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Abstract

This article examines how digital platforms construct imperialism in the Asian cultural markets. It discusses the increasing role of global digital platforms in cultural production, referring to the production and circulation of cultural content in Asia. It articulates how global digital platforms in the audio-visual sector, including broadcasting, film, and popular music, have expanded their market shares in Asian cultural markets to determine the similarities and differences between East Asia and other regions in the construction of platform imperialism. Finally, it examines whether Western digital platforms perpetuate a vicious circle in the local cultural sphere, despite the growth of local digital platforms in Asia, while contemplating its broader implications for global cultural markets.

Keywords

Asia digital platform platform imperialism

Introduction

The academic discourse on imperialism in media and cultural studies is not new. Several media scholars have developed different approaches to understanding imperialism in relation to the transnational flows of popular culture since the 1970s. As the flow of cultural content and information has increased, scholars have developed various theories based on imperialism discourses, such as cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1976), media imperialism (Boyd-Barrett, 2015), and information imperialism (Fuchs, 2010). While their emphases differ, these theoreticians commonly argue that a handful of Western countries have reigned supreme in the global cultural and information markets.

As the latest imperialism theory, platform imperialism (Bannerman et al., 2020; Jin, 2015; Qiu & Chan, 2025; Steinberg, 2020) has especially focused on the ways in which global digital platforms have dominated global cultural markets. Unlike previous imperialism discourses, platform imperialism refers to an increasingly dominant mode of capital accumulation and cultural influence facilitated by a multitude of digital platforms that are predominantly created and owned by a handful of Western, in particular, American corporate actors (Grove & Breytenbach, 2021; Jin, 2015; Steinberg, 2020). Digital platforms, such as social media platforms, OTT (over-the-top) platforms, search engines, and smartphones, are integral parts of daily life, and many people around the globe are deeply influenced by Western-based digital platforms.

The emergence of digital platforms

Cultural imperial theory (see Guback, 1984; Jin, 2007; Schiller, 1976) as a subset of imperialism mainly developed in the 1970s and 1980s and emphasized that a couple of Western countries, in particular, the United States, dominated the global cultural markets as they were primary actors in cultural production and the transnational flow of cultural products. Theoreticians (Fuchs, 2010; Guback, 1984; H. Schiller, 1969) focused on the primary role of big media and cultural industries firms supported by nation-states that dominate the cultural sphere, and therefore, the national economy. Hollywood action films, American television sitcoms, and UK-style reality television programs have become globally popular, resulting in a global homogenization of culture (Demont-Heinrich, 2011).

Due to the increasing popularity of local cultural products starting in the 1990s, however, several theoreticians (Reeves, 1993; Straubhaar, 1991; Tracy, 1988) argued that cultural pluralism arrived to challenge American dominance. As Straubhaar (1991) pointed out with the case of Telenovelas in Mexico and Brazil, national cultures seemed to defend their ways of life and, in some respects, even shared their images with other parts of the globe. A few Asian countries, including Japan, China, India, and Korea, have created their own cultural content and exported them to neighboring countries and then later to Western cultural markets starting in the late 20th century. Japanese anime, India’s Bollywood movies, and the growth of Korean popular culture and global popularity, known as the Korean Wave (Hallyu in Korean), demonstrate the development of local cultural content competing with American cultural products. These Asian countries seem to extend their cultural forces, although the United States has continued to sustain its dominant influence in the region.

The situation surrounding the transnationalization of cultural flows, however, is not simple in the digital platform era. Various digital platforms, both OTT platforms (e.g. Netflix) and social media platforms (e.g. YouTube), have significantly increased their power as cultural mediators who control and manipulate the transnational flows of cultural content, instead of limiting their roles as mere distributors. Although a few Asian countries have increased their cultural production, these global digital platform firms, mainly based in the United States, have continued to expand their dominance in the global cultural markets, providing digital platforms, necessary funds, and business models.

The advent of digital platforms has changed the major norms in cultural production as they play a pivotal role in shifting platform economy and culture. Until the early 2000s, the flow of cultural products, such as films, dramas, and popular music, was the primary form of cultural exchange, and the United States had been a dominant force. However, in the digital platform era mainly starting in the 21st century, the transnationalization of cultural content must be understood in relation to other elements, beyond production and circulation, including transnational money flows, intellectual property (IP) rights, and the increasing role of digital platforms as distributors and producers.

In other words, the form of dominance has changed, from the export of cultural products, and therefore, the increase in the market share of Western popular culture in the non-Western cultural markets to the manipulation of the entire process of cultural production—the production of popular culture, the circulation of cultural content, and the consumption of these cultural programs—through the necessary funds, distribution power, artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms based on big data, and IPs. Global digital platforms like Netflix and Disney+ not only distribute cultural programs, either produced in the United States or in East Asian countries, but also produce popular culture, which eventually controls the process of cultural production. They consequently influence the shift of cultural text in genres and themes in East Asia, from focusing on local specificities to emphasizing global universalities. Global digital platforms also use data from global subscribers to develop algorithms to recommend certain types of cultural content to individual subscribers and users.

Amid the rapid growth of digital technologies, in particular, digital platforms, the notion of imperialism has gained new momentum. What is significant is that the majority of digital platforms that people heavily rely on globally are US-based platforms like YouTube, Google, Netflix, and Disney+, which intensify capital accumulation in the hands of American corporations. Due to the increasing roles of global digital platforms, East Asian cultural industries are controlled, manipulated, and influenced by a handful of American digital platforms in their cultural production.

Platform imperialism in the Asian context

With the rapid growth of digital platforms in Asia, platform imperialism as a theory and practice is conspicuous in the region. In Asia, several countries, such as Japan, Korea, China, and India, have continuously created and advanced their digital platforms and popular culture. As these countries have developed local popular culture to become new global forces, they constantly develop cutting-edge digital technologies and digital platforms. People might argue that Asia has advanced enough power to compete with American power in the realms of digital platforms and popular culture. In reality, these platforms in Asian countries have not secured enough market share even in their own countries, as numerous global digital platforms, including Netflix, YouTube, and Disney+, are increasing their market shares in the Asian markets.

More specifically, Asian countries have different perspectives due to their own distinctive media environments. In China, Baidu, QQ, and Tencent are the primary players. Due to the Great Wall policy, local Chinese platforms can grow under government protection. However, other Asian countries are substantially controlled by American digital platforms. In Korea, YouTube and its music streaming services are gaining dominance in the local music streaming market. According to a Korea Creative Content Agency survey, which conducted a nationwide survey of 3500 people between 10 and 69 years of age in 2023, local music streaming giant Melon, operated by Kakao—one of the largest digital platforms—was the most popular platform with 32.8% of the respondents subscribing in 2022. Melon’s usage, however, has decreased for three consecutive years, dropping from 36.4% in 2020 to 34.6% in 2021. In contrast, YouTube usage increased from 26% in 2020 to 28.7% in 2022. Combined with YouTube Music, usage surged to 38.5%, surpassing Melon (Korea Bizwire, 2023).

American OTT platforms like Netflix and Disney+ have especially increased their dominant roles in Asian cultural markets other than China. Among these, Korea has continuously enchanted global audiences with its dramas and films over the past two decades. However, since Netflix entered the Korean market, the local cultural industry firms have faced severe challenges from Netflix as the platform plays a pivotal role not only as a distributor but also as a producer. Since 2017, Netflix has continued to develop its originals in Korea, including Kingdom (2019), Squid Game 1 (2021), and Squid Game 2 (2024). Consequently, as of December 2022, the market share of Netflix in the Korean OTT market accounted for 38.2%, followed by Wavve (14.4%), Tving (13.1%), Coupang Play (11.8%), Disney Plus (5.6%), and others (B.G. Kim, 2022).

American OTT platforms are major players in Japan as well. Netflix entered the Japanese streaming market in 2015, making it the first Asian market the company ventured into. Amazon Prime was also launched in 2015. Consequently, Netflix was the leading OTT platform as its market share held more than 22.3% in Japan in 2022, followed by U-Next (12.6%), Amazon Prime (11.8%), DAZN (11.4%), Disney+ (9.4%), Hulu (6.8%), Docomo Anime Store (4.4%), and others (21.3%). Among these, American platforms, including Netflix, Amazon Prime, Disney+, and Hulu, accounted for 50.3%, and including DAZN (UK platform), global OTT platforms comprised 61.7% of the Japanese market (Statistica, 2023). The estimated market value of the domestic subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) sector amounted to 450.8 billion Japanese yen in 2022, up from 386.2 billion yen in 2021. The entry of several foreign OTT platforms into the Japanese market became one of the major reasons for this development (Statistica, 2023).

In Taiwan, the media ecology is not different, as Netflix has gained momentum. Netflix’s market share has increased from 17.6% in 2017 to 65% in 2022, while local OTT platforms have continuously lost market share (Lin & Liu, 2022). Netflix has continued to expand in the Asian market, especially thanks to the global success of the Squid Game series—Netflix’s Korean originals. Netflix provided a platform for Taiwanese dramas as well. In 2019, Netflix produced a few original programs, including Nowhere Man, Triad Princess, and The Ghost Bride. Although these series received mixed reviews, Netflix continues to invest in Taiwan with a strong emphasis on the Asian markets (Lin & Liu, 2022).

As such, various configurations of platform imperialism have been identified in Asia. Although US digital platforms dominate globally and in Asia, the ways in which they exercise power vary. For example, in Korea, Netflix controls distribution channels and shapes cultural tastes, whereas in China, most American platforms have either exited or been blocked. However, the United States exerts long-arm control over Chinese platforms’ global expansion through geopolitical and financial tools. India, lacking a strong developmental state like Korea and Japan, maintains a different relationship with American platforms. With a population of 1.4 billion people and a growing economy, India has been a lucrative market for digital platform companies in the early 21st century. Many American platforms, such as Google, Apple, and Meta, serve as primary platforms in India. The Indian government has recently developed protective measures; for example, a government panel in India proposed the Digital Competition Law, which aims to prohibit companies from exploiting non-public user data and promoting their own services over those of rivals. Of course, American digital platforms have argued regulations may hinder their growth in India, triggering tensions between the United States and India in the tech sector (Kalra & Chaturvedi, 2024).

More specifically, the increasing roles of American digital platforms in East Asian countries have been distinctive as several countries, like Japan, Korea, and China, have developed various digital platforms, and therefore, they are supposed to compete with American digital platforms, unlike other regions, such as Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. In fact, in Korea, a handful of digital platforms named Naver, Daum, and Kakao have certainly been major players in the national market. In Japan, several platforms, such as Mixi, LINE, and Docomo, have meaningfully controlled their local markets. These countries have also advanced several local OTTs. Several Asian countries, such as Japan, India, and Korea, have also created local cultural programs and exported them to other countries, including Western regions. When other non-Weser regions could not develop their own local or regional digital platforms due to the lack of capital, know-how, and manpower, Asia advanced its popular culture, as can be seen in Japanese anime and horror movies and the global popularity of Korean dramas and popular music, as well as Indian Bollywood movies.

Since American digital platforms produce local cultural programs, local cultural industries in these countries are supposed to utilize global platforms in the production of popular culture, which is somewhat promising to local cultural creators; however, they are global digital platforms that benefit from these local cultural products; therefore, local cultural creators cannot get what they have to secure. For example, in Korea, Netflix funded US$21.4 million to a local creator to produce Squid Game 1 (2021)—one of the most popular dramas on Netflix. With the soaring popularity of the series, Netflix gained $900 million as many global audiences started subscribing to the program. Furthermore, local creators cannot secure additional financial benefits, as Netflix has sheltered IP rights (Spangler, 2021), which was unprecedented. American digital platforms are big winners in their global cultural production.

In East Asia, local platforms’ market share has decreased due to severe challenges from US-based platforms. Regardless of the growth of local digital platforms and popular culture in Asia, these countries’ cultural markets cannot bolster their own cultural sphere due to the increasing roles of American digital platforms. The United States has continued to dominate digital platforms, resulting in the advent of platform imperialism in East Asia.

More importantly, those East Asian countries have not penetrated the global platform markets due to US-based platforms. However, Chinese platforms like arguably TikTok and WeChat seem to be expanding their global reach. At the same time, Line in Japan and Kakao in Korea also attempt to increase their roles in the global markets, their presence is still marginal other than in a few countries, and they are not digital platforms in the audio-visual sectors. As Davis (2023, p. 1148) points out, therefore, Netflix relates to the four facets under the rubric of platform imperialism:

This entails first addressing three ways Netflix fits the definition: (1) a shift from an explicitly distribution-oriented business model to a vertically integrated business model focused on internalizing production and distribution; (2) a process of transnationalizing production that scaled up its capacities (including budgets) to the point where competitors face difficulties when entering the market if they are not working with Netflix; and (3) attempts to leverage both the international financial system and the transnational nature of its production to avoid taxes . . . [And, (4) Netflix also] relies on this data to fuel its business model and create its algorithmic process of user engagement. (Davis, 2023, p. 1148)

US-based platforms have gained more considerable commercial benefits because there are soaring global users, which is one major distinction between cultural imperialism and platform imperialism. For example, Facebook’s (now Meta) annual revenue was US$164.5 billion in 2024, and the majority of them came from international markets. Revenue in the United States and Canada combined consisted of 48.5% in 2022, while international revenue comprised 51.5%, increased from only 30% in 2008, mainly due to the increasing number of international users and big data (Facebook, 2023, 2025). As digital platforms rely on people’s access to and use of platforms, US-based platforms that have penetrated the global platform and cultural markets benefit from their global dominance. American platforms greatly appropriate soaring user bases to transform their daily activities into revenue resources. US-based platforms have intensified their global hegemony because they act as major mediators due in large part to their roles in aggregating various functions and services (Jin, 2015). Although East Asia has proved that non-Western countries can develop digital platforms, American platforms eventually take over the market:

US-based monopolies have dominated globally and the world has been hit with an all-American technological system. Academia is occupied by Eurocentric discourses and the production and development of global technology is informed by Western culture, knowledge, and values. It seems as though the so-called “globalization” is only a modern day veneer for Western economic and political sovereignty; an extension of historic colonization that has now been transposed onto the digital space in more covert and admissible forms. (Siu, 2020)

Finally, US platforms have controlled the East Asian cultural markets, deeply influencing local cultural production, from the production of popular culture to the consumption of cultural content, which shifts cultural text in terms of genres and themes. Local cultural creators and industries firms have to follow the guidelines that these global platforms require in order to work with these platforms that provide the necessary funds and distribution channels. They have to change the major characteristics in genres and themes to appeal to global audiences already familiar with American popular culture. For example, in Korea, local cultural creators used to develop melodramas and romantic comedies as major cultural genres; however, they now create zombi (e.g. Kingdom and All of Us Are Dead), sci-fi (e.g. Jung_E), thriller (e.g. Squid Game), and action genres that American cultural industries and digital platforms emphasize. Consequently, local cultural industries have greatly lost cultural diversity and uniqueness in the digital platform era. East Asian cultural creators and cultural industries are subjugated to American digital platforms mainly because they want to work with Netflix, Disney+, and YouTube to produce cultural content funded by them and to circulate their content through these platforms. Equipped with capital, distribution networks, big data, and cutting-edge AI algorithms, American digital platforms as mediators rather than simple intermediaries have become dominant forces in East Asia more than any other region, which actualizes platform imperialism.

Conclusion

Unlike other regions, several East Asian countries, leveraging their advanced economies, talents, and technologies, have developed various OTT platforms and Internet portals. However, American digital platforms, such as YouTube and Netflix, have intensified their dominance in the East Asian region, reinforcing platform imperialism. The concept of platform imperialism “evokes the complex interactions of the dynamics of capital as well as technological innovations and inventiveness, and the diffusion of technology . . . and it is undeniable that the U.S. still holds a hegemonic position” in the information technology (IT) field in East Asia (Josifidis & Losonc, 2014, p. 608).

Digital platforms, serving as sites for content containment, distribution, and management, play pivotal roles as mediators in cultural production, with American platforms being the primary actors (Jin, 2007). Leveraging their distribution power in the global markets, American platforms are tactically connected to production and consumption, allowing a handful of American digital platforms to maximum profits in the East Asian platform markets, as elsewhere. These platforms have expanded their control and even manipulated the flow of popular culture and information through advanced big data and algorithms. Unlike previous cultural imperialism discourses, which mostly focused on the flow of cultural content from the West to the East, platform imperialism implies increasing American dominance through digital platforms that control the entire cultural production chain.

In the digital platform era, people’s cultural activities heavily rely on various platforms, and the penetration of US platforms in global cultural markets underscores the increasing role of the United States in cultural production. In contemporary society, American dominance in digital platforms has been unparalleled. The United States has remained a dominant actor in a handful of areas, including culture and information, and none of them experience the same level of dominance as digital platforms. Digital platforms mediate the entire value chain. While a few East Asian countries have developed unique and successful platforms within their own countries, they have not penetrated other countries. Meanwhile, US-based platform giants continue to expand their influence in East Asia, intensifying asymmetrical power relations between the United States and East Asia.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Dal Yong Jin

Statements and Declarations

Author biography

Dal Yong Jin is a Distinguished Professor at Simon Fraser University. His major research and teaching interests include digital platforms and digital games, globalization and media, transnational cultural studies, and the political economy of media and culture. Jin has published numerous books, journal articles, and book chapters. His books include Korea’s Online Gaming Empire (2010), Digital Platforms, Imperialism and Political Culture (2015), New Korean Wave: transnational cultural power in the age of social media (2016), Transnational Korean Cinema (2019), Artificial Intelligence in Cultural Production: Critical Perspectives on Digital Platforms (2021), and Understanding Korean Webtoon Culture: Transmedia Storytelling, Digital Platforms, and Genres (2022). Jin has also published articles in scholarly journals, such as New Media and Society, The Information Society, and Media, Culture and Society. In May 2022, Jin was inducted as a fellow of the International Communication Association (ICA). He is the founding editor of the book series Routledge Research in Digital Media and Culture in Asia. Jin has been editing the Korean Journal of Communication since summer 2024. Since the summer of 2021, he has been directing The Transnational Culture and Digital Technology Lab.

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