2026: Global Environment in Peril: A Look Ahead on the Role of the UN

Abstract

At the dawn of 2026, this Preface Article to the EPL Special Issue 56 (1–2) provides a brief stocktaking since the “global wellbeing is in jeopardy” as the humankind's consumption is “at the rate of 1.7 planets a year”. The UN Charter originally did not contain any reference to the word ‘environment’ or ‘sustainability.’ Yet it's spirit can be traced to some Charter provisions and words embedded therein. Over the years, the UN has played the vanguard role for the global environment protection, global commons and sustainable development. Over the last 65 years [after the 1960 UNGA resolution 1514 (1960)], the UN has tried best to navigate between global developmental requirements and environmental imperatives. Upon the UN attaining historic milestone of 80-years in 2025, the new global headwinds brought intense pressures, humanitarian crises, persistent violent conflicts (affecting two billion people) geopolitical divisions and non-payment of UN's ‘assessed contributions’ reducing it to the “brink of bankruptcy”. The year of 2026 has arrived in the backdrop of 50-years (1975–2025) of UN processes for “revitalization” to make it fit for remaining part of the twenty-first Century. The future trajectory of the UN in the protection of the global environment need to be seen in this context. This preface-cum-article seeks to briefly provide a stocktaking and a look ahead for the UN's future role amid funding crunch, withdrawals from environmental entities and sidelining of the UN from its core function of maintenance of peace and security. 2026 has brought a renewed hope in the election process of the 10^th UNSG to lead the UN in 2027 to vindicate the solemn dedication to “We, the Peoples”. The article modestly urges for an audacity of hope and invites balanced ideational scholarly contributions to lead the way for securing our common planetary future in the UN-led world order.

Introduction

The year 2026 began with literally a bombshell contained in a White House Memorandum (January 07, 2026) ¹ wherein the United States, a founder member of the United Nations (UN), chose to withdraw from 31 UN entities and 35 non-UN entities. It included, as a major blow, some of the entities engaged in environment related works such as IPCC, ITTO, IUCN, IREA, ISA, IPBES and the UNFCCC. It came even as the UN Charter ² attained 80th anniversary (1945–2025). ³ It elicited response from the UN in legal terms since payment of assessed contributions is a “legal obligation under the UN Charter for all Member States, including the United States” ⁴ . In the final year of the second term (2017–2026) of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres, the world appears to be “caught in a turbulent tailspin" ⁵ and perception that the “law of power is prevailing over the power of law” ⁶ .

The rollout of the election process ⁷ in accordance with the UNGA resolution 79/ 327 ⁸ (September 05, 2025) as well as a joint letter (November 25, 2025) ⁹ of the President of the General Assembly (GA) and the President of the Security Council (SC), for election of the 10^th UNSG holds great significance at the historic milestone of the UN@80. As of early February 2026, in view of turn of Latin America, two nominations have been officially filed by Argentina (Rafael Mariano Grossi) as well as Brazil, Chile and Mexico (Michelle Bachelet Jeria). The UNGA President has further laid down the process of interactive dialogues ¹⁰ for the nominated candidates in the week of April 20, 2026 (with April 01, 2026 as the last date of nominations). This yearlong election process for the next UNSG holds vital significance since prognosis (priorities) for 2026 by the UNSG has underscored a grave crisis of “race to bankruptcy” ¹¹ along with growing global incidences wherein “International law is trampled. Cooperation is eroding. And multilateral institutions are under assault on many fronts” ¹² . It shows that in times of profound flux the selection/election of the incoming chief administrative officer (Charter Article 97) of the UN would be crucial to navigate the organization out of the challenge of sidelining of the UN in favor of other parallel processes (such as the Gaza Board of Peace), epidemic of impunity for brazen violations of International Law and geopolitical minefields.

In the wake of the 2024 Summit of the Future ¹³ and its outcome document (Pact for the Future) ¹⁴ , the year 2025 was expected to be the “Year of Hope” ¹⁵ in the 80^th year of UN's remarkable trajectory. Though the 1945 UN Charter ¹⁶ did not contain any reference to the word ‘environment’ or ‘sustainability’ per se, yet it's spirit could be traced to some of the Charter provisions and words embedded therein. Thus, over the years, the UN has been placed in the vanguard position with changing needs of the member states, among others, for the protection of the global environment, global commons and sustainable development.

UN Role in Global Environment Protection

The UN embarked upon global environmentalism is a big way after some early law-making UNGA resolutions such as the ‘decolonization’ (1514 of 1960) ¹⁷ , ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ (1803 of 1962) ¹⁸ and the ‘declaration on friendly relations’ (2625 of 1970). ¹⁹ However, it took a formal shape with the Swedish initiative in 1968. After the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution 1346 (XLV) ²⁰ on July 30, 1968, it was duly endorsed by the UNGA resolution 2398 (XXIII) of December 03, 1968 ²¹ “to convene in 1972 a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment”. It culminated in the first 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) ²² that took place in the “shadow of the Cold War and the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which led to profound political cleavages at Stockholm ²³ ”. As it is said, the rest is history since the UN adopted ‘global conferencing’ technique’, ²⁴ at a periodicity of roughly ten years. According to Peter Haas, the “Global mega-conferences such as UNCHE and its successors have helped empower actors, disseminate norms, establish rules, and created new institutions ²⁵ .” Over the last 65 years, especially after the 1960 ‘decolonization’ resolution, the UN has tried its best to navigate between the developmental requirements and environmental imperatives of its member states that has grown from original 50 to 193 today. The historic North-South discourse ²⁶ ran through this arduous process with mixed results especially for the developing countries that came out of the colonial yoke.

It seems the humankind has not yet come to the grips with the “predicament” ²⁷ of striking a judicious balance between environment and development. Lessons from human evolution, rise and fall of civilizations, wisdom of saints, rishis and sages have shown that there are ‘limits’ to everything that requires balancing between human needs and greed. This has been ordained by modern scientific understanding too that much of the global development, profligate lifestyles, wasteful consumption and natural resource extractive production patterns are not sustainable. The conflicting national positions and quest for material wealth litters the pathway in every part of the world. The graphic description of “two different worlds, two separate planets, two unequal humanities” for the North-South divide (by the economist Mahbub-ul-Haq) at the 1972 Stockholm Conference still haunts the world. As observed by Haq, “In your world, there is a concern today about the quality of life; in our world, there is concern about life itself which is threatened by hunger and malnutrition.” ²⁸ It now appears, the Gandhian (1908) warnings about choice between our needs and greed as well as lament of Tagore (1908) on “progress towards what and progress for whom” seems to have been left far behind. ²⁹

The prognosis of the world we live in shows mindless quest for progress at the cost of our essential ecological processes. It endangers survival of the life on planet earth. The quagmire of global environmental crisis stares us in the face. This author's 1992 audacious prediction has almost come true that “if the current pace persists, people will be forced to move with gas masks in some of the mega-cities in the not-too-distant future” ³⁰ . With 8 billion (2022) ³¹ world population expected to reach frightening levels of 10 billion (2050), one can only imagine the kind of life the future generations will inherit. The words of late Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (expressed poetically in Hindi), reflect our graphic reality that “Human being has reached the moon but does not know how to live as a human on the planet earth”!

The choice of the UN system as the fulcrum was obvious since it is the only preeminent global political organization of the sovereign states. It commands confidence notwithstanding the misguided pastime of UN-bashing practiced by some member states. Over the years, the UN has put into practice the global conferencing technique. As a result, the 1972 Stockholm Conference was followed by further environmental confabulations in Rio de Janeiro (1992) ³² , Johannesburg (2002) ³³ , Rio de Janeiro (2012) ³⁴ and Stockholm+50 (2022) ³⁵ and the Summit of the Future (2024) ³⁶ . On the one hand, celebrations of these environmental anniversaries show the penchant for hypothesis that ‘global problems need global solutions’. Yet the global environmental conditions have only worsened over the years notwithstanding all the mega global conferences, regulatory processes, creation of institutional maze and spending of a staggering amount of funds. Was it worth it? Despite marshalling of the entire UN's system, responsibility for worsening of the global environment by failing to adhere to the global goalposts, commitments and solemn summit declarations remains responsibility of the 193 sovereign UN member states. Thus walking-the-talk and how nations behave matters most in addressing global environmental challenges so as to secure the “planetary future” ³⁷ .

The stocktaking of the global environmental problems and evaluation of the regulatory approaches took heightened form during three 2022–2024 back-to-back processes: the Stockholm+50 Conference, ³⁸ the SDG Summit ³⁹ and the Summit of the Future ⁴⁰ . Now the UN has on its agenda implementation of the 2024 Pact for the Future, regarded as once-in-a-generation opportunity. It comprises two annexes: (i) Global Digital Compact and (ii) Declaration of Future Generations. Though the international environmental institutions have provided useful forums for international cooperation on a variety of issues, the nature, content, quality, and implementation of the legal instruments remains worrisome.

The creeping processes of ‘institutionalization’ of international environmental law-making and institution-building have shown remarkable growth. Yet the global environment has continued to deteriorate. In lamenting about the grim global environmental scenario, in his opening remarks at Stockholm+50, the UNSG Guterres succinctly observed:

“today the global wellbeing is in jeopardy, in large part because we have not kept our promises on the environment…Earth's natural systems cannot keep up with our demands. We are consuming at the rate of 1.7 planets a year.” ⁴¹

As the UNSG addressed the august gathering at the 2022 Stockholm+50 Conference and pleaded to “lead us out of this mess”, his clarion call to address the “triple planetary crises” seemed like a cry of a lonely sparrow in the wilderness. UNSG was referring to climate induced migration and deaths, loss of biodiversity threatening some three billion people and the global pollution and wastes which yearly costs some nine million lives. Similarly, the executive director of the UN Environment Program, Inger Andersen, expressed the guilt on what went wrong in the five decades (since 1972 Stockholm) of the global regulatory enterprise:

“If Indira Gandhi or Olof Palme were here today, what excuses would we offer up for our inadequate action? None that they would accept. They would tell us that further inaction is inexcusable” ⁴² .

Thus, the 2022 Stockholm event remained a timid acknowledgement of things going terribly wrong since the 1972 Stockholm event. Still, it lacked the courage for a decisive course correction. The time seemed to stand still with the “world problematique” diagnosed in the 1972 Club of Rome report, Limits to Growth. ⁴³ Hence, follow-up to the outcome of the 2024 Summit of the Future and translating into action the Pact for the Future ⁴⁴ remains crucial for securing the “planetary future” ⁴⁵ .

Processes of Institutionalization

In the UN-led world order, the global environmental regulatory process is primarily spearheaded by the sovereign states. The UN has provided an institutionalized forum in various shapes (plenary organs of the UNGA, ECOSOC as well as subsidiary organs, specialized agencies and MEA convention secretariats etc.) to catalyse and institutionalize governance of the global environment, global commons and sustainable development. Accordingly, it is duly moulded by international environmental institutions (IEI), which act as catalysts, stimulators, and active participants. It reflects a remarkable symbiosis between the development of law and the various institutions in the field. In turn, the mosaic of IEG architecture provides an interesting picture of a web of institutionalization at work. The growing corpus of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) ⁴⁶ has significantly contributed to the proliferation of sector-specific institutions that cater to the global regulatory requirements. ⁴⁷ As compared to these regime-specific institutions, several specialized international environmental institutions (IEIs) like the UN Environment Program (UNEP), ⁴⁸ the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), ⁴⁹ which replaced the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), ⁵⁰ and the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) ⁵¹ have been constituted by the political organs of the UN (UNGA the ECOSOC). This could be augmented in the future with the “repurpose” and revival of the UN Trusteeship Council (UNTC) ⁵² .

The advent of MEAs and other IEIs, shows persistent growth in institutional actors – and the clogging of this space – in the environmental field. This situation has contributed to making the environmental institutional scenario highly complex. In turn, it presents significant challenges in addressing issues of institutional coordination, interlinkages as well as synergy. ⁵³ As a plenary organ of the UN, the UNGA has played a crucial role in designing the institutions and marshalling of the prevalent ‘global conferencing’ technique. ⁵⁴ During the last more than six decades, the UNGA has shown intense engagement in the global environmental arena, acted as a ‘conductor of a grand orchestra’, providing political guidance to states, ⁵⁵ notwithstanding the built-in Charter limitation that it can only make recommendations through its principal instrumentality of resolutions (Article 11). ⁵⁶ The designing of the three global instruments for regulation of climate change is a case in point. However, after more than 33 years, entire 1992 UNFCCC process appears to be floundering. ⁵⁷ A pall of gloom has been further cast after the US President's address (September 23, 2025) in the UNGA High-level Debate that termed carbon footprint “a hoax.” ⁵⁸

The UNGA has also adopted, often without a vote, resolutions comprising constituent instruments of specialized environmental institutions such as UNEP, the CSD, the HLPF, and the UNFF. In this context, an analytical study of the design of IEIs with a focus on the CSD and its replacement with the HLPF (pursuant to UNGA Resolution 67/290) is a good example of the changing character and trend of institutional designs at work. After the Millennium Summit (2000) ⁵⁹ , the UNGA has resorted to further institutional ‘engineering’ by making of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), the Environment Management Group (EMG), the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF), the HLPF, and, in 2013, the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). It also saw the unmaking of institutions such as the Environmental Coordination Board, the UNEP Governing Council, the GMEF, and the CSD. The role played by these institutions has often resulted in overlapping jurisdictions, working at cross-purposes, turf wars, and the wastage of resources. ⁶⁰ Cumulatively, they did not help in efficiently and effectively realizing the goal of institutionalized international environmental cooperation.

At the same time, the multiplicity of institutions has also made the task of coordination very difficult. In fact, a lack of coordination has emerged as one of the major challenges of IEG. Some studies have underscored that the system of IEG that has developed since the 1972 Stockholm Conference is not only too complicated, but it is also steadily getting worse. As a result of the current state of the IEG architecture, lack of interest in crafting de novo remedial institutions and the effects of fatigue and a rudderless navigation urgently calls for some concrete and least-cost solutions to address the global environmental crisis. To begin with, this ordains availing the ‘low-hanging fruits’ (such as ‘repurpose’ of the UNTC and upgrading of the UNEP as a ‘specialized agency’) to galvanize global environmental institutional responses. In turn, they would pave the way for revitalization of the entire global environmental regulatory framework to secure the planetary future.

Conclusion A Look Ahead

The year 2026 would need to be continuation of audacity of hope by staying the course and swift institutional overhauling amid big geopolitical shocks in the first year (since January 20, 2025) of the second Donald Trump Administration (2025–2028). In a way, it has caused “great rupture” in the architecture of the International Rules-based [Law] Order as well as sidelining and unsettling primacy of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security. Notwithstanding all, the nature of the global environmental challenges calls for continuation of persistent efforts to reign in inherently exploitative nature of the global model of development in the larger interests of the humankind. This calls for ideational contributions by scholars leading the way to provide futuristic solutions including elevation of the global regulatory approach from a “common concern” to a “planetary concern” ⁶¹ . The Editor-in-Chief invites interests of the scholars from around the world in this respect for contributions to the EPL as a global journal for decision makers. The year 2025 was reasonably expected to be the Year of Hope ⁶² as the UNGA resolution 79 (270) ⁶³ emphasized on “the relevance of hope and well-being as universal goals and aspirations in the lives of human beings around the world”. We can again hope against hope for better prospects in the year 2026 for common “planetary future” of the humankind in the UN-led world order.

EPL special issue on ICT advisory opinions on climate change

As a sequel to the EPL Issue 55 (6), this issue further comprises five scholalrly contributions on the ICJ Advisory Opinions on Climate Change as follows:

(i) “A New Point of Departure: Reflections on the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Climate Change” (Felix Lange and Julian Schophaus). Though the ICJ Opinion did not reinvent the law on climate change, this article examines the ‘obligation of progression’ under the Paris Agreement, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment and the issue of state responsibility for climate harm. In view of the limitation of an ‘advisory opinion’, the article opines that “expectations should not be too high” and it could be construed as providing a “baseline for future political negotiations among states”.

(ii) “Due Diligence, Obligations to Cooperate and to Regulate Private Actors: Insights from Three Climate Change Advisory Opinions” (Joshua Paine). It has examined three aspects of due diligence, obligations to cooperate and obligation to regulate private actors. It takes the view that ‘due diligence’ obligation falling upon the States varies depending upon various context-specific factors (including the capabilities of the State concerned). The States have a duty to regulate effectively the activities of private (non-State) actors causing climate change without recourse to any unmanageable indeterminacy or excuse for national circumstances driven climate inaction.

(iii) “Strengthening the Global Response to Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Reflections on the ICJ's Advisory Opinion” (Daniëlla Dam-de Jong). It has examined the principle of sustainable development that requires states to balance environmental, social and economic considerations for present and future generations. It views that the Opinion provides “little guidance” on attaining such balance though the ICJ was in “in a unique position to clarify” on how balancing exercise should be conducted.” In order to give effect to the legal obligations of the States, the author considers SDGs providing a lens to assess synergies between development and environmental protection on the bedrock of equity and CBDR-RC.

(iv) “Displacement in the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Climate Change” (Jane McAdam). It considers rising tide of displacement as a “severe and far-reaching” consequences of climate change. The time-tested principle of non-refoulement especially in life-threatening situation provides a lifeline to those who cross national boundaries to seek refuge. The author takes an optimistic view that the Court's recognition of the interconnectedness between international human rights law, environmental law and climate change law provides a beacon of hope to address the global challenge of human displacements. Going beyond non-refoulement, the author underscores the need for adaptation and disaster risk reduction measures to avert displacement altogether, or at least to mitigate its impacts.

(v) “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Soil Security: The Wider ICJ Advisory Opinion Nexus?” (Oliver C Ruppel and Ruda Murray). It has sought to examine the ICJ AO in the context of “indispensable” domain of the governance of soils. It argues that the court's articulation of states’ obligations to safeguard the climate and human rights need to encompass the protection of soil. As a corollary, the article has construed the legal foundations for soil-related obligations (comprising prevention, regulation, remediation, and cooperation) within the existing frameworks of international human rights and the environment. Taking a larger view, the authors contend that anthropocentrism and ecocentrism is juridically permeable and so is the transnational line between national and international law. Hence, on the premise of ethical insight, scientific evidence, and factual necessity into an enforceable duty, it makes a plea for considering life and soil as inseparable.

Finally, the EPL issue also includes a regular submission: “Environmental Pollution Liability: A Comparative Legal Study of EU, Kazakhstan and Russia” (Andrey Balobeyev, Gulzhazira Ilyassova, Yerzhan Yegemberdiyev, Ardak Biyebayeva). It provides a comparative legal analysis of current criminal law provisions on environmental offences in the EU, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation. It probes differences, strengths, and limitations across these jurisdictions and intersection of criminal and environmental law.