Abstract
Most of the previous studies of power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the political PSA to be ineffective in stabilizing post-agreement peace. These studies argue that the political PSA is a signal that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry or commitment problem among the signatories. In this article, I develop an alternative theory of the political PSA that identifies its “negative” effect on post-agreement stability by highlighting two issues that have attracted little attention in the previous studies, i.e. distributional effects of the political PSA and shifts in the bargaining power among the signatories. To assess the validity of the theory, I first conduct a logistic regression analysis of inclusion of political PSA provisions in peace agreements, and then conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement peace duration.
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