Abstract
This article explores the evolving concept of ecocide within international criminal law, focusing on its normative development and potential deterrent function. Although not formally recognized under the Rome Statute, ecocide's growing presence in legal and political discourse reflects a broader shift in how environmental harm is conceptualized. The analysis considers national legislative efforts, ICC discourse, and complementary approaches such as transitional justice and symbolic legislation. It also highlights structural limitations, including enforcement gaps and the focus on individual responsibility. The article argues that ecocide, rather than being a fully codified crime, currently stands at a critical normative juncture shaped by legal experimentation, global advocacy, and expanding expectations of accountability in the face of ecological destruction.
Introduction
The concept of ecocide has gained notable traction in recent years, with environmental disasters prompting renewed attention across various disciplines. Simultaneously, legal challenges emerging throughout international law have intensified curiosity and concern regarding the environment's place within this evolving legal landscape. Even long-established legal structures—once regarded as stable—are being reexamined, and environmental issues have acquired a visibility that can no longer be overlooked.
The term ecocide, modeled on the word genocide, conveys rhetorical and moral weight, underscoring the seriousness of the harm it denotes. Yet translating this symbolic gravity into binding international legal norms remains complex. A growing body of literature explores how serious and deliberate environmental destruction should be defined, prevented, and penalized. Central to this discourse is whether ecocide falls within the scope of existing crimes under the Rome Statute or whether it should be recognized as a distinct fifth core international crime.
This study approaches that question through the lens of deterrence, analyzing ecocide's normative emergence and the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in shaping its legal trajectory. It begins by outlining ecocide's conceptual and historical development, followed by an assessment of its current and potential status under the Rome Statute. The discussion then turns to legal limitations, as well as complementary and alternative frameworks. Finally, the deterrent capacity of ecocide—whether addressed within existing provisions or as an autonomous crime—is evaluated in connection with its normative trajectory and the ICC's symbolic and legal functions.
Definition and context
The conceptual development of ecocide began in 1970, when American biologist Arthur W. Galston coined the term and proposed an international treaty for its prevention at the Conference on War and National Responsibility, 1 and it continued at the Stockholm Conference in 1972, with the Swedish Prime Minister describing the Vietnam War's environmental damage as “ecocide.” 2 One of the earliest formal definitions of ecocide was offered by Richard Falk in a 1973 article, in which he also proposed an international regulatory framework for the crime. The UN subcommittee on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities suggested including Ecocide in the genocide convention in 1978, and the proposal was discussed at the time. 3 Ecocide, defined as the widespread, violent, and systematic destruction of ecosystems/planets, 4 has been debated in the international arena since the 1970s and addressed by the United Nations and the International Law Commission. As a result of the Vietnam War, many countries, including Vietnam, 5 which regulates Ecocide under domestic law, and later Russia, 6 consider Ecocide to be a crime under domestic law. It has been suggested that ecocide has long been a topic of international concern, particularly within the United Nations, and required to be classified as the fifth crime against international peace and security. 7 Ecocide is often considered the most serious form of international environmental crime. Other offenses involve environmental harm but fall short of ecosystem destruction. While such descriptions may lack a firm legal basis for prosecution, they remain a meaningful starting point in conceptualizing ecocide. 8 This historical and conceptual foundation sets the stage for contemporary discussions that frame ecocide not only as a legal question but as a matter of global responsibility.
The Amazon rainforest crisis illustrates two key points: national environmental decisions can have global consequences, and an urgent international response is needed when states neglect climate responsibilities. Brazilian President Bolsonaro has been widely criticized for endangering public welfare through his environmental policies. This case revived the concept of responsible sovereignty and reaffirmed states’ duty to protect under the UN framework. In response to such conduct, some have called for sanctions and other punitive measures, framing Bolsonaro's actions as a form of “ecocide.” 9 Macron also described the Amazon fires as “ecocide” and threatened Brazil to prevent free trade. Macron, one of the concept's most vocal proponents, also initiated measures to criminalize Ecocide in France's climate policies while highlighting that he sees Ecocide as a global issue. 10 Despite prolonged debate and growing urgency, international criminal law still lacks a comprehensive framework for large-scale environmental harm.
The Case for a Fifth Crime
A core challenge in addressing ecocide through international criminal law is the limitation of the current legal framework, particularly within the Rome Statute of the ICC. As Winter observes, ecocide could serve both deterrent and punitive functions in response to severe environmental harm. However, international law remains fragmented and exploitable. Currently, environmental destruction is criminalized only when linked to additional elements, not as an autonomous offense focused on environmental protection. 11
Although the Rome Statute does not establish a standalone offense targeting environmental destruction, environmental concerns are marginally addressed within the framework of war crimes. The most direct provision in this regard is Article 8(2)(b)(iv), which criminalizes: “Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” 12 This provision criminalizes attacks that cause “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to the environment if such harm is clearly excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage. Environmental harm may sometimes fall under crimes against humanity (Article 7) or genocide (Article 6), particularly when deliberate destruction of natural resources leads to forced displacement or loss of livelihoods. However, these categories are context-dependent and not tailored to ecocide. Adding a new core crime like ecocide under the Rome Statute requires a state-driven process defined in Articles 121–123, including a two-thirds majority and individual ratification, with Article 123 allowing for Review Conferences. 13
The call to recognize ecocide as an international crime continues to gain traction. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor has included environmental destruction among the serious crimes it seeks to address in cooperation with national systems, identifying environmental massacre as a key concern. A related policy document, viewed as a significant step, outlines plan to investigate such crimes. 14 The ICC also acknowledges that environmental harm, land grabbing, and illegal resource exploitation violate human rights, particularly the right to life. In countries with weak governance, such as Cambodia, land deals often trigger displacement, livelihood loss, and ecological degradation. 15
Although these developments are viewed positively, they have yet to produce substantive changes in the current legal landscape. Executing an investigation into environmental degradation could advance the conversation about including it in the court's jurisdiction, but there isn’t enough international support for Ecocide recognized as a crime. 16 Scholars argue that although the inclusion of ecocide in the Rome Statute may at first appear radical, it becomes both appropriate and imperative when considered through the lens of ecological integrity. This perspective highlights the need for corporate accountability, a shift away from anthropocentrism, and the potential of strict liability to enhance deterrence and address the urgency of crossing planetary boundaries. 17 The growing discourse around ecocide underscores both the promise and the limits of international criminal law. It continues to evolve not despite these structural constraints, but alongside them.
Challenges and Limits of Criminalizing Ecocide
Efforts to criminalize ecocide are gaining momentum, yet translating this normative goal into binding international law presents significant conceptual and legal challenges. Defining a new environmental crime is particularly difficult, as the Rome Statute contains only limited references to environmental harm and lacks provisions for peacetime destruction. Nevertheless, ongoing ICC debates reflect growing recognition of environmental concerns, and the need for a more ecologically responsive legal framework is increasingly urgent. 18
The transboundary nature of environmental crises limits the effectiveness of domestic laws and underscores the need for internationally accepted definitions of environmental crimes. Key barriers to criminalization include sovereignty concerns, definitional ambiguity, the moral element of liability and challenges in establishing appropriate sentencing frameworks. 19 Beyond recognizing ecocide as a crime under the ICC, whether the environment can be treated as a legal victim remains a distinct debate. Some studies point to a key limitation: international law typically requires human victims, making it difficult to grant victim status to ecosystems. This raises broader challenges for conceptualizing the environment as a subject of legal protection. 20
Environmental harm often results from deliberate, strategic cost-benefit decisions. 21 The implications of criminalizing ecocide remain under active debate. The Court's exclusive emphasis on individual criminal responsibility is increasingly seen as a structural shortcoming, especially considering that states and corporate entities, often central actors in large-scale environmental degradation, currently fall outside the Court's direct jurisdiction. 22 This gap highlights the limitations of an individual-focused model in holding powerful economic and political actors accountable. Given that the ICC prosecutes only individuals, one possibility is the prosecution of senior executives who issue directives resulting in large-scale ecological harm. 23
Mehta, president of the Stop Ecocide Foundation, argues that targeting individuals is crucial for deterrence and prevention. She explains that corporate decisions are ultimately made by individuals who often evade responsibility behind the corporate veil—while companies may face fines, decision-makers remain largely unaffected. Since corporations cannot be imprisoned, she emphasizes that holding individuals accountable directly impacts their personal freedom, prospects, and corporate reputation. 24 Critics argue that targeting individuals like CEOs may fail to address systemic negligence within corporate structures. The deterrent impact of individual liability depends not only on legal feasibility under the Rome Statute but also on its ability to influence broader corporate behavior. Cases like the Exxon Valdez oil spill show how blame is deflected to lower-level staff. Advocates of Corporate Criminal Liability argue that prosecuting corporations directly may better deter harmful practices by affecting both executives and shareholders. 25 Kate Mackintosh 26 argues that ecocide could serve as a powerful deterrent, especially for corporate actors. She emphasizes that large-scale environmental harm often stems from commercial activity, and prosecutions would likely target senior executives. The threat of international criminal charges, along with reputational and financial risks, could influence corporate decision-making more effectively than existing crimes, which typically involve ideologically motivated political actors. 27 These arguments have spurred interest in corporate liability models that complement individual accountability frameworks.
Creating a crime for ecological harm could deter state and corporate actors, but its effectiveness depends on cooperation, complementarity, and enforcement. Extraditing powerful corporations may face resistance, and assigning individual liability is difficult when no domestic law is violated. Major powers like China, India, Russia, and the U.S. remain outside ICC jurisdiction, weakening its reach and raising concerns about post-colonial bias and neglect of structural harm in the Global South. 28 For ecocide to attain effective legal status at the international level, any proposed definition must garner state consensus and widespread political support to facilitate amendment of the Rome Statute. In the interim, the primary focus should be on preventing and deterring actions that harm our remaining ecosystems and contribute to irreversible climate change. 29 The Stop Ecocide Campaign highlights the deterrent aspect, stating that “the more countries endorse the crime, the narrower the scope of operation for major polluters, and working in harmony with nature will become more appealing”. 30 Still, without sufficient state engagement and jurisdictional coherence, the deterrent potential of these developments may remain limited.
Several countries have incorporated the crime of ecocide into their national legal frameworks. For instance, France's 2021 ‘Climate & Resilience Act’ criminalizes actions causing serious and lasting damage to health, flora, fauna, or environmental quality, with penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment. 31 Russia's Criminal Code, under Article 358, punishes mass destruction of wildlife or severe environmental contamination with 12 to 20 years of imprisonment. 32 Similarly, Kazakhstan's Article 161 imposes 10 to 15 years imprisonment for acts leading to ecological catastrophes. 33 Other nations, including Vietnam, 34 Uzbekistan, 35 and the Kyrgyz Republic, have enacted comparable laws addressing severe environmental crimes. 36
Adding to these many countries have proposed or are in the process of proposing laws to criminalize ecocide. In July 2023, Mexico introduced a bill to amend the Federal Penal Code, imposing 10 to 15 years in prison for severe and long-term environmental harm, based on the 2021 definition of ecocide. 37 That same month Italy 38 and the Netherlands 39 proposed similar legislation, and Spain's Catalan Parliament approved a bill to include ecocide in the national Penal Code. 40 In November 2023, the UK introduced an Ecocide Bill, and the Scottish Parliament considered a proposal to criminalize major polluters with 10 to 20-year sentences. 41 On 8 November 2023, Brazil's Deputies Chamber also approved a bill to criminalize ecocide, with support from environmental organizations. 42 Belgium adopted an ecocide law, following Council of State review 43 becoming the first European country to recognize the crime at both national and international levels. These reforms support legal innovation and global norm development.
The Directive (EU) 2024/1203, adopted on April 11, 2024, strengthens the EU's environmental legal framework by imposing stricter sanctions for widespread and severe ecological harm. Replacing Directive 2008/99/EC, it expands corporate and individual liability and aligns with growing recognition of ecocide. The directive harmonizes enforcement across member states and supports ongoing efforts to establish ecocide as an international crime, including under the ICC. 44 Although Directive strengthens environmental protection through criminal law, some experts argue that monetary fines alone may not deter large corporations with significant resources. Ashmore and Barnes highlight the need for additional tools, including stricter enforcement, executive accountability, and reputational consequences. This view aligns with broader debates on ecocide and corporate liability, emphasizing the need for legal frameworks that move beyond financial penalties to ensure effective deterrence. 45 The Working Group on the National Criminalisation of Ecocide stresses the need to distinguish between infringement and endangerment in domestic laws. Infringement involves actual harm, while endangerment concerns risky conduct, proven or not. Legislators must decide whether to define ecocide based on harm or risk. 46 As legal innovation accelerates, so too does the imperative to design ecocide frameworks that balance enforceability with normative clarity.
Complementary and Alternative Legal Pathways
Given the limitations of prosecuting ecocide solely through the Rome Statute, scholars have proposed complementary approaches. Gillett outlines three: the status quo relies on Article 8(2)(b)(iv), limited to wartime harm; the amendment approach seeks to revise the Statute to include environmental crimes; and the International Court for the Environment (ICE) model envisions a specialized tribunal with broad jurisdiction to address environmental harm, including corporate liability, restorative justice, and ecocentric principles. 47 Scholars emphasize the role of alternative, non-state forums in advancing environmental justice. While Higgins critiqued international law's foundations, she did not extend this to institutions like the ICJ or ICC. Her work nonetheless supports exploring mechanisms like the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, which, though unenforceable, holds normative value in amplifying marginalized claims. 48 These developments suggest the potential value of informal or hybrid mechanisms in filling normative and procedural gaps left by state-centered institutions.
According to Stahn, repression is only one aspect of international criminal justice, which also pursues broader goals such as prevention, deterrence, and the denunciation of atrocity patterns. It further influences domestic legal and political systems by promoting reform or post-conflict stability. While retribution and deterrence focus on individuals, collective approaches dominate areas like compensation, security reform, and transitional justice. 49 The ICC's ability to combine punitive, deterrent, and transitional justice functions may make it more effective in addressing environmental harm than traditional prosecutorial bodies. This view aligns with Stahn's emphasis on the multifaceted nature of international justice, where individual accountability is complemented by collective mechanisms like compensation and institutional reform. Within this framework, the ICC and Transitional Justice Mechanisms should be seen as complementary. Their collaboration through prosecutions and restorative processes can strengthen public engagement, support policy reform, and improve redress for affected communities. 50 Although existing prosecutions support accountability and reduce impunity, the sanctions under Article 77 of the Rome Statute—imprisonment, fines, and asset forfeiture—may be inadequate for addressing the widespread and lasting effects of environmental harm. In response, restorative measures focused on ecological rehabilitation have been proposed as more effective alternatives. 51 However, for these alternatives to succeed, they must be embedded in broader legal and political strategies that address structural impunity.
Despite the potential of integrative models, the ICC still faces structural constraints. Scholars argue that weak enforcement and political reluctance, rather than definitional gaps, are the main barriers. Without institutional capacity, criminalizing ecocide may have limited impact. Critics question reliance on monetary penalties for corporations and suggest alternatives like equity-based fines, executive accountability, and restorative measures focused on environmental repair. 52 Observers note that by recognizing both symbolic and reparative compensation under Article 75 and promoting institutional reform, the ICC adopts a more integrated approach that extends beyond prosecution. Unlike ad hoc mechanisms such as the UNCC, permanent structures are seen as more effective in closing accountability gaps. Addressing unresolved aspects of environmental compensation is also considered vital for more consistent responses. 53 While such complementary frameworks expand the normative landscape surrounding ecocide, Important questions remain regarding the deterrent potential of defining ecocide either within the existing legal architecture or as a standalone international crime.
Deterrence Through Fragmented Protection vs. Autonomous Criminalization
As support for ecocide grows, debate has intensified over whether fragmented legal protections can deter environmental harm or if a distinct international crime is needed to ensure accountability. Commentators argue that the Rome Statute's wartime focus fails to address peacetime destruction. These limitations undermine both liability and deterrence. A separate crime could improve legal clarity, strengthen the principle of legality, and support a more coherent normative framework. 54 Gillett argued that the use of genocide and crimes against humanity as legal categories, rather than directly prosecuting environmental harm, does not necessarily reflect the international community's condemnation of environmental destruction itself. 55 International criminal justice seeks to punish, deter harm, and provide remedies to victims. Penalties for ecocide would likely include both punitive and reparative measures such as fines, deferred imprisonment, and environmental restoration. Although some question whether ecocide meaningfully differs from other Crimes Against Peace, ongoing prosecutions signal growing international commitment. Advocates argue that even limited enforcement can have a deterrent effect. 56
Recognizing ecocide as an international crime could enhance deterrence by enabling broad condemnation of large-scale environmental harm in both conflict and peacetime. Beyond its judicial role, the ICC contributes normatively by shaping legal discourse and advancing environmental justice. Incorporating ecological concerns into interpretation and enforcement is essential for a more coherent international legal response. 57 In parallel, some commentators argue that holding individuals in corporate and governmental roles criminally liable for environmental harm could deter similar conduct by others. This view emphasizes the need for normative change, especially in addressing systemic failures that permit environmental harm and rights violations to go unpunished. The proposal to establish crimes against future generations is seen as a forward-looking legal innovation to support sustainable development. 58 These forward-looking proposals also reflect broader ambitions to redefine the legal language of environmental responsibility.
However, some scholars adopt a more skeptical stance regarding the deterrent capacity of international criminal law in general. Drumbl argues that even in the prosecution of the gravest crimes—such as genocide or crimes against humanity—international tribunals often fail to achieve their stated goals of retribution and deterrence. The Rome Statute refers to these aims only in broad terms and lacks clear guidance on how they should be operationalized in sentencing or enforcement. According to Drumbl, this gap between aspiration and implementation significantly undermines the preventive function of the system, especially when it comes to complex or collective harms such as environmental destruction. 59 Ambos argues that, from a criminal policy standpoint, ecocide is part of a broader trend of using penal law to protect the environment. At the international level, the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes and Security of Mankind 60 is often referenced, with Article 26 proposing the crime of “willful and severe damage to the environment.” The drafters aimed for this to create a conscious shift, relying on a general preventive effect rather than just negative deterrence. 61 However, no empirical evidence supports this expectation. Criminological studies on the effectiveness of criminal law, in both positive and negative terms, suggest that the outcomes may not be as promising as hoped. 62 This empirical skepticism invites a reassessment of how deterrence is conceptualized and measured in international legal contexts.
“Hardly any empirical study has managed to demonstrate deterrent impact credibly and to trace clear patterns of causation and weigh intermediate causes.” 63 Although concrete evidence of the ICC's deterrent effect remains limited—especially in the short term—some cases suggest that the threat of prosecution may influence state and non-state actors. The Lord's Resistance Army reportedly considered ICC indictments during surrender negotiations, with the 2015 transfer of Dominic Ongwen cited as an example. Similarly, after Colombia ratified the Rome Statute, paramilitary commanders appeared more aware of potential prosecution, even if this did not immediately curb violations. Such instances imply that, while deterrence is difficult to measure, the ICC may function as strategic leverage in conflict contexts. However, cases like Sudan expose its limits, as ICC action and Security Council involvement failed to halt ongoing atrocities, raising doubts about its deterrent power in politically resistant environments. 64 Ultimately, deterrence remains a contested concept that is difficult to evaluate and even harder to implement in practice, with its effectiveness undermined by persistent enforcement challenges. 65
According to some analyses, the ICC's emphasis on individual criminal responsibility would place liability for ecocide on influential figures within governments, industries, and financial institutions, rather than on corporate entities or states. Advocates contend that the risk of being prosecuted alongside war criminals could serve as a powerful deterrent, particularly for business leaders and financiers. 66 The Stop Ecocide campaign highlights the potential of criminalizing environmental destruction to generate an immediate deterrent effect, arguing that no corporate executive or financier would risk association with the stigma of international crimes. Criminal prosecution is presented as a more effective deterrent than administrative or civil mechanisms, with the ICC's role extending beyond punishment to influencing broader social and normative contexts. Including ecocide within the Court's jurisdiction is thus framed to strengthen accountability, promote reparations, and reinforce global condemnation of large-scale environmental harm. Still, criminalization alone is unlikely to resolve the systemic drivers of ecological devastation. 67 General justifications for criminalization offer further perspective. While there is empirical skepticism about the ICC's deterrent effect, some argue that accusing business owners of a crime as grave as genocide could undermine their determination. Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that national criminalization has a deterrent impact on environmental harm. 68
International criminal law entails political and legal costs, as it may hold individuals accountable for state-approved actions. Although it carries symbolic and normative value, securing state support for criminalizing certain acts remains challenging, especially in the case of ecocide, which implicates economic interests. Promoting its recognition requires confronting the longstanding marginalization of environmental issues in international law and politics. 69 The ICC's deterrent effect depends largely on its ability to enforce arrests and secure convictions. Its first conviction, in the Lubanga case, came after a decade-long delay, rendering its early deterrent role mostly symbolic. Political pressures in cases like Sudan and Uganda have further undermined its credibility, especially when post-conflict settlements grant immunity. Deterrence also weakens when officials evade justice, though indirect measures like sanctions or isolation may still exert pressure. Consistent enforcement and state cooperation remain essential. 70 Beyond the contested role of deterrence, the intensifying legal and normative interest in ecocide illustrates an evolution in how international law frames responsibility for environmental harm.
Normative Foundations and Symbolic-Legal Deterrence
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is often seen as the first international criminal norm explicitly addressing environmental harm. By including such harm among protected legal interests, the Rome Statute's drafters signaled a concern for ecological preservation. Any provision addressing environmental harm, in war or peace, contributes to emerging international environmental criminal law. 71 Sikkink offers a normative framework for understanding international crimes, urging that the development of the ICC be situated within a broader historical context. She argues that the 1998 Rome Conference should not be viewed in isolation, but as the culmination of a trajectory beginning with Nuremberg and extending through cities such as Athens, Buenos Aires, and Geneva. The ICC's creation was not inevitable, but the result of cumulative processes and gradual normative shifts. For Sikkink, the ICC embodies a global justice movement shaped by history, agency, and collective moral decisions. 72
Recent shifts in international politics and human rights reflect a move from regulating inter-state hostilities, as seen in the early Hague Conventions, to scrutinizing how states treat their own populations. This evolution challenges traditional notions of absolute sovereignty, which once shielded domestic affairs from external scrutiny. With global human rights norms on the rise, acts like war crimes and crimes against humanity are now subject to international legal accountability. 73 While not universally effective, normative innovation has historically played a crucial role in expanding the scope of international criminal law in response to grave global challenges. The emergence of crimes such as genocide 74 and crimes against humanity illustrates how legal norms can evolve to confront unprecedented harms. Although institutional resistance often hinders reform, the creation of new crimes can offer an important avenue for reshaping entrenched legal structures and advancing the pursuit of justice at the international level. 75
One of the earliest examples of moral outrage shaping legal norms appears in Dunant's A Memory of Solferino (1862). Though not a legal text, Dunant's vivid account of wartime suffering mobilized international attention and led to the First Geneva Convention in 1864. This marked a turning point where a humanitarian narrative prompted binding norms on the treatment of wounded soldiers and civilians—a process that closely parallels current efforts to establish ecocide as a legal norm. 76 As with earlier legal norms, the emergence of ecocide reflects the interplay between legal innovation, moral outrage, and political momentum.
Norm Development and Enabling Structures
Public support for the prevention of ecocide has grown alongside a surge in sudden and large-scale environmental crises. Famine, displacement, and conflict can all result from environmental destruction. Environmental destruction is intrinsically linked to social and humanitarian crises. 77 Stop Ecocide urges experts to focus on improving definitions and related concepts that will serve as the foundation for international legal regulations through addressing them in international law. 78 With the assistance of many experts in the field, the movement to recognize Ecocide as a crime has evolved into a campaign. Although the campaign engages with each legal and political challenge separately, it remains a long-term and complex undertaking, it highlights the significance of Ecocide's international presence. 79 Several commentators argue that recognizing ecocide as an international crime could help prevent future environmental and humanitarian crises, while also setting a legal precedent for stronger international responses. 80
Polly Higgins played a pivotal role in advocating for ecocide as an international crime, submitting a fully drafted proposal to the United Nations in April 2010. Her efforts paved the way for ongoing advisory roles to governments, NGOs, and UN bodies. 81 In Eradicating Ecocide, Higgins argues that compromise laws, which seek a balance between environmental protection and economic interests, are ineffective in addressing the severity of ecocide. She emphasizes that such laws fail to provide meaningful deterrence and often result in loopholes that allow harmful practices to continue. Higgins advocates for stronger, uncompromising laws that explicitly criminalize ecocide without compromise to ensure real accountability and protection of the environment. 82
Some have cautioned that creating a new crime in isolation from existing environmental law could risk disregarding both its legal framework and the normative principles underpinning it. However, from a normative standpoint, the intensified legal and social scrutiny that would result from criminalization is likely to significantly strengthen the incentive structure, compelling actors to seriously consider long-term environmental harms and to implement available mitigation measures with greater diligence. 83 The current scope of international crimes is insufficient to address severe environmental harm. In this context, the special rapporteur's support for bringing ecocide under ICC jurisdiction marks a step toward closing accountability gaps and may help build broader consensus for a binding, deterrent framework to address large-scale ecological destruction. 84
The ICC's role extends beyond retaliation and deterrence. However, the crime of environmental destruction, which aims to fulfill both retaliatory and deterrent functions, can be effectively integrated into the ICC's framework. Given that actions leading to ecological damage often result in severe and irreversible harm, deterrence becomes a crucial legal response within international criminal law. 85 The ICC Office of the Prosecutor has launched a public consultation on a policy initiative to address environmental crimes under the Rome Statute. It aims to integrate such crimes systematically across its work and invites feedback on crime types, investigation strategies, prosecution methods, and international cooperation. 86 These efforts signal a growing momentum within international legal discourse to fill the normative void concerning massive and irreparable environmental harm.
International criminal justice has expanded its scope by addressing new forms of social harm through thematic investigations and prosecutions. These include sexual and gender-based violence, child soldier recruitment, and cultural destruction, alongside evolving legal approaches to core crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. 87 According to Kersten, during Fatou Bensouda's tenure as Chief Prosecutor, the ICC deliberately shifted its focus toward symbolic authority. Rather than pursuing a high volume of prosecutions, it sought to strengthen its normative role in international law. However, Kersten argues that this symbolic strategy's success depends on securing tangible outcomes, such as arrest warrant enforcement, state cooperation, and accountability for senior officials. He contends that the Court's legitimacy also relies on its responsiveness to victims and affected communities. 88
Symbolic laws 89 often address real-world issues in emotionally resonant ways, aiming to shape societal values rather than provide direct legal remedies. Within this view, efforts to include ecocide in the Rome Statute may be better understood as symbolic legislation—expressing normative commitments without creating a fully enforceable legal tool. 90 Many commentators contend that the ICC primarily articulates moral condemnation and fosters a shared global normative framework. Accordingly, judges should prioritize the expressive function of punishment over goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, or restorative justice. 91 The growing visibility of ecocide within legal, institutional, and discursive arenas marks its emergence as a distinct and increasingly recognized normative concern.
Conclusion
The extensive literature on ecocide has frequently addressed whether it can be recognized as a crime under international criminal law and within the framework of the ICC. These debates, however, face inherent constraints, as international legal structures are clearly delineated. Rather than focusing solely on legal definition or classification—regardless of whether ecocide is ultimately criminalized or formally included in the ICC's framework—this study has examined its broader deterrent capacity. It assessed national and international legal developments, increasing societal attention, how ecocide is handled within current frameworks, and alternative approaches to prevention and accountability. These elements are argued to form integral parts of ecocide's normative evolution. ICC jurisdiction extends beyond legal enforcement; it reflects the collective normative orientation of the international community. Historically, all international crimes have first taken shape as normative claims before gaining formal legal status. Thus, rather than narrowing ecocide to criminal categorization or institutional inclusion, its evolving normative character offers a richer basis for ongoing legal and political discourse.
As this study illustrates, even without formal recognition, the very presence of ecocide within ICC discourse invites meaningful reflection on deterrence. Still, concerns about measurability and case-specific complexities prevent simple conclusions like “criminalization under the ICC would increase deterrence.” Assessing deterrent value requires actor-specific evaluation, and existing literature demonstrates no clear consensus at the individual or corporate level. The ICC's normative influence has extended far beyond prosecution, having played a key role in elevating ecocide within global legal and moral discourse. However, such visibility does not automatically generate measurable deterrent impact.
The broader crises in international law and the limitations of legal frameworks highlight the shortcomings of efforts focused on rapid legal solutions. This context reinforces the value of steady normative development when addressing complex harms like ecocide. While establishing a new international environmental crime is legally challenging, the growing attention it receives signals a strong need for environmental transformation within criminal law. Addressing this need entails understanding its roots and exploring mechanisms from the perspectives of different actors. For instance, will states be persuaded to act, or will environmental deterioration force their hand?
Regardless of its critiques, Don't Look Up 92 offers a potent metaphor for the difficulty of recognizing ecocide. The film depicts resistance to acknowledging existential threats despite scientific clarity. Likewise, the international community has often delayed action on ecological harm. This parallel underscore the urgency of both symbolic and enforceable responses. While crises demand timely action, history shows that normative processes evolve gradually. Expecting immediate legal outcomes often leads to frustration. Strengthening ecocide's normative evolution with focus and consistency is more likely to yield realistic, sustainable results. From this standpoint, ecocide stands at a critical turning point.
Footnotes
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
