practically impossible for any efforts toward CTF to make any positive impact. As argued by the Chairperson of the AU, Moussa Faki, in line with the complex realities and forces of change in today’s international system, continued emphasis on the use of force to counterterrorism is self-defeating (Ero, 2017). This is because, the current approach to countering Boko Haram’s funding and other activities is uncoordinated due to the absence of a coherent strategy that is not just reductive (emphasis on the use of force), but fails to incorporate other critical (non-military) approaches to fighting terror-related activities (Interview with a Conflict Resolution Researcher October 11, 2018). Therefore, defeating terrorism and the funding capacity of terror groups such as Boko Haram requires the commitment and effort by relevant actors in designing a well-structured counterterrorism initiative that is all-encompassing that reflects contemporary realities (Interview with a Transnational Threat Expert January 7, 2018).

The lack of political will and the inability of leaders to implement the various counterterrorism policies, to prosecute sponsors of Boko Haram, and to address the structural factors contributing to terror-related activities are seen as other challenges facing actors in the fight in countering Boko Haram’s funding activities across the Lake Chad region. As argued by a key informant, the 2011 and 2013 Counterterrorism Laws and the 2017 National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism have not yielded the desired result in limiting the presence and activities of Boko Haram (Interview with a Professor and a former Director of Research, NIIA, Lagos, Nigeria. November 14, 2018). These laws, if implemented, offer the platform for strong inter-agency collaboration, community engagement in building resilience, safeguarding and preserving the rule of law, human rights and addressing the challenges associated with radicalization, funding and the negative ideological narratives pursued by Boko Haram (Anonymous Interview, with a CVE Researcher ISS South Africa, January 7, 2019). Currently, these laws have yet to be fully implemented by political actors. Second, limited efforts by the government to name, shame, and prosecute persons suspected to be sponsors of Boko Haram calls into question the prosecutorial ability of political actors and institutions to combat terrorist financing in the country (Ibenegbu, 2017; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018b). Although individuals are identified as sponsors and sympathizers of Boko Haram, no action has been taken to ensure they are prosecuted, jailed and their assets seized (Adepoju, 2014; Ibenegbu, 2017). Furthermore, the inability of actors (state and non-state) to address structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, radicalization, illiteracy and lack of social amenities helps to fuel the activities of Boko Haram and affects any efforts to stem the funding operations of this group across the Lake Chad region (Campbell, 2013, 2018; Matfess, 2016, 2017; Soriwei et al., 2016). The failure to address and respond to these critical problems has created an avenue for Boko Haram to recruit members and extend its influence beyond the northeast to the Lake Chad, further increasing its resources (Weeraratne, 2017). As argued by Campbell (2018), the absence of government services in Maiduguri saw residents of the region resort to seeking assistance from Boko Haram. This was evidenced in the group, providing services such as water, food, and medical supplies to these communities (Campbell, 2018). Thus, this led people in the region to perceive Boko Haram as an alternate government; the group has established a state-like structure of governance collecting taxes and providing security (“Boko Haram Still Collecting Taxes, Providing Services in Borno—Archbishop Of Kaduna,” 2019). The provision of these services by Boko Haram to the locals means that they are required to make compulsory tax contributions. Therefore, without addressing these critical issues affecting the people of Lake Chad, any effort toward CTF will remain counterproductive.

Conclusion

Combating Boko Haram’s funding is challenging despite the various countermeasures at the national, sub-regional and regional levels by state and non-state actors to prevent this terrorist organization from carrying out attacks and expanding its operations. Boko Haram continues to show resilience by expanding its frontiers in the sub-region, buying more fighting equipment, recruiting more fighters, and carrying out more attacks across the Lake Chad region. This has reduced the effectiveness of the various counterterrorism and countermeasures on terrorist financing against the group. These challenges stem from a lack of implementation of various counterterrorism policies at different levels, as well as the lack of multi-agency cooperation on financial intelligence gathering, sharing, and reporting. In addition, the lack of political will by stakeholders in ensuring the implementation of the various CTF policies, the “cui-bono” effect of terrorist financing, border porosity across the Lake Chad region, and the lack of an effective coherent counterterrorism strategy to confront the methods and avenues through which Boko Haram funds and expands remain critical problems in combating terrorist financing.

To address these challenges, the article recommends that a multi-dimensional approach is necessary for the fight against terrorist financing. This involves the integration of various formal and non-formal instruments by relevant stakeholders to limit Boko Haram’s funding capabilities. This includes the following: (a) Strengthening the operational capacity of agencies responsible for the fight against TF by equipping them with resources to fulfill their mandates. (b) Ensuring relevant stakeholders (actors) across the Lake Chad and the African continent encourage synergy and multi-agency collaboration in the gathering, monitoring, and sharing of financial intelligence to prevent the illegal movement and trafficking of funds to facilitate any act of terror-related activity. (c) Taking stringent measures to name, shame, and prosecute persons and organizations and freeze and confiscate the assets of those involved in the financing and facilitating any terror-related activity in Nigeria, the Lake Chad, and the African continent. (d) Addressing the economic, political, ideological, socio-cultural, environmental and structural conditions that motivate individuals to join violent extremist groups. (e) Ensuring the implementation of the various CTF and CT policies across all levels in line with the guidelines prescribed by FATF. (f) Continuing “military raids” in territories perceived to be controlled by Boko Haram where they collect taxes, extort and engage in other forms of illicit activities to fund their operations. (g) Ensuring effective border control across the northeast, Lake Chad and the continent to effectively monitor, check, report and address other issues regarding illegal migration, money laundering, arms smuggling and other forms of transnational crimes across the Lake Chad. (h) Investing in research and development (R & D) that can effectively address current trends in terrorist financing. This can be contextualized within the framework of training, designing, and equipping individuals and institutions responsible for CTF with the necessary technical skills and tools on cybersecurity, surveillance, and cyber-threats. This will help in combating terrorist financing through the use of the internet and other information and communication tools, which has proven to be a new frontier used by terror groups to fund their operations.

As an avenue for further studies, future researchers in TF and CTF are encouraged to explore the current trends in terrorist financing, particularly the growing influence of cryptocurrencies, blockchains, and crowd-funding practices to finance terror-related activities; the challenges associated with combating these new frontiers of terrorist financing; and how a group such as Boko Haram, which abhors Western civilization, education, technology, and globalization, relies on these alternate channels to fund its operations as well as plan and carry out attacks.