How Right-Wing Populists Instrumentalize News Media: Deliberate Provocations,Scandalizing Media Coverage,and Public Awareness for the Alternative for Germany (Afd)
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online October, 2023
How Right-Wing Populists Instrumentalize News Media: Deliberate Provocations,Scandalizing Media Coverage,and Public Awareness for the Alternative for Germany (Afd)
The rise of right-wing populist parties in Western democracies is often attributed to populists’ ability to instrumentalize news media by making deliberate provocations (e.g., verbal attacks on migrants or politicians from other parties) that generate media coverage and public awareness. To explain the success of populists’ deliberate provocations, we drew from research on populism and scandal theory to develop a theoretical framework that we tested in two studies examining the rise of German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) between January 2015 and December 2018. In Study 1, an input–output analysis of 17 deliberate provocations by AfD politicians in German news media revealed much more coverage about their attacks on migrants than about their attacks on political elites, although all were covered in predominantly scandalizing ways. Next, Study 2, involving media database research and an analysis of Google Trends data, showed that the provocations had increased overall media coverage about the AfD and influenced public awareness of the party
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