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Abstract

The study examines the patterns and conditions of catchphrases on the Chinese Internet from 2003 to 2015 and their social, political, and cultural implications. Through investigating online catchphrases from a critical-historical perspective, the study develops a refined typology that reveals the patterns underlying online catchphrases, such as (1) the tendency of labeling, (2) the tendency of framing, (3) the tendency of violence, and (4) the tendency of emptying-out. These trends are roughly threaded by a transition of discursive genres—playfulness, parody, and carnival. The findings suggest that the functions of online popular communication shift from social criticism to identity formation. It reflects social transformations in a period that witnessed ideologies gradually losing grip and the growing nihilism in value systems in China.

Keywords

Catchphrase China online discourse parody political satire

Introduction

In 2011, 22-year-old Li Qiming was intoxicated when he crashed his car into two students on the Hebei University campus, injuring one and killing the other. After attempting to drive off and being impeded by campus security, he reportedly shouted “Go ahead, sue me if you dare, my dad is [local deputy police chief] Li Gang” (China Daily, 2011). The incident quickly flared up and instigated a massive public outcry both online and offline. The phrase “My father is Li Gang” began to be widely circulated and reappropriated by Internet users and websites in various activities, such as collective sentence-making, even making its way to news titles of official media outlets. The coinage has since become a metaphor for shirking responsibilities and social justice. Despite huge social grievances, Li Qiming was sentenced to only 6 years in prison and paid modest compensation to the victims’ families (BBC News, 2011). This light punishment, itself only possible because of the pressure of Internet users, has merely quelled public anger over officials’ legal impunity.

The case was just an epitome of the politics of cyberculture in China. With the rapid diffusion of digital technologies in recent decades, Chinese Internet users have creatively produced new words, images, and other audio-visual works to discuss public affairs and express their attitudes, values, and sentiments. Despite heavy Internet control, stylized discourses such as parody and satire, widely circulated and reproduced on the Internet, offer means to defy authority, criticize social problems, and avoid censorship. Among these creative works, a growing number of online catchphrases epitomize a prominent and exuberant cultural phenomenon in Chinese online space, infusing alternative expression within the highly censored environment.

Literature review

Studies on the Internet in China have often focused on the role of technology that leads to the dichotomous categories of authoritarian control and democratization (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015; Yang, 2014). Under this binary framework, online public discussions are conceived either as political resistance or digital escapism. On one hand, many studies have argued the Internet empowers the public in China by facilitating public discussion and supervision (Jiang, 2010; Xiao, 2011; Yang, 2009). Research in this vein conceives online discourse in China as weapons of criticism and resistance against authoritarian control (Esarey & Xiao, 2008; Meng, 2011; Tang & Yang, 2011). As these studies have demonstrated, Internet users have grown more adept at using euphemism, parody, and satire to express their discontent with the establishment. On the other hand, some researchers challenge the optimistic views by pointing out that the Internet could also reinforce authoritarian control (MacKinnon, 2008; Morozov, 2011). Scholarship in this vein identifies entertainment as a dominant feature of online discourse in China, distracting people from rational deliberation and real civic engagement (Damm, 2007; Leibold, 2011; Sullivan, 2014).

Although there is a well-developed literature on the role of the Internet in China, our understanding is largely confined by “a tendency to focus on technology at the expense of meaning and people” (Yang, 2014, p. 136). The growing research on online language has focused on linguistic and discursive features of digital contestation in comparison to standard Chinese interactions (Wong, Xia, & Li, 2006), without shining much light on the complex dynamics of social forces in which online contestation is embedded and with which it interacts. Few studies have fully explored the relationship between online discourse and social practices in China from a historical-cultural perspective (Yang & Jiang, 2015). Norman Fairclough (1992) emphasizes that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure. Discourse is “shaped and constrained by social structure” and “a practice not just of representing the world but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meanings” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 59).

Along this vein, Szablewicz (2014)’s study of the online meme “diaosi” suggests that online language offers a means to articulate alternative identities distinct from mainstream visions. Yang and Jiang (2015) propose that online political satire should also be conceptualized as a means of political ritual articulated and negotiated through networked social practices. Online memes, catchphrases, and discourses are far from static and unitary. They are social practices that develop, change, and evolve over time. Nevertheless, few studies have fully explored the relationship between online discourse and social change in China from a historical-cultural perspective (Yang & Jiang, 2015).

This study argues that a more comprehensive understanding of alternative discourse should involve a dynamic approach which takes into account the transformation of various factors including social, political, cultural, and technical influences which the discourse constitutes and reflects over a period of time. In this sense, historical studies offer unique lenses to deepen our understanding of the meaning and significance of online political satire as a networked social practice (Yang & Jiang, 2015). The historical approach would allow a context-rich understanding of online discussions that could potentially avoid falling into the dichotomy informed by technological determinism.

Taking the approach of qualitative content analysis, this study situates online satire in its particular historical moment with its concomitant cultural, political, and technological opportunities and constraints. With systematic collection and analysis of examples and cases of online popular language over a time frame from 2003 to 2015, the study creates a more refined typology that reveals the patterns of change and continuity underlying online satire and its broad social implications. It aims to advance a nuanced understanding of the production, circulation, and consumption of users’ everyday social practice and the meanings they create to reveal the broader social transformations in China from the perspective of online discourse.

Research questions

What are the patterns and conditions of change and continuity underlying China’s online catchphrases from 2003 to 2015?

What are the implications of the patterns and trends identified for social, political, and cultural changes in China?

Methods

Since ChinaNet first opened its business in 1995, the Internet has grown rapidly in China. According to the reports released by China Internet Information Center (CNNIC) (CNNIC; 2003, 2004, 2005, 2015), the number of Internet users in China has been almost tripling every year from less than 40,000 in 1995 to 59.1 million in January 2003. After the year 2003, the growth rate of new Internet users has gradually decreased to around 20% and slowed further. The period from 2002 to 2012 occurred under the Hu-Wen Administration, marking a new phase of leadership and industrial policy in China. Choosing the time frame from 2003 to 2015 is based on the assumption that this frame marks a steadier and more normalized phase of Internet development in China to make it possible to find patterns and trends underlying online discourse.

The article relies on the method of qualitative content analysis to identify and analyze the characteristics and trends of catchphrases across 13 years. Qualitative content analysis serves to develop thematic categories and interpretations from texts and contexts through systematic classification process of identifying patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Qualitative content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication by analyzing both the content and the contextual information of the text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

The data were collected through the researcher’s 4 years of online observations and offline research from 2012 to 2015. Within each year from 2003 to 2015, the researcher identified the top 25 catchphrases by utilizing Baidu index as an indicator of the popularity and influence of a certain catchphrase. This yields a data pool of a total of 313 items, since in year 2004 there are only 13 catchphrases after compiling data from different sources. After creating the data pool, two researchers conducted a sampling process by choosing 10 most popular catchphrases within each year. Since Baidu Index reflects the overall attention scale of a word or phrase that may be susceptible to official manipulation, this process is conducted to temper this effect by leveraging researchers’ insights from years of immersion in the online communication. For example, Shenzhou is one keyword from the compiled data pool screened through using Baidu Index. From the researchers’ experience and knowledge, this word refers to an unmanned flight of the Shenzhen 8 spacecraft in 2011, a political event that was heavily disclosed through official reporting rather than becoming viral in online public communication. For these reasons, the researchers decided this word does not constitute an online catchphrase in the data sample. After this human’s screening process, the data come down to a sample of 130 items across 13 years, which are all listed in Table 1. For each item, the Chinese character, the Mandarin pronunciation, and the term’s word-by-word English translation are given. In many cases, not only the literal meanings but also the extended meanings are provided to better contextualize the data. The translation was conducted by one researcher first and was proofread by another researcher afterwards to avoid possible misinterpretation and misrepresentation.

Table 1.

Sample cases of Internet catchphrases from 2003 to 2015.

Year	Number	Chinese	English
2003	1	斑竹	“ban zhu,” a homophonic word for “版主 (ban zhu)” which means “the administrator of a forum”
	2	灌水	“guan shui,” literally meaning “to pour water or to flood into something.” It refers to post comments on a forum or other online platforms
	3	拍砖	“pai zhuan,” literally meaning “to hit with bricks, to stone.” It refers to critique deconstructively or to attack maliciously a comment or a thread
	4	楼	“lou,” literally meaning “a storied building or a tower.” It generally refers to a thread consisting of many postings on a BBS
	5	MM/GG	The abbreviation of mei mei/ge ge, meaning girls/boys
	6	恐龙	“kong long” means dinosaur. It is a derogatory word to describe unpopular or ugly girls
	7	东东	“dong dong,” meaning “things”
	8	菜鸟	“cai niao,” meaning newbie or novice. It refers to someone who is new or knows little about the topics being discussed
	9	表酱紫	“biao jiang zi.” “表 (biao)” is a legato homophonic word for “不要(bu yao),” meaning “(please) do not.” “酱紫 (jiang zi)” is a legato homophonic word for “这样子 (zhe yang zi),” meaning “(behave/act/say) like this.” Together the phrase means “please don’t do or act like this”
	10	FT	The abbreviation of “faint,” meaning “shocked, astonished”
2004	1	做人要厚道	“zuo ren yao hou dao,” literally meaning “to be a human is to be honest and kind.” The meme comes from a movie called Cell Phone by a famous Chinese director Feng Xiaogang
	2	沙发	“sha fa,” refers to sofa, meaning the first reply to a forum thread or post
	3	汗/寒	“han,” meaning “to perspire/sweat or to freeze when faced with other intense or strenuous conditions.” The two words are used to describe reactions of anxiety or astonishment
	4	百度一下	“bai du yi xia,” meaning to search something on Baidu.com, China’s largest search engine
	5	潜水	“qian shui,” literally meaning “to submerge underwater.” It is used to describe actions of lurking online, which is silently scrolling through forums or reading articles without commenting
	6	顶	“ding,” meaning “to prop up [a post/comment]; to carry on the head”
	7	出来混，迟早是要还的	The phrase means “what goes around, comes around”
	8	弓虽	“gong sui,” the split of the Chinese character “强 (qiang)” which means “powerful, cool”
	9	偶稀饭	“ou xi fan,” homophobic words for “我喜欢 (wo xi huan)” which means “I like”
	10	FB	The abbreviation of “腐败 (fu bai)” which means “to squander money, to be wasteful”
2005	1	PK	The abbreviation of “player killing” that mostly likely comes from “counter-strike” and other popular video games. It means “to contest or to call out among multiple competitors”
	2	海选	“hai xuan,” meaning the first or initial audition from a large pool of candidates
	3	作秀	“zuo xiu,” meaning “to show off or put on a performance”
	4	过劳死	“guo lao si,” meaning “irregular death from overwork”
	5	千手观音	“qian shou guan yin,” meaning “thousand-hand Bodhisattva”
	6	高考移民	“gao kao yi min,” meaning “gaokao (National College Entrance Examination) migrants.” It refers to the people who change their household registration from one province to another in order to take advantage of lower admission scores required of in-province applicants
	7	PS	The abbreviation of “photoshop”
	8	XX很生气，后果很严重	It literally means that “XX is really angry, and the consequences will be severe.” The meme originates from a movie called A World Without Thieves, directed by Feng Xiaogang
	9	我不当教授很多年了	The phrase means “I haven’t been a professor for many years”
	10	恶搞小胖子	“e gao xiao pang zi.” It refers to the Little Fatty series of parody work that went viral online in 2005
2006	1	额滴神啊	“e di shen a,” literally meaning “oh my god”
	2	你不是一个人	“You are not alone”
	3	网络暴民	“wang luo bao min,” meaning Internet mobs
	4	相当的	“xiang dang de,” meaning “very, quite”
	5	草根	“cao gen,” meaning “the grass-roots”
	6	恶搞	“e gao,” meaning “parody, spoof”
	7	顶你个肺	“ding ni ge fei,” used in Cantonese, meaning “how dare you?!” or “get lost!” or “blow me!”
	8	你侮辱我的人格，还侮辱我的智商	“You insulted my diginity, and even insulted my intelligence (by blatantly deceiving me)”
	9	农夫山泉，有点田	“peasant woman, mountain spring and a few farmlands.” The original sentence is a punchline from an advertisement of a Chinese drinking water company “Nongfu (farmer) Shanquan (mountain spring).” Its original meaning describes the drinking water as “Farmer Mountain Spring, a little sweet”
	10	人不能无耻到这个地步	“You cannot be shameless to such an extent”
2007	1	很好很强大	“hen hao hen qiang da,” literally meaning “very good, very mighty.” This meme originated with the WoW Chinese-translation group. The Chinese version of World of Warcraft replaces skeletons with creatures with flesh like human body because of the government’s censorship. Game players add the caption “very good, very mighty” on the Wow website to allude to the fact that the game is being censored. The meme took off when a state authority in charge of Internet regulation Peng Bo used the phrase in an official conference, saying “tomorrow’s Internet will be very very green, very very healthy, very good and very mighty!”
	2	做人不能太CCTV	“don’t be too CCTV”
	3	知音体	“zhiyin ti” or “zhiyin style.” “zhiyin,” literally meaning “confidant,” is a title of a well-known Chinese tabloid magazine now stereotyped as targeting lonely and undereducated housewives in small towns. “zhiyin style” refers to the style adopted by the magazine which always publishes excessively sensational and tear-jerking stories
	4	钱不是问题，问题是没钱	Money is not the problem, and the problem is having no money
	5	和谐	“he xie,” harmonious/harmonize/harmonization
	6	我看行	“wo kan xing,” meaning “I think it works”
	7	晒	“shai,” to show off, to post online
	8	你太有才了	You are too talented
	9	史上最牛钉子户	coolest nail house in history
	10	纸包子	cardboard bun hoax
2008	1	打酱油	“da jiang you,” literally meaning “get some soy sauce”
	2	俯卧撑	“fu wo cheng,” meaning push-ups
	3	叉腰肌	“cha yao ji,” meaning “psoas muscle”
	4	范跑跑	“fan pao pao,” or Runner Fan
	5	脑残	“nao can,” meaning “brain damage”
	6	囧	“jiong,” an emoticon representing annoyance, shock, embarrassment
	7	很黄很暴力	“hen huang hen bao li,” meaning “very erotic, very violent”
	8	做人不能太CNN	Don’t be too CNN
	9	周老虎	“zhou lao hu,” meaning “Tiger Zhou”
	10	雷	“lei,” literally meaning “thunder.” It refers to someone or something that shocks people or makes people speechless
2009	1	躲猫猫	“duo mao mao,” meaning hide-and-seek
	2	70码/欺实马	“70 ma,” meaning “70 miles”
	3	不差钱	“bu cha qian,” meaning “not a penny less”
	4	这事不能说太细	The incident cannot be explained in detail
	5	做噩梦	“zuo e meng,” meaning “to have a nightmare”
	6	草泥马	“cao ni ma,” or “Grass Mud Horse”
	7	贾君鹏，你妈喊你回家吃饭	Jia Junpeng, your mother is calling you home for meal
	8	富二代	“fu er dai,” literally meaning “the second generation of wealth”
	9	杯具	“bei ju,” meaning tragedy
	10	被就业	“bei jiu ye,” meaning “to be employed”
2010	1	给力	“gei li,” meaning “cool,” “awesome,” or “exciting”
	2	我爸是李刚	My father is Li Gang
	3	神马都是浮云	Magic horse is just floating cloud
	4	我勒个去	“wo le ge qu,” meaning “surprise,” “discontent,” or “powerlessness”
	5	你懂的	“ni dong de,” meaning “you know”
	6	非常艰难的决定	A very difficult decision
	7	羡慕嫉妒恨	“xian mu ji du hen,” literally meaning “envious, jealous, hateful”
	8	蒜你狠	“suan ni hen,” meaning “Brutal Garlic”
	9	你妹	“ni mei,” literally meaning your sister. It is a mild condemn term which means “damn,” or “shit”
	10	先谢国家	“xian xie guo jia,” meaning “to first thank the country”
2011	1	Hold住	“hold zhu,” means “to stay calm and keep everything in control”
	2	不管你信不信，反正我是信了	Whether you believe it or not, I believe it
	3	二逼青年	“er bi qing nian,” literally means “the idiotic youth”
	4	伤不起	“shang bu qi,” means “too delicate to bear a blow”
	5	有木有	“you mu you,” means “have or have not”
	6	坑爹	“keng die,” literally means something or someone commits flagrant deception or swindle
	7	蛋定	“dan ding,” means “keep your head” or “stay calm.”
	8	肿么了	“zhong me le,” means “what happened”
	9	悲催	“bei cui,” means “sad” or “tragic”
	10	卖萌	“mai meng,” means “acting cute”
2012	1	屌丝	“diao si,” an ironic term loosely translated as “loser.” It typically refers to “self-aware, and self-deprecating loser”
	2	XX style	XX style, originated from the Gangnam Style, a K-pop single by the South Korean musician Psy released in 2012
	3	你幸福吗	Are you happy?
	4	我能说脏话吗	Can I say dirty words?
	5	我再也不相信爱情了	I no longer believe in love any more
	6	元芳你怎么看	Yuan Fang, what do you think of it?
	7	正能量	“zheng neng liang,” meaning “positive energy”
	8	随时受不了	[I] cannot bear it at any time
	9	中国好XX	“China good XX,” was originated from The Voice of China, a Chinese reality talent show that premiered in 2012
	10	我姓曾	My last name is Zeng
2013	1	土豪	“tu hao,” means the nouveau riche, newly rich
	2	女汉子	“nv han zi,” means tough girl or cow girl
	3	大V	“Big V,” was originally used to refer to verified account users on microblogging websites. Later, it refers to the most vocal and influential Internet commentators who have large quantity of followers
	4	说闹觉余	“shuo nao jue yu,” literally means “while other people are having a good time talking and frolicking, I feel myself an unwelcome outsider”
	5	不明觉厉	“bu ming jue li,” means “although I don’t understand what you are talking about, I think you are really terrific.” The term is now used to explain I have no idea of what you said
	6	人艰不拆	“ren jian bu chai,” stands for “my life is hard enough and please do not hurt me with the relentless truth.”
	7	喜大普奔	“xi da pu ben,” an amalgamation of four expressions commonly used—perhaps overused—in Communist Party language, often to describe public satisfaction with party’s policies
	8	点赞党	“dian zan dang,” refer to the group of people who constantly “like” posts on the Internet, whatever the content is
	9	十动然拒	“shi dong ran ju,” means “[A] is deeply moved and impressed [by B], but A rejects B without hesitation”
	10	细思极恐	“xi si ji kong,” means “when you think it over, you will feel horrible”
2014	1	萌萌哒	“meng meng da,” means someone or something is cute or acts in a cute manner
	2	逗比	“dou bi,” means someone or someone’s actions which are funny and foolish
	3	也是醉了	“ye shi zui le,” literally means “I’m also drunk,” often used to describe the situation when you are shocked or speechless and nothing could shock you anymore
	4	且行且珍惜	“qie xing qie zhen xi,” means “when you are going forward (doing something), remember to cherish (something)”
	5	涨姿势	“zhang zi shi,” means “enhance one’s knowledge”
	6	有钱，就是任性	“you qian, jiu shi ren xing,” means “[I] have money, and [I] am capricious”
	7	暖男	“nuan nan,” literally meaning “boy of warmth” or “sunshine boy,” is defined as a man who is friendly, caring, and positive
	8	买买买	“mai mai mai,” literally means “buy buy buy”
	9	也是蛮拼的	“ye shi man pin de,” literally meaning “someone who tries very hard, although he doesn’t succeed eventually”
	10	逼格	“bi ge.” “逼 (bi)” refers to “zhuang bi,” which means pretending to be awesome and cool. “格 (ge)” is similar to “style, ability, quality.” “bi ge” generally means the style and ability to pretend
2015	1	颜值	“yan zhi,” literally meaning one’s scores of one’s looks
	2	约吗	“yue ma,” literally means “want to date with me?”
	3	日了狗了	“ri le gou le,” literally means “fuck the dog”
	4	我想静静	“wo xiang jing jing,” meaning “I want to calm down” or “leave me alone”
	5	整个人都不好了	“zheng ge ren dou bu hao le,” literally means “I feel not well all over my body”
	6	什么鬼	“shen me gui,” literally means “what the fuck?”
	7	小鲜肉	“xiao xian rou,” literally meaning “little fresh meat,” refers to teens and young adults who are nice-looking (especially with impeccable skin), innocent and relatively inexperienced in dating
	8	单身狗	“dan shen gou,” lieterally meaning “single dog,” is an irony to those people who are single
	9	然并卵	“ran bing luan,” means “but there’s really not that much useful in it.” “卵 (luan)” literally means “egg” but has long been as a derogatory term
	10	我的内心几乎是崩溃的	“wo de nei xin ji hu shi beng kui de,” means “I almost have a nervous breakdown”

The data in the data pool were collated and compiled from three major sources. The first one is the Annual Report on Public Opinion in China from 2009 to 2012. But since the report only started from 2009, other secondhand materials are consulted for catchphrases before 2009, including report and rankings from major media outlets. The third source is the annual Chinese Online Verbal Expression Report released by People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center since 2011, a think tank-like unit of People’s Daily which is an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.

The catchphrases from 2003 to 2008 were selected based on the rankings from some major web portals in China, such as Sina.com, major online forums such as Mop.com and Tianya.com, and web portals of official media outlets and news agency such as People’s Daily and Xinhua News. The catchphrases from 2009 to 2015 were selected based on the rankings in Annual Report on Public Opinion in China in 2011 and 2012, and the Chinese Online Verbal Expression Report from 2011 to 2015. Examples selected for case studies in this article are based on the extent of their relevance and influence from the author’s observation. These examples are considered representative of the data collected because they demonstrate certain patterns, and they are widely shared and reproduced across the online networks, and some of them were reappropriated by official discourse and thus exert a wider influence on public opinion.

Table 1 presents some of the major online catchphrases from 2003 to 2015 in China.

The transformation of online catchphrases from 2003 to 2015

The word “catchphrase,” refers to a popular word or phrase within a certain period of time. In this study, online catchphrases include words, phrases, or sentences created by Internet users, or borrowed from other sources but widely spread and used in online settings. Their influence may reach beyond online space into the offline world.

The study discovers that three stages of the development of online catchphrases in China feature three main genres, respectively. Genre, according to Fairclough (2003), is “the specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social events” (p. 65). Online expressions from 2003 to 2005, brimmed with “playfulness,” are markers of young people’s interactions and explorations into the uncharted territory. Creating a code system which makes odd variations of the existing normative language is a symbol of subverting the traditional rules and norms in real world. In the second phase from 2006 to 2009, the genre of parody is manifested mostly in spoofs, political satires, and other popular expressions that appropriate elements from official discourse or traditional culture. Online popular language, closely associated with social-political issues, serves to criticize or defy the regime and to mock the lack of social justice and freedom in China. However, online popular language from 2010 to 2015 became less political and referential to social problems. A key characteristic of online discourse during this phase is carnival, involving the juxtaposition and hybridization of different genres, styles, metaphors, meanings, and values. The remixing of different types of discourse triggers the carnivalesque experience, a communal performance where polyphonic voices mark a temporary suspension of the hierarchical social order (Bakhtin, 1984). In the official discourse, hierarchical precedence is prominent as people are usually divided by their social status based on wealth and connection to power. The symbols of authorities are carefully curated and protected from being ridiculed or criticized to preserve the privileges and norms they harness. However, in the online discourse, parodies of the authorities create a temporary suspension of the hierarchical rank and social norms which is often impossible in everyday life given the heavy censorship of mainstream media. Bakhtin (1984) stresses that symbols of the carnival are characterized by change and renewal. Online catchphrases are constantly reappropriated by Internet users, in which the element of parody renews and revives through the enormous propagation in the digital sphere. However, the carnivalesque experience is far from bare negation and formal parody of authorities. Carnival laughter is directed at all people including those who laugh. It is “gay, triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 12). Catchphrases, consisting of scatological humor and trivial meanings, are increasingly disembedded from social or political issues, with contexts collapsed and meanings flattened out. Former focus of parodies of authorities has shifted to a universal laughter of all subjects. In many cases, online discourse serves as vehicles for sheer emotional catharsis and identity construction (e.g. Szablewicz, 2014). Playful and parodic expressions still exist. However, they no longer predominate as significant elements of online catchphrases. They gradually give way to a carnival scene which convey a sense of ambivalence and gay recreation in all people.

Along with the three stages of the development of Internet catchphrases, the study creates a typology of four tendencies based on qualitative content analysis: (1) the tendency of labeling, (2) the tendency of framing, (3) the tendency of violence, and (4) the tendency of emptying-out. The four trends epitomize the transition into the network society where information, knowledge, and experience are increasingly disembedded and deterritorialized (Castells, 2010). Lash (2002) heralds that the emergence of information technologies has altered the nature of information. Information’s nature entails the compression of time and space. In the network society, forms of life are lifted out, disembedded, and flattened into everyday life (Lash, 2002). The fast update and alternation of information allows little time for rational deliberation and the limited frame of the online meme allows little space for articulations of meanings and arguments. Both meaning and material content are emptied out from objects. Information clears away the last foundation of territorialization of an already largely deterritorialized object (Lash, 2002). Thus, the network society and its culture revolve around the timeless time and placeless place. The subjectivity dispels and flows in the boundless digital space (Castells, 2010).

In the network society, objects and subjects are increasingly deterritorialized and the sense of history and locality drifts away. Consequently, the online popular language displays a tendency of disembeddedness from original contexts from 2003 to 2015. The function to criticize subsequently wanes as the meaning of the catchphrase is emptied out. In this sense, the emptying-out effect of online discourse also has its technological roots.

The tendency of labeling

Labeling generally refers to the tendency to use labels to stigmatize minorities as deviant from standard cultural norms (Becker, 1963). The analysis of online popular language in China reveals that the tendency of labeling is notable over the past 13 years, and it is largely associated with the socially privileged classes, including authorities, entrepreneurs, celebrities, and social elites. With the replication and propagation of certain popular language, some of its precise content of the language is replaced by a more generic category, so it can be used in a more abstract way. The tendency reveals the growing tension between the upper class and grass-roots, aggravated by the solidification of social stratification in contemporary Chinese society.

A case study to illustrate this is the adoption of “My father is Li Gang” introduced at the outset of the paper. Despite the widespread exposure on the Internet, the incident did not gain much coverage on the state’s media apparatuses. Li Gang, the deputy police chief in the Beishi district of Baoding, was hence suspected to abuse power to cover up the accident.

The dramatic incident personified an enduring social grievance—a civilian grievously killed by a privileged criminal pulling strings to escape punishment. As dramatized as it appears, the abuse of authorities’ power is not rare in China and incurs strong social discontent. The government authorities, realizing the delicacy of the matter, later moved censors to prohibit reporting on similar incidents involving government officials.

The Li Gang case was hard to quell on the Internet. It began to be appropriated for many different circumstances to form sarcastic meanings. For example, one piece of news, featuring the title of “A man was hired by the bureau of finance without taking entrance examination, because ‘my father is the director of a bureau’” appeared in official media’s website (Dan, 2010). The title stirred ripples when it replaced the specific subject of the original catchphrase, in this case, Li Gang, with a more generic and abstract concept which points to the authorities of the society. The semantic meaning of “Li Gang” herewith expands from a deputy police chief to the ruling class of the society, forming the stigma of certain social classes and groups. It reflects that the critical meaning of the catchphrase was deconstructed and the function to criticize dissolved and eventually collapsed as the semantic meaning shifted from definiteness to indefiniteness.

The first phase of labeling culminates over a surge of parodic expressions which feature a strong denouncement of the authority and privileged social groups, reflected in catchphrases such as “guan er dai” and “fu er dai,” or “the second generation” which refers to the children of privileged government officials and the super-rich. This is characterized by sweeping emotions of anger and resentment felt by the underprivileged social groups. However, in the later phase of labeling, the emotions of anger and resentment toward the establishment are replaced by feelings of frustration and disillusionment, giving birth to expressions of self-mockery that tend to stigmatize underprivileged social groups with negative labels. Privileged social class is best captured in the jubilant acclaims of “gao fu shuai” (literally meaning “tall, wealthy, handsome”), and flattering pursuit of “tu hao, let us be friends.” “Tu hao” means “the newly rich” in Mandarin. Underprivileged social groups are characterized as “diaosi,” referring to “losers” in Mandarin, or “ai qiong cuo,” literally meaning “short, poor and ugly.” The labeling could ultimately reinforce many norms and values that the label seemingly intends to ridicule, hence defeating the original purpose of symbolic subversion. As Szablewicz’s (2014) study shows, “diaosi” signals young netizens’ disillusionment with the apparent lack of possibilities for upward socio-economic mobility in contemporary China. By embracing the word “diaosi,” young people are explicitly acknowledging the unfair standard of success and inequality in the market economy.

The tendency of framing

The evolution of catchphrases from fixed words or phrases to expressions with certain syntactical structure is a notable trend from 2003 to 2015. The structure itself could be appropriated and multiplied with many of its varieties, all of which share a common discursive frame. The popularization of online popular language structure bespeaks a tendency of framing in terms of semantic meaning, value and ideology.

Since 2007, Chinese linguists have observed a new and unorthodox use of bei (Shao, 2010). Bei-sentences rose into popularity with its novel syntactic structure. Bei is used as a passive marker on verbs to display that the actor mentioned is forced to accept some effect of an action implemented by another agent in Mandarin Chinese. Since the agent is omitted, it conveys a sense that the compulsion comes from an unspoken source. Bei is frequently added to the verbs that normally cannot be expressed in passive voice to evoke a counterintuitive sense. Many analogous usages emerged on the Internet from 2008 to 2009, such as “bei zi sha” (to be suicided), “bei kai xin” (to be made happy), “bei shi zong” (to be disappeared), and “bei xiao kang” (to be made well-off) (H. Wang, 2009).

In 2009, “bei dai biao,” literally meaning “to be represented,” was frequently referred to by media and Internet users in China. It implies that people do not voluntarily represent themselves but are forcibly represented even without their own knowledge and consent. “Bei dai biao” originated from a public hearing about adjusting the water price in urban residency of Jinan city, Shandong Province in China (S. Wang, 2009). Internet users questioned the legitimacy of some representatives attending the hearing, many of whom come from middle and upper-class backgrounds, their occupation ranging from division chief to professor, whereas people from lower class had no representatives and hence no say in the hearing. So, Internet users created this phrase “bei dai biao” to satirize and criticize the injustice and lacking of transparency in legislation procedures, or even to challenge the legitimacy of the government which is based not on the consent of people, but on its own coercive force. The phrase also emphasizes the voices of the grass-roots that are for long ignored and underrepresented by the government, strengthening the opposition between the authorities and the grass-roots.

In China’s context, the tensions between the authorities and grass-roots are very intense, as the process of social stratification, the rampant commercialization, and other socio-economic forces create new social unevenness—which, not surprisingly, generates prevalent social discontent. The use of bei language expresses resentment both at individual’s lack of personal agency and of the overwhelming power of the state. The authorities become an imagined and monolithic power in opposition to the public. They are simply reduced to an abstract symbol without tangible incarnations, through which public resentment is targeted and released. In a sense, the authorities become the enemy of the people.

Catchphrases with bei-structure reflect the growing divergence of social classes, and in turn intensify and solidify stereotypes of certain social groups. In adopting bei-structure to express ridicule, criticism, and complaint, the Internet users autonomously classify and identify themselves with the “patient” group who are powerless, underprivileged, and vulnerable to bad influence by the “actor.” In stark contrast, the authorities are portrayed as a unified and homogeneous stereotype of actor who is powerful, ruthless, coercive, unjust, and ubiquitous.

The case study of bei-sentence reflects the pervasive distrust in the Chinese society, especially between government agencies and citizens. In a nationwide survey over 10,000 respondents (Fan, 2012), 61.4% believed that lack of trust is the most serious problem the Chinese society is facing, and 74.8% do not trust government officials, followed by celebrities (48.6%) and entrepreneurs (33.7%). Officials, celebrities, and entrepreneurs are the major authorities in the country’s politics, culture, and economy. The fact that they are ranked top three in the trustless category means that the country has fallen into a deep crisis of credibility in all major social fields (Fan, 2012). A lack of trust results in a high degree of skepticism. In the poll by Edelman (2012), 84% need to hear information three or more times to believe and only 2% believe information they hear once.

The tendency of violence

From 2006 to 2009, despite frequent occurrences of social events and intense conflicts between the privileged and the unprivileged, discontent, and criticism toward the authorities were still mediated and converted in euphemism like online parody and satire. Since 2010, those sentiments of Internet users began to take on a bold, straight, and fierce look, resulting in a surge of new types of speech characterized by “abusive language,” “insulting words or expressions,” and “profanities and oaths,” all of which are speech patterns excluded from the official discourse (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 16). The old speech patterns, such as literary satire, parody, newspeak, and stylized language, still continue to exist, though not as the predominant pattern in this phase on the Chinese Internet. Most top catchphrases created in this period entail insulting curse, scatological humor, grotesque presentations, and sexual denotations. This is manifested and summarized as the tendency of violence.

Verbal aggression is one of the major categories of violent behaviors (Yudofsky, Silver, Jackson, Endicott, & Williams, 1986). In the narrow sense, online verbal violence refers to using language to harass, insult, abuse, and attack, as well as engaging in improper privacy disclosure by means of digital media (Yudofsky et al., 1986). This phenomenon is not exclusive to China as studies have shown online verbal aggressions frequently emerge in online forums (Balci & Salah, 2015). Nevertheless, this study defines the tendency of violence in a broad sense. This indicates to understand violence as the imposition of power in a bare form without any symbolic mediation and direct reference of objects. On one hand, online popular language functioning mainly as emotional catharsis gains much popularity from 2010 to 2015. The emotions the language embodies consist mostly of negative emotions from anger and grief to apathy and frustration. On the other hand, the aggravation of abusiveness in the online popular language is also manifested by the disappearance of object and reference of it. What this study finds unique with the tendency of violence in China are the social-cultural changes of the Chinese society that account for this particular tendency.

“Ren bu neng zhe me wu chi,” literally translated as “people cannot be so shameless,” became a hot catchphrase in 2006. It at least contains a certain degree of earnest exhort, if not completely straightforward denunciation. From 2010, many buzzwords involved outrageous profanity, oaths, and abuse. In 2015, the dominant trait of the top 10 Internet memes is the abusiveness in expressions, largely carrying negative emotional tones (Zhou, 2015). For instance, these words—“wo le ge qu,” “wo cao,” or “wo ca,” loosely translated into “holy shit” or “fuck”—began to catch on in 2010. Another more implicit one is “ni mei.” Literally meaning “your sister,” it is a euphemism for “fucking one’s mother.” The phrase was spread over the Internet for its referential opaqueness, as a way to get around the Internet censorship. The abusive tone of the swearing language is moderated by its implicitness. What it implies nevertheless does not set it apart from other more straightforward name-calling.

Researchers have pointed out the symbolic power of foul language in ridiculing and resisting official attempts to control online content in analyzing online parody (Meng, 2011; Tang & Yang, 2011). As the cases of “Grass Mud Horse” and “Steamed Bun” have manifested (Li, 2011), online popular slang between 2006 and 2010 was highly political or associated with social issues, targeting the authorities as the object of ridicule and satire. Nevertheless, the study finds there is a critical turn after 2010 when online popular language grew more apolitical, without specific target for abuse and ridicule. A report demonstrates 20% of Internet memes come from entertaining topics comparing to only 13% of those originate from news events and social issues in the first half of 2015 (Zhou, 2015). In many cases, abusive language in Internet memes are pervasive such as sheer rants manifested in “ni mei,” “diaosi,” and “tu cao.”

Foul language used to be regarded as abnormal and social taboos in daily communication, whereas they are now adopted in common situations on a regular basis. The major function of foul language has diverted from expressing criticism toward the authorities to a sheer relief valve to vent out anger and frustration felt by the Chinese youth who face dim prospects of a future in a highly consolidated social hierarchical system, as reflected by Chinese Online Verbal Expression Report in 2014 (Chen, Zhou, & Ding, 2014).

Power is usually acquired through two channels: symbolic power and coercive power (Castells, 2009). In the modern society, symbolic power underpins the governance, largely achieved and maintained by ideologies such as freedom, equality, and democracy. In the post-modern capitalistic society, or namely, in the information society, ideology shrinks and eventually comes to an end (Lash, 2002). The symbolic violence replaces the “symbolic power” and becomes the foundation of the governance. Ideologies take time and space for narration and reflection, which no longer exists when space-time undergoes a process of compression when the information accelerates (Lash, 2002). Hence, power works less through “narrative” or “pedagogy” than though the immediacy of information and communications (Lash, 2002). Symbolic power no longer takes the forms of the systems of ideas that constitute ideologies but instead is largely informational. This constitutes the technological foundation of the tendency toward verbal violence.

Apart from the technical mechanisms, the tendency of violence is also constituted by and reflects the social and cultural changes over the 13 years in China. With the enormous social transformation in China, since the market reforms in 1979, social stratification and hierarchies have become increasingly entrenched and opportunities for upward mobility increasingly limited (Lu, 2014). According to the Report on Chinese Social Opinion and Crisis Management (2003–2015), the hotspot social issues with large influence have grown prominently from 2003 to 2012. The influential incidents grew by 26.7% in 2010 comparing to 2009, and 55.8% in 2011 comparing to 2010. Only in 2013, the number of the influential social issues began to dwindle, but year 2014 has seen a resurge of hot social issues. Year 2005, 2008, and 2012 rank among the highest regarding media and Internet users’ attention to hot social issues, with 2012 being the highest over the 10 years, between 2003 and 2012. What most significant social issues are spearheaded at are institutions related to the Chinese government, such as government-endorsed charity organizations. The phenomenon further uncovers the exacerbating tensions between the ruling class and the grass-roots. As a key character of online catchphrases during this phase, the hatred, frustration, anger, and anxiety toward the ruling class with wealth or connections to political power is the offspring of the consolidation of social classification.

Arguably, the legacy of the highly politicized discourse of the Cultural Revolution also influences contemporary online political communication in China. The rhetoric of the movement tends to legitimize power and violence and to dehumanize a group of people identified as class enemies (Lu, 2004). Lu (2004) contends that the revolution polarized Chinese thought through its deployment of moralistic terms, and that it replaced rich expressions with hollow political jargon and tedious ideological clichés. Online catchphrases such as “People cannot be so shameless,” “I am sent from Beijing (here Beijing insinuates the connection to political power)” demonstrate the self-righteous position to bash others in highly moralistic and politicized terms.

The tendency of emptying-out

From 2008 to 2015, more expressions without concrete themes, specific contexts, and substantial meanings are created and adopted to relieve the boring sentiments of netizens. This reveals the trend of emptying-out underlying online popular language. Emptying-out refers to the process in which the lexical meanings of the language are stripped away from its original specific contexts to an extent that it loses its locality and specificity. This process, also known as “semantic bleaching,” occurs “as a morpheme loses its intention: from describing a narrow set of ideas, it comes to describe an ever-broader range of them, and eventually may lose its meaning altogether” (Haiman, 1991). The tendency of emptying-out is represented in the triviality and hollowness in the online expressions in this phase. A good example is “Magic horse is floating cloud,” which was one of the top online memes in 2010. “Magic horse” (shen ma, literally “god horse,” or a pegasus) is not actually a horse, but a homophone of “shen me” (shen ma, “what”). The implicated meaning of “floating cloud” (fu yun) is “being vain.” The slang implies “everything is meaningless and like fleeting clouds.”

“Magic horse is just floating cloud” came from the Internet incident “Xiao Yue Yue” in 2010. Xiao Yue Yue is the main character of a post by a netizen on the online forum of Tianya.com, arguably the most active online forums in China. Xiao Yue Yue became famous for her stupefying behaviors, many of which are purely vulgar and erotic. In an online post titled “I thank this obnoxious friend for bringing me such a dismal National Day Holiday,” “Xiao Yue Yue” was born. Her strange words and deeds were appalling to many Internet users, leading to netizens connecting “shen ma” and “fu yun” together, giving birth to phrases, such as “No words can describe her, they are all too dull/boring, shen ma [what] Internet uninhibited woman, fu yun [not worth mentioning]! All fu yun!” What makes “shen ma” and “fu yun” magical is that when these two words are combined together, the new phrase becomes multi-purpose, applicable to all situations.

It seems nonsensical that the subjectless and meaningless phrase took off, but given the social context, it makes more sense. The meme offers discursive resources for netizens to express their apathy and frustration toward the institution whose political legitimation is increasingly weakened for the slackening economy and stagnant political and social reform. The feeling of disillusionment and frustration is pervasive and reflects the social mentality of young people who face dim prospect of future in a highly consolidated hierarchical system. In conducting symbolic rituals of following up posts on forums, collective sentence-making, and other activities, the netizens may experience a sense of collective identity (Szablewicz, 2014). They have diverted their focus of attention from the outside society to themselves, creating numerous “isolated niches” in which people explore their own narrow identities and interests with like-minded individuals (Damm, 2007).

Any online catchphrase in nature is a sign that consists of two elements: the signifier which refers to a form of the sign and the signified which refers to the meaning of the sign (Barthes, 1977; Saussure, 1974). With the proliferation of catchphrases adopted in different contexts, the original context that attributes meaning to the catchphrase in question is collapsed, resulting floating signifiers which do not point to any actual object or agreed upon meaning. For example, the phrase “My father is Li Gang” is originally a signifier of the identity of a perpetrator of a car accident but is adopted in decontextualized uses that are open to interpretation of any users. These interpretations constitute the “floating chain of signifieds,” the notion of which indicates various vague, highly variable, unspecifiable signified pointing to a signifier (Barthes, 1977). The signifier thus becomes “empty signifier” because it means different things to different people. Along with “floating chain of signifieds,” the meanings (the signified) are detached from the numerous reproductions of their forms (the signifier) and thus the linkage between signifier and signified collapses. It constitutes the linguistic foundation of the trend of emptying-out. When the linkage collapses, the language becomes increasingly general and abstract, ultimately turning itself into symbols that do not represent any specific subjects. This explains the interrelation of linguistic logic and the trends of online popular language. For example, the generalization and abstraction of objects, ideas, and concepts are essential elements in the process of labeling. For instance, in adopting the phrase “My father is Li Gang,” its original context is replaced by multiple contexts, and its original meaning has dissolved in numerous replications. The phrase has become an empty symbol that no longer preserves the subversive power of political satire.

Conclusion

Locating online discourse in the Chinese context, this article argues that although online catchphrases may appear to be rather contingent and incoherent, they have demonstrated certain trends, patterns, and features of change and continuity across 13 years. These trends reveal a big picture of social transformation and the shift of social mentality in China.

The paper identified and analyzed four major trends of online popular language over the past 13 years: (1) labeling, (2) framing, (3) violence, and (4) emptying-out. These trends manifest a transition of genres—playfulness, parody, and carnival—each characterizing one stage of Internet development from 2003 to 2015. The years from 2003 to 2005 feature a genre of playfulness, taking many forms in which the most prominent are the variations in common language. Between the year 2006 and year 2009, the dominating discursive genre of online catchphrases is parody, with irony and anger as its two components. Unlike the innocuous nature of playfulness in the first stage, parody takes effects in many ways from scathing criticism toward burning social issues to the wide reproduction of satirical works that aim at ordinary people as target of spoofs. In the final stage of the years from 2010 to 2015, online catchphrases feature the main characteristics of carnival in which the degradation of online discourse into triviality, vulgarity, violence, and eroticism has become a common scene. It is hard to contribute the trends of the language to a single force or hereby conclude any causal relationship between any single force and any single trend. The significance of this study lies in that it not only depicts the landscape of change and continuity of online popular language over time but also goes further to uncover the societal, technological, and linguistic roots that shape and constitute the transformations of discourses. With these efforts, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the ways in which language, technology, and society interact and mutually constitute each other. The shift from playfulness to carnival reflects the mentality of urban youths who are the majority of Internet users in China. In the past, with the outburst of social issues, youths utilized satirical ways to express their discontent and anger toward the authorities. A recent study has shown there is an increasing diversification of “agnostics” over time whose political preferences lack ideological orientations (Wu, 2014). In other words, this particular group displays growing disagreement with liberalism, nationalism, and political conservatism. The research, to some extent, supports the findings of this study, which demonstrates the trend of growing nihilism in value systems underlying the online popular discourse among Chinese youth. Living in a slowing economy with widening wealth disparities and consolidation of social hierarchy, the youth have grown disillusioned with the chances to climb to a higher end of social class by one’s own efforts and are disenchanted with any institutional changes initiated by the government or the masses. It opens up promising space for future study exploring the reasons behind the transition of social mentality.

The reappropriation of online catchphrases by mainstream media is notable as the traditional media vie to gain more prominence in influencing public opinion. For example, some catchphrases, such as “My father is Li Gang,” become popular partially because of mainstream media reporting. Thus, one limitation of this study is the data collected are subject to official censorship and manipulation. And, it is difficult to parse out the influence of censorship in deciding what data are purely the outgrowth of online public opinion. Yet, the study questions the absolute dichotomy of online discourse and mainstream media discourse because the two are in constant interplay and influence each other. In this sense, seeking a pure sense of discourse that only emerges and exists online seems not necessary, if only possible. The fact that mainstream media opted to reappropriate this phrase to attract people’s attention reflects the phrase’s original popularity online. And the evolvement of the language does not stop after the mainstream media co-opted it, but it enters into an evolving spiral where netizens continue to apply the word for their own uses and interests. The findings of the study is informed while limited by the data collected and reflect the public discussions where the Internet filtering apparatus is in place. Although the Internet is heavily censored in China and many Internet catchphrases are ephemeral, the study contends that online communication does not merely mirrors the official agenda to only represent what the government approves to be discussed. Rather, the study proposes that the relationship between mainstream media discourse and online discourse is not uni-dimensional but the two are mutually constitutive and constantly absorb the elements in one another. This opens space for future studies to explore the dynamic relationship between mainstream media discourse and online discourse.

Footnotes

Author biography

Mengjun Guo is a PhD student at the University of Washington. Her research focuses on digital culture, activism, and online communities. She has presented eight single-authored papers and one co-authored paper in national and international communication conferences on topics regarding visual culture, identity, and discourse of digital activism. Her recent work investigates the interplay of visual culture and digital media in the Umbrella Movement from a critical cultural perspective.

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Playfulness,parody,and carnival: Catchphrases and mood on the Chinese Internet from 2003 to 2015

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Literature review

Research questions

Methods

The transformation of online catchphrases from 2003 to 2015

The tendency of labeling

The tendency of framing

The tendency of violence

The tendency of emptying-out

Conclusion

Footnotes

Author biography

References