Abstract
Over the past six decades, owners of sport teams and municipalities have been involved in the shared construction of new, state-of-the-art sport facilities. The negotiation and acceptance of these Private–Public Partnerships (PPPs) has often been contentious and unsuccessful. There are, however, other examples where team owners and cities enter into productive business relationships. We argue that one reason for a PPP being successful is that there are certain key actors, partnership coordinators, who are involved in this process. In particular, their skilful “work” at using rhetoric helps characterize the PPP in a specific way whereby the perception is that the risk of the project is distributed evenly amongst all the parties. To explore these ideas, a case study is presented of the successful negotiations in Canada between the Edmonton Oilers of the National Hockey League and the City of Edmonton to build a new downtown arena.
Keywords
In an effort to improve quality of life and attract labour and business investment in service-based economies, cities of all sizes throughout the world have struggled to compete with one another (Hannigan, 1998). Civic leaders have sought to attract inflows of capital and labour by increasing the number of entertainment, cultural and leisure amenities, specifically through the construction of sports facilities and hosting of mega-events such as the Olympics (Harvey, 2006; Nelson, 2002).
For over six decades, municipal governments have regularly committed public funds for the construction of new, or the renovation and maintenance of older, major league sport venues. The rationale behind these decisions is that doing so creates a variety of economic, urban development and cultural opportunities and benefits for city centers (Barghchi et al., 2009; Coates, 2007; Long, 2013; Seifried and Clopton, 2013) . There is considerable evidence of the use of public funds in recent decades as a result of reviews of construction costs indicating that the levels of public investment and debt were in the tens of billions of dollars for the creation or maintenance of state-of-the-art venues (Frey, 2011; Long, 2005). Seifried (2010) defined state-of-the-art sport venues as those facilities serving ‘spectators in live and remote attendance with the greatest spectacle possible’ through ‘creative entertainment, comfort, and technological advances’ (Seifried, 2010: 67–68). Interviews with community leaders consistently show support for the use of public monies on sport-related state-of-the-art facilities and their accompanying cultural events because they generate a great deal of public and media interest, which also prompts additional urban development projects (Rosentraub and Ijla, 2008). Nelson (2002) added support for this by arguing that sport venues are viewed in many communities as similar to other cultural artefacts and projects such as museums and symphonies because they too act as a ‘critical element of a metropolitan area’s economic and social vitality’ (Nelson, 2002: 98). Others (e.g., Gratton et al., 2005; Pfleegor et al., 2013; Rosentraub, 2008) have also similarly remarked that sport venues help provide opportunities for social engagement and redevelop the image and infrastructure of cities in order to make communities more attractive places in which to live and work.
Despite this history of facility construction, there is a growing awareness that the halcyon days of public funding for massive sport stadium construction projects are gradually ending (Seifried and Clopton, 2013; Tutka and Seifried, 2015). Over the past few years it has become increasingly uncommon for municipalities to shoulder the entire burden, particularly with regard to finance, of the construction project. What is more common is a shared approach to mega projects where the team owner(s) enter into a partnership with one or more levels of government to fund the project. Whilst these Private–Public Partnerships (PPPs) are more palatable, even this approach often faces stiff opposition and can, in some cases, lead to delays or even the complete elimination of the project (Tutka and Seifried, 2015).
With this in mind, we explore why some state-of-the-art projects are initiated and eventually completed while others are stymied and never leave the drawing board. Our position is that one of the key differences between individual PPPs is that those which succeeded have been successfully characterized as a specific type of partnership whereby both the municipality and the private business share the risk of the project equally. To explore this idea we draw on the management concepts of ‘work’ (e.g., institutional work, identity work, dirty work) which provide for descriptions of the activities and, in many cases, the rhetorical actions with which individuals engage in order to accomplish specific goals such as creating, disrupting or maintaining institutional arrangements (e.g., Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 2009) or producing a specific individual identity for a particular context (e.g., Beech et al., 2008; Creed et al., 2011; Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003).
We also propose that the successful completion of large, state-of-the-art projects requires not only specific forms of work but also designated individuals, ‘partnership coordinators’ who we define as ‘
Our argument is that because partnership coordinators are deeply embedded in their community and with the PPP this provides them with inherent advantages such as an understanding of the community history, available resources, access to key stakeholders and private information, and an emotional attachment to the community and its citizens (Dahl and Sorenson, 2009). These individuals are also keenly aware of how the political process works and how to access and manoeuver through the steps needed to ensure the project ends successfully. These advantages are essential for the successful completion of projects of this size, length and potential legacy.
What is still unknown, however, is how partnership coordinators help at different stages of the project to ensure acceptance of the terms of the deal and, eventually, the completion of the project. To address this shortcoming we will examine how these individuals work rhetorically to enhance the perception of the PPP in order to justify the proposed construction. Thus, our key question is: ‘How do partnership coordinators work rhetorically during stadium construction projects to ensure initiation and completion of PPP’s?’.
We suggest that our paper makes two contributions to the current literature on stadium construction and private–public partnerships. The first is that we develop further the current literature that has explored the language used during debates about stadiums. Our approach differs, however, in that the focus of our concern is on the strategic ways that specific actor(s) (i.e., partnership coordinators) construct and create a particular view of a private–public partnership. This approach is different from that reported in the existing literature on rhetorical framing (e.g., Buist and Mason, 2010; Mason, 2010; Norman et al., 2015; Sapotichne, 2012) because we do not focus on a descriptive account of the negotiations but, rather, we identify the mechanisms and factors that contribute to the processes which enable PPPs to be accepted and supported.
Our second contribution is the idea of exploring the rhetorical work needed to manage PPPs in the context of stadium construction. In particular, we argue that partnership coordinators are highly skilled at reading and engaging with the civic environment in a way that enhances their chances of managing the perception of the PPP, the reasons for the partnership, the benefits it provides and, specifically, to whom the benefits accrue. In so doing their actions are essential to managing how the partnership is perceived and, therefore, why this arrangement is beneficial to all those involved.
To address our research question we present a single case study of a project that is currently under construction: work commenced in March 2014 and is expected to be completed for the 2016–2017 NHL season. The Katz Group, an organization operated by the owner of the National Hockey League’s (NHL) Edmonton Oilers, negotiated a PPP with the City of Edmonton to construct this new downtown multi-purpose arena. We use the newspaper accounts from the city’s largest-circulation newspaper, about the negotiations to enter into this arrangement, to illustrate this project as a successful example of how a particular partnership coordinator was essential throughout the negotiation process. Further, we highlight how rhetorical work helped ensure the successful completion of the negotiations.
In the following sections we first outline the current research on stadium negotiation and construction. This is followed by a discussion of our theoretical position and an overview of the history of the Edmonton Oilers and the importance of the team to the city. This is followed by the presentation of our methods and our analysis of the key aspects of the negotiation process. We conclude with a discussion of rhetorical work and a key strategy used by partnership coordinators to facilitate and manage the perception of a PPP.
Stadium negotiation and construction
Negotiating, planning, and constructing stadiums and arenas is a global business. Greenberg and Hughes, Jr. (2011) estimated that professional sport construction expenditures exceeded US$16 billion between 2003 and 2011. Furthermore, Propheter and Hatch (2014) stated that close to US$1 billion is provided annually in facility subsidies from professional sports. Most often the owner of a sports team, whose organization will occupy the building upon completion, champions these projects (Tutka and Seifried, 2015). These owners explain how a completed arena will add to the municipal landscape and how this will have a transformative effect on citizens and visitors alike. As an example, Greenberg (2004) argued that such facility districts with state-of-the-art venues would not only provide a lucrative revenue stream for owners but would also assist and improve community bottom lines and cultural attractiveness.
However, because it is difficult to articulate with clarity that mega-projects have tangible, economic benefits to a city, there has been a shift in how stadium/arena projects are portrayed (Buist and Mason, 2010). Currently, the most commonly used approach is predicated on the idea that these projects, and the attendant construction that follows them, enhance the image and value of the city through a variety of intangible benefits. Barghchi et al. (2009) and Rosentraub and Ijla (2008) each suggested that positive, intangible public goods or benefits result from the events or activities within the facilities. Examples of intangible benefits might include (a) improved health for community participants; (b) enhanced opinion of the local government decision-making practices; and (c) the realization of social goals such as regeneration, improved civic pride and increased psychic income (Barghchi et al., 2009; Walton et al., 2007). This shift in approach builds on the idea of civic legacy and how the stadium/arena contributes a larger civic project (Buist and Mason, 2010).
This approach has been used successfully in a number of cities across North America. Two stellar examples have been those in Los Angeles, CA and Columbus, OH. In both cities the owners of the local sports franchises successfully argued that the construction of a new arena (e.g., Nationwide Arena in Columbus and The Staples Centre in Los Angeles) would be the focal point and the catalyst for development in a particular area of the city (Rosentraub, 2014). In these two instances, the evidence appears to indicate that these projects have been successful and the areas where the arenas were constructed have shown new signs of life. Moreover, Wood and Thomas (2006) positioned sport facilities as social anchors for communities and franchise fan nations (Foster and Hyatt, 2008) because of the events and activities associated with their completion (i.e., either directly within the venue or resulting from the venue’s presence).
However, despite the successes in promoting these perspectives, there have been other examples where the proposed development of an arena district has proven less successful and, in some cases, damaging to the municipality. For instance, in Glendale, AZ, a suburb outside Phoenix, the city council decided to build both an arena and a stadium to lure the professional sports teams located in Phoenix away from the city, as a way to enhance the image of the municipality and grow the economy. This strategy has had limited success. Specifically, the city has continued to make concessions to, in particular, the NHL’s Arizona Coyotes, because of the inability of the team to draw local supporters. There are other cases (e.g., Brooklyn) where similar plans to redevelop a civic area have failed and have had a negatively effect on the city, despite claims to the contrary. Other negative external factors regarding stadium construction involve the threat of relocation and the paying down of the likely large public debt. The threat to relocate sport franchises by team owners has regularly pushed communities to accept stadium bonds and to make their associated debt payments over 20 to 30 years (Seifried and Clopton, 2013). Poor facility designs and locations have corresponded to the razing of some venues still possessing debt, while abandonment raises questions about what to do with the less revenue-capable old facilities (Pfleegor et al., 2013; Seifried and Clopton, 2013).
What these contrasting examples indicate is that mega-projects are risky propositions despite the claims of owners who suggest otherwise. Moreover, decisions to enter into these arrangements now face increased scrutiny and examination from citizens who demand that these projects benefit the city as a whole and not just a small group of elites or fans. However, despite this increased scrutiny and numerous examples of failed projects, municipalities continue to enter into agreements to fund the construction of mega-projects. The question then is, why do some municipalities agree to fund and build mega-project while others do not?
Private–public partnerships
Although the owners of major league teams are unabashed cheerleaders for and champions of their projects and the virtues they provide, few are willing to undertake and accept the entire risk of the construction. As Carey and Mason (2014) stated, ‘…municipal governments have struggled with the dilemma of addressing private sector and other pressures for new facilities, while balancing public concerns over funding and civic priorities’ (Carey and Mason, 2014: 105). A common approach in the North American market has therefore been for teams and organizations to partner with municipalities and other private businesses to offset the cost of these facilities (Crompton et al., 2003; Long, 2013). Broadly defined, a public–private partnership (PPP) is “… a formal or informal arrangement between a city and one or more private firms where all participants share in the financial risk, and the benefits that accrue to each partner are dependent on the success of the other partners” (Bland and Overton, 2014: 2). This partnership is motivated by the desire to generate surplus value, defined as those ‘policy outcomes that exceed what would have been obtained in the absence of the collaborative arrangement’ (Bland and Overton, 2014: 2). The details differ for each facility project; however, a typical approach is for the municipality and the owner to be responsible for an agreed percentage each of the construction costs.
Because of the relative newness and the varied goals of PPPs, some scholars have asked what is actually meant by the term ‘partnership’ in this context. Although PPPs are typically presented as an agreement between two equal parties, how the partnership is perceived can make it appear that one party, particularly the municipality, is being taken advantage of by its business partner. Specifically, Linder (1999) has identified six distinct ways in which the term ‘partnership’ is used when discussing PPPs. These ‘grammars’, identified by Linder, present partnerships as: (1) management reform; (2) problem conversion; (3) moral regeneration; (4) risk shifting; (5) restructuring public service; and 6) power sharing. Each ‘grammar’ represents a different use of the term in the context of the partnership.
Furthermore, each distinct usage ‘conveys an understanding of their intended purpose and significance’ and ‘invokes certain premises about what the relevant problems are to be solved and how best to solve them’ (Linder, 1999: 41). Also of interest is that Linder (1999) identifies instances whereby the term ‘partnership’ is used when presenting and discussing a PPP, although this does not accurately explain the current arrangement between the city and its business partner. The term ‘partnership’ is used as a Trojan horse for businesses, ‘as a euphemism for privatizing the functions of government’ (Linder, 1999: 49).
Because there is the possibility that PPPs might be predicated upon or evolve into arrangements that are perceived to be unequal, we argue that many PPPs are subject to criticism. This criticism rests upon scepticism about the motives of the business for entering into this type of agreement with government. The critics of this type of agreement point out that the benefits of these arrangements are highly weighted in favour of the franchise owner/tenant and are not in the best interests of the municipality (Pfleegor et al., 2013; Propheter and Hatch, 2014; Seifried and Clopton, 2013; Tutka and Seifried, 2015). For instance, one argument in favour of the municipalities sharing the costs of mega-projects has been that there will be substantial economic benefits associated with the arena and stadium construction. However, most economic studies have demonstrated that new stadium/arena construction provides little to no economic benefits (Coates and Humphreys, 2008). Moreover, as is also noted by critics, the decision by a municipality to partner in building a new mega-project is fraught with opportunity costs that are not always captured on a balance sheet. So, for some, the decision to build a stadium means that there will not be an investment in projects such as public transportation, parks or other community services.
PPPs therefore face greater scrutiny and are subject to increasing scepticism about both the economic and intangible benefits of these arrangements. Despite these challenges, however, PPPs continue to be advanced as viable options and implemented by municipalities around the world. What factors contribute to the successful initiation and completion of PPPs?
Rhetorical work
Recently there has been recognition in management scholarship that people and their actions have, largely, been ignored (Suddaby, 2010). Organizations and institutions were thought to be largely responsible for specific actions and, as a result, little attention was paid to the actions and activities of individuals. People were an afterthought when explaining individual behaviour. The erasure of people from the management literature precipitated a resurgence in the study of individual micro-practices (Gray et al., 2015). Predominantly these investigations investigate the ‘work’ (Phillips and Lawrence, 2012) or the various actions of people that were purposeful or not in the service of achieving a particular goal. This interest in work has been discussed in the context of identity construction, of occupying work roles that are considered ‘dirty’ (Ashforth, 1999) and in discussions of how institutions are created, maintained and/or disrupted (Lawrence et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2013; Rojas, 2010). In all, a focus on ‘work’ has brought the person back into social research.
One particular form of work is rhetorical (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). To accomplish their goals people need to persuade others. This is accomplished by the skilful use of language to elicit the help they need (e.g., Ice, 1991; Jones and Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Mueller et al., 2004). This work has been identified as important in situations where people interact with others to build greater or lesser support. Rhetorical work is thus particularly suited to building consensus or presenting a particular version or rendition of a topic or series of events.
There have been few discussions about the use of rhetoric in PPPs; however, rhetoric has been examined in debates about stadium construction (i.e., Sapotichne, 2012). Most commonly these studies dealt with how the people in positions of power ‘framed’ the issue in a particular way (Buist and Mason, 2010; Mason, 2010). These studies suggest that the individuals who were particularly adept at framing issues were successful at having their position adopted.
Recent research into public policy suggests that rhetorically framing an issue might not be the only reason why particular views or positions are accepted and adopted. Also of importance is the willingness of individuals to engage and debate an issue. In her study of the 1993 debate about US health care reform, Jerit (2008) found that framing an issue was limited, and that engaging with criticism and negative views of an issue helps persuade others. Engaging with one’s critics is important because ‘proponents seemed to benefit from direct engagement with the opponent rather than from strategic redefinition of the issue’ (Jerit, 2008: 15). As such, the ability of proponents to debate directly and question negative critiques is an important strategy which, Jerit argued, often sways individuals to support or oppose an issue.
With the above in mind, we argue that the successful negotiation of a PPP to construct a state-of the-art facility with public monies requires a partnership coordinator who is rhetorically skilled in engaging and debating with opponents. In the following sections we explore how a particular partnership coordinator helped ensure the successful negotiation of a state-of-the-art facility.
Empirical example
To illustrate our discussion of the rhetorical work of partnership coordinators we present a case study of a recent example where a mega-project was jointly funded by a municipality and the owner of a professional sport organization. Our objective is to highlight the rhetoric that a particular partnership coordinator used, in order to emphasize the importance of the PPP to the city, by engaging directly with critics of the project.
The case at hand is of the negotiation between the Edmonton Oilers, a professional ice-hockey team in the NHL, and the City of Edmonton, the municipality where the city plays its home games. The negotiations took place over a three-year period and ended with the City and the owner of the Oilers, billionaire Darryl Katz, agreeing to jointly share the costs associated with building a multi-purpose arena in the City’s downtown. Although the City and the Oilers eventually came to an agreement about the funding arrangement to be put in place, there were times when questions were asked about whether the new construction was prudent or necessary. In the sections that follow, we provide a narrative account of some of the various key events and identify a particular partnership coordinator who contributed to the agreement to construct the arena.
Background
The Edmonton Oilers are a franchise in the NHL and have been since entering the league in 1979 as an expansion franchise. The team experienced a high level of success upon entering the league, winning the Stanley Cup – the championship trophy awarded annually to the National Hockey League playoff winner – five times in the first nine seasons of the team’s presence in the league. This unprecedented success, led by Hall of Fame players such as Wayne Gretzky and Mark Messier, has caused some pundits to call the Oilers of this time one of the NHL’s greatest, hockey dynasties.
It was just after this period of success that Canadian franchises in the NHL began to experience substantial economic pressure arising from currency imbalances between the Canadian and American dollars. Because player salaries are paid in US dollars, a weak Canadian dollar meant that Canadian franchises were at a disadvantage despite the national popularity of the sport. In particular, Canadian teams in smaller civic centres such as Edmonton, Calgary, Quebec City and Winnipeg were unable to recoup their costs because of smaller fan bases and fewer revenue streams. For the Oilers, this meant that a team once the best in the league became, in a few short years, one of the worst teams in the league.
The team’s precipitous fall was exacerbated by questions about the ownership of the team. The Oilers were owned by millionaire Peter Pocklington, who, soon after declaring bankruptcy, sold the team to a group of local investors. The sale process was also fraught with drama in that the local investors had to counter an offer from another buyer who planned to move the team to Houston. The process concluded with a group of nearly 50 local business people owning and operating the team for almost ten years, with various degrees of financial and team success.
The current owner of the team, Darryl Katz, purchased the team in 2006 from the local investors for CAD $200 million. Katz, a billionaire who made his fortune operating a chain of drug stores, grew up in Edmonton and was a fan of the team when they were successful and a friend of many of the players on those teams. When he purchased the team he expressed his goal of building a winning team in Edmonton. In addition, soon after purchasing the team Katz expressed his interest in constructing a new arena in downtown Edmonton on land that was then undeveloped or under-developed.
Method
To conduct our analysis we develop a case study around the three-year public negotiation process between the Katz Group, Darryl Katz’s business organization, and the City of Edmonton. Our goal is to revisit the negotiations as they played out in public, in an attempt to illuminate a key rhetorical strategy used by a particular partnership coordinator.
Eisenhardt and Graebner defined the case study as ‘rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 25). Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) highlighted the usefulness of case studies to research contemporary phenomena and resolve problems that occur in real-life. Baxter and Jack (2008) suggested this is possible because ‘…rigorous case studies afford researchers opportunities to explore or describe a phenomenon in context…It allows the researcher to explore individuals or organizations…’ (Baxter and Jack, 2008: 544).
The type of case study chosen for this research effort was descriptive. The descriptive case study has been described by Yin (2003) as research designed to organize information about a specific question (e.g., rhetorical work of partnership coordinators in stadium/arena debates) and detail the context in which this occurs. We make use of the descriptive case study because it also generates opportunities to provide instrumental explanations with regard to resolving this issue
The data that we used for the case were collected from the
Our search produced 549 articles. The authors read the articles and initially sought to develop a timeline of what happened in the negotiations, and who the key actors involved with the negotiations were. After we established the timeline and players we returned to the articles and looked at what each of the actors said and at what stage of the negotiation process. Our intention was to identify the key actions of important actors in order then to identify who might be regarded as an institutional facilitator and how they were able to persuade others that the arena project was valuable.
To achieve this goal, we used a content analysis. According to Krippendorff (2004) a content analysis is a research method that compels ‘…a systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter, not necessarily from an author’s or user’s perspective’ (Krippendorff, 2004: 3). We used our content analysis for summarizing, as Riffe et al., (2005) argued was appropriate and consistent with other research on media content. Furthermore, as Riffe et al. (2005) explained, the qualitative themes emerging from ‘typical patterns and characteristics’ helped us understand the relationships and behaviours of individual actors (i.e., an idiographic approach). Neuendorf (2002) argued that recognition of qualitative themes can be facilitated by quantitative efforts to compile and categorize information; moreover, this ‘nomothetic approach’ remains consistent with other scientific methods (Neuendorf, 2002: 15). The researchers served as the primary coders and experienced a high level of agreement exceeding the threshold (i.e., 80%) established by Tan (1985).
We used historical institutionalism as a lens to create the outline and timeline to support both a nomothetic and idiographic approach. Fioretos (2011) has defined historical institutionalism as a perspective that wishes to uncover the foundation of ideas and events and their impact on the status quo. Historical institutionalism emphasizes that behaviour is a ‘function of preferences informed by point-to-point comparisons; that is individuals are thought to balance evaluations of the costs and benefits of adapting to new circumstances with the costs and benefits of maintaining or losing their investments in past arrangements’ (Fioretos, 2011: 373). It is also particularly suitable for building timelines and outlines for both idiographic and nomothetic approaches, because it requires attention to the timing and sequence of events and the effect a changing environment has on institutional actors.
Last, we present our assumption that the institution (i.e., municipality) is like other organizations in that it comprises ‘more-or-less, taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviour that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order’ (Greenwood et al., 2008: 4–5). Again, our view using historical institutionalism locates the municipality as historically dependent on the surrounding environment and the competing organizational and/or individual self-interests within an area to produce selected planned outcomes (Pierson, 2004; Scott, 2008). In this instance the individual preferences of local entrepreneurs and municipal leaders to use large institutional projects to improve quality of life, attract labour and business to a city, and maintain or create a competitive advantage may result from constraints of the institution, because the municipality, as an institution, is constrained by rules, policies and norms resulting from those in the local environment (Pierson, 2004; Scott, 2008).
Results
In our analysis of the articles we found that one individual stood out as a partnership coordinator in the negotiation process, the Mayor of the City of Edmonton during the negotiation, Stephen Mandel. Mandel’s position as Mayor afforded him the role and the opportunity to play a significant part in the negotiation process by engaging critics of the project in public debate through the media. We explore below a particular form of rhetorical work that occurred consistently throughout the negotiation process.
Engaging rhetorical work
Throughout the three years’ worth of data we analyzed, it was clear that Mandel’s intended goal was a successful conclusion of the negotiations, which would lead to the construction of a new, downtown arena. To meet this objective he had to demonstrate that the project was more than corporate welfare and a handout to a billionaire owner.
The primary rhetorical work used by Mandel to engage the critics of the project was a strategy of
Mandel most commonly contrasted the difference between the current state of the downtown city core and the proposed, new redeveloped downtown. By providing stark contrasts between what people could see in the downtown core with an enhanced vision for the future, Mandel explained how the only way to redevelop the downtown was by constructing the arena with the help of the Katz Group. For example, in his April 2011 ‘State of the City’ speech and follow-up conversation with the Editorial Board of the We sat as a city that did nothing to create opportunity for people. The time has come for us to be competitive, to build the kind of city that will have my children come back here because they see this as a place of the future. (Staples, 2011b)
He then follows this statement up by saying, In my mind I don’t know how else we develop our downtown. I’ve driven by that damn piece of property an unending number of times and it’s still vacant. I’ve been here almost 40 years. (Staples, 2011b)
As evident in the above quotations, Mandel is contrasting the future of the downtown development with the then current, underdeveloped state of the city. He talks about the past and how ‘…we sat as a city that did nothing to create opportunity’, which is contrasted with the statement about the city as ‘…a place of the future’. In addition, as the negotiations progressed he would talk about how the downtown ‘…sorely needs an evolutionary project that’s going to make a change to our city’ (MacKinnon, 2012). Finally, when the deal was agreed, Mandel stated, ‘…we will se an incredible development downtown that will change the face of the city’ (Gordon, 2013). The stark contrast made between a current, uncompetitive city and a city of the future demonstrates the importance of the arena as the main, if not the only, way to turn the city into a place where people would want to live and work. Mandel, as the partnership coordinator, shows how those who opposed the project could be construed as supporting the current state of the city, with its dilapidated and underdeveloped core. He engaged with the critics of the project by arguing for a new, redeveloped downtown that would make the city a ‘world-class entertainment and sports district’ (MacKinnon, 2010).
This deft and important strategy of comparing is frequently employed throughout the negotiation process. Although many other individuals and group also discuss the arena and the pros and cons of the possible construction, Mandel is adept at demonstrating and reassuring the citizens of the city that constructing the arena is in their best interests, and that the proposed partnership between the City and the Katz Group was necessary to spread the risk of the project. For example, when a deal to construct the arena was first announced Mandel called it ‘the start of a dream come true to rebuild our downtown’ (Gordon, 2011a). Furthermore, when the first drawings of the arena were released Mandel said that, Our arena will be Edmonton’s arena and it will have the kind of ingredients that will make Edmonton successful. This is not about the Katz Group. This is about the City of Edmonton co-operatively with its tenant to make sure its successful for everybody. (Stolte, 2012)
The Mayor refers to the arena as ‘Our’ and is clear that the project is not solely for the benefit of the Katz Group, that the construction is a partnership between the two groups. Use of the arena and its benefits are presented as being for Edmontonians. It is important to recognize the strategic contrast between constructing a state-of-the-art facility for a billionaire and building a new, public use facility. By addressing the opponents of the project Mandel was able to indicate rhetorically that partnering with Katz was necessary in order to redevelop the downtown core of the city. This approach defused the criticism that the arena would only benefit Katz and the Oilers. In other words, Mandel’s rhetorical actions showed how the risk for constructing the arena was shared, thus making the new building an asset for all the citizens of Edmonton, not just Daryl Katz.
Another important aspect of the negotiations was the implied notion that without the new arena the Edmonton Oilers would be economically disadvantaged and that to be competitive the team would have to leave the city. However, at the time of the arena negotiations, Edmonton was considered one of the strongest markets in the NHL. Mandel thus took another approach to engage opponents of the project. He chose not to argue, as many had in the past, that Edmonton was a poor hockey market. Instead, Mandel argued that the arena the team played in – Rexall Place – was inadequate (i.e., was not state-of-the-art) for a team in a world-class city. He did so by contrasting the current state of Rexall Place with the aspirations of the city and how the image of the city would be diminished by the loss of the team. In one exchange he stated clearly that Rexall place was ‘unrenovatable’ [sic] and that ‘either we build a new arena or we become a second-class city, which we don’t want to be’ (Staples, 2011a). Once again, by directly addressing the criticism that was circulating in the public discourse about the need for and the risks of the project, Mandel was able to diffuse much of the opposition.
Another way in which Mandel acted as a partnership coordinator was by contrasting the potential aesthetics of the arena and how it was essential to build something of iconic status. At the outset of the negotiations Mandel made it clear that he supported the Katz Group and their vision for the building to be ‘grand’. He did so by engaging critics who suggested that the cost of the building might escalate because of design choices made by the Katz Group. Mandel was adamant that there would be no tolerance for a building that did not improve the aesthetics of the downtown core. He said, in one interview, Let’s be fair. A guy’s going to put $100 million into an arena and $100 million in the property beside, he’s not going to design two pickles and a hot dog. They’re going to design something of substance. (Gordon, 2011b)
In addition, when the designs for the arena were released he stated that it was important that the arena, and the buildings that were being proposed as part of the downtown redevelopment, added value to the city. He said, ‘I don’t want to build a piece of (crap) either. This is going to be standing for 40 years. I don’t want to drive by something that looks like a piece of garbage’(MacKinnon, 2012). Later in the negotiations he also offered another aesthetic contrast by suggesting that he and the city councilors understood that it was important to fund and construct a building that would anchor the downtown. As he said, ‘People shouldn’t be silly to think council wouldn’t have the courage to finalize a deal to build a great facility for a few dollars…It’s about building a great city’ (Stolte and O’Donnell, 2012).
When Mandel contrasted the potential ‘crap’ construction with a possible iconic design and contrasted an old, ‘unrenovateable’ Rexall Place with the new arena, he was once again working rhetorically by engaging the opponents of the project. By comparing current and future states of the city he demonstrated how important it was to partner with the Katz Group to construct the downtown arena. In these two instances, the strategy of contrasting once again brings to light the issue of what Edmonton might look like without the new arena. Moreover, he demonstrated that, despite potential criticisms that the Katz Group would take advantage of the City, it was necessary to agree to a PPP to ensure the project was completed and that the risk associated with the project was shared equally.
Discussion
At times the negotiations between the City of Edmonton and the Katz Group appeared to be close to collapsing, only to be resurrected and saved at the last moment despite what appeared, at times, to be deliberate attempts by Darryl Katz to scuttle the deal because of mishaps and clumsy negotiating tactics. In other words, the successful negotiation of a deal to construct an arena in Edmonton succeeded in spite of the efforts of detractors and supporters alike.
In this case study we have shown that the negotiations to enter into a PPP to construct a new arena in Edmonton were ultimately successful because of the efforts of a particular partnership coordinator. During the prolonged, contentious, bombastic and, often, surreal negotiations, Stephen Mandel, the Mayor of Edmonton, proved to be a key player who, by engaging the project’s opponents, helped shape the way the PPP was perceived.
What, then, does this tell us about how the PPP eventually came to fruition? In particular, it was clear from the outset that there was a concerted effort by a specific individual to ensure that the negotiations succeeded. We have demonstrated and explained how that individual, the Mayor, played the key role of partnership coordinator by actively debating the challenges made by various detractors of the proposed partnership. The decision to engage opponents by showing what their opposition would entail was essential in demonstrating that the economic and social value of the arena was not to be accrued solely by Darryl Katz or the Edmonton Oilers. In fact, Mandel’s skilful rhetorical work showed that the construction of the arena had to be completed by means of a partnership with Katz and the City.
This latter point is further reinforced by a specific rhetorical strategy that Mandel used to describe the project and what it meant to the city. Mandel was rhetorically skilled at contrasting the current state of the city with the possible benefits that could come to the city in the future. The most common and stark example of this was the way that Mandel juxtaposed the perception of Edmonton as a second-class city with the future image of the city with the arena. By contrasting a revitalized and reconstructed city with the current, undeveloped, arena-less downtown, Mandel was able to diffuse any suggestion that the project was only in the best interests of Katz, and not those also of the general public. The process of starkly contrasting the current representation of Edmonton with the future, wildly aspirational, image of the city was skilful rhetorical work that helped shape how the construction was perceived.
Another way Mandel coordinated the negotiations was to demonstrate that there were some outcomes that were unacceptable. Specifically, he was able to show how it was untenable for any consideration to be given to renovating Rexall Place, the Oilers’ current arena. Mandel was able to engage the critics from different groups and express the view that there was almost no value to be gained by having the Oilers play their games in the current arena. This strategy was particularly important because of the presence of Edmonton Northlands, an organization with sizeable economic and political resources. The Mayor’s ability to counter and dismiss the challenges brought forth by Northlands served to show that the new downtown arena was the only viable option for the City and the Oilers. Painting a picture of Rexall Place as outdated, archaic and rundown was important because it restricted the number of possible choices that were open to the negotiating teams, and demonstrated the need for the PPP as a way to defray risk and complete the project.
These results are important because they demonstrate that the chances of a successful negotiation to construct a large public project, such as a stadium or arena, can be greatly enhanced by the presence of a partnership coordinator. Such individuals help expedite the negotiation process by challenging critics and demonstrating the importance of the PPP to the construction process. In our case, we have shown how Stephen Mandel, someone who was skilled at engaging the project’s critics rhetorically, was able to help the negotiation process reach fruition.
Past discussions about the virtues of constructing mega-projects with public money have been plagued by debates focused on the economic impact of a particular project. As most economists have shown, this was a losing proposition because, arguably, these projects contributed little to the economic well-being of a city (Coates and Humphreys, 2008). There has been a shift in the debate, to a discussion of the other possible benefits of mega-projects. Nevertheless, there is still resistance to the idea of public monies being used to help support billionaires increase their net worth. Our case study has shown that resistance to private–public mega-projects can be overcome if a partnership coordinator is able to minimize the criticisms aimed at the project by using a specific strategy of engagement by comparing and, particularly, contrasting the current and future options. Although we cannot state definitively that the arena negotiations would not have succeeded without Mandel’s efforts, the evidence suggests that his rhetorical efforts helped facilitate the process when an agreement appeared to be in jeopardy.
In practical terms, we suggest that our findings have two main implications for future PPP negotiations. The first is that it seems prudent to have someone involved with the process, but not directly involved with the formal negotiations, take on the role of partnership coordinator. In this instance it was Mandel who played that role, but it need not have been the Mayor. We speculate that other individuals, whether from the city or another, independent organization, could have stepped in to explain how the partnership was necessary to defray the risk and complete the project. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the response to key criticisms had to come from someone perceived to be neutral to the entire process. Mandel was regarded as having the best interests of the city in mind during the negotiations. This added to his credibility and helped legitimize the counter arguments he presented to neutralize critics of the project. This suggests that a supposedly-neutral partnership coordinator – which in the case of Mandel was clearly not how he acted – could be of value in other situations where critics question the importance and fairness of a PPP.
A second practical implication of our work is that engaging rhetorical work, as opposed to merely framing, is an effective strategy for diffusing opposition to a proposed PPP. Mandel was a supporter of the negotiation process and was clearly in favour of the project succeeding. Nevertheless, there were those on the City council who opposed the project and other key stakeholders who did not wholeheartedly support the negotiations. Why were these individuals not able to gain traction in the negotiations and in the public debate? We believe that it was because others on council were not as willing to challenge the Mayor’s vision of the city with a completed arena. If these stakeholders had been able to engage with Mandel’s representations of the current state of the city, to demonstrate that this was inaccurate and exaggerated, it is perhaps possible that their objections to the project might have had more salience and traction. Our case suggests that past reliance on framing an issue in a particular light is not necessarily the only, or most effective, form of rhetorical work when negotiating or implementing large scale PPPs. These findings also seem to indicate that engagement might be an effective strategy for groups that oppose a particular PPP. Future research could look at different situations where both sides actively engaged each other in debate on an issue. This would then provide some indication as to whether there are different, and possibly more effective, forms of rhetorical work that can be use to engage one’s critics.
We would be remiss if we did not note some of the limitations of our analysis and evaluation of the case. The first is that we were not part of the actual negotiation processes. The negotiations were all conducted behind closed doors and we were not privy to the discussions. Nevertheless, we are confident that important aspects of the negotiations were brought forth and presented publicly because the negotiations were conducted with a public body. Further, although we may have missed some nuance in the discussions, our analysis is focused more on the rhetorical work of the partnership coordinator and how this affected the negotiation process which ultimately demonstrated that a PPP was needed to complete the project. We cannot state definitively that the deal would not have been sealed without the work of the Mayor; however our feeling is that these negotiations would have been even more difficult and contentious without the skilful actions of the Mayor as a partnership coordinator.
Finally, because we are drawing conclusions on a single case study there might be some question as to the applicability of our findings to other negotiations. In addition, the city of Edmonton, as an ‘arriviste’ city (Scherer and Davidson, 2010), was in a unique position compared to other cities in Canada and the USA and this needs to be taken into consideration. The city was facing unprecedented economic and population growth (Management, 2014) throughout the negotiations. These factors suggest that the role of the partnership coordinator might have been relevant to Edmonton but would not to other cities that are in the midst of their own negotiations to construct a state-of-the-art facility.
Conclusions
The decision to fund, build or renovate a state-of-the-art facility is one that many municipalities currently face, or will face in the future. Because of their financial scale, it is important to recognize that economic arguments in favour of these projects no longer have the same rhetorical weight as they once did. Of greater importance is the ability to counter key criticisms as they arise by demonstrating why it is believed that such projects are necessary and how they can be completed.
However, this is not an easy process and is one that can be easily disrupted. As such, our study has shown that a partnership coordinator, an individual with the skills to help the negotiation process through to a successful end, is an important person to involve in discussions about large-scale projects. Such individuals have the ability to defuse and defray most criticisms while continuing to emphasize the importance of the project and the need for a PPP arrangement. As economic arguments in favour of arena and stadium become ever more difficult to justify, enlisting the aid of key actors in the negotiation and partnership process appears to be a sound, strategic tactic that could ultimately ensure the initiation and timely completion of these projects.
Footnotes
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
References
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