Previous research on decision reversibility has found that, although people believe they prefer reversible decisions, irreversible decisions yield the most satisfaction. Two studies investigated whether these findings are moderated by individuals’ tendencies toward maximizing (decision making via extensive search for the best option) versus satisficing (decision making via less exhaustive search and less optimizing). Study 1 found that satisficers were more satisfied following an irreversible decision about a poster choice, whereas maximizers were more satisfied following a reversible decision. When a different group of participants in Study 2 were asked whether they would prefer the reversible or irreversible versions of Study 1, satisficers disproportionately chose the irreversible version, and maximizers disproportionately chose the reversible version; however, some extreme maximizers preferred the irreversible version as a means of preventing needless worry or second guessing. The results demonstrate that individual differences are likely to moderate even robust patterns of decision making and affective forecasting.
BullensL.ForsterJ. A.van HarreveldF.LibermanN. (2012). Self-produced decisional conflict due to incorrect metacognitions. In GawronskiB.StrackF. (Eds.), Cognitive consistency: A fundamental principle in social cognition (pp. 267–284). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
2.
BullensL.van HarreveldF.ForsterJ.HigginsT. E. (2014). How decision reversibility affects motivation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 835–849.
3.
BullensL.van HarreveldF.ForsterJ.van der PligtJ. (2013). Reversible decisions: The grass isn’t merely greener on the other side; It’s also very brown over here. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 1093–1099.
4.
EpstudeK.RoeseN. J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168–192.
5.
FordB. Q.TamirM. (2014). Preferring familiar emotions: As you want (and like) it?Cognition and Emotion, 28, 311–324.
6.
FreyD.KumpfM.IrleM.GniechG. (1984). Re-evaluation of decision alternatives dependent on the reversibility of a decision and the passage of time. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 447–450.
7.
GilbertD. T.EbertJ. E. J. (2002). Decisions and revisions: The affective forecasting of reversible outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 503–514.
8.
GilbertD. T.MorewedgeC. K.RisenJ. L.WilsonT. D. (2004). Looking forward to looking backward: The misprediction of regret. Psychological Science, 15, 346–350.
9.
GilbertD. T.WilsonT. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science, 317, 1351–1354.
10.
HafnerR. J.WhiteM. P.HandleyS. J. (2012). Spoilt for choice: The role of counterfactual thinking in the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 28–36.
11.
IyengarS. S.WellR. E.SchwartzB. (2006). Doing better but feeling worse: Looking for the “best” job undermines satisfaction. Psychological Science, 17, 143–150.
12.
KushlevK.DunnE. W. (2012). Affective forecasting: Knowing how we will feel in the future. In VazireS.WilsonT. D. (Eds.), Handbook of self-knowledge (pp. 277–292). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
13.
LeachJ. K.PatallE. A. (2013). Maximizing and counterfactual thinking in academic major decision making. Journal of Career Assessment, 21, 414–429.
14.
LoweR. E.SteinerI. E. (1968). Some effects of the reversibility and conquences of decision on postdecision information preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 172–179.
15.
MathieuM. T.GoslingS. D. (2012). The accuracy or inaccuracy of affective forecasts depends on how accuracy is indexed: A meta-analysis of past studies. Psychological Science, 23, 161–162.
16.
MoldenD. C.LeeA. Y.HigginsE. T. (2008). Motivations for promotion and prevention. In ShahJ.GardnerW. (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 169–187). New York, NY: Guilford.
17.
NenkovG. Y.MorrinM.WardA.SchwartzB.HullandJ. (2008). A short form of the maximization scale: Factor structure, reliability, and validity studies. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 371–388.
18.
ParkerA. M.de BruinW. B.FischhoffB. (2007). Maximizers versus satisficers: Decision-making styles, competence, and outcomes. Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 342–350.
19.
PreacherK. J.RuckerD. D.MacCallumR. C.NicewanderW. A. (2005). Use of the extreme groups approach: A critical reexamination and new recommendations. Psychological Methods, 10, 178–192.
20.
PurvisA.HowellR. T.IyerR. (2011). Exploring the role of personality in the relationship between maximization and well-being. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 370–375.
21.
SchwartzB.WardA.MonterossoJ.LyubomirskyS.WhiteK.LehmanD. R. (2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1178–1197.
22.
SparksE. A.EhrlingerJ.EibachR. P. (2012). Failing to commit: Maximizers avoid commitment in a way that contributes to reduced satisfaction. Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 72–77.
23.
SpuntR. P.RassinE.EpsteinL. M. (2009). Aversive and avoidant indecisiveness: Roles for regret proneness, maximization, and BIS/BAS sensitivities. Personality and Individual Differences, 47, 256–261.
24.
TamirM. (2009). What do people want to feel and why? Pleasure and utility in emotion regulation. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 101–105.
25.
WilsonT. D.GilbertD. T. (2005). Affective forecasting: Knowing what to want. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 131–134.
26.
ZeelenbergM.PietersR. (2006). Looking backward with an eye on the future. In SannaL. J.ChangE. C. (Eds.), Judgments over time: The interplay of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (pp. 210–229). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
