The right to information or data sovereignty? Sending unsolicited messages to Russians about the war in Ukraine

Abstract

The Russian government's narrative about the Russia-Ukraine war has raised concerns about disinformation, fake news and freedom of information. In response, websites have been developed that allow people across the world to call or send emails and texts with information about the war to individuals based in Russia. To facilitate this person-to-person communication between strangers, automated data processing has been used to collect personal data from the internet and compile it into publicly accessible mailing lists. This side-stepping of consent coupled with the nature of information being transmitted and the motivation behind its transmission poses important questions of an ethical nature: What is an appropriate balance between the data subjects’ right to freedom of information and their right to privacy? Can data processing without the consent of the data subject be justified in certain circumstances? This commentary does not seek to provide definitive answers to these questions, rather it canvases some key issues in the hope of starting further dialogue on the topic.

Introduction

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Russian state media control the discourse power and frame the invasion of Ukraine as a legitimate, ‘special military operation’ to ‘demilitarize and denazify’ Ukraine. NATO's expansion to Russia's borders is also cited as an existential threat that undermines the region's security (Vorobyov, 2022). On 4 March 2022, the Kremlin promulgated a suite of laws ¹ that prohibit the dissemination of ‘unreliable information’ about Russian Armed Forces’ and other state bodies’ operations abroad. For example, calling the conflict a ‘war’ or an ‘invasion’ is seen as undermining the national interest (Troianovski and Safronova, 2022). Contradicting official stories about the invasion can result in a prison sentence of up to 15 years (Sauer, 2022). Since March 2022, independent news outlets have either withdrawn from Russia or been shut down (Paul, 2022). This extended existing censorship of news and social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram (Glazunova, 2022). In Russia, the Internet is regulated by the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (i.e. RKN, Roskomnadzor). Certain content is intercepted or blocked by the platform/server provider which influences and shapes the ‘reality’ that is understood by the Russian population (Maréchal, 2017).

State control over Internet content in Russia has raised concerns about people's access to websites and diverse information (Ermoshina et al., 2022; Glazunova, 2022). To break through the Kremlin's wall of censorship and provide Russian citizens with alternative perspectives on the conflict in Ukraine message-sending websites were created enabling anyone to call (e.g. CallRussia.org), email (e.g. mail2ru.org), or text (e.g. 1920.in) Russians about the ongoing war in Ukraine. These platforms harness the power of ‘big data’ readily available on the Internet and crowd-sourced activism (Karlsrud, 2014). Web scraping was used to collect the publicly available contact details of individuals the purpose of creating mailing lists of people likely to be based in Russia. For example, mail2ru.org contains a list of 90 million active email accounts registered in Russia. Anyone can access these mailing lists, and send unsolicited messages to these individuals about the war in Ukraine using the templates provided (see Figure 1). Users can send emails to 100 recipients per hour in Russian, English, or both.

Figure 1.

Sample email template from the website.

This side stepping of consent coupled with the nature of information being transmitted and the motivation behind its transmission brings several human rights into competition with each other. Aspects of the freedom of expression are traded against the right to privacy and informed consent to the use of personal data in a way that leads us to consider: What is an appropriate balance between the data subjects’ right to freedom of information and their right to privacy? Can data processing without the consent of the data subject be justified in certain circumstances? This commentary does not seek to provide definitive answers to these questions, rather it canvases some key issues in the hope of starting further dialogue on the topic. We suggest it is important to work towards a best practice approach that seeks a sound balance between these competing rights when engaging in this kind of ‘networked’ counter-disinformation campaign on sensitive topics such as war, national identity, and public attitudes.

Ethical challenges

Facilitating the right to information or disseminating propaganda?

The stated purpose of these messaging platforms is to ‘bypass Putin's lies and deliver the truth to Russians’ (CallRussia.org), and to ‘send an email to people in Russia … with a few tips for avoiding censorship so they can make up their own mind’ (mail2ru.org). It is intended that the information disseminated is fact-based by showing photos of destroyed hospitals, murdered children, and civilians targeted (Tidy, 2022).

Such language and intent frames these initiatives within a narrative of human rights—specifically the right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression is underpinned by a number of interdependent rationales. Key to this discussion is the ‘truth rationale’ where ‘true opinion’ can be identified, and ‘false ideas’ exposed through criticism—a process facilitated by a free-flowing ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Rolph et al., 2015). In this vein, the Human Rights Commission has noted that freedom of information and expression is not restricted to political information and expression. It:

includes the expression and receipt of communications of every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others, subject to the provisions in article 19, paragraph 3, and article 20. It includes political discourse, commentary on one's own and on public affairs, canvassing, discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic expression, teaching, and religious discourse. It may also include commercial advertising. ² (Italics added).

Framed in this light, these message sending platforms are an accessible means for individuals to assist people living in Russia realise their human rights through the everyday practice or sending and receiving emails. Reaching out through these platforms can thus even be presented as ‘our responsibility and our duty’ (CallRussia.org).

However, being well-intentioned and ‘factual’ does not exclude the messages from being propaganda. Propaganda has been defined as communication ‘that invites us to respond emotionally, emphatically, more or less immediately, and in an either-or manner, emphasizing its capacity to undo more reasoned habits of mind’. (Postman, 1985; Taylor, 2003). Images and descriptions of war are content most people (especially for vulnerable individuals such as the families of Russian soldiers) will find disturbing and respond emotionally to—an issue recognised in the Journalistic Code of ethics of war reporting. ³

Furthermore, when highly individualized actions such as sending an email from a private email account or making a telephone call to an individual in Russia are the central means for information dissemination, it is impossible to ensure that the messages sent adhere to the principles on which the platforms are founded. Participants in socio-political initiatives such as this will be motivated by their own agendas which may include aggressively imposing their own world view on others or carefully curating the information they send with the intent to mobilize recipients in a particular way or even incite hatred against the Russian people.

The consequences of misusing these platforms, intentionally or otherwise, are significant legally and socially. International human rights law prohibits the use of (a) propaganda for war, and (b) advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. The European Council Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia holds that EU member states need to prohibit ‘publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin’. (Fathaigh et al., 2021) ⁴

These messages (implicitly or otherwise) impose Western worldviews on Russian citizens in defining what is ‘true’ or ‘fake’ and what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. When presented with ontologically divergent values (Makarova et al., 2019; Martyanov, 2005), individuals can respond in a number of ways. For some, it may trigger internal dilemmas and challenge fundamental elements of their sense of self. In these circumstances, individuals may create a ‘psychological firewall’ to block these ontologically divergent messages (Nisbet et al., 2017). In other cases, recipients may ignore the message while feeling frustrated at not being able to voice their thoughts (Glazunova, 2022). Others may not know how to constructively react to or evaluate contradicting information (Yum and Schenck-Hamlin, 2005).

Justifiable collection and use of personal data?

As mentioned above, these message sending platforms have used data processing technologies to collect publicly available contact details without the consent of the affected individuals. Including these contact details into mailing lists waives the security, anonymity, and privacy of these individuals. In certain contexts, such practices would go against the industry code of ethics or even the law. The Council of American Survey Research Organizations (CASRO) code of ethics states that researchers must not collect ‘email addresses from public domains’ and use ‘technologies or techniques to collect email addresses without individuals’ awareness’ (Baltes and Diehl, 2016). In 2018, the European Union (EU) issued a new set of regulations to protect personal data against data processing, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The processing of individuals’ data is prohibited unless it is performed in one of the circumstances prescribed for in Article 6 of the GDPR. ⁵ The following circumstances are relevant to the present discussion: with the consent of the data subject; to comply with a legal obligation; to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; to perform a task carried out in the public interest; or the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party.

In the present case, an argument could be made that although consent was not obtained from the data subjects, the data collection and use are protected under the GDPR as it is in their interests to receive information from alternative sources about the war in Ukraine. However, even if this use of personal data is deemed lawful, thought should be given to associated ethical challenges. The information being transmitted may place the data subject at risk of imprisonment (Sauer, 2022), and thus impinging on their right to physical safety. It may be true that message recipients ‘cannot be blamed for messages simply appearing in front of their eyes’, ⁶ however making the decision to use the data subject's details to transmit sensitive information to them must not be taken lightly (Ferreira and Serpa, 2018).

Conclusion: The alternatives?

Sending unsolicited messages to individuals based in Russia is one way to provide them with alternate sources of information about the war in Ukraine. Yet, the ethical challenges accompanying such practices cannot be ignored. To address these challenges, there is a need to brainstorm ‘best practice’ approaches to initiating communication with Russian citizens about the war and censorship.

Our intention is not to judge whether assisting individuals based in Russia to access their human right to ‘a marketplace of information’ justifies the methods used to collect personal data and transmit information ordinarily censored by the Russian government. Instead, we seek to start a discussion on the various ethical considerations that must being accounted for when designing or participating in initiatives such as CallRussia.org, mail2ru.org and 1920.in. We hope such discussions may lead to ethical guidelines to inform participation in such initiatives. In saying this, we do not wish to promote the adoption of standards from other communities—such as the research community—but we think the standards of ethical research and ethical war reporting could serve as a starting point to inspire conversation.

We suggest platform designers might consider ways to reduce opportunities for platform misuse and risks to data subjects. To prevent the dissemination of propaganda or hatred, the platforms could limit users’ ability to edit the range of standardized, factual, non-hateful messages already provided. Considering the rights of data subjects, platforms could develop mechanisms whereby recipients can request the removal of their details from the mailing list and are given the opportunity to ‘opt-in’ before accessing information contained in the message. Further, platforms may utilize the encryption offered through messaging platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp (see Safronova et al., 2022). We note that platforms such as Telegram already play host to myriad channels of competing sources of ‘truth’ about the war in Ukraine (Schechner et al., 2022). Using a platform already the site of an information battlefield would not be without its challenges.

We also encourage platform users (message senders) to look for ways to share information as objectively as possible and consider the welfare of message recipients. Information that is sent should be fact-checked, from varied but reliable sources and not contain ideological or normative judgements that praise or condemn the actions or behaviours of either Russia or Ukraine (Chipidza et al., 2022). Message senders can also include links to legal and social services if recipients find they require support.