Power Assymmetry in Negociation: A Study of Perceveid Power Differential and Cognitive Differentiation

Abstract

This research investigates the influence of perceived power differential and cognitive differentiation on the strategies and results of negotiations in power asymmetry situations. A model based on the power dynamics and the source/target approach is established and empirically tested using negotiation games. The results show that the negotiation strategy of the source is dependent upon its cognitive differentiation ability while the negotiation strategy of the target is only dependent upon its perceived power differential.

Keywords

Power asymmetry negotiation negotiation game negotiation strategy individual gain perceived power differential cognitive differentiation

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