This study examines how long the Israeli people support the government for an ongoing war. The rally-round-the-flag phenomenon, proclaiming that wartime governments can enjoy majority public support at the beginning of wars, is a challenging topic in the field of International Relations. Although this effect was noticed at the time of the Second Lebanon War, it remains unclear which particular condition determined the duration of public support in Israel. While the rally effect is a universal phenomenon, it is important to keep in mind the particularity of Israel. We hold on to an alternative theory, bandwagon effect, emphasizing the role of affectivity of individuals on the flow of information in crisis, in place of the standard rational expectation theory. An original experimental survey was conducted to examine the bandwagon effect in the rally phenomenon among Israeli citizens.
AlmondGA (1950) The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger.
2.
ArianA (2005) Politics in Israel: The Second Republic. 2nd edn. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
3.
BakerWOnealJ (2001) Patriotism or opinion leadership?Journal of Conflict Resolution45(5): 661–687.
4.
BaumMAGroelingTJ (2010) War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public View of War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
5.
Ben-MeirY (2007) Israeli public opinion and the second Lebanon War. In: BromSElranM (eds) The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions. [In Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, pp. 84–100.
6.
BerinskyAJ (2007) Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American public support for military conflict. Journal of Politics69(4): 975–997.
7.
BerinskyAJ (2009) In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
8.
BerinskyAJDruckmanJN (2007) The polls – review: Public opinion research and support for the Iraq War. Public Opinion Quarterly71(1): 126–141.
9.
BrodyRA (1991) Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Opinion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
10.
BurkJ (1999) Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the casualties hypothesis. Political Science Quarterly114(1): 53–78.
11.
CampbellAConversePEMillerWE. (1960) The American Voter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
12.
ColaresiM (2007) The benefit of the doubt: Testing an informational theory of the rally effect. International Organization61(1): 99–143.
13.
CoserLA (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press.
14.
EichenbergRC (2005) Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force, 1981–2005. International Security30(1): 140–177.
15.
ElranM (2007) The civilian front in the Second Lebanon War. In: BromSElranM (eds) The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Dimensions. [In Hebrew]. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, pp. 101–118.
16.
EvertsPIserniaP (2001) Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. London and New York: Routledge.
17.
FeaverPDGelpiC (2004) Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
18.
FriedenJALakeDASchultzKA (2013) World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions. 2nd edn. New York: W.W. Norton.
19.
FurmanM (1999) Army and war: Collective narratives of early childhood in contemporary Israel. In: Lomsky-FederEBen-AmiE (eds) The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society. New York: State University of New York Press, pp. 141–169.
20.
GartnerSSeguraG (2000) Race, casualties, and opinion in the Vietnam War. Journal of Politics62(1): 115–146.
21.
GartnerSS (2008) The multiple effects of casualties on public support for war: An experimental approach. American Political Science Review102(1): 95–106.
22.
GartnerSSSeguraGM (1998) War, casualties, and public opinion. Journal of Conflict Resolution42(3): 278–300.
23.
GelpiCFeaverPDReiflerJ (2006) Success matters: Casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq. International Security30(3): 7–46.
24.
GelpiCFeaverPDReiflerJ (2009) Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25.
HardmeierS (2008) The effects of published polls on citizens. In: DonsbachWTraugottMW (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, pp. 504–513.
26.
HayesDGuardinoM (2011) The influence of foreign voices on U.S. public opinion. American Journal of Political Science55(4): 831–851.
27.
HermannT (2001) Moving away from war: Israeli’s security beliefs in the post-Oslo era. In: EvertsPIserniaP (eds) Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 158–179.
28.
HermannTYuchtman-YaarE (2002) Divided yet united: Israeli-Jewish attitudes toward the Oslo process. Journal of Peace Research39(5): 597–613.
29.
JentlesonBW (1992) The pretty prudent public: Post post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force. International Studies Quarterly36(1): 49–73.
30.
JentlesonBWBrittonRL (1998) Still pretty prudent post-Cold War American public opinion on the use of military force. Journal of Conflict Resolution42(4): 395–417.
31.
KullSRamsayC (2001) The myth of the reactive public: American public attitudes on military fatalities in the post-Cold War period. In: EvertsPIserniaP (eds) Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 199–221.
32.
LaiBReiterD (2005) Rally ‘round the Union Jack? Public opinion and the use of force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001. International Studies Quarterly49: 255–272.
33.
LarsonEV (1996) Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
34.
LarsonEV (2000) Putting theory to work: Diagnosing public opinion on the US intervention in Bosnia. In: NincicMLepgoldJ (eds) Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 174–233.
35.
LazarsfeldPFBerelsonBGaudetH (1968) The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. 3rd edn. New York: Columbia University Press.
36.
LevyGSasson-LevyO (2008) Militarized socialization, military service and class reproduction: The experiences of Israeli soldiers. Sociological Perspectives51(2): 349–374.
37.
LevyJ (1996) Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for international conflict. International Political Science Review17(2): 179–195.
38.
LevyY (2010) The Second Lebanon War: Examining ‘democratization of war’ theory. Armed Forces & Society36(5): 786–803.
39.
LevyY (2011) How casualty sensitivity affects civilian control: The Israeli experience. International Studies Perspectives12(1): 68–88.
40.
LevyY (2012) Israel’s Death Hierarchy: Casualty Aversion in a Militarized Democracy. New York: New York University Press.
41.
MaozIMcCauleyC (2009) Threat perceptions and feelings as predictors of Jewish-Israeli support for compromise with Palestinians. Journal of Peace Research46(4): 525–539.
42.
MarshC (1985) Back on the bandwagon: The effect of opinion polls on public opinion. British Journal of Political Science15(1): 51–74.
43.
MuellerJE (1971) Trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam. The American Political Science Review65(2): 358–375.
44.
MuellerJE (1973) War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
45.
MuellerJE (1994) Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
46.
MutzDC (1997) Mechanisms of momentum: Does thinking make it so?Journal of Politics59(1): 104–125.
47.
OECD (2016) Education at a Glance 2016: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing.
48.
PageBIShapiroRY (1992) The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American’s Policy Preferences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
49.
PerlaH (2011) Explaining public support for the use of military force: The impact of reference point framing and prospective decision making. International Organization65(1): 139–167.
50.
PopperM (1998) The Israel defense forces as a socializing agent. In: Bar-TalDJacobsonD and Klieman (eds) Security Concerns: Insights from the Israeli Experience. Stamford, CT: JAI Press, pp. 167–180.
51.
SandS (2010) When and How Was the Jewish People Invented? [Japanese translation]. Tokyo: Random House-Kodansha.
52.
SchwarzBC (1994) Casualties, Public Opinion & U.S. Military Intervention: Implications for U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
53.
ShamirJShikakiK (2002) Self–serving perceptions of terrorism among Israelis and Palestinians. Political Psychology23(3): 537–557.
54.
ShapiroRYPageBI (1988) Foreign policy and the rational public. Journal of Conflict Resolution32(2): 211–247.
55.
ShefferG (1997) Individualism vs. national coherence: The current discourse on sovereignty, citizenship and loyalty. Israel Studies2(2): 118–145.
56.
SullivanPL (2008) Sustaining the fight: A cross-sectional time-series analysis of public support for ongoing military interventions. Conflict Management and Peace Sciences25(2): 112–132.
57.
VerbaSBrodyRAParkerEB. (1967) Public opinion and the war in Vietnam. The American Political Science Review61(2): 317–333.
58.
WelchDA (2005) Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59.
ZallerJR (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
