While democratic revolutions are not uniform in their pursuit of democracy, they do have something in common: those calling for revolution and participating in demonstrations do so under the banner of democracy. However, studies have revealed that these citizens were not at first committed to democracy per se; rather, they took the opportunity to vent their frustration against the current regime because of their struggle against poverty and social inequality. Why, then, do citizens who are not pursuing democracy per se participate in revolutions under the banner of democracy? Previous studies have failed to clarify this point. To fill this gap, we outline three strategic rationalities and necessities behind the use of “democracy” as a common slogan to justify civil revolutions: 1) organizing large scale dissident movements in a country; 2) attracting international support; and 3) imitating successful examples from the past. Evidence from the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine supports this theory.
AliyevR (2005) The Georgian Rose Revolution: Challenges and supports for ensuring the non-violent outcome in a post-Soviet society. Journal of Azerbaijani Studies8(1–2): 1–91.
2.
AngristM (2013) Understanding the success of mass civic protest in Tunisia. The Middle East Journal67(4): 547–564.
3.
AprasidzeD (2005) Georgia’s new nationalism: A better opportunity for state building? In: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-Yearbook2004. Hamburg: Nomos Verlag, pp. 179–190.
BakerP (2003) Pressure mounts on Georgian leader; Opponents keep round-the-clock vigil in capital. Washington Post, 12 November.
6.
BakerPGlasserSB (2003a) Protesters storm Georgia parliament; Shevardnadze flees but vows not to resign. Washington Post, 23 November.
7.
BakerPGlasserSB (2003b) Georgian president resigns; Uprising topples Shevardnadze. Washington Post, 24 November.
8.
BakerPGlasserSB (2004) Push for democracy has authoritarians unnerved; Events in Georgia embolden long-frustrated opposition groups in many ex-Soviet republics. Washington Post, 26 January.
9.
BeissingerM (2007) Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics5(2): 259–276.
10.
BeissingerM (2013) The semblance of democratic revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. American Political Science Review107(3): 574–592.
11.
BrancatiD (2013) The 2011 protests: Were they about democracy?The Washington Quarterly36(1): 25–35.
12.
BunceVWolchikS (2007) Bringing down dictators: American democracy promotion and electoral revolutions in postcommunist Eurasia. Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies Working Paper Series5(7): 1–25.
13.
CecilC (2003) Georgians are braced for day of reckoning. Times, 22 November.
14.
ChiversCJ (2004a) Ukraine premier is named winner; U.S. assails move. New York Times, 25 November.
15.
ChiversCJ (2004b) Premier claims he’s the winner in Ukraine vote. New York Times, 23 November.
16.
ChiversCJ (2004c) Youth movement underlies the opposition in Ukraine. New York Times, 28 November.
17.
ChiversCJ (2005) How top spies in Ukraine changed the nation’s path. New York Times, 17 January.
18.
Civil Georgia (2003a) Thousands of protesters set an ultimatum to Shevardnadze. 8 November. Available athttp://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5448 (accessed 13 January 2018).
Civil Georgia (2003c) Bush offers Shevardnadze assistance in transition of power. 22 January. Available athttp://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=3045 (accessed 13 January 2018).
D’AnieriP (2007) Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
25.
DemesPForbrigJ (2006) Pora: “It’s time” for democracy in Ukraine. In: ÅslundAMcFaulM (eds) Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 85–102.
26.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (2003) 1ST LEAD: Shevardnadze urges army restraint after opposition “coup”. 1ST LEAD: Shevardnadze urges army restraint after opposition “coup.”23 November.
27.
DevdarianiJ (2004) Georgia: Rise and fall of the façade democracy. Demokratizatsiya12(1): 79–115.
28.
De WaalTAkhvledianiM (2003) A bitter resignation. Independent, 1 December.
29.
DzhindzhikhashviliM (2003) Georgia’s Shevardnadze declares state of emergency after opposition breaks into parliament, declares interim rule. Associated Press International, 22 November.
30.
Edmonton Journal (2004) Ukraine enters critical campaign period: Many see October election as most important in independent country’s history. 20 August.
FairbanksC (2004) Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Journal of Democracy15(2): 110–124.
33.
GamsonW (1992) Talking Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
34.
GoldstoneJ (2001) Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual Review of Political Science4: 139–187.
35.
HaleH (2013) Regime change cascades: What we have learned from the 1848 revolutions to the 2011 Arab uprisings. Annual Review Political Science16: 331–353.
36.
Hash-GonzalezK (2012) Popular Mobilization and Empowerment in Georgia’s Rose Revolution. New York: Lexington Books.
37.
HowardMMWaltersM (2015) Mass mobilization and the democracy bias. Middle East Policy22(2):145–155.
38.
HydeS (2011) The Pseudo-Democratic Dilemma: Why Democratic Observation Became an International Norm. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
39.
HydeSMarinovN (2012) Which elections can be lost?Political Analysis20(2): 191–201.
KarumidzeZWertschJ (2005) Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
44.
KuzioT (2005) The opposition’s road to success. Journal of Democracy16(2): 117–130.
45.
LichbachM (1995) The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
46.
MacKinnonM (2003) Riding the democracy wave. Globe and Mail, December 1.
47.
MacKinnonM (2004a) Yushchenko cruises to victory in Ukraine. Globe and Mail, December 27.
48.
MacKinnonM (2004b) Challenger says Ukraine ‘on the brink’ of civil war. Globe and Mail, December 25.
49.
McFaulM (2004) Democracy promotion as a world value. The Washington Quarterly28(1): 147–163.
50.
McFaulM (2007) Ukraine imports democracy: External influences on the Orange Revolution. International Security32(2): 45–83.
51.
MitchellL (2006) Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution. Orbis50(4): 669–676.
52.
MitchellL (2009) Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
53.
MydansS (2003) The giant who shrank: A post-communist tale. New York Times, November 30.
54.
MyersSL (2004) Ukrainian challenger rejects deal offered by opponent. New York Times, 1 December.
55.
NodiaG (2006) The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects. Delft: Eburon Publishers.
56.
OnuchO (2011) Why did they join en masse? Understanding “ordinary” Ukrainians’ participation in mass-mobilisation in 2004. Nowa Ukraina11: 89–113.
57.
OSCE International Election Observation Mission (2003) Georgian parliamentary elections marred by confusion over voter lists, 3 November. Available athttps://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/55759 (accessed 13 January 2018).
PeuchJC (2003) Georgia: opposition prepares to march on capital as government allies occupy city center. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 19 November. Available athttps://www.rferl.org/a/1105057.html (accessed 13 January 2018).
60.
SchraederPRedissiH (2011) Ben Ali’s fall. Journal of Democracy22(3): 5–19.
61.
SmithS (2004) President storms ahead in Georgia election. Times, 29 March.
62.
StephanMChenowethE (2008) Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. International Security33(1): 7–44.
63.
SushkoOPrystaykoO (2006) Western influence. In: ÅslundAMcFaulM (eds) Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 125–144.
64.
ThompsonM (2004) Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge.
65.
TuckerJ (2007) Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. Perspectives on Politics5(3): 535–551.
66.
TudoroiuT (2007) Rose, Orange and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies40(3): 315–342.
67.
TymoshenkoY (2004) The battle for Ukraine: Tell us we don’t stand alone. Globe and Mail, December 26.
68.
VasovicA (2004a) Tens of thousands march on Ukraine’s parliament, demanding annulment of vote results. Associated Press International, 23 November.
69.
VasovicA (2004b) Ukrainian opposition complains of foot-dragging in vote count, claims Yushchenko has taken the lead. Associated Press International, 2 December.
70.
WalshNP (2004) Inquiry sought into claims of US funding. Guardian, 13 December.
71.
WheatleyJ (2005) Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
WilsonA (2005) Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. London: Yale University Press.
74.
WilsonA (2006) Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: NGOs and the role of the West. Cambridge Review of International Affairs19(1): 21–32.
75.
WolchikS (2012) Can there be a color revolution?Journal of Democracy23(3): 63–70.
76.
ZemniS (2015) The roots of the Tunisian revolution. In: SadikiL (ed.) Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization. New York: Routledge, pp. 77–87.
