Illegal luxuritecture: How the super-rich in Hong Kong land grab and unlawfully expand their luxury living spaces

Abstract

Spanish

This article introduces the concept of ‘illegal luxuritecture’ – illegal luxury architecture – to capture the way a minority of super-rich expand their living environments without planning permissions, sometimes through land grabs of government land. Typically, illegal housing is associated with the urban poor, but it is argued that through elite capture, unauthorised building works (UBWs) have also been utilised by the super-rich. This article focusses on Hong Kong where a number of illegal luxuritectural structures came to light after September 2023 when the most severe rainstorm since records began in the 19th century caused the collapse of unauthorised building works. Illegal luxuritectural construction involves illegally altering building foundations and sometimes flood protection walls, causing destabilisation of soil and creating landslides. Although failure to comply with Building (Planning) Regulations and the Buildings Ordinance is a criminal offence which can result in fines or imprisonment, findings suggest that a minority of the elite class tends to ignore these regulations. This is because, the fines for unauthorised building works are relatively small in relation to the high value of the property or the rental income generated, and prison sentences are almost never imposed. This article contributes to the current academic discussions on the super-rich in general and the housing of the global super-rich in particular.

Keywords

elite class Hong Kong illegal luxuritecture land grab super-rich unauthorised building works (UBWs)

Introduction

In the 24 hours between 16.00, 7 September and 16.00, 8 September 2023, the Hong Kong Observatory recorded 638.5 mm of rain, the highest since records started in 1884 (Hong Kong Observatory, 2023); and a Black Rainstorm Warning was issued for 16 hours and 35 minutes, the longest since the rainstorm warning system was first introduced in 1992. Many parts of the city were severely flooded, particularly, in the lower and basement floors of various buildings. At least seven large-scale landslides were reported, along with one heavily flooded metro station. The rainstorm resulted in two deaths and 140 injuries (Government of Hong Kong, 2023b). The total damage was estimated at more than US$100 million (Frost, 2023). Nonetheless, the city quickly returned to normal because of its efficient disaster recovery planning and management.

Although Hong Kong has long adapted to severe rainstorms and typhoons, what caught the public's attention were several cases of soil erosion and smaller landslides that occurred in some of the most exclusive neighbourhoods. One widely circulated photo was of four luxury properties located in the Redhill Peninsula private residential development in Tai Tam, Southern District, on Hong Kong Island, showing soil surrounding the foundations being washed away, exposing suspected unauthorised building works (UBWs). These low-density residential buildings, along with many in other exclusive neighbourhoods in Hong Kong, were later identified as structures added without planning permissions, with some extending onto government land.

To illustrate the exclusivity of the Redhill Peninsula, a two-bedroom apartment unit with areas of approximately 1000 ft²/93 m² listed for around HK$28 million/US$3.6 million/€3.3 million/£2.8 million¹ can be rented out for HK$53000/US$6784/€6318/£5363 per month.² On the higher end of the scale, individual houses with areas of approximately 3000 ft²/279 m² sell for about HK$180 million/US$23 million/€21 million/£18 million and are rented out for HK$185,000/US$23,680/€22,052/£18,722 per month.

On average, the monthly rent for a one-bedroom apartment in Hong Kong is around HK$15,000/US$1920/€1788/£1518. On the lower end of the scale, the monthly rent for a subdivided unit with an average size of 121 ft²/11 m² is around HK$5000/US$640/€596/£506. These units are typically of poor quality, and some lack separate bathrooms.

Based on the above observations, this article introduces the concept of illegal luxuritecture – illegal luxury architecture – to examine how a small number of elites in Hong Kong land grab and illegally expand their living environments onto government land. Not all unauthorised building works encroach on government land, but as we will see in this article, many properties do.

This article aims to contribute to the current academic discussions on the global super-rich (Forrest et al., 2017), elite housing segregation (Atkinson and Ho, 2020; Lauermann, 2022b), earlier research on unauthorised structures (Lai and Ho, 2001), and illegal housing in Hong Kong (Tanasescu et al., 2010). Much previous research has associated illegal housing with the urban poor, but this article demonstrates how the super-rich also construct illegal extensions.

Conceptualising housing segregation of the global super-rich

Since around 2010, an emerging body of research in social sciences has focussed on the way that global elites (Hay, 2013) have influenced the development of so-called ‘alpha cities’ (Atkinson, 2020; Atkinson et al., 2017). The research mainly focussed on conceptualising the lifestyle and servicing the needs of the super-rich or the 1%, as well as their investment strategies (Forrest et al., 2017; Ho, 2020; Ho and Atkinson, 2018). This body of literature has become well-established in the field of political economy and urban studies, focussing on elite geographies, the super-rich, and inequality.

Specifically, recent research has begun to focus on super-rich housing segregation (Atkinson and Ho, 2020). This form of segregation is often expressed through the concept of elite capture, which refers to the practice of exploiting legal loopholes, lobbying for special exceptions, or outright ignoring the law (Lauermann and Mallak, 2023). Another form of segregation is known as vertical segregation, which relates to the spatial separation by floors within residential buildings (Forrest et al., 2020). Moreover, the spatial arrangement and social separation can be identified as micro-segregation and nano-segregation. Micro-segregation refers to the pattern of social separation in residential areas, characterised by the close spatial proximity of luxury housing developments and substandard dwellings due to wealth disparities (Ho and Yip, 2022). Furthermore, nano-segregation describes the cohabitation of multiple households from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds within a single apartment, a phenomenon resulting from the rise of nano-sized urban dwellings (Ho and Yip, 2024).

In terms of physical architecture, a related concept is ‘libertecture’, which represents libertarian approaches to architecture theory, emphasising personal liberty and unrestricted market activity (Atkinson and O’Farrell, 2023). Similarly, the term ‘necrotecture’ refers to the trend of the super-rich buying super-prime housing not for habitation, but for investment, leading to underused or empty properties and lifeless areas of a city (Atkinson, 2019). This process often leads to super-gentrification, which describes the further upgrading of already gentrified neighbourhoods (Lauermann, 2022a , 2022b).

Since this article also explores the expansion of land use, this topic can be framed around the idea of land grabbing. Much of the existing literature focusses on how wealthy individuals, nation states, local companies, and multinational corporations acquire land for the production of biofuels and food, resulting in the phenomenon known as the ‘global land rush’ or ‘global land grabbing’ in both rural and urban environments (Zoomers et al., 2017). Other forms of land grabbing include securing key resources such as water (Adams et al., 2019; Theesfeld, 2018) or repurposing land for palm oil and pulpwood plantations (Dhiaulhaq et al., 2018). Overall, this form of land grabbing raises concerns about the monopolisation of food production and common goods, with the profits often ending up in the hands of a small number of wealthy individuals and shareholders. A related concept to consider regarding the inefficient use of land is land banking, where housebuilders aim to profit from the increase in land value rather than developing housing (Bradley, 2021). Typically, planning permissions have been approved for the construction of residential developments, but in reality, the land remains undeveloped and is unavailable for alternative development, such as affordable housing. Essentially, while many academic debates on land grabbing focus on large-scale development, the issue of land grabbing at the micro or individual level for private use often remains overlooked.

Nonetheless, global cities like Hong Kong, London, and New York are notorious for having some of the most unaffordable residential housing in the world (Ho and Yip, 2022), and the global financial crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2023 have further worsened housing inequality. In the case of Hong Kong, which this article focusses on, the urban poor resort to subdivided housing. Subdivided housing refers to the division of already small apartments into several smaller units. Problematically, in 2023, approximately 200,000 residents, including 34,000 children, currently live in subdivided housing (SCMP, 2023).

From illegal housing for the poor to illegal luxuritecture for the super-rich

Hong Kong has a long history of illegally built housing because of its high property prices, scarcity of land, and the lack of public housing dating back to the colonial era. For instance, in the 1950s, the Kowloon Walled City in Hong Kong, originally a Song Dynasty (960–1279) military outpost, became one of the world's most notorious neighbourhoods. Its jurisdiction was ambiguous due to unresolved sovereignty issues post-Opium Wars between the British Empire and Imperial China in the 19th century, leading to minimal formal policing. Despite prevalent triad activities, prostitution, and drug trade, its affordable housing attracted the urban poor. The lack of regulations allowed for easy factory setup, contributing to a robust manufacturing sector. However, the absence of building codes led to illegal and hazardous construction. Moreover, poor sanitation resulted in widespread pollution and pest infestation.

By 1990, with a population of 50,000 (Carney, 2013) within an area of 0.026 km², equivalent to a population density of 1.9 million people/km², the Kowloon Walled City was the most densely populated area in world history. Its depiction in media varied from a romanticised self-governing dystopia to a vilified space with poor infrastructure and criminal activities. In 1993, the city was demolished, and its residents relocated to public housing. By 1995, the once-notorious area was transformed into the Kowloon Walled City Park. But despite the largest illegally built area being demolished, unauthorised building works and illegal housing continued to be an issue for Hong Kong. Specifically, in the 1990s Hong Kong witnessed three main forms of unauthorised structures (Lai and Ho, 2001, 113). First, advertising boards and satellite dishes were installed on external walls or rooftops, providing financial gain for property owners. Second, canopies and flower racks were built to extend the features of properties. Third, additional structures could create extra living spaces which landlords could rent out at a profit while providing inexpensive housing for the poor.

In light of this, the Buildings Department (BD), founded in 1993, has since been responsible for building codes, safety, and inspection through the enforcement of the Buildings Ordinance (BO) (2023, Chapter 123). At the time, the Buildings Department aimed to address the issue of unauthorised structures posing immediate dangers to the public, such as collapses that resulted in injuries and fatalities (Lai and Ho, 2001, 115). However, in the case of illegal housing in Hong Kong, the local authority selectively legitimised some illegal rooftop structures to offer partial solutions to the shortage of affordable housing (Tanasescu et al., 2010, 480).

The Buildings Department currently operates under the Development Bureau: to carry out alteration and addition works (A&A works), formal applications must be made to the Department which must grant approval in order for the works to proceed. Furthermore,

Building works which have been carried out without prior approval and consent from the BD will become unauthorised building structures or unauthorised building works and will be subject to enforcement actions under the BO (Buildings Department, 2024).

It is a criminal offence for owners to ignore the Statutory Order issued against unauthorised building works. Specifically, the Buildings Department (2018) states the following:

If the owners do not comply with this Order, the Buildings Department (BD) will have the demolition work carried out by a government contractor. They will then be billed for all costs plus a supervision charge and a surcharge.

Not complying with the Statutory Order is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of 1 year's imprisonment and a maximum fine of HK$200,000. For continuing offences, there is a further daily fine of HK$20,000.

The Order will also be recorded in the Land Registry and, if the property is mortgaged, the financial institution concerned will be notified.

Additionally, there are legal implications for those providing unauthorised building works and construction services. According to Section 40(1AA) of the Buildings Ordinance (2023, Chapter 123), individuals who intentionally violate Section 14(1) of the Buildings Ordinance by initiating or conducting construction activities without obtaining prior approval and consent from the Buildings Department are deemed to have committed an offence. If convicted, the individual can face a fine of HK$400,000 and a prison sentence of 2 years. If the offence persists, they may be subject to an additional fine of HK$20,000 for each day of non-compliance. In addition, individuals who fail to appoint a prescribed building professional or a prescribed registered contractor as required by the Building (Minor Works) Regulation (B(MW)R) for minor works that they arranged to be started or carried out, are committing an offence (Section 40(1AB)). This offence falls under Section 4A(2) or Section 9AA(2) of the Buildings Ordinance. If convicted, they can be subject to a fine of HK$100,000. For example, in April 2020, a contractor was found guilty of violating the Buildings Ordinance and fined a total of HK$400,000 for deviating in a material way from the originally approved plan which caused a fatal accident for an excavation machine operator (Government of Hong Kong, 2022). However, many more unauthorised building works have likely been carried out without being caught.

The approach of the Buildings Department to regulating illegal housing and unauthorised building works can be seen to exemplify the historical assumptions that link UBWs to the urban poor living in marginalised and deprived neighbourhoods, illustrated in two leaflets on unauthorised building works, one from April 2011 (Figure 1) and another from November 2014 (Figure 2). Both leaflets use photographs of UBWs in traditional Chinese-style shophouses as examples, creating the impression that UBWs are primarily associated with older buildings in less desirable neighbourhoods. This overlooks the fact that UBWs were already much more widespread and could be found in affluent neighbourhoods inhabited by the super-rich.

Figure 1.

A section of the leaflet published in 2011 by the Buildings Department. Source: Government of Hong Kong, accessed 2 July 2024. https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/en/resources/pamphlets-and-videos/rubw.pdf.

Figure 2.

A section of the leaflet published in 2014 by the Buildings Department. Source: Government of Hong Kong, accessed 2 July 2024. https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/en/resources/pamphlets-and-videos/MWCS_ubw_e.pdf.

The conceptualisation of residential housing for the elites has been approached as ‘VIP Urbanism’ (Briata and Di Vita, 2023) and ‘elite capture’ (Lauermann and Mallak, 2023): these approaches argue that many cities have created a two-tier system – one for the ordinary citizens, and another for the elites. In some cases, further segregation takes place at the ‘ultra-high-end’ level which the ‘high-end’ wealthy individuals are also excluded (Ho and Yip, 2022 , 2024). Through the introduction of a wealth-based typology of five forms of segregation in Hong Kong, Ho and Yip (2024, 150) have shown how the ultra-high-end wealthy utilise urban planning control of plot ratio while incorporating illicit extensions as part of their strategies to circumvent government policies and planning controls. Above all, such extensions could not exist without the assistance of intermediates such as architects and builders who enable the construction of illegal luxuritecture.

The super-rich expand their living spaces is not a new phenomenon. For example, the term ‘bunkering down’ (Burrows et al., 2022) is used to describe wealthy neighbourhoods in London where the expansion of basements below existing houses to create extra rooms for gyms, swimming pools, cinemas, and staff accommodation. Nevertheless, the expansion of such basements has environmental consequences including disrupting the flow of groundwater, increasing the risks of flooding, damaging deep-rooted plants, and noise pollution from construction and transportation of building materials. In the case of owners being caught for unauthorised building works carried out in London, the penalties are significantly lower compared to those imposed in Hong Kong. For instance, in Lambeth Council in London, the penalties for violating building regulations include fines of up to £5000 if prosecuted, along with an additional £50 for each day after conviction until the work is rectified.³

However, because super-rich neighbourhoods tend to be highly segregated and well-hidden by design, and some neighbourhoods even have around-the-clock private security to ensure the public are deterred from strolling around the areas. Therefore, what goes on in these areas mostly remains unknown to the public. It is only recently that the availability of high-definition drone footage and satellite imagery and even complaints from super-rich neighbours have begun to shed light on the scale of the damage caused by illegal luxuritecture.

Similarly, in Hong Kong's ultra-high-end wealthy segregated neighbourhoods (Ho and Yip, 2024), some super-rich residents construct below-ground extensions including guest rooms, wine cellars, and garages, as well as visible above-ground additions such as patios, gardens, and fishponds. Not only do some of these homeowners occupy government land but such extensions, which require extensive remodelling of building foundations and flood protection walls, have also been shown to cause structural damage to the surrounding built environment creating soil degradation, landslides, and the destabilisation of neighbouring buildings.

In light of these observations, the following section looks at how illegal extensions have been built by the elites in Hong Kong, and how, in some cases, the offenders were those who held government positions at the highest level.

Exposing illegal luxuritecture

After the landslide at the four properties in the Redhill Peninsula development in September 2023, the Buildings Department initially faced resistance from some owners who denied access to building inspections. However, this denial was eventually overridden by Court warrants. On 22 September 2023, the Hong Kong government issued a press release which announced that the Lands Department and the Buildings Department had concluded that all four houses had serious unauthorised building works, and out of the four houses, three were also illegally occupying government land. Subsequently, removal orders were issued under the Buildings Ordinance (Government of Hong Kong, 2023a). The individuals implicated in the ownership and construction of these four houses included both Hong Kong and foreign senior corporate executives.

In November 2023, the Buildings Department issued a circular letter to 11 associations, organisations, and institutions involved in architecture, contracting, construction, engineering, and surveying. These included the Hong Kong Institute of Architects, the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, the Hong Kong Construction Association Limited, and the Minor Works Contractor Association. The purpose of this letter was to address the issues of unauthorised building works and highlight the importance of compliance with the Buildings Ordinance (Buildings Department, 2023).

By December 2023, the Buildings Department issued another press release stating that the remaining 85 seafront houses located in the area of the four collapsed houses were inspected. It was concluded that the construction of the 29 houses involved both the illegal occupation of government land and also had UBWs. A further 40 houses had UBWs, and one house was illegally occupying government land, while 15 other houses were compliant and had neither UBWs nor were illegally occupying government land. The owners of the illegally constructed properties identified in the second inspection were also issued removal orders under the Buildings Ordinance (Government of Hong Kong, 2023c).

After the Redhill Peninsula incidents, a number of local media outlets such as the South China Morning Post began to report on how local politicians, including the former Chief Executive, the former Chief Secretary, and the former Secretary for Justice, were found to have had UBWs constructed for their luxury residences in previous years (Hamer, 2023). While some of them were fined insignificant amounts in relation to the rental income generated or the value of their properties, the majority of them were instructed to rectify the modifications without facing criminal charges.

In early 2024, the South China Morning Post conducted a further investigation and uncovered more illegal luxuritecture with UBWs (Marquez et al., 2024). These cases included 16 houses at Flamingo Garden on the Kowloon Peak, of which 12 were suspected to have UBWs, 11 were illegally occupying government land and four had outdoor swimming pools without planning permission. Other illegal luxuritecture included Seaview Villas in Tai Po and Villa Rosa, located above the Redhill Peninsula. The size of one particular extension found at Seaview Villas was estimated to be 23 times the area of a regular flat (430 ft²/40 m²) or 82 times of an average subdivided flat (118 ft²/11 m²) in Hong Kong (Marquez et al., 2024). With some high-end residential rentals approaching HK$100,000 per month or more, the relatively small fines, assuming the owners are caught and prosecuted, are insignificant in relation to the financial gains from the rental income.

Conclusion

This article has introduced the idea of illegal luxuritecture to illustrate how the political elites and the super-rich in Hong Kong have enlarged their living environments by combining low-density land use with unauthorised building works, often on government land. In this analysis, illegal luxuritecture can be seen to go beyond the practice of ‘elite capture’ which involves interpreting the law in a creative way or ‘exerting influence on everyday planning’ (Lauermann and Mallak, 2023, 650), practices which can also be associated with ‘bunkering down’ (Burrows et al., 2022) in which the wealthy property elites of London do acquire the relevant planning permits for the construction of extensions and basements (but do not always exactly follow the approved plans). Rather, illegal luxuritecture involves ignoring planning regulations and the need to get permission altogether and/or illegally encroaching on government land, often to construct luxurious private cinemas, fishponds, gyms, swimming pools, wine cellars, bedrooms, guestrooms, and servants’ quarters.

While there has been a persistent housing shortage in Hong Kong, resulting in many people living in substandard conditions, the public perception is that the elite class lives by a different set of rules when it comes to planning permissions or the lack thereof. While it may not be the case for all wealthy owners of large residences, the examples covered by this article demonstrate that the majority have had unauthorised building works carried out and/or have expanded onto government land. It is important to note that not only does altering existing buildings without planning permission violate the Buildings Ordinance, but modifying building foundations and flood protection walls can also have detrimental consequences for both the illegal luxuritectural buildings and the surrounding environment.

In much previous research, illegal housing and unauthorised building works have been associated with the urban poor as a means of finding affordable housing. Even though in the event that owners of illegal luxuritectural structures are caught with unauthorised building works, they may face fines and potential imprisonment, in reality, the fines imposed are often insignificant in relation to the rental income or property value, and prison sentences are rarely given.

In this way, examining the phenomenon of illegal luxuritecture highlights how the elite class in Hong Kong ignore the need for permissions and regulations. They take matters into their own hands and have unauthorised building works carried out, thereby expanding their already spacious and luxurious residences. They do so based on the assumption that the rules do not apply to them, or if they do, the fines and prosecutions are not worth worrying about. However, these illegal and unauthorised practices often go unnoticed by planning and building authorities, even though illegal constructions can cause consequential environmental and structural damage to the owners’ and, equally importantly, surrounding properties. The purpose of planning and building regulations is to regulate the impact of development on the surrounding environment and neighbourhood. This fundamental objective is completely disregarded by libertarian development approaches (Atkinson and O’Farrell, 2023), as well as by illegal developers and property owners.

This article presents a proposed solution to tackle the problem of illegal luxuritecture. Instead of imposing a maximum prison sentence of 1 year and a fixed maximum fine of HK$400,000, with a daily fine of HK$20,000 for continuing offences when owners are caught violating the law, the suggestion is to impose longer prison sentences and hold them accountable for an unlimited financial penalty. This penalty would be based on the property's overall value and the value of all unauthorised building works added, taking into consideration the duration of these additions. For instance, if the property is valued at HK$50,000,000 and the unauthorised building works, such as swimming pools and bedrooms, increase its market value by HK$10,000,000, then the owner would be held accountable for a property valued at HK$60,000,000. If unauthorised building works are constructed on government land, the market value of the land would also be added to the overall valuation of the property, and the fines would be adjusted accordingly. To deter owners from maintaining UBWs, a daily fine of, for example, 1% of the property's total value, in this case, HK$600,000, would be imposed for each day the UBWs remain; and the owner would still be responsible for removing the UBWs and restoring the affected areas. Perhaps only by imposing substantial financial penalties will owners consider the consequences of having unauthorised building works carried out. However, it is important to note that this solution is purely theoretical and would require significant political willpower to implement.

In short, the exposé of illegal luxuritecture has brought attention to the disparity in the application of rules to ordinary citizens and the elites. The concept of the 1% versus the 99%, or rules for thee and not for me, is not well-received by the general public, especially since Hong Kong has the most unaffordable housing market in the world. In the case of London, the penalties for unauthorised building works are significantly low, with a fine of £5000 if prosecuted, along with a daily fine of £50 for work that is not rectified. These penalties are unlikely to deter the super-rich from occasionally carrying out modifications without the relevant planning permissions.

Consequently, this article suggests two potential new directions for academic research, one on illegal luxuritecture, and another one on land grabbing at the micro or individual level, aiming to provide insights into the extent of such issues not only in Hong Kong but also on a global scale.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Ethical consideration

The author(s) declared that ethical approval was not necessary for this study.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Hang Kei Ho

Notes

Author Biography

Hang Kei Ho is a visiting professor in the Department of Cultures at the Faculty of Arts and an associate professor of Sociology (Title of Docent) at the University of Helsinki. Additionally, he serves as an adjunct associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has held academic positions in Finland, Hong Kong SAR, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, delivering lectures in Anthropology, Asian Studies, Business Communications and Management, Development Studies, Economic Geography, Public Health, Sociology, and Urban Studies. His research interests involve luxury consumption and brand management, the globalisation of the wine industry, urban segregation, housing policy, inequality and the super-rich, and the flow of capital from Asia to global property markets. He holds a PhD, an MBA, and three master's degrees in various academic disciplines, and has professional experience in real estate consultancy, IT, and engineering.

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