Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of interviews, focus groups and workshops with employees in the technical administration in the municipality of Copenhagen in the year after it won a prestigious Smart City award. The administration is interpreted as a ‘most likely’ to succeed in translating the idealised version of the smart city into a workable bureaucratic practice. Drawing on the work of Orlikowski and Gash, the empirical analysis identifies and describes two incongruent ‘technological frames’ that illustrates different ways of making sense of data and the smart city within this single organisational unit. One is called
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Introduction
The concept of the ‘smart city’ has gained traction within academia and urban planning. On one hand, it has spurred dreams of new and more effective modes of urban governance (Harrison et al., 2010). On the other hand, it has been criticised for being yet another neo-liberal utopia blueprint (Hollands, 2008; Zook, 2017), and a form of new public management (Przeybilovicz et al., 2018) that is blind to the urban ecologies in which it is situated (Colding and Barthel, 2017). Even though no standard definition of a smart city exists, projects falling under this category focus on how information and communication technology (ICT) can improve urban governance. Kitchin (2014) argues that such improvements are related either to developments in Big Data and real-time city planning, or to the emergence of the new knowledge economy, in which app development is used to spur innovation.
Proposals for smart-city projects often include images of data-analytics centres, where data across organisational units are cross-fertilised on real-time dashboards (Marvin et al., 2015). Such dashboards have become paradigmatic illustrations of the smart city, as they are believed to empower city planners (and potentially citizens) with new technologies to enhance insight and control (Shelton et al., 2015). Even though they rarely exist in practice, their future existence often is assumed in the literature. For instance, Kitchin (2014: 6) argued that ‘over the next decade, the real-time city is likely to become a reality’. This new reality is believed to afford new modes of governance (Flyverbom et al., 2017) that involve a combination of market-based logics, data-driven evidence and technologies of control. Conversely, critical literature on the smart city has elicited important discussions about, e.g., epistemology of data, the use of data to control populations, links between business and government, and privacy issues. Each of these discussions has challenged important assumptions within the smart-city paradigm and has enriched the debate over what data-driven governance practices could be implemented
However, this paper takes a different analytical route. Rather than critically examine assumptions about data and governance that are explicated in presentations on smart-city strategies, it expands on a suggestion from Shelton et al. (2015) on how to understand the ‘actually existing smart city’. This deliberately contrasts with the idealised – but often unrealised – vision that dominates the social imagination. Whereas the critical deconstruction of this ideal is a good strategy for exposing a certain epistemological and political naiveté across a broad range of smart-city projects, it also risks reifying the smart city. Discussions of the pros and cons of a generic paradigm risk losing track of the way smart-city ideals are situated and integrated into existing constellations of urban governance in specific cities.
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the work involved in turning a smart-city strategy into an actual workable practice in a specific organisational unit. Through interviews with public servants within Copenhagen’s technical administration, the analysis identifies two radically different modes of sense-making around data that challenge the ideal of a smooth translation from ideal to practice. One is called
Drawing on Orlikowski and Gash (1994), these two modes of sense-making are conceptualised as distinct ‘technological frames’ that mobilise different ideas about the nature of data, as well as its proper use in public administration. The paper identifies incongruences between these frames with the purpose of illustrating concrete challenges in translating an existing smart-city strategy into practice even within a single organisational unit in one city. Furthermore, the paper contributes to literature on smart cities by arguing that these discovered incongruences challenge the argument that the smart city is characterised by injecting market logics and evidence-based decision-making into the urban bureaucracy. Rather, the two frames share a perspective on these elements, while interpreting them differently.
Technical administration in Copenhagen
In 2014, the municipality of Copenhagen won the prestigious World Smart Cities Award at the Smart City Expo in Barcelona. The winning project was titled ‘Copenhagen Connect’, and it exhibited many of the aforementioned characteristics of an idealised smart city. It linked the development of ICT to improved urban planning, promoted the use of new forms of sensor data to understand the city and provided a plan to integrate third-party app developers into a newly developed, crowd-sourced market that seeks data-based solutions to problems such as traffic jams. Furthermore, the project was promoted through ideas for a dashboard-equipped ‘control room’, like the one shown in Figure 1.
Dashboard illustrating the potentials of Copenhagen Connect (The picture can be found at https://www.dailyscandinavian.com/copenhagen-connecting/).
After winning the award, Copenhagen Solutions Lab (CSL) – a new unit within the technical administration – was assigned the task of coordinating the realisation of the project. As a new unit within the established system, its employees had to resolve the meaning of
After the award ceremony in Barcelona, I began attending meetings and workshops related to this process. Furthermore, I conducted interviews and focus groups with individuals who either voluntarily showed up to the workshops or occupied an organisational position in which they controlled some of the data that were central to realising the project. This work forms the present study’s empirical background, but the specific analysis below is restricted to three interviews, one focus group and one workshop that included employees in the city’s technical administration. 1 The reason for this methodological choice is that I interpret this organisational unit as being what Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) would call a ‘most likely case’ to succeed in translating an idealised smart-city strategy into a workable practice. The reasons for this interpretation are the following:
First, Copenhagen is a city with a relatively high degree of digital inclusion (Roy, 2017) in a country where citizens have a history of trusting public servants with their personal data (Pedersen, 2011). This means that people share data, use apps and are accustomed to balancing privacy concerns with a functional welfare state. Second, Copenhagen’s top management in 2014 decided that each administration was obliged to deliver data to what ultimately would become the dashboard-equipped control room. Accordingly, organisational pressure was exerted to make the transition work. Third, the technical administration was pioneering the project from the start, and it was working with the least-sensitive data sources. Compared with, e.g., person-sensitive data in the administration of children and youth, the technical administration managed data on items such as cars and trash cans.
The logic of the ‘most likely’ case selection goes as follows: If the translation of the idealised version of the smart city into a workable practice is challenged by radically different interpretations of data in this specific administration, then the problems of translation most likely would be even worse in other administrations. While much literature on smart cities starts from the assumption that the realisation of a ‘real-time city’ will happen within years, such a finding would question that assumption. Therefore, this paper’s research strategy was to look for incongruences in a place where the existence of such incongruences would indicate some fundamental challenges in realising smart cities. Rather than discussing assumptions about data and governance in the idealised vision that won the award in Barcelona, the goal was to identify and describe the challenges involved in fitting such ideals into existing constellations of urban governance (Shelton et al., 2015).
Technological frames
This research strategy motivated the choice of a theoretical lens that could help explicate differences between modes of sense-making around data in the administration. The connection between sense-making and organisational change, of course, has a rich theoretical history in organisational theory. For instance, Karl Weick (1995) introduced psychological theories of sense-making as an alternative to explaining organisational forms with reference to demands in their environments (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Rather than looking at how organisations fit themselves into external forces, he focused on the ways in which organisations ‘enact’ themselves by promoting specific practices and crafting narratives that make these practices understandable and legitimate. Every act in an organisation (e.g., the decision to link data across administrations on a dashboard) will be met by a response (which could, e.g., be compliance or silence), and it is between such acts that a collective interpretation and mutual commitment to a shared organisational form (e.g., an agile smart city) are even possible. However, this outcome is dependent on whether employees within the organisation can justify this commitment with respect to their existing standards on what constitutes proper fulfilment of their organisational roles. Collective sense-making is – on this account – a process situated in specific organisational contexts and realised with references to existing standards or structures.
This paper follows this tradition in the sense that it actively looks for incongruences that challenge collective sense-making in the technical administration. More specifically, it identifies such incongruences with inspiration from Orlikowski and Gash’s (1994) concept of ’technological frames’, which similarly proposes understanding organisational forms with roots in the psychology of interpretation and sense-making. The concept of technological frames originally was introduced to investigate interpretive processes related to information technology (IT) in changing organisations, and the authors define it broadly as ‘[…] assumptions, knowledge and expectations expressed symbolically through language, visual images, metaphors and stories’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994: 176). They suggest that such frames will influence the way in which an ideal (such as the smart city) is translated into actual work practices in a specific setting (e.g., the technical administration).
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) suggest that technological frames are composed of three elements, of which this paper discusses two. First, they offer views on the
These concepts guided the analysis of the transcribed empirical material. The coding strategy was deductive in the sense that I used coloured markers to underline quotes that exhibited these two aspects of technological frames. For instance, if and interviewee voiced assumptions about the ontology of data or indicated preferences for specific epistemological positions, I would code it as pertaining to the nature of data, whereas comments about consequences of specific analyses within the municipality would be coded as pertaining to the use of data. I thereafter looked at the highlighted quotes with the aim of identifying incongruences that would reveal diverse ‘expectations around the role of technology in the organisation’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994: 180). I deliberately organised my material to identify juxtaposing positions because explication of incongruences can increase our understanding of potential conflicts when new technologies – such as data infrastructures – are introduced into organisations. Furthermore, since technological frames are social and embedded in interactions, I took notes on whether they were justified with respect to the environment (e.g., the smart-city paradigm and the tech industry) or re-negotiated with reference to existing situated standards for good bureaucratic practice. This helped me get a sense of the ways in which different references were mobilised to make a specific framing legitimate and understandable.
Two technological frames: The experimentalist’s credo and the data owner’s vocation
The analysis below describes two distinct technological frames that illustrate different methods of interpreting data and smart cities in the technical administration. These frames should be read as ideal types, with each having its own ways of translating the idealised version of the smart city into workable practices. Even though these ideal types are written up to highlight differences, they are, to a large extent, rooted in units within the administration. The first technological frame is the
Frame I: The experimentalist’s credo
When it comes to the […] You can find out where bikes are if they are stolen, where the trash cans are, where the material possessions of the municipality are – because [the chips] are so cheap, it is only the imagination that sets the limit. (Focus Group 1, p. 5) Well, Brønshøj was the first neighbourhood where all city lights had to be changed, and this became the place where we had the possibility to insist on making the poles empty – without even knowing what to use it for. The culture has so far been that we have had employees sitting and collecting data with very specific purposes in mind […] in order to make sure that their own little project succeeds. [What we want to explore is the] kind of solutions the market can produce if we make this data freely available. (Workshop 1, p. 9 & 11) […] There are so many indications […] that people are just creative in their re-use […] It is utterly impressive what people can get out of something that nobody saw any relevance in. Just getting more eyes on the data and start comparing it [with other data sets]. I believe that we can use it in so many ways that we never thought about when we collect it in the first place (Workshop 1, pp. 7–8) I have seen data sets that we have made part of our open strategy, where citizens have given feedback with corrections. This is very cool. For instance, they say: ‘Wait, there is no parking lot there anymore – it’s been removed’ […] There is a basic value in having more eyes on a problem (Focus Group 1, pp. 4–5). This idea that data is made openly available in a systemised fashion – that it is [removed] from the silos and drawers [in the sub-units] is, in my opinion, a huge advantage for a municipality the size of Copenhagen. [However], the IT-department [wants all data stored in specific environments]. The result is that the agile approach we would like to champion goes down the drain. (Interview 1, p. 1) I am still exposed to the precautionary principle […] this is a bit annoying [I think we need] a shift in culture, a paradigm shift – another way to think about [our] data. (Workshop 1, pp. 14–15) […] The choice seems to be that we want to ensure the quality so we know it is 100% correct […] But that is never going to happen! So why not release it in the – probably great – quality that we have now? (Workshop 1, pp. 4–6) Today, we do these things with […] historical data and hunches and say ’OK, this is how it must be’ and then we figure out that there is a daily traffic jam on Åboulevarden, and then we go back and redo the models, implement them and wait half a year to do evaluations. It would be really cool to be able to see, in real time, how a given solution works. (Workshop 1, p. 4)
Finally, the experimentalist’s frame contains an assumption about data use that – unlike the ones just discussed – is not directly related to finding solutions to city problems. Rather, it concerns the democratic value of being a transparent administration. Once again, building on references to ‘best practices’ in other cities, an interviewee from CSL expresses the hope that early release of data and collective discussions about analytical procedures can increase the democratic legitimacy of regulations that the municipality proposes, approves and enforces: It makes the municipality more trustworthy when we can say that we are open and transparent. We saw a fantastic example from [a city] that had a giant dashboard with all their KPIs [key performance indicators] exhibiting the goals the municipality had set for themselves. This meant that the citizens could follow the progress toward meeting these goals almost in real time […] I found this approach extremely trustworthy […]. (Interview 1, p. 11)
Frame II: The data owner’s vocation
When the so-called ‘data owners’ in the municipality talk about the smart city, they propose much different ideas about the nature and use of data than the ones outlined above. In the technical administration, ‘data owners’ is the name used for people who are responsible for producing, storing and analysing data used to maintain the city’s daily functions. This could be, for instance, data about trash or traffic flows. The data owners typically belong to the administration’s maintenance unit, which differs from the developmental unit, as it focuses strictly on the bureaucracy’s more mundane daily workings.
We call the frame emerging from this unit [This idea that] data is free, and we can trust a crowd of people to analyse it, is kind of a big leap for me because I get a lot of data […] that is on the verge of being company secrets. [Data from garbage-sorting facilities] can tell competitors about what is done to the garbage […] It reveals the efficiency of the technologies that [a facility has invested in]. (Interview 2, p. 2)
This way of thinking about the nature of data as situated in specific transactions also leads to a less-ambitious formulation about data-driven governance. In the case of garbage management, the interviewee explains that data often are used merely to calculate simple summaries of garbage waste to determine what the municipality owes the subcontractor, or perhaps to conduct simple checks for anomalies that might indicate something that needs urgent attention. For instance, a sharp rise in the garbage processed by a facility might indicate that citizens are dumping illegal garbage on the premises. In short, data owners see value in using data within the boundaries set by the original negotiations because derived use can cause problems.
This tells quite a different story about the use of data than the one encountered above. Data are used here as a resource for planning and control, but they also are a medium through which trust between a municipality and subcontractors is upheld. The consequence is a suggestion that the bureaucracy must design data infrastructures that balance these functions. Good design should be evaluated not only on its ability to find quick solutions to problems in the city, but also on its ability to underpin fair procurements and maintain lasting relations with important partners to solve these problems.
Another use of data that illustrates its situated and contextual nature can be found in a story about the way data sets are used as political assets in discussions among different sub-units of the technical administration: We are located in a branch called ‘maintenance’, and we sit on a lot of data which is useful for the branch called ‘development’ when they make long-term plans. However, if we do not agree with them on the plans they make, I have, on occasion, said: ‘Fine, if you want input from [our data], I need to be there in person. […] you have to listen to my experiences from the field if you want to get the numbers right’. […] This means that I show up, and I am part of the meeting. (Interview 2, pp. 13–14)
However, the quote above also formulates an epistemological reason for having data owners present when doing an analysis on top of data. They are not just there to win a political battle. The quote contains the argument that ‘if you want to get the numbers right’, you need to align with someone who knows the context of data production – someone who has ‘experiences from the field’. Proper use of data requires intimate knowledge of its production context. This requirement is exemplified in the following quote explaining problems involved in releasing data on cardboard waste to third-party analysts: We have carried out an experiment with the purpose of investigating how much extra cardboard we could collect in an area of the city […] such isolated experimental data is not necessarily ready to go on an open data portal because they are born under these strange circumstances that need careful explanation. (Interview 2, pp. 14–15) To me, data is a tool that I use in my daily work […] If a journalist contacts me in order to get some data, I want to make sure that I tell him about all nuances of the data and make sure that I get to see the story before it goes to print. This enables me to check for potential errors. This has been my role – to check the quality and ensure that the context is not forgotten. (Workshop 1, p. 10)
Ultimately, these thoughts about the contextual nature of data make the dream of the real-time dashboard a chimera. As stated by the owner of garbage data: ‘ The municipality is not geared to take advantage of all these innovative solutions […] As soon as we build some solution, it has to be accessible […] for blind people, hearing impaired and so on. But this makes it very complicated [to recommend and take ownership of solutions] – and this is why it doesn’t happen. (Interview 2, p. 9)
Incongruences with reference to literature on smart cities and Big Data
The analysis above outlined two technological frames, illustrating different ways of interpreting data and the smart city. As mentioned above, these frames are ideal types in the sense that they are designed to dramatise differences. However, they are, nonetheless, mobilised by specific interviewees who occupy specific positions in the organisation. The
‘Critiques from within’ as an alternative to reify the smart city
The first relevant finding is that different frames exist even within the technical administration, which was argued to be the ‘most likely case’ for translating the idealised version of the smart city into a workable practice. Even though it is perhaps not surprising that this translation was met with resistance, it is still interesting that
The analysis above takes the first step in doing that, and the resulting ideal types challenge a tendency in the literature to define the smart city as a mode of governance that increases the role of markets and evidence in public administration (Kitchin, 2014). In fact, both technological frames view markets and evidence as central elements in their version of how a data-driven city should be designed. They are not incongruent because the experimentalists focus on these elements, whereas the data owners do not. Rather, they mobilise quite different versions of markets and evidence that need to be understood to understand how the smart city, in the words of Shelton et al. (2015), can be situated and integrated into existing constellations of urban governance in this specific setting.
Markets and the smart city
In terms of the interplay between markets and urban planning, the
This philosophy of problem-solving and organisation is the foundation from which markets are understood within the
Looking at recent literature on Big Data, this method of connecting markets and governance shares many traits with what Evgeny Morozov (2013) has critically termed ‘solutionism’. This is a mode of planning that has roots in the entrepreneurial spirit of Silicon Valley, where promises of ‘algorithmic regulation’ recently have been championed (O’Reilly, 2013). Morozov sees this tendency as the latest attempt by utopian technocrats to practice ‘politics without politics’ by hiding normative choices behind a belief in the existence of raw data and neutral algorithms. By focusing on finding effective solutions in data patterns, this is a form of regulation and governance that effectively bypasses important epistemological and democratic dilemmas. In the words of Morozov, it promotes stressing the ‘what’ of politics rather than the ‘how’.
The
Transparency and the smart city
These different methods of conceptualising the link between markets and governance also explain why the two frames are incongruent in their approach to transparency in the public sector. As noted by Grasten and de Montoya (2009), the notion of transparency has emerged as an organisational buzzword that acquires specific meanings depending on the interests of those promoting it. In some contexts, the ‘transparent organisation’ is viewed as an arbiter of accountability and control, whereas in other contexts, it is justified in terms of the efficiency it promotes or even merely on its democratic merits. Therefore, when translated into organisational practices, it can materialise in many different ways. Examples are open-office environments (disclosing who is at work), sharable Outlook accounts (making planning more effective) or – as in our case – calls for open-data repositories (making the public sector accountable to its constituents).
The
Evidence and the smart city
In terms of the interplay between evidence and urban planning, the
In recent debates on Big Data, the
The criticism of traffic modelling voiced in one of the quotes above is also paradigmatic of this discussion. First, it has been argued that models build on hunches, which are easily translated into unfounded theories or vague assumptions in the sense of Anderson (2008). The insistence on building these assumptions into models arguably runs counter to the promise of working with raw data and neutral algorithms. Second, the models are criticised for being too slow. They trade balance for perfection, which is not a sensible trade-off if one believes that traffic regulations would perform better if they simply were grounded in slightly less valid – but much faster – data inputs. To the extent that the
Conversely,
In recent debates about Big Data, we have seen the critique of the empiricist position translated into a body of scholarly work that shares the claim that ‘
Conclusion
This paper presented an analysis of interviews, focus groups and workshops with employees in the technical administration in the municipality of Copenhagen during the year after winning a smart-city award. This administration was chosen as a case study because it exhibited characteristics that made it ‘most likely’ to succeed in translating the idealised version of the smart city into a workable bureaucratic practice. Drawing on the work of Orlikowski and Gash, the empirical analysis aimed to identify and describe incongruent ‘technological frames’ that could illustrate different methods of making sense of data and the smart city within this single organisational unit. The outcome of the analysis was a description of two distinct technological frames that shared a focus on links between markets, evidence and governance, but that had much different ways of making sense of them.
One frame was termed the
The other frame was termed the
It was argued that these findings contribute to literature on smart cities in two ways. First, they illustrate that one should be careful not to reify the smart city being analysed. Many critiques of the smart city delve into an idealised version of the phenomenon, which easily leads to the isomorphic argument that public administration is headed toward a mode of governance that is shaped by environmental factors, such as Silicon Valley trends. In the case of Copenhagen, one could, for instance, have made this argument by referring to the demonstration case that won the prize in Barcelona. However, the analysis illustrates that translating a technological trend into prize-winning slides is much simpler than translating those slides into a shared understanding of the essence of data and the smart city. Rather than crafting external critiques of ideals, the analysis illustrates the potentials in problematising the smart city from inside the organisation, which should realise it.
Second, the findings suggest that
Theoretically the paper drew on literature that stemmed from a specific reading of the sense-making paradigm. As Holt and Cornelissen (2014) have argued, there is a risk that such a theoretical move becomes overly anthropocentric because the predominant unit of analysis is agents with linguistic, embodied and cognitive capacities. The interview technique in this paper amplifies this risk as the identified frames are grounded in stories and descriptions, rather than observed practices. Future studies that build on this paper productively could expand the theoretical and methodological criteria by which ‘sense’ is understood and thereby explore how to make sense of data beyond articulation. The kind of sense-making that occurs through everyday data use is an important line of study that could provide the materiality of data infrastructures with a more prevalent place in descriptions of the contemporary smart city.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
