The 1972 Stockholm Conference and China's diplomatic response

Abstract

Increasing public pollution and US President Nixon's environmental diplomacy strategy led to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (also known as the Stockholm Conference), to which China was invited as one of the United Nations member states. Before the conference, the Chinese government clearly understood the purpose of its participation in international environmental issues and the way to demonstrate its political position. During the conference, the Chinese delegation promoted the establishment of a group to revise the declaration on the human environment by uniting with Third World countries. China quickly established an effective environmental management system and contributed to the improvement of international environmental issues by acquiring scientific and technical information through participation in international conferences.

1. Introduction

Since the Industrial Revolution, environmental problems caused by excessive carbon emissions have become one of the important challenges faced by humans. After entering the twenty-first century, developed countries or regional alliances led by the United States (US) have put forward the goal of ‘carbon neutrality’. On 22 September 2020, at the 75th United Nations (UN) General Assembly, China officially proposed the goal of achieving carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 (i.e., the ‘double carbon’ goal). This is an important commitment that China has made in addressing environmental issues such as worldwide climate change. In addition, in the process of achieving economic growth and the double carbon goal at the same time, China aims to become a knowledge provider for environmental protection in developing countries, and the transformation of energy structure will also reduce China's political barriers in international competition. Therefore, environmental protection is not only a concrete practice of scientific activities but is also a diplomatic means under complex international relationships. Of course, this also raises questions: When did environmental issues begin to receive common attention from countries around the world? When did China start devoting attention to environmental issues?

From 5 to 12 June 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm Conference) was held in Stockholm, Sweden. It was the first international conference on environmental issues in human history. A total of 113 countries, including China, attended the conference. At the same time, this was also the first UN conference that China had been invited to participate in since it regained its legal seat in the UN in 1971. Previous studies of the Stockholm Conference have focused on its contribution to the promotion of international environmental governance and the relationship between different countries and the conference. The relationship between China and the conference has been discussed from the perspectives of environmental governance, political considerations (Wang, 2012) and the improvement of relations between the US and the Soviet Union, but the international context and real intentions of China's participation in the conference have not been sufficiently discussed. This paper analyses the contradiction and complexity of China's participation in international affairs in this special historical period on the basis of re-examining the relationship between China and the Stockholm Conference by combining relevant archives.

2. Origin of the Stockholm Conference

In 1962, Silent Spring, written by Rachel Carson, was officially published in the US, sounding alarm bells and quickly generating great public concern about environmental issues. The book described the widespread use of chemicals and fertilizers by humans to increase agricultural yields, triggering a serious ecological crisis that eventually backfired on humanity itself. Along with the deliberate push by the forces of environmentalism, environmental pollution became one of the major issues that the US government had to face at the time. In fact, countries in other industrialized regions of the world also faced serious environmental problems. In December 1930, a combination of gases and dust killed 60 people in a week in the industrial area of the Meuse Valley in Belgium. In December 1952, a smog event in London killed more than 4000 people in four days. In 1953–1956, people living in Minamata, a city in Japan, had multiple cases of Minamata disease, mainly due to the consumption of fish contaminated by industrial wastewater, and more than 60 people died. In addition, in the late 1960s, more than two-thirds of the arable land in the Soviet Union suffered from various degrees of ecological damage (Moynihan, 1969). Accordingly, both capitalist and socialist regions are plagued by public pollution, making it a global issue.

In July 1968, Sweden, which was deeply affected by pollution, proposed ‘convening an international conference on problems of the human environment’ at the UN Economic and Security Council (UN, 1968). On 3 December 1968, at its 23rd session, the UN General Assembly adopted this proposal, which was supported by most of the participating countries. After adopting the proposal, the 23rd UN General Assembly decided to convene the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The resolution emphasized the participation of developing countries, hoping that they would gain knowledge and experience on human environmental issues through international cooperation. As expected, the preparation for the conference was not easy, and the concrete manifestations of this complexity came from hundreds of countries in the world that had different ideologies and different perceptions of environmental issues. In December of the following year, the 24th UN General Assembly agreed to set up a preparatory committee of highly qualified people appointed by governments and a conference secretariat, and to appoint a conference secretary-general to ensure that the conference would be held as soon as possible (UN, 1969).

In addition to the Swedish government and the UN Secretariat, the US government was also concerned with the preparation of the human environment conference. This was related to the philosophy of President Nixon's administration. After Nixon became President of the US, he established the Council on Environmental Quality, which increased attention to environmental affairs. On the one hand, this was to fulfil Nixon's campaign promise to the public to solve domestic environmental pollution; on the other hand, it was shaped as a new form of diplomacy. With the purpose of facilitating the summit between the US and the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration included the environment among the issues of US–Soviet cooperation. For US–China relations, the Nixon administration similarly used environmental issues as a method of enhancing contacts. In other words, the low political and volatile nature of environmental issues made a new instrument of the Nixon administration's foreign policy. Overall, if this conference could be organized as planned, it would undoubtedly provide a new platform for dialogue for the US.

Maurice Strong was appointed secretary-general of the conference as a result of a tripartite effort among Sweden, the UN and the US. An outstanding diplomat with a deep background in business, politics and environmental significance, he was Canada's representative to the UN beforehand. As Strong (2010: 148) recalled, ‘[The] Swedish ambassador to the UN, Sverker Astrom, who had spearheaded the idea, contacted me through a mutual friend. We met at his residence in New York, hit it off and he recommended to Philippe de Seyne, UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs, that they approach me to head the conference secretariat. A young Canadian friend, Wayne Kines, who was a media consultant to the UN at the time, arranged a meeting with de Seyne’. Subsequently, Christian Herter, who served on the US's conference delegation, invited Strong to his home, and, after much persuasion, Strong accepted the appointment. Eventually, Maurice Strong became secretary-general of the conference and undersecretary-general of the UN responsible for environmental affairs. Notably, Strong's colleagues did not support his decision, which they considered a mission doomed to failure.

Many analyses and viewpoints have been published on Strong's efforts towards the human environment conference, especially on promoting the participation of developing countries, such as the Founex Report (Manulak, 2016); accordingly, I will not review the details here but will only add that China was invited to the conference. Notably, the US was quite concerned about China's attendance at the conference (Xu and Xia, 2010). In December 1971, Strong approached the head of the Chinese delegation to the UN, Qiao Guanhua, with the intention of inviting China to the conference. He also expected China to make a presentation at the conference, for example, introducing China's experience with garbage sorting and waste utilization. It is noteworthy that Russell E Train, Nixon's environmental adviser, suggested increasing contacts with China through environmental cooperation, mainly in the areas of earthquake prediction, recycling of industrial waste, dryland use and water management, and wildlife conservation. In other words, one must ponder whether Strong's recommendations on the contents of the report to China were authorized by the US.

Subsequently, Qiao relayed that message to the authorities. On 15 December, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Affairs Commission of the Ministry of Health jointly requested the State Council's approval to participate in the Stockholm Conference on environmental pollution, and the request was approved by Premier Zhou Enlai.

Improving international relations through environmental issues was a significant diplomatic strategy of the Nixon administration, and China was one of the key targets in practice. In fact, both the UN and the US expected China to participate in the conference. How China should respond to this situation was an important diplomatic challenge for the Chinese government, which had just recently regained its legal seat in the UN.

3. China's goal setting and role positioning before the conference

On 14 February 1972, the Secretary-General of the UN sent a formal note to the Chinese Foreign Minister inviting China to submit as soon as possible a list of its delegates to the conference, including a head of the delegation, no more than five accredited representatives, and such alternates and advisers as might be required. In terms of the selection of the delegation, the UN General Assembly recommended that it be composed of policy-making figures, including political leaders and senior administrative officials, supplemented by a relatively small number of technical advisers with broad exposure to key environmental issues, economic experts, material designers and other social scientists, and possibly opinion makers (Qu and Peng, 2010a). In terms of proposed participants’ status, there were more political than scientific roles. China provided a list of participants as required.

In fact, the list of the Chinese delegation went through several deliberations before it was approved by Premier Zhou. To some extent, the department that was in charge and the person who was the head reflected the Chinese government's intention to participate in the conference. Initially, the Ministry of Health was elected to be the head. Zhou Enlai thought that this was not comprehensive enough and proposed that the industrial sector should also participate. Subsequently, the competent authorities submitted a list of delegation members, mainly from the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries (Gu, 1998). On 15 December 1971, Zhou Enlai gave instructions on the composition of the delegation: ‘The environmental issue is not only a health issue, but also involves all aspects of the national economy’ (Qu and Peng, 2010b: 204). The finalized Chinese delegation consisted of one head, one deputy head, four delegates, five alternate delegates, six counsellors, two secretaries, four entourages and seven interpreters, representing a total of 31 people from the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of Second Machinery, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Bureau of Oceanography, the Xinhua News Agency, and industrial and mining enterprises in Beijing and Shanghai. Among the members, the Chinese delegation was led by Tang Ke, vice minister of the Fuel and Chemical Industries Ministry, and Gu Ming, vice director of the State Planning Commission, and the four delegates were Bi Jilong, Chen Haifeng, Hou Xianglin and Li Jiarui. In terms of the identity of the main members of the delegation, most of them were from the industrial sector and had certain decision-making power.

Subsequently, the members of the delegation studied intensively for several months, thoroughly discussed the draft of the UN Declaration on the Human Environment and the conference documents, and formed the ‘Request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries on the Program of Attending the Conference on the Human Environment’ and the statement of the delegation. The request included two parts: information about the conference and the delegation's guidelines, and a request for instructions on specific issues. Regarding the purpose of the conference, the delegation considered that ‘it is ostensibly a professional conference, with the aspect of exchanging experiences on environmental issues and seeking international cooperation, but in essence it has to reflect the current international political struggle, mainly the struggle between control and counter-control’ (Qu and Peng, 2010c). Moreover, the delegation expected that there would be a number of developing countries with some illusions about receiving technical and financial assistance from developed countries. The main reference here was to the Nixon administration's proposal to raise a billion-dollar environmental fund. In other words, the delegation thought that developed countries were trying to use the conference to improve their environmental woes and thus achieve leadership in international environmental affairs. Although the Chinese delegation's judgement was consistent with the Nixon administration's strategic intent of environmental diplomacy, it reflected to some extent the delegation's attitude to some hegemonic countries. Certainly, in the context of the Cold War, this judgement was reasonable.

Importantly, China had a clear understanding of its role in the conference. Before the conference, the Chinese delegation formulated specific guidelines and practices: (1) to stand firmly on the side of the Third World and the people of the world; (2) to work with Asian, African and Latin American countries to win over small and medium-sized developed countries and to expose and fight against the US and the Soviet Union, based on the policy of exploiting contradictions and expanding the international united front; (3) to point out the root causes of environmental problems and encourage the peoples of all countries to protect and improve the environment; (4) to work more and take proper care of some wrong views and unrealistic illusions of Asian, African and Latin American countries that aimed to seek assistance from developed countries; and (5) to introduce and publicize China's environmental problems in a factual and realistic manner and firmly reject any slander against China. These guidelines and practices also reflect the Chinese delegation's response to the draft declaration on the human environment, which may be called diplomatic means. Importantly, note that the delegation planned to introduce some of China's effective experiences on and measures of environmental issues, not to deny the existence of environmental pollution in China, but to build the country's image. Qu Geping, one of the main members of the delegation, recalled that, in 1970–1972, several incidents of environmental pollution occurred in China, leading to great attention by the State Council and plans for a special conference. This was temporarily shelved due to preparations for the Stockholm Conference (Qu, 1997). In addition, Premier Zhou Enlai instructed the delegation that ‘through this conference, we should learn about the state of the world environment and the significant impact of environmental problems on economic and social development in various countries, and use this as a mirror to understand China's environmental problems’ (Qu and Peng, 2010d: 206).

In fact, China has always been cautious about engaging with other countries. Before the conference, the delegation made advance plans on what attitude to adopt in facing different participating countries. For the Third World countries, it was thought that China should take the initiative to contact them; for the US delegation, it was thought that China should maintain a certain etiquette and not take the initiative to receive them; for the Japanese delegation, it was thought that China should remain aloof and avoid issues such as Sino-Japanese relations; for other capitalist countries, it was thought that China should treat them with courtesy and make appropriate contacts; for Sweden, it was thought that China should take the initiative to contact the conference secretariat and express its friendship; and for South Korea and South Africa, it was thought that China should not deal with them. This was consistent with the established practice of the Chinese delegation's participation in the conference.

Overall, the Chinese delegation set a clear policy before participating in the conference. On the one hand, China hoped to gain more experience in pollution control and prevention through the conference; on the other hand, China also expected to demonstrate its political position and give signals of international cooperation.

4. China's diplomatic efforts to promote the revision of the Declaration on the Human Environment

In its invitation note to China, the UN stressed that several drafts, including a declaration on the human environment and a plan of action, needed to be considered at the conference. Prior to its arrival in Stockholm, the Chinese delegation had made clear its commitment to promoting the revision of the declaration. There have been a number of specific studies on China's efforts to promote the revision of the content of the declaration, and the present paper only adds to those efforts.

The Chinese delegation thought that the declaration would be the focus of the struggle at the conference, mainly because the document did not adequately reflect the demands of developing countries and avoided the main responsibility of developed countries for environmental pollution. Many developing countries were also dissatisfied with these aspects of the document. On 30 May, Chinese delegates Bi Jilong and Chen Haifeng took the initiative to visit Nelfin, the assistant secretary-general of the conference, to discuss and negotiate the draft declaration. Nelfin revealed that ‘if many governments agree to the changes, the drafting group will continue its work’ (Qu and Peng, 2010e: 170). This attitude made the Chinese delegates realize that it was possible to revise the declaration, and the delegations of Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela proposed the establishment of a group to revise the declaration at the preparatory meeting on 31 May. This coincided with the Chinese position.

On 1 June, Bi Jilong and Chen Haifeng reached out to representatives of developing countries such as Pakistan, Syria, Egypt and Algeria to explain the importance of the declaration for developing countries and to try to gain their support. This development also attracted the attention of the Canadian, Swedish and British delegations. In the afternoon of the same day, the representatives of the three countries took the initiative to talk to Bi Jilong with the intention of accepting the declaration, which they stressed was the result of a compromise among many countries and would be difficult to change.

The Chinese delegation's idea of amending the declaration did not gain the support of the conference, and, on 3 June, the head of the Chinese delegation, Tang Ke, the deputy head, Gu Ming, and others arrived in Stockholm and immediately met with the secretary-general of the conference, Maurice Strong. Strong showed a clear view of rejection. Additionally, Strong's assistant, Winter, suggested that the Chinese side abstain from voting on the declaration, and, on 4 June, Tang Ke and others visited the President of the General Assembly, Bengt Save-Soderbergh, to present their views on amending the declaration. Until the day before the conference, the Chinese delegation was still making efforts to amend the declaration. Judging from the results, this attempt was not successful. On 5 June, the conference was formally convened, and Strong said during the plenary session that the declaration should not be revisited.

On the conference day, the Chinese delegation invited the heads of the delegations of Algeria, Syria, Pakistan, Argentina, Venezuela, Egypt and Zambia to lunch; Egypt and Zambia were absent. After thorough discussion, the six delegations agreed on the revision of the declaration and the establishment of a working group on the revision. At the same time, the delegations undertook to divide and consult with other delegations by region. On 6 June, the host delegation, Sweden, extended an invitation to a dozen delegations to hold small informal consultations on whether to revise the draft declaration. The Chinese delegation did not consider this to be broadly representative. Therefore, on 7 June, the Chinese delegation formally submitted an urgent written motion to the General Assembly to establish a special committee on the declaration and requested that the President of the General Assembly read it in the plenary session. In the afternoon of the same day, the Swedish delegation expanded the delegation's invitation, and two heated opinions were formed at the meeting, which allowed for a focused and formal presentation of the opposing views in the draft declaration. Ultimately, the Swedish delegation decided to report the issue to the governing body of the conference.

The Chinese delegation's efforts to revise the draft declaration had positive effects, and, on 8 June, the delegations of Syria and Chile made overtures to China. Additionally, the Asian delegations held consultations on the revision of the draft declaration, which resulted in agreement. In the end, the General Assembly also agreed to the urgent motion proposed by China and decided to involve all participating countries in the revision of the declaration. As the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter commented, ‘this action by China shows that China is willing to exert its influence at international conferences’ (Qu and Peng, 2010f: 152).

Besides contributing to the revision of the draft declaration, the Chinese delegation also exerted an influence on other international disputes related to environmental pollution. In the case of the US invasion of Indochina, for example, on 10 June, the Chinese delegation issued a strong condemnation to the US in the plenary session on the grounds that it had used chemical agents in the war to destroy the human environment. In addition, the Chinese delegation tried to join other delegations in proposing a motion to condemn the US to the General Assembly. This was too difficult to accomplish, and the motion was therefore withdrawn. In fact, before the Chinese side took the floor, several delegations had already condemned the US in the plenary session. The Swedish Prime Minister and Tanzania, Syria and Zambia, and Romania and Libya took measures in their statements on 5, 8 and 9 June, respectively. In fact, the US delegation had expressed its goodwill to the Chinese side by offering a handshake greeting and inviting a meeting, which was related to Nixon's visit to China. Faced with the Chinese side's condemnation, the US delegation was quite upset and immediately offered a reply, then postponed it, and finally responded only briefly. This reflected the US government's position on the de-escalation of Sino-American relations. On the morning of 13 June, Zhou Enlai issued an urgent instruction requiring the delegation to ‘stop when appropriate’ (Qu and Peng, 2010g).

5. Conclusion

The Stockholm Conference was an international conference that focused on environmental issues in the context of the Cold War, and its convening had much to do with the environmental protection movement and the environmental foreign policy pursued by the Nixon administration. It can be said that the conference provided an opportunity for the US to take the lead in international environmental affairs and to further ease international relations. As a sovereign nation that also suffered from public pollution, China expected to learn about environmental problems and management experiences from other countries. Therefore, China not only sent a 31-member delegation with industrial and political backgrounds, but it also played a key role in the conference. By proactively seeking cooperation and demonstrating a political stance, the Chinese delegation pushed the conference to make limited changes in the declaration to give developing countries a voice in international affairs.

Undeniably, the conference also permitted the successful acquisition of international scientific and technological intelligence. Upon its return to China, the Chinese delegation conveyed to Premier Zhou Enlai useful information that it had acquired at the conference, including about international environmental efforts. Under Zhou Enlai's direction, the State Council Environmental Protection Leading Group was created, with Gu Ming, deputy head of the delegation, as one of the main leaders. It is clear that the Stockholm Conference shaped China's environmental management system.