Introduction to Special Issue: Science,Diplomacy and a Case of Institutions in Eurasia

In the western world, we always acknowledge the role played by premier universities in shaping of state and national policy. There seems to be a significant presence of Harvard, Cambridge, Heidelberg or Stanford in the policy circles of their respective political spheres. The instruments of this influence tend to be the elites trained at these institutions who carry a certain network or school-of-thought with them to their professional practise. However, there does not seem to be a mechanism through which the universities or the institutes in the Western style set up can directly lobby or carry out representation in the government. It is the alumnus or ‘old-boys’ networks they rely on for both following the political trends and making subtle representation. In turn, political and state institutions never want to be seen as influencing the freedom of academia, but do their bidding behind the scenes as they not only ultimately hold the purse strings, but are also responsible for educational policy and its implementation.

Such practice is embodied in a particular perception, both that of the academic institution itself and the political machinery it interacts with, that it is not the place of academia to get directly involved with the inner political workings. As the perception of both expertise and training evolves through the varying economic and political systems and as these systems start to strongly interact in a global sphere of quite different academic and political traditions, it has become essential to learn and evaluate the rules of engagement of the ‘non-western’ systems. Not the least because various educational aid and development initiatives together with aggressive marketing of Western education world over seek to displace the local educational practices with consequences broader than just in education itself (Kalra & Saxena, 2021). The general agenda relies on labelling local practises as backwards, inefficient, corrupt and even threatening, for example, in the case of the Islamic system. This seems ironic as the same Western policy makers and institutions seek to import highly trained, cheap and lucrative labour force as well as services which are products of these very systems they want to reform and expunge. This makes one wonder, could such dichotomies be understood by looking at the dynamics between policy institutions close to the governments and academia? One thing is clear, that no single template or model is sufficient for either understanding or engaging with this process. In an effort to look at particular regional scenarios we have chosen Eurasia/Central Asia as a case study. Despite their stellar performance, high degree achievement and impact, academic traditions and institutions of Central Asia have been largely misunderstood. This is mainly because this region has historically been ‘reconfigured’ to reflect the histories of the Islamic World, the Persian Empire or the Soviet Union, but not very often in its own right. Even today we refer to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan collectively as the former Soviet republics or the ‘Stans’. Indeed there are continuities that do exist within each of these configurations and we will cast a look at some examples of knowledge acquisition and delivery institutions and their interaction with the political and government circles. Here we will generally consider whether in the Islamic and Soviet past, or the post-Soviet present, the Central Asia region's academic institutions have been a resilient ‘system’ which seamlessly consolidated different forms of knowledge and extended this know-how beyond the purely utilitarian function of educating the society and its leaders.

The Islamic tradition of learning is well regarded and well discussed. However only among a narrow circle of experts is it understood that quite a few of the Islamic thinkers were not Arabs or of Arab heritage whatsoever. Even those historians who cross this threshold stop at ascribing the Persian identity to these thinkers. All these classifications are not completely untrue either, as many scholars at the time wrote and published in Arabic or Persian, depending on their audience and, more importantly for the discussion here, the leaning and heritage of their patron. Several notable examples like Al Khwarizimi (AD 780), Al Farghani (860), Al Beruni (AD 973) and Ibn Sina (AD 980) who came from Transoxiana or Mawarannahar, as it was called then, and worked in Arab and Persian lands. Then of course, there were Persian luminaries like Omar Khayyam who were nurtured in the courts and academies of Samarkand.

Along with their treatise on Astronomy or Medicine and their poetic and literary manuscripts one also notices the continual dialogue they had with the courtiers and even with the Caliph, King or the Emir. Their role as advisory experts seemed to be wide ranging and often well beyond the disciplinary remit they are generally known for. At the same time, their direct presence in the power circles and participation in courtly functions and embassies did not distract them from producing major academic works and nurturing future scholars and finding support for contemporaries and colleagues. Indeed, they would use the same influence to sometimes suppress and marginalise the work they deemed unworthy or conflicting with their own agendas. Quite often these intellectual leaders had a wider network base than many of the courtiers, as quite a few came from humble backgrounds. Also they had agency through religious and Sufite connections. They had access to both lay intellectuals and common citizenry. This access was considered a valuable ‘instrument’ by both the court and the intellectual establishment. Despite their multifaceted existence these scholars perceived themselves foremost as academics and mediators of knowledge, as evident form a remark by Al Beruni, the 10th century scientist and chronicler:

After I had barely settled down for a few years, I was compelled to participate in worldly affairs, which excited the envy of fools, but which made the wise pity me.

This he said while retaining the king’s patronage and position in the court. So these scholars would nuance their independence by sometimes being critical of the ruler or even switching courts. Courts and kings also regularly used the expertise of the well-regarded academics directly to justify their legitimacy or convey their ideology. For example, Al Beruni accompanied Mahmud of Ghazani on military campaigns to India and on Mahmud’s behest documented not only India’s philosophy, culture and religion, but also its technology, flora and fauna. Mahmud’s court in Ghazna was at the borders of India and his court had no shortage of both Indians and ‘India hands’. In fact we also know of Indian rulers who offered him their services. So it is interesting to consider why Al Beruni was chosen for this task and why he accepted the mission. Some sources suggest that he was a virtual prisoner of the Sultan, while others imply that he was an esteemed companion. There are some general points like he had accompanied the king on military adventures and thus knew what type of knowledge was sought and as he worked in the court he would be sensitive to the polity and the conduct of the peoples and lands he visited. Information thus would be useful in a more holistic strategy of engagement. We find evidence for this not only in his accounts of India, the book titled Kitab-al-Hind, but also in other sources.

Perhaps, more importantly, Al Beruni acknowledges that his leanings were towards the observational sciences which require mathematical treatment. He had studied the Indian texts in translation, mainly Persian and Arabic, thus he welcomed the opportunity to master Sanskrit and study the texts in the original language. He effectively used Mahmud’s military intentions to justify his own intellectual means for a period of 20 years. It is also curious that he actually does not dedicate Kitab-al-Hind to any particular ruler. Similar examples of engagements can be found among most of the other notable scholars. At the same time there were a larger number of academics who gathered around these luminaries but didn’t achieve the same level of prominence, primarily due to the limited engagement they had with the politics and the government. These people, however, began the process of forming academic institutions in the region. As early as 10th and 11th Century we find the formation of the Academy of Al Mamun in Khwarizm (Khiva). Thus, we see that the medieval madrassa system was a fantastic engine not only for attracting students from all over the world but also for extending benign political and cultural influences within and beyond the region.

With this backdrop in mind we should remember that Silk Road(s) has been a place for manufacturing and has contributed to scientific, artistic and cultural breakthroughs of global significance historically. However, the region and its peoples have been left out of current discussions of this region as a producer, of ideas and goods. This has had an impact on our understanding of knowledge production and educational framework in the region. Such a flawed understanding is a product of a de-contextualised economic analysis and subsequent mismatched political and security studies narratives. An economic understanding of production is limited, and limited largely to post-facto analysis of the production phenomenon and process. Economics alone does not have the tools either to understand how production originates and how it is sustained. Production is more often rooted in need, not in demand (!), while the need is correlated to how the society is organised. This societal organisation generates value systems which in turn govern the need itself. If one only uses the prevalent neo-liberal economics framework, very construed understandings can emerge. If one turns the analysis on its head, some key questions can arise from this discourse and help clarify things, for example, let us consider the cure for cancer, for which it is easy estimate the level of demand; and despite this extensive demand and money invested in it, the market driven systems have not been able provide even a basic cure and resilience against cancer. And similarly, how come we are so far behind in alternative energy solutions despite the demand?

So how is this relevant to the case of Central Asia and Eurasia? (Kalra & Saxena, 2015) Historically, as noted above, the region of Eurasia was the dynamo of curiosity led intellectual development, for example, Al-Khwarizmi’s discovery of Algorithm, and a wide array of physical and chemical principles, translated mineral wealth into global supply chains of then and now. It was the nurturing of science and ‘investment’ in human capital that has played the key role in creating resilience in Eurasia. This pattern has been repeated through myriad political orders of Khanates, Empires and even in the recent past, the Soviet period.

A diagrammatic understanding of Science to Innovation process perhaps can help understand and explain the fabric of the resilience process in Eurasia; the basic principle is as follows:

• Science (similar to Culture and Music) (grasping principles of nature) →

• Engineering (systemising and controlling process, leading to application of science) →

• Technology and Innovation (making engineering useful for public good and/or commercial gain)

Thus the premise here is that those policy makers who achieved an understanding of investing in science and human capital as the key to sustainable economic growth were able to create progress at a global scale, despite the challenges of land-locked geographies, harsh climates, political upheaval and unstable globally linked finance, and indeed, low population densities. So as stated earlier, in the past we have Eurasia at the centre of processes of development, integration and growth. This brings us to the present, so what does it have to offer now? For one, their natural wealth of vast materials and metals, needed to drive a new era of electronics, refrigeration and energy storage underpin all other areas of technology can aid in sustainable global development. This is particularly important when going beyond hydrocarbons and Silicon-based technologies which are prevalent today.

For Eurasia specifically, the following concerns are important to keep in mind in order to not compromise its millennia old intrinsic resilience capacity. In a post-Soviet, new liberal world order in which Eurasia re-industrialises, it should not fall for ‘easy-options’. Easy options often discussed by many developing countries which are industrialising now are different to the needs of Eurasian countries. Eurasia is reindustrialising but their starting point in terms of human capital and institutional capacity remains different. The countries of Central Asia, for example, need to pay close attention to not getting caught up in thinking that technology transfer is the final goal. On the contrary, it is the starting point for developing further technologies. Access to vast materials and metals base, which are needed to drive the new era of electronics, refrigeration and energy storage which underpin all other areas of technology do not rest with IT, 3-D printing and consumer goods. Countries in Central Asia, especially, are home to natural resources of the kind that are essential in future technologies, from metals to hydrocarbons. New industrial and sub sectors of global relevance have potential to be induced in/from Eurasia through deployment of new scientific ideas. For example, the down-stream potential of the oil and gas industry, mining and agro resources are necessary for producing clean-tech and green technologies as well. Polymers and oxide semi-conductor devices like light emitting diodes, solar cells and transistors; cheap deposition of polymers by printing; improve devices by understanding fundamental laws of physics, and can all lead to spin-off technologies which can put Eurasia at the forefront of production and high-technology rather than compete with established players in developed fields. So resilience is not the endgame, it is a kind of insurance policy.

Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan have oil and gas and as a result polymers and plastics on the one hand, while together with the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, they have vast reserves of Rare-Earth minerals. This can help them diversify their economies and lead the change rather than play catch-up to developed countries. Some examples of these kinds of technologies are Spin Nematics (for the next generation of environmental, medical and industrial sensors for applications ranging from satellite communication to chemical industry heat process management and mining exploration); Computer Memories and Information Transport (eg components and fully integrated chips for quantum computation and memory storage); Multifunctional Composites (these can act as both batteries for energy storage and process sunlight for energy production), Magnetic Refrigeration (for example, manipulation of quantum spins can produce refrigeration that no longer requires cumbersome compressors or use of environmentally damaging gases such as CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) and HCFCs (hydro-chlorofluorocarbons) like R-12 or R-22. Such technologies have the potential to power our computers, keep our food fresh); and High Temperature Superconductivity (for dissipation-less transmission of electricity and production of magnets for Maglev High Speed trains as well as plasma confinement reactors for energy production).

Conclusion

The Oxford dictionary defines Resilience as ‘the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties and with toughness’. Historically, Eurasia has not only been resilient but rather been the epicentre of change, transformation and production. Whether it was the Silk Road(s), or home to the most ancient and great civilisations in the world, Eurasia has been at the centre of all things new. The natural connectedness of the Eurasian region allowed for a sharing of resources and led to some of the world’s best science. Home to a plethora of materials and metals, renewable and non-renewable sources of energy, the countries of Eurasia have benefitted from each other through interactions in knowledge production along with exchanges of goods and peoples which has been at the heart of progress through time and space. Even in Soviet times Central Asian countries remained connected with flexible borders, if any, and shared infrastructure which favoured interaction. It is only since the end of the Cold War that we have seen Eurasia, especially countries in Central Asia, question and struggle with their place in the world (Kalra & Saxena, 2007). Rather than play catch-up to the world’s leading economies, countries in the region should look to development paradigms which are Eurasian in character and are generated from within. International organisations and think tanks bring with them Euro-centric concepts of development, economic and otherwise, and fail to take into account the knowledge and technologies that exist within Eurasia.

This special issue is set well within this context and explores Eurasian Science Diplomacy as a concept and practice in this region through time and space. The task here is to consider aspects of the modern concept of science diplomacy and expand it to explain the importance of science and knowledge in this region. The authors in this volume challenge the notion that science diplomacy is somehow new and instead offer examples of how science and scientists have played the role of diplomats and negotiators since before European hegemony. One of the key findings of this issue is the understanding of science as diplomacy. In this special issue, science informs, cultivates and produces collaborations within and outside of societies. This particular culture in science does not rely on political support. Consequently this volume offers a view of the sciences in Eurasian history starting with the paper on ‘The case for Science Diplomacy in Mongol Eurasia in the 13th Century’ by Prajakti Kalra. The Mongol Science-Diplomatic complex thus provided shows the importance of the sciences in the governance of the Mongol Empire. These integral components of the modern hi-tech industry, economy, and markets come in the form of both, scientific discoveries and human capital generated in the Soviet era. Boram Shin’s paper on ‘The East-West Collaboration across the Iron Curtain against Polio Epidemics: Soviet Engagement with Global Health and Poliomyelitis Vaccine Development in 1956–1960’ sheds light on health and medical diplomacy within science diplomacy that showcases the experience of international collaboration on the polio vaccination campaign and its effect on the US-Soviet relations at the height of the Cold War era. Albina Muratbekova’s paper on ‘Soviet science diplomacy: How Central Asia was instrumentalised in Soviet foreign policy’ unpacks the institutional and individual potential of Soviet Central Asian diplomacy especially in Asia. Lastly, Manyang Moon’s paper on ‘South Korea’s Detent with Soviet Russia: Building Diplomatic Relationship through Science and Technology Collaboration, 1988–1998′ examines the highs and lows of Russian-South Korean collaboration in science and technology (S&T) during the first 10 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries (1986–1996).

The special issue offers an insight into how the natural connectedness of the Eurasian region has allowed for a sharing of resources and led to some of the world’s best science. Home to a plethora of materials and metals, renewable and non-renewable sources of energy, the countries of Eurasia have benefitted from each other through interactions in knowledge production along with exchanges of goods and peoples which has been at the heart of progress through time and space. Those policy makers who achieved an understanding of investing in science and human capital as the key to sustainable economic growth were able to create progress at a global scale, despite the challenges of land-locked geographies, harsh climates, political upheaval and unstable globally linked finance, and indeed, low population densities. The pursuit of science has helped diplomatic interactions and created conditions for cooperation and collaboration of ideas, knowledge and industry in Eurasia in time and space (Saxena, 2017). The immediate past of the region can be counterbalanced with a longer historical lens which incorporates the history of Eurasia which is rife with examples of sharing, collaborating and understandings which cut across borders. Production, trade and development of technology are at the heart of the narrative of Eurasia which needs to be addressed in the context of historical developments to fully understand the place of Scientific Diplomacy and its position in Eurasian Development.