Primary fragmentation from detonation of high-explosive metal-cased munitions imposes significant risks to the safety of related personnel and the public. Barricades or other protective structures are commonly used to stop fragments and reduce casualty risks caused by detonated munitions when a sufficient safety distance cannot be guaranteed. This study aims to provide decision support for the positioning of barricades that can reasonably mitigate primary fragmentation hazards from the detonation of large calibre munitions using a probabilistic risk assessment approach. This approach enables a stochastic characterization of fragment ejections, stacking effects, fragment trajectories, human vulnerability and fragment hazard reduction by barricade. In a case study, the assessments of casualty risks and effectiveness of barricades were conducted for a single and a pallet of 155 mm projectiles. It was found that barricades with heights exceeding the height of munitions can significantly reduce the hazardous fragment densities and casualty risks beyond the barricade. The benefit of increasing the barricade height becomes marginal when it exceeds the height of munitions.
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