Affective polarization can have profound consequences for the quality of the democratic process as it becomes a force to mobilize people around parties or issues. Political affiliations and trust in government have been considered as driving forces for developing in-group and out-group sentiments. In addition, the current high-choice media environment provided by mass media and social media has also been blamed for exacerbating affective polarization. The current study explores media effects on affective polarization in South Korea, using surveys collected in 2018, 2020, and 2022, reflecting a period in which the government transitions from liberal to conservative. Regression analyses show that mass media and social media use were not significantly related to affective polarization, except for national newspapers’ mitigating effect in 2018. Political factors such as trust in government and support for political parties were more important and consistent in the widening affective gap in South Korea.
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