Abstract
The governance of Antarctica has long been debated, including proposals to ‘repurpose’ the United Nations Trusteeship Council (UNTC) for its administration. However, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) emerged as the primary framework. In 2021, UN Secretary-General António Guterres revived discussions on the UNTC's role in managing internationally shared spaces including Antarctica. This paper assesses the AT system's evolution, and examines its relationship with the UN system. It evaluates the ATS's effectiveness in ensuring stability, scientific collaboration, and environmental protection, offering policy recommendations to strengthen Antarctic governance amid growing global challenges. In the aftermath of the 2024 Pact for the Future, the near future governance of the ATS and other global commons remains an open question for the future of the planet.
Keywords
Introduction
The governance of Antarctica has been a subject of international legal debate since the mid-twentieth century. Among the various proposals considered, one idea that emerged was the potential repurposing of the United Nations Trusteeship Council (UNTC) 1 to administer the continent. Given that the UNTC was originally designed to oversee non-self-governing territories, some scholars and policymakers questioned whether it could serve as an appropriate body for Antarctica. However, despite these discussions, the UNTC was never utilized for Antarctic governance.
More recently, discussions on the role of the UNTC have resurfaced. In 2021, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SG) António Guterres, following his predecessor Ban Ki-moon, proposed ‘repurposing the Trusteeship Council’ 2 to advise and guide the long-term governance of the "global commons" and "global goods"—such as the high seas, outer space, and Antarctica. This proposal, outlined in the 2021 report Our Common Agenda, aimed to enhance global preparedness for emerging challenges and ensure better representation of future generations. 3 As a part of this vision, the UNSG called for the development of a Declaration for Future Generations and the appointment of a Special Envoy to oversee its implementation and assess the feasibility of repurposing the Trusteeship Council.
Three years later, in the framework of the Pact for the Future, the Declaration for Future Generations 4 has been successfully adopted. Additionally, the Secretary-General has recently announced the designation of the Special Envoy, marking a significant step toward institutionalizing long-term global governance. 5 These developments raise new questions about the future role of the UN in Antarctic governance. Does the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 6 comprising 1959 Antarctic Treaty and associated instruments, serve as the most effective framework for managing the icy continent? It is in this context that this paper analyses the origins of the idea of repurposing the UNTC especially for Antarctic. Furthermore, it examines whether the ATS has demonstrated the capacity to evolve in response to contemporary global challenges and how its relationship with the UN has developed over time. The analysis considers the effectiveness of the ATS in maintaining stability, fostering scientific cooperation, and ensuring environmental protection in the region. Finally, the paper offers conclusions and policy suggestions for strengthening the governance and protection of Antarctica. In light of increasing geopolitical interest and environmental concerns, a reassessment of the legal and institutional mechanisms governing Antarctica may be necessary to ensure its preservation for future generations.
The ATS Governance and the Repurposed UNTC
The idea of granting the UNTC competencies over Antarctica is not new. Analysing the preparatory works of the Antarctic Treaty (AT), it becomes evident that this proposal emerged several times from different actors. However, none of these efforts materialized.
The first to present this idea was the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. They considered that the control and administration of the polar areas should be under the mandate of one or two commissions of the cited UNTC. Under this proposal, the UNTC was expected to eliminate dangerous rivalries among the countries; bring about a range of benefits, including equal and free access to raw materials organized and adequate scientific research, and surveys whose results would be available to all interested parties. The proposal also aimed to establish equitable arrangements for fishing and whaling rights, and to prevent destructive methods in connection with whaling and sealing. 7 Despite these promising prospects, it was considered that the UNTC did not have competence on the subject. 8
The second attempt was in 1947, as the first Director-General of UNESCO, Sir Julian Huxley proposed the establishment of an "International Antarctic Research Institute." This initiative was part of his broader vision to promote international scientific collaboration and to explore uncharted territories for the advancement of knowledge. However, due to various challenges, including political complexities and resource constraints, the proposal did not come to fruition. 9
The third occasion was made by the Department of State of the United States in 1948. They suggested the administration of Antarctica by the UNTC and a joint sovereignty mechanism over the continent among eight countries, namely, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the proper United States who pretended to claim territorial sovereignty over some zones of Antarctica. 10 This idea did not arrive at a good port because territorial vindicating States did not accept it. 11 As a result, Chile came up with the "modus vivendis" proposal consisting of "freezing" the legal rights and interests in Antarctica for a period of limited time (5 or 10 years) to lessen the controversies. 12 All the concerned parties eventually accepted this proposal, and consequently, the UNTC idea was abandoned again. 13
The fourth time was in 1956, when New Zealand suggested again that Antarctica should be a UN trusteeship. 14 India followed it in the same year by requesting, through a note, the inclusion of the "Peaceful Use of Antarctica" on the agenda of the 11th UNGA. The reasons for this, outlined in an attached memorandum, were rooted in Antarctica's strategic, climatic, geophysical, and economic significance, as well as India's concern that the continent could become a source of East-West tension or be used for nuclear testing. However, India had no intention of placing sovereignty claims under the UN administration. 15 It seems the United States persuaded India that its concerns were unfounded. Additionally, Argentina and Chile, along with most of the sovereignty claimant countries, opposed the proposal, 16 prompting India to withdraw its request. 17
It is worth to mention that, in 1958, India sought to include the "Question of Antarctica" on the agenda of the 13th UNGA. An explanatory memorandum highlighted Antarctica's significant strategic, climatic, and geophysical importance to the global community. 18 However, on May 2, 1958, the United States, following an initiative of Argentina in 1940, 19 proposed to eleven other nations involved in the International Geophysical Year's Antarctic programme that they convene a conference to discuss future of Antarctica. The countries invited countries included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. 20 Following this U.S. initiative, India withdrew its petition to discuss the Antarctic question at the UNGA, opting to await the outcomes of the proposed conference. 21
Since then, the idea of repurposing the UNTC has resurfaced on multiple occasions. For instance, former UNSG Ban Ki-moon 22 proposed revitalizing the Council for similar objectives. However, history has demonstrated that a complex interplay of political, institutional, and practical factors has prevented this idea from materializing, underscoring the challenges of adapting legacy institutions to contemporary global governance needs. However, none of the ideas delve upon the nature and content of the ‘repurposed’ UNTC. The solitary scholarly proposal in this respect was mooted by Bharat Desai on January 15, 1999 in a special talk at Legal Department of the World Bank, Washington DC. It comprehensively examined the idea of ‘trust’ in the international system (both under the League of Nations and the United Nations) and how to repurpose the UNTC with a new mandate for the environment and the global commons. 23
Revitalizing the ATS
There are several reasons why the repurposed UNTC proposal comprising future common governance of the global commons including Antarctica has not yet materialized. In this respect, five key factors stand out as the most relevant: The first concerns Antarctica's status as a global common good. Legally speaking, Antarctica is not considered res communis, as there is no international legal norm that explicitly defines it as such. 24 Historically, it was res nullius before being appropriated by seven States, which later asserted sovereignty claims over different portions of the continent. 25 One of the core elements of the AT was to establish a legal framework that accommodated the sovereign rights of the claimant States while promoting scientific cooperation and peaceful use. Article IV of the (1959) Washington Treaty – the cornerstone of the Antarctic legal system 26 – was designed to preserve the status quo by freezing territorial claims and preventing new assertions of sovereignty. This remains a crucial component of the region's governance. 27
The ATS has played a fundamental role in minimizing disputes by freezing the sovereign rights of the seven original claimant States. Despite ongoing territorial claims, these States have chosen to collaborate within the treaty framework. 28 However, the sovereignty issue remains complex, as different theories of occupation exist among the seven claimant nations, and territorial overlaps persist especially among Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom. 29 Moreover, some States, such as the United States and the Russian Federation, do not recognize these claims and reserve the right to assert their own in the future. Additionally, while some nations engage in Antarctic activities for scientific purposes, others see potential economic opportunities in the region. 30
In this context, the Antarctic Treaty has been an effective mechanism for accommodating these diverse interests. It has facilitated cooperation, safeguarded peace, and enabled scientific progress despite underlying sovereignty disputes. The continued success of the treaty system suggests that States have found in it a pragmatic solution that balances national interests with the broader goal of maintaining Antarctica as a zone of peaceful scientific research.
A second factor that may explain why the UNTC supervision through ‘repurpose’ has not yet been used for Antarctic governance is the issue of sovereignty claims and the unique structure of ATS membership. When determining the most suitable framework for governing Antarctica, it became evident that the twelve original members of the Antarctic Treaty required a mechanism that would allow them to "freeze" their claims while fostering cooperation despite their differing legal positions. The concept of Consultative Parties provided an one practical solution, granting special participation rights to those actively engaged in scientific research and other matters in Antarctic governance as well as ensuring that decision-making remained in the hands of committed stakeholders.
Despite this initial exclusivity, the ATS has progressively evolved to become more inclusive. The original signatory States to the Antarctic Treaty were nations that had been actively involved in Antarctic research during the International Geophysical Year (1957–58) and were invited by the United States to participate in the 1959 Washington diplomatic conference where the Treaty was finally adopted. These founding members were granted the right to participate in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) under Article IX of the Treaty, thereby facilitating their involvement in the Antarctic governance.
Since 1959, forty-six additional countries have acceded to the Treaty. According to Article IX (2), these nations may participate in the Consultative Meetings provided they demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by "conducting substantial research activity there." Seventeen of these acceding countries have met this requirement, bringing the total number of Consultative Parties to twenty-nine, representing a significant majority of the world's population. 31 The remaining twenty-nine Non-Consultative Parties are invited to attend the Consultative Meetings but do not have decision-making authority. 32 Thus, the structure of the ATS, with its distinction between Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties, has allowed for both continuity and expansion, ensuring that Antarctic governance remains stable while also accommodating new stakeholders. This unique arrangement—designed to balance historical claims, scientific research, and international cooperation—likely influenced the decision not to involve the UNTC in Antarctic governance.
A fundamental feature of the ATS is the special responsibility of the Consultative Parties, who exercise a quasi-legislative function. While their decisions do not impose obligations on non-members, they establish a regulatory framework for states and actors engaging in Antarctic activities. This function is exercised through recommendations that become binding once unanimously approved, forming the foundation of the decision-making process. These recommendations have played a crucial role in preserving Antarctica as a zone of peace, fostering scientific collaboration, and ensuring the conservation of living resources. The ATCM thus serve as key mechanisms for shaping governance and reinforcing the principles upon which the ATS is built. 33
A third reason that could explain why placing Antarctica under supervision of the ‘repurposed’ UNTC has not yet found favour, in place of the ATS, relates to the scientific research in the Icy Continent. It is essential to recognize that the scientific purposes that were instrumental in the establishment of the AT 34 are not just historical facts. They are as essential and relevant today as they were when the treaty was first signed 65 years ago. 35 The fundamentals of such an affirmation are twofold: (i) the scientific activity in Antarctica started at the end of the nineteenth century 36 and (ii) by the time of the Third Polar Year or International Geophysical Year in 1957/1958 (IGY), four preparatory conferences were held regarding Antarctica in the frame of the IGY (Paris, 6–10 July 1955; Brussels, 8–14 September 1955; Paris, 30 July-4 August 1956; and Paris, 13–15 June 1957). 37 The interest in the region and scientific and technological research capacity in it had increased. 38 This led to the creation of the Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1958 under the auspices of International Council for Scientific Unions (ICSU). The SCAR played a crucial role in coordinating international scientific research efforts in Antarctica, thereby highlighting the importance of international cooperation in the region. 39
The cited scientific activities generated the necessity of having a legal frame not only to foster international cooperation but also because the different positions regarding Antarctica provoked incidents among the scientists, despite the exclusive scientific character of the conferences. "At one point a delegation illustrated its activities with a map which showed the sectors of some countries and omitted those of others". 40 The same situation was reproduced in different forums. For instance, in 1955, the Australian Government adhered to the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization specifying, by note, that the Convention also applied to the Australian Antarctic territory. 41 The situation made the United States react by declaring that it did not recognize any claims in the Continent and reserves all the rights accrued to the United States out of activities of its nationals in the area. 42
The above situation has not changed. 43 The same type of difficulties would arise if the ATS were not functioning, and Article IV were not "freezing" the sovereignty rights of the State claimants. On the contrary, thanks to the AT, Antarctica has remained almost untouched by human hands, which makes it even more relevant, from the scientific point of view today, than in the past, not only because of the possibility of understanding earth processes but also because the capacity and technology that currently can be used is much more sophisticated than in the past so the possible data collected turns to be essential to understand phenomenon and its consequences, such as environmental changes. 44 It is relevant to highlight that research in Antarctica has implications that extend far beyond its icy confines, impacting global scientific understanding and policymaking in diverse fields.
The political context may have been the fourth reason that may explain why the Trusteeship Council proposal failed and why the Antarctic Treaty was considered the preferable option. In effect, by the time of the Washington Conference in 1959, and even almost a decade before it, when the USA tried several options to establish a coexistence system in Antarctica among the States claiming sovereign rights, the world was living the Cold War. Antarctica was no exception to the dispute between the two big power countries, the USA and the ex-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ex-USSR). Even though it did not become a territory of direct confrontation, it was one where the two States tried to safeguard their position, diminishing one of the other. 45
At the time of the AT signature, there was not yet a system for determining resource exploitation. 46 That would come years later, particularly with the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1991 (Protocol of Madrid). 47 Thus, it appears in hindsight, that Antarctica was in 1959 a strategic territory for many reasons such as resources, science, location, among others. Ironically, the political situation remains largely unchanged. Global confrontations persist, and the 'West-East' dichotomy continues to shape international relations. 48 While the dynamics between the two hemispheres may have evolved over time, the underlying conflict appears to persist. 49 The addition of new actors only serves to further complicate the situation. 50 This is evident in the recent Consultive Meeting of the AT (India, June 2024), particularly in the discussions about accepting new members. 51
As a corollary, though the political situation surrounding the AT has evolved because the international community does not live anymore under the frame of the Cold War, the same actors still are in conflict, now with new alliances that generate, in practical matters, the same consequences. As in the past, that paralysis not only can be seen in the frame of the ATS but also in many other mechanisms of groups, such as G20, for instance. 52 It is pertinent to note that in addition to the political situation, international cooperation in Antarctica has not diminished. On the contrary, the Antarctic Treaty's period of validity has shown that it continues to be a successful and relevant framework, despite the evolving geopolitical landscape. 53
A fifth element pertains to the way in which decisions are taken under the ATS. Underneath this, consensual AT decision-making ensures that all parties have an equal say in shaping the policies that govern Antarctica. 54 It is widely recognized that consensus, in formal terms, is defined by the adoption of decisions in the absence of objections, eliminating the need for a formal vote. 55
Although every decision-making process presents its challenges, consensus has proven crucial in resolving disputes, maintaining peace, and fostering cooperation among states with diverse interests. 56 While consensus may result in texts that are vague or ambiguous, subject to varying interpretations, it effectively mitigates the issues associated with majority voting systems, which can enable the adoption of controversial resolutions despite significant opposition from a large group of states. In contrast, consensus emphasizes dialogue and compromise, facilitating agreement between diverse groups, such as industrialized and developing nations. 57
Unlike majority voting, which can lead to divisive resolutions, consensus ensures that decisions reflect the collective agreement of all Consultative Parties. This collaborative approach has also facilitated the implementation of treaties and agreements, reinforcing the stability of the ATS.
58
Since all parties must agree on a decision, they are more likely to remain committed to implementing the outcomes. The consensus approach fosters a sense of ownership over agreements, as each party has had the opportunity to influence the decision-making process.
59
This dynamic has helped maintain a balance within the ATS, reinforcing the principle that Antarctica is a region governed through collective responsibility rather than dominance by a few powerful actors
As the ATS has expanded and adapted to new challenges, it is important to note that consensus decision-making has become more complex. Initially, with fewer parties, reaching consensus was more manageable. However, as the number of states has increased, the process has required greater diplomatic efforts to achieve agreement. 61 Despite this difficulty, the ability to maintain agreement among a growing and diverse group of Consultative Parties demonstrates the system's resilience and adaptability. Instead of leading to fragmentation, consensus has strengthened cooperation, ensuring that Antarctic governance remains inclusive and stable in the face of shifting geopolitical dynamics. This supports Erik Suy's argument that, in a divided world, consensus is the most effective method for achieving global agreement. 62 In the same vein, Bloom assert that ‘when weighing the benefits of keeping the consensus rule with removing it, in current circumstances keeping it is the better answer’. 63
Finally, it is relevant to note that the positive outcomes of consensus as a decision-making method in the ATS can be measured in practical terms. Although some member states challenged it during the negotiations of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), they ultimately reaffirmed their commitment to consensus when adopting the Madrid Protocol. 64 This shift underscores the enduring effectiveness of consensus in maintaining stability and cooperation within the ATS, particularly in addressing complex and sensitive issues.
The AT System and the UN System
Even though the ATS is a particular or sui generis independent legal system 65 with its own decision-making mechanisms, it is important to mention that it is not incompatible with the UN system. On the contrary, it recognizes the relevance of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Indeed, its preamble explicitly states that "a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 66 "Moreover, it is structured in a way that helps accomplish these principles and purposes, regardless of the sovereignty claims of certain states over Antarctica. In other words, the practical objectives that led to the creation of the ATS 67 have effectively maintained peace and fostered cooperation, and they continue to do so in alignment with the UN Charter, contributing to the achievement of its goals.
On the other hand, the ‘Question of Antarctica’ has been object of debate on several occasion in the UN General Assembly without generating any structural change in the ATS. On the contrary, history shows that its independent legal regime has prevailed successfully. Indeed, in 1983, Malaysia and Antigua and Bermuda, with support from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), succeeded in including the "Antarctic Question" on the agenda of the 38th UNGA. This led to the adoption of Resolution A/38/77, which requested the UN Secretary-General to prepare a detailed study on Antarctica, considering the ATS. 68 Following the adoption of this resolution, Malaysia proposed the creation of a special committee within the UNGA to study the "Antarctic Question" in depth but rather for modifying the AT than to press for an alternative system. 69 The relevance of that resolution for the ATS was its official recognition as such. It is worth noting that the "Antarctic Question" remained on the UNGA agenda until 2005, 70 albeit with varying focus, often referring to the debates surrounding its inclusion in 1983. Since then, the "Antarctic Question" has ceased to be a topic of debate or resolution within the UNGA.
The relationship between the ATS and the UN system is also evident through the collaboration of various UN agencies that play a key role in Antarctic governance. For instance, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) works closely with the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). 71 Similarly, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO contributes to scientific research on climate change and marine biodiversity in the region, enhancing global understanding of Antarctic ecosystems. 72 Additionally, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) oversees maritime transport regulations in Antarctic waters through the implementation of the Polar Code, ensuring both navigational safety and environmental protection. 73 Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has launched a scientific initiative to assess the extent of microplastic pollution in the Antarctic environment, addressing growing concerns about its impact on marine ecosystems. 74
Beyond these direct collaborations, the ATS and the UN intersect through broader global environmental and governance frameworks. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provide critical research and policy recommendations relevant to Antarctic climate trends. 75 The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also has implications for maritime jurisdiction and resource conservation in the Southern Ocean. 76 Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) contributes to the sustainable management of Antarctic marine resources through collaboration with CCAMLR. 77 These linkages illustrate the ATS's integration into the international legal and institutional architecture established by the UN, reinforcing its legitimacy and effectiveness in Antarctic governance.
Challenges for the ATS
Over the years, the ATS has successfully navigated various challenges. In addition to the well-documented issues of territorial disputes, sovereignty claims, and Cold War tensions, one of the most disruptive concerns has been the question of mineral resources. This issue was not only a key factor behind India's push in the 1950s to bring the "Question of Antarctica" onto the UNGA agenda – an initiative later taken up by the NAM countries in the 1980s and sustained into the 1990s—but it also posed a significant challenge to the ATS's governance framework. The negotiation of the CRAMRA nearly led to the erosion of consensus as the ATS's fundamental decision-making principle, 78 highlighting the complexities of balancing peace, science, environmental protection with diverging national interests.
Indeed, as previously mentioned, one of the key reasons India raised the ‘Question of Antarctica’ in UNGA was the continent's economic significance. This concern was shared by the NAM countries, which supported India's initiative. In 1983, the delegation of Antigua and Barbuda expressed its apprehensions in a statement, highlighting that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) were working on a regime to exploit the mineral resources of Antarctica. The delegation emphasized its scepticism, asserting that ‘it is obvious that they will not surrender Antarctica to the rest of the world’. 79 This sentiment reflected broader concerns among developing nations regarding equitable access to Antarctic resources and the potential exclusion of non-Treaty members from decision-making processes related to the continent's governance and economic potential. In the same vein, the representative of Malaysia emphasized that Antarctica should be governed under a regime that upholds peace and security, facilitates scientific research and international cooperation, and ensures environmental protection. He further stressed that any exploitation of the continent's resources should be conducted in a manner that guarantees equitable sharing of benefits among all humankind, rather than being monopolized by a select group of states. 80
The UNGA resolutions on the "Question of Antarctica" highlight the continent's significance from multiple perspectives, including its economic potential. 81 In the resolution adopted during its Forty-second session, the General Assembly called upon the ATCPs to impose a moratorium on negotiations aimed at establishing a minerals regime. 82 Likewise, in its Forty-fifth session resolution, the UNGA urged all members of the international community to support efforts to ban prospecting and mining activities in and around Antarctica. It also emphasized the need to ensure that all activities conducted on the continent serve exclusively peaceful and scientific purposes, 83 reinforcing the principles of environmental protection and international cooperation.
CRAMRA was adopted in 1988 in Wellington (New Zealand), with the aim of establishing a regulatory framework to assess the environmental impact of potential mining activities in Antarctica. It sought to ensure that, if mineral extraction were ever deemed necessary, it would be strictly controlled to minimize ecological harm. However, despite being adopted by consensus, CRAMRA's implementation required ratification by all Antarctic claimant states. The consensus was soon fractured when Australia and France reversed their positions in 1989, refusing to sign the Convention and instead advocating for a complete prohibition on mining. Their shift, which was later supported by other countries, fundamentally altered the trajectory of ATS governance. 84
In response to the growing momentum for stronger environmental protections, the ATS Consultative Parties launched a series of negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the Madrid Protocol in 1991. This landmark agreement established an indefinite ban on all mineral resource activities, except for scientific research, and designated Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science. The swift replacement of CRAMRA with the Madrid Protocol underscored the adaptability of the ATS. By designating Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science, 85 the Protocol strengthened the consensus-based decision-making process and affirmed the continent's unique ecological and scientific value. It also reinforced international commitment to preserving Antarctica's pristine environment for future generations. Additionally, the Madrid Protocol established a comprehensive framework for environmental protection, introducing strict regulations on human activities, including waste management, environmental impact assessments, and ecosystem conservation. Recognizing the need to prevent Antarctica from becoming a source of international discord, it reaffirmed the continent's exceptional status and ensured that all activities align with the highest environmental and scientific standards.
The adoption of the 1991 Madrid Protocol was a milestone not only for the ATS but for the entire international community. By prohibiting mining and establishing a comprehensive environmental protection framework, it safeguarded Antarctica from potentially irreversible ecological damage and preserved its status as a region dedicated to peace and science. The Protocol reinforced the ATS by reaffirming consensus as its guiding principle and strengthening international cooperation in the governance of the continent. Beyond the ATS, its impact extends to future generations, ensuring that Antarctica remains untouched by extractive activities that could have fundamentally altered its fragile ecosystem. In doing so, the Madrid Protocol set a precedent for environmental stewardship on a global scale, demonstrating that strong multilateral commitments can successfully protect the world's most vulnerable and valuable regions. As a result, the interests of UNGA members were ultimately safeguarded in a way that went beyond their initial demands. While many had advocated for a resource-sharing mechanism that would allow the entire international community to benefit from Antarctic minerals, their calls still centred around an extractive activity. Instead, the Madrid Protocol ensured that Antarctica remained free from exploitation altogether, preserving its pristine environment for future generations and preventing the geopolitical and ecological challenges that mining would have inevitably introduced. In this sense, the outcome was even more favourable than originally envisioned, securing long-term environmental and scientific benefits for all humankind.
Nowadays, the international community faces a range of emerging challenges that test the ATS effectiveness and adaptability. Environmental threats, particularly those linked to rising global temperatures that accelerates ice loss, with direct consequences for global sea levels and Antarctic ecosystems. 86 Additionally, the system has encountered significant hurdles in advancing key conservation measures. Efforts to establish new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) have been repeatedly stalled reflecting perhaps broader tensions that extend beyond environmental concerns. 87
Beyond these ecological challenges, human activities in Antarctica are expanding, raising concerns about their sustainable management. Tourism has seen a sharp increase, with record numbers of visitors arriving by ship and air, leading to concerns about environmental degradation, safety risks, and the long-term impact on fragile ecosystems. 88 Similarly, bioprospecting—research aimed at identifying genetic and biochemical resources with commercial potential—has gained traction, raising legal and ethical questions regarding access, benefit-sharing, and intellectual property rights, issues that remain unresolved under the current ATS framework, 89
Geopolitical tensions are also beginning to affect the functioning of the ATS. The strategic significance of Antarctica, including its potential mineral and freshwater resources, has led to increased interest from global powers. While the Madrid Protocol prohibits mining, there are concerns that certain states may seek to challenge or reinterpret this prohibition in the future. 90 The growing presence of state-sponsored scientific missions, dual-use infrastructure, and increased military logistical support in Antarctic operations have fuelled suspicions about the underlying strategic intentions of some countries. 91 Additionally, tensions between major Antarctic player have complicated diplomatic negotiations, making it increasingly difficult to maintain consensus-based decision-making, which has been the foundation of ATS governance since its inception. 92
Making the ATS Work: Road Ahead
The ATS was established as a pragmatic response to competing territorial claims and geopolitical tensions, particularly during the Cold War. By setting aside sovereignty disputes, it created a unique model of international governance, designating Antarctica as a demilitarized and denuclearized zone dedicated to scientific cooperation and environmental protection.
The ATS has proven to be both adaptable and subject to challenges. Its resilience has been demonstrated through its ability to evolve in response to emerging issues while preserving its core principles. A key example is the Madrid Protocol, which introduced a comprehensive ban on mineral resource exploitation, even though the original Treaty did not have explicitly environmental provisions. This decision was shaped not only by internal negotiations among ATS members but also by external pressures from the international community, which advocated for a fair and sustainable approach to Antarctica's mineral resources. The dialectic forces at play during this debate ultimately strengthened the ATS 93 by reinforcing its environmental commitments and ensuring the long-term protection of the continent even in a greater way, safeguarding global values, that the one originally foster by both internal and external positions.
It is important to recognize that the political tensions within the ATS, which at times hinder greater inclusivity and stronger environmental protections, reflect broader dynamics in the international community. While the ATS operates under a distinct regulatory framework that has shielded Antarctica from certain global challenges—such as armed conflicts, military competition, and large-scale resource exploitation—the actors involved remain the same
One of the primary concerns is the issue of sovereignty claims. The ATS does not resolve territorial disputes but rather freezes them, allowing states with competing claims to set aside their differences in favour of cooperative governance. Any structural change to this arrangement could reignite sovereignty debates, potentially destabilizing the region and disrupting the diplomatic balance that has preserved Antarctica as a zone dedicated to peace, science, and environmental protection.
Additionally, the current geopolitical climate makes it highly complex to achieve a global consensus on Antarctic governance. The increasing fragmentation of international relations, shifting power dynamics, and diverging national interests would make any attempt to restructure the ATS highly contentious. As geopolitical rivalries intensify, securing agreement among states on a new governance model may prove challenging, potentially resulting in impasse or the exacerbation of political tensions. From a scientific and environmental perspective, the existing ATS framework already provides strong guarantees for demilitarization, scientific cooperation, and environmental protection. Given these existing safeguards, any drastic change to the governance structure would appear unnecessary, unless aimed at reinforcing the Treaty's foundational principles rather than replacing them.
Another key consideration is the ATS's consensus-based decision-making process. This mechanism has provided stability and legitimacy to the system, ensuring that policies reflect the collective will of the involved states. However, it also makes it unlikely that states would willingly relinquish decision-making power to an external body where governance structures and voting mechanisms differ significantly from the ATS model. Given these factors, it appears, strengthening the existing mechanisms within the ATS, rather than replacing them, remains the most viable and effective approach. Furthermore, the UN faces considerable challenges to work effectively amidst concerns for legitimacy and effectiveness. 95 The ATS has been regarded as one of the most successful diplomatic achievements in contemporary international law and diplomacy. 96 Even in the UN's 2024 Pact for the Future, 97 adopted with the participation of 193 states and formalized in UN resolution 79/1 (September 22, 2024), it is underscoring the urgent need to reform and strengthen the multilateral system, stating: "We recognize that the multilateral system and its institutions, with the United Nations and its Charter at the centre, must be strengthened to keep pace with a changing world’ 98
From the perspective of realist theory in international relations, 99 the ATS already includes the five permanent members of the UNSC, as well as most of the states that aspire to be part of it, particularly in the event of a democratization process within the Council. 100 The positive of this arrangement lies in the fact that all these actors engage in peaceful cooperation, working toward a common goal that transcends their individual interests. This shared vision of preserving Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and scientific inquiry allows for a rare example of international cooperation, where even major geopolitical players prioritize collective goals over territorial or strategic gains.
Conclusion
Therefore, instead of replacing the ATS, a more effective approach may be to reinforce and adapt its existing mechanisms to address contemporary challenges. This includes preserving Antarctica's status as a neutral, cooperative space. Moreover, it would be crucial to develop new mechanisms for managing political tensions within the ATS and fostering greater inclusivity. Achieving these goals would better equip the ATS to confront pressing environmental challenges in Antarctica, such as ecosystem disruption, and the loss of biodiversity, while also regulating tourism and human activity to ensure long-term ecological sustainability. Moreover, the ATS could collaborate with other international forums to address global environmental issues, enhancing the collective response to environmental degradation and promoting sustainable practices worldwide.
The history of the ATS demonstrates that dialectical forces – balancing internal governance with external pressures – are vital for its ongoing evolution. Thus, promoting a dialectical approach could help the ATS effectively respond to new challenges, allowing for a dynamic and adaptable governance framework that evolves with changing global and environmental circumstances. By cooperating with the UN system, the ATS could benefit from broader international support and resources while maintaining its unique governance framework. In conclusion, by adapting to contemporary challenges while maintaining its foundational principles, the ATS can continue to serve as a model for international cooperation, scientific research, and environmental stewardship for future generations.
Footnotes
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.