This paper uses micro-data from Mexico's 2016 ENIGH household survey to first estimate per capita poverty rates by sex and then examine the sensitivity of these estimates to different intra-household pooling assumptions. By applying a range of pooling models—including joint pooling, male- and female-controlled systems, and partial pooling structures—the analysis reveals substantial variation in female poverty estimates, ranging from 51.6% to 58.4%. Our results show that relying on the standard assumption of resources being pooled and shared equitably across households can understate women's poverty by up to 7 percentage points. These findings underscore the importance of integrating women's agency and control over resources into poverty analysis and the need for further research and data on intra-household inequality to improve estimates of per capita poverty.
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Note: The definition of income is further narrowed to adequately reflect the resources available to households to satisfy their needs. Only payments and in-kind gifts received more than once a year are considered, given the randomness and frequency with which they occur. Moreover, given that imputed rent is not fungible and so households cannot make use of it to satisfy their needs, this item is excluded from the definition of income.
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Note: Unlike other approaches, which are complex and perhaps difficult to replicate across National Statistical Offices (NSOs), this approach enables NSOs to explain clearly the origin of the newly identified as poor (women previously in the non-poor group) and the intent and value of the new estimates (recognition of gender-based inequality at the household level). Since no other regrouping is performed, the new figures’ implications, value, and limitations are easy to discern.
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