Centralization and decentralization of power structure: A theory of ruling risks and empirical evidence from Chinese history

Abstract

In Chinese history, the power relationship between the central and local governments has undergone perennial and critical changes. These changes have given rise to three questions: First, why did some dynasties adopt feudalism at an early stage, merely to curtail the local authority in times of stability? Second, why did the Yuan and Ming dynasties employ a native chieftain system, while the Qing dynasty struggled to bureaucratise the native officers in ethnic minority areas? Third, why were the dynasties of Han ethnicity so hesitant to set up a provincial government while nomadic societies did not view this as a dilemma? Furthermore, why was the Qing dynasty, which was ethnically Han, able to break down these contradictions and create a stable provincial government and provincial state? This paper demonstrates that these changes may be explained by the propensity of the rulers to minimise the ruling risks and constraints that they encountered. Specifically, the ruler’s decision to centralise or decentralise power was constrained by certain challenges, such as fiscal and administrative costs, military technology limitations and political competition. These constraints impelled the ruling class to deviate from the system of prefectures and countries. Under these circumstances, the central government was forced to endure higher social risks and also the potential delegation of power. However, it would reduce the social and delegate risks provided that the constraints were loosened, which triggered the evolution of a power structure between the central and local governments. Another potential driving force behind the changes in the power structure was the dynamic between the social and agency risks. When these risks increased, the central government would readjust the centralisation and decentralisation of power at different government levels to control the rising risks.