Abstract
Following the end of the Marcos dictatorship (1965–1986), the 1987 Constitution was adopted to safeguard democratic governance. Since then, the Philippines has witnessed numerous, albeit unsuccessful, attempts at constitutional change. This article examines the relationship between oligarchic interests and efforts to amend the Philippine Constitution from 1987 to 2024. The study documents the various efforts lobbying for charter change and examines how powerful political and economic families have engaged with these initiatives under each administration. Our analysis shows that support or opposition to constitutional change often reflects oligarchic goals, raising concerns about the authenticity of reform efforts. However, competitive-clientelist dynamics among oligarchic families serve as a countervailing force, particularly during election cycles, as factions fear that reforms could restrict their future access to state resources or exclude them from power. This article offers insights into the interplay between entrenched power structures and constitutional reform to highlight the persistent influence of oligarchic families in shaping the Philippine political landscape.
Introduction
The Philippines presents a paradox when it comes to constitutional reform. Following the ouster of President Marcos Sr. in 1986, the country was one of the first countries to adopt a new constitution as part of the third wave of democratisation sweeping through Southeast Asia. However, unlike its neighbours – such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, which have frequently amended or redrafted their constitutions – the Philippines has kept its constitution unchanged for over thirty-five years, making it an outlier in the region.
At the same time, efforts to amend or replace the constitution have been a recurring feature of Philippine politics. Nearly every presidential administration has initiated proposals for significant constitutional change. While these have included shifts to a parliamentary system, the adoption of federalism, or the removal of nationalist economic provisions, none have succeeded. Under the current Marcos Jr. administration, concerns around constitutional reform are further amplified by the country's historical experience – particularly the legacy of constitutional manipulation under Marcos Sr. that facilitated decades of authoritarian rule.
What explains this paradox? Much of the existing literature attributes the durability of the 1987 Constitution to institutional constraints within the Philippine political system (Tamase, 2024). The 1987 Constitution outlines three primary methods for constitutional change: (i) a Constituent Assembly (Con-Ass) composed of a joint session of both houses of Congress; (ii) a Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) composed of elected delegates; and (iii) a petition-based People's Initiative. However, all three avenues involve high majority requirements and must be followed by a national referendum, creating significant institutional hurdles – particularly in a system marked by strong formal separation of powers (see Table 1).
Constitutional Change Provisions, Philippines (Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution).
Others have pointed to broader public scepticism and resistance to constitutional reform efforts. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the political system, public support for constitutional change tends to be lukewarm, primarily because such initiatives are perceived as self-serving manoeuvres by political elites. This perception is frequently reinforced by attempts to extend term limits, which only deepens public mistrust (Yusingco, 2022).
Both perspectives remain significant, as institutional barriers and lack of popular support compel presidents and their oligarchic allies to expend considerable political capital on the reform process. Yet, conventional wisdom would also suggest that the considerable powers of the executive and undue influence over the legislative branches should be sufficient to overcome these challenges. Likewise, while public opinion matters, it is unlikely that civil society alone could derail the charter change agenda. These explanations help account for the durability of the 1987 Constitution but do little to explain the persistent contestation of its framework or why political elites consistently fail to unite behind successful reforms.
A significant gap in the existing scholarship is the lack of attention to the broader context of the post-1987 political settlement, which can best be characterised as competitive-oligarchic. The 1987 Constitution, which restored oligarchic pluralism after the authoritarian era of Marcos Sr., has fostered a winner-takes-all contest for power across various levels of government. This system incentivizes elites to push for constitutional changes that would consolidate power and secure greater access to state-derived economic resources.
However, since these reforms tend to benefit specific factions, they are frequently blocked by rival oligarchic factions that find themselves either out of power or disenfranchised. Consequently, it is not merely institutional constraints or public resistance that impede reforms, but also how competing oligarchic factions leverage existing structures to safeguard their interests. This largely understudied dynamic helps to explain both the persistent contestation and the paradoxical durability of the 1987 Constitution.
Against this background, this chapter aims to address several key questions: Who are the primary oligarchic actors and coalitions that have sought to influence constitutional change over the past three decades? What goals and strategies have they pursued, and with what outcomes? Most importantly, what do their efforts reveal about the nature and future of constitutional democracy in the Philippines?
We argue that oligarchic competition drives both constitutional durability and reform efforts. Oligarchic interests – whether pursued directly or through proxies – are often motivated by factors such as regional influence, economic gains, or the pursuit of political power, particularly in the form of the presidency. However, as political power shifts, so do these interests. Those excluded from power frequently mobilise to obstruct reforms, even if they had previously supported similar measures when they or their allies held power. This narrow, strategic calculus produces a cycle of contestation in which legal and extra-legal mechanisms are deployed and mobilised to advance or obstruct constitutional change. The result is a paradoxical condition of constitutional fragility – constantly under pressure, yet remarkably enduring.
To support this argument, the article is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on oligarchic politics and constitutional reform. In particular, we focus on the mechanisms typically used by oligarchic actors, such as political patronage, lobbying, and direct involvement in constitutional change processes. Next, we examine constitutional developments in the Philippines, tracing reform efforts across various presidential administrations, highlighting key actors, their proposals, and the mechanisms they employed. We then provide a comparative analysis of recurring reform issues across different administrations, illustrating how various actors’ support for reform has shifted in line with narrow, self-serving agendas; how the influence of certain political dynasties has risen and fallen (with some notable exceptions); and how the institutional pathways prescribed by the constitution have shaped the degree of strategic engagement for these actors. Finally, we conclude by discussing how these dynamics are likely to influence future reform efforts and the broader implications for constitutional reform debates in the region and beyond.
Oligarchy and Constitutional Politics in Asia
Constitutional change has been a recurring feature in Asia over the past seventy years. 1 The initial wave of constitution-making (1945–1970s) followed the departure of European colonial powers and the decolonisation process. The late 1980s saw a second wave of constitutional reforms. During this period, countries either drafted new constitutions (e.g., Bhutan 2008; Cambodia 1993; Mongolia 1992; Nepal 2007; Philippines 1987; Timor-Leste 2001; and Thailand 1991, 1997;) or undertook comprehensive amendments as part of political transitions or following independence (e.g., Indonesia, 1999–2002; South Korea, 1987) (Tan, 2002). Malaysia and Singapore regularly amended their constitutions, while Thailand (2006, 2007, 2014, 2017) and Myanmar (2015) later experienced constitutional changes or replacements due to military coups. In contrast, nations such as the Philippines, Japan and South Korea have not made significant constitutional changes despite ongoing constitutional debates.
While broadly reflective of ongoing constitutional contestation in one of the world's most dynamic regions (Dressel and Bünte, 2016), the role of political elites – especially oligarchs – in these processes has received limited attention. This oversight persists despite evidence that constitutional developments in the region have facilitated wealth accumulation for a select few while amplifying their power and influence in politics (Aspinall, 2015; Pye, 1997). This trend is especially evident in Southeast Asia, where electoral democracies are often characterised by clientelism, money politics and the coexistence of oligarchic rule with electoral processes. In such systems, democracy is understood in minimalist or procedural terms (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019; Robison and Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2012). This raises a critical question: how and why do oligarchs engage in constitutional change?
Debates in both political science and law offer partial answers to this question. Political science scholarship, while diverse in its approaches (see, Ford and Pepinsky 2014), often builds on classical definitions of oligarchy as ‘rule by the few’ by emphasising material wealth and its defence as central features of oligarchic systems. Oligarchs are defined as ‘actors who command and control massive concentrations of material resources that can be deployed to defend or enhance their personal wealth and exclusive position’ (Winters, 2011: 6). Similarly, Hadiz and Robison define oligarchy broadly as ‘a system of power relations that enables the concentration of wealth and authority and its collective defense’ (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 38). Thus, the ‘politics of wealth defense among materially endowed actors’ (Winters, 2011: 7) becomes critical –not only in securing existing claims to wealth and property but also in safeguarding future income and profit streams (Winters, 2011).
In many cases, this convergence of wealth and political authority creates a systematic alignment between political and oligarchic elites. Oligarchs often view ‘political-bureaucratic power as a key determinant of how private wealth and social power are accumulated and distributed’ (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 35). However, not all oligarchs seek political office or transform into political elites. As Winters’ work highlights, oligarchs can leverage resources ranging from political rights and official positions to coercive, mobilisation and material power. The resources they employ depend on the structure of oligarchic rule, the external threats to their wealth, and, crucially, the coercive capacity of the state. In contexts where the state apparatus is strong, oligarchs may delegate the protection of their assets to state actors, thereby reducing their need for direct political involvement (Winters, 2011).
It is unsurprising then, that oligarchic actors often have a vested interest in the constitution. At its core, a constitution reflects ‘political settlements’ among elites on the fundamental rules of governance (Bell, 2017) and serves as a ‘power map’ that organises the distribution of power and wealth within a state (Duchacek, 1973), often embedding economic provisions, such as property rights and economic policies, which are often reinforced by judicial review.
Constitutions regulate access to public office through rules on elections, political parties and term limits, while defining the basic structures of accountability. Finally, as a discursive space where competing ideologies, paradigms and visions of the ideal state intersect, constitutions influence both the nature of political contestation and the legitimacy of governance within a polity (Regilme Jr., 2023: 132). Hence, both the formal rules and the underlying norms enshrined in constitutions often benefit entrenched political and economic elites, making constitutional debates a ‘focal point’ for elite and oligarchic influence (Weingast, 2005).
This perspective is also reflected in the expanding body of constitutional law and socio-legal scholarship on global inequality and wealth disparities. Scholars increasingly recognise the role that law plays in exacerbating the wealth divide between those who control capital and those who do not (Pistor, 2019). Consequently, attention has shifted towards understanding how constitutions can either facilitate or curb the concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of a small elite (Vergara, 2020). Some scholars have focused on how elites misuse constitutional reforms to entrench their power, a practice termed ‘abusive constitutionalism’ (Landau and Dixon, 2020).
However, oligarchic dominance is not always uncontested. Revolutionary moments, for instance, often provide opportunities for outsiders to radically reshape constitutional orders (Ackerman, 2019; Gardbaum, 2017). Even when traditional elites are in charge of constitutional revisions, significant influence from non-traditional actors can be applied through public scrutiny, popular pressure and mechanisms such as public consultations (Horowitz, 2013; Hudson, 2021; Moehler, 2008). This can lead to normatively aspirational constitutional measures aimed at curbing oligarchic power structures, such as land reform, or anti-oligarchic provisions that create inclusive avenues for political participation, such as reserved seats for marginalised groups. The same can be said for anti-establishment candidates, who have risen to prominence in the latest populist wave.
Nevertheless, constitutional change – and the debates surrounding it – is often driven by internal competition and conflicts within the oligarchy itself. These dynamics play out when certain factions within the oligarchy seek to consolidate power at the expense of rivals (e.g., through a coup), or when elites seek to advance narrow interests, such as altering the powers of the executive, removing term limits or protecting specific economic interests from broader competition. Hence, the degree of competition serves as a major driver behind many constitutional developments. Whether an oligarchy is ‘tame’ or ‘wild’ may be assessed in terms of its members’ willingness to work within institutional rules and the ability of powerbrokers to impose costs on particularly destructive behaviours within factions.
We identify four ideal pathways for oligarchic influence:
These strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may be employed simultaneously. The choice of strategy will depend on factors such as available resources, the perception of threats, and the ability to navigate institutional environments. Indeed, if many oligarchs have integrated into state institutions, such as through political dynasties, it is conceivable that different strategies could be pursued simultaneously by different members of the same family. Additionally, oligarchs may prefer to work through proxies, such as political parties or candidates, or influence debates by supporting academic experts to avoid direct association with reforms that might benefit them.
The Case of the Philippines
The Philippines offers a compelling example of how oligarchic influence has shaped political and constitutional development. During the U.S. colonial period and the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1945), landed oligarchs played a significant role in shaping the 1935 Constitution. These oligarchs utilised the constitution to capture state institutions to channel resources to their local power base – a pattern that persisted post-independence in 1946 (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003; McCoy, 1994 (2002)).
The authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. (1965–1986) intensified efforts to centralise power (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 193–198). Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law in 1972 saw the dismantling of competing power centers – including non-aligned oligarchic families – and the promotion of Marcos’ oligarchic cronies to key positions (Hutchcroft, 1991; Wurfel, 1988). This culminated in the 1973 Constitution, which shifted the Philippines from a presidential to a semi-presidential system while further consolidating executive authority as part of a ‘sultanistic’ patrimonial regime (Hernandez, 1985).
The 1986 ‘People Power Revolution’ overthrew Marcos but failed to dismantle the patrimonial-oligarchic state. Instead, elites that enjoy ‘an independent economic base outside the state yet depend upon particularistic access to the political machinery as the major avenue for private accumulation’ (Hutchcroft, 1991:12) preyed upon a weak state. The revolution led to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, which restored the Philippines to a presidential democracy. This document emphasised civil, political and socio-economic rights, strong judicial review and accountability. It also included anti-oligarchic provisions such as term limits, party-list representation for marginalised sectors, and commitments to decentralisation, social justice, and restrictions on foreign ownership (Atienza et al. 2019).
However, the country soon returned to ‘cacique democracy’ (Anderson, 1988) or elite democracy (Bello and Gershman, 1990) under the continued dominance of oligarchic elites (Quimpo, 2015: 337). Under pressure from landed elites and the military, President Corazon Aquino (1987–1991) failed to implement far-reaching social reforms, leading to a rapid ‘return of the oligarchs’ (Miranda, 1991). Anti-Marcos oligarchs re-emerged alongside those who had retained their power during the dictatorship, including the Marcos family (Gutierrez et al. 1992).
Consequently, the post-1987 constitutional order has become a ‘ruling oligarchy’, whereby traditional landed families – now with diversified economic interests – compete within the constitutional framework to control public office and influence state institutions (Sidel, 2014: 7–8). Oligarchs rotate public office among themselves, while corruption and political violence persist. Meanwhile, ‘wild oligarchs’ threaten to resort to coercion at both local and national levels to pursue their interests amidst weakened state institutions (Quimpo, 2009, 2015).
It is well documented that political power in the Philippines is concentrated in a few oligarchic, political-economic clans, often spanning multiple generations. Nearly eighty per cent of Congress and more than fifty per cent of local government officials belong to political dynasties (Mendoza et al., 2022). At the local level, many dynasties have become ‘fatter’ in the last decade, with more family members occupying elected positions across sub-national levels (Mendoza et al., 2019). This intertwining of wealth and political power highlights how deeply embedded oligarchs are in the country's political fabric.
The next section explores how oligarchic interests have shaped constitutional debates in the post-1987 period. We begin by examining the various reform initiatives pursued under each administration, before delving into how inter-oligarchic interests and rivalries both support and resist reform efforts.
Charter-Change: A Dance of Political Families (1987–2024)
The post-1987 political order in the Philippines is marked by recurring constitutional debates under every presidential administration. These debates highlight the competitive nature of oligarchic rule in the Philippines, whereby political actors seek ‘wealth defense’ and accumulation. Strategies are shaped by the political capital wielded by the presidency, the level of support or resistance from both the public and other oligarchic actors, as well as institutional constraints. However, due to the lack of trust in the process and among powerholders, these efforts have often stalled.
Aquino Administration, 1986–1992
The 1987 Constitution was hastily drafted in just three months by a forty-eight-member Constitutional Commission amidst ongoing political instability, including seven military coup attempts. Fresh out of the publicly ratified constitutional drafting process, there were no moves to amend nor revise the 1987 Constitution under Corazon Aquino's administration. However, growing resistance from oligarchic interests challenged Aquino's ambitious social reforms and ensured that the constitutional debate did not end with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Political actors began targeting the lengthy document, with some questioning the inefficiencies and costs of lawmaking imposed by the new Constitution. Calls emerged for the abolition of the Senate and a shift to a parliamentary system, while others sought to raise constitutional questions before a revitalised Supreme Court, which now had expanded powers of judicial review (Rüland, 2003: 464).
Despite some support from constitutional scholars and political-oligarchic actors in both chambers of Congress, these proposals gained little traction. This was largely due to the lingering memory of ‘bogus parliamentarism’ under Marcos's 1973 Constitution and resistance from the Senate, where oligarchic-political families were quick to resume public office after a return to democracy.
Ramos Administration, 1992–1998
The first significant attempt to amend the 1987 Constitution occurred under the administration of President Fidel Ramos (1992–1998), who pledged to return the Philippines to stability and growth. Ramos was a former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and had long-standing family ties to the Liberal Party and the former Marcos regime. His administration sought reforms that included the deregulation of state monopolies, which directly benefited oligarchic actors, and the expansion of coercive means and institutional privileges for the AFP.
Ramos' election platform and inaugural address advocated for a parliamentary form of government, an idea that was later promoted by the National Security Council (NSC), the Philippine Constitutional Association (Philconsa), and the non-governmental Association for Government Reforms for Advancement (AGORA) (Rüland, 2003: 465). However, there was little political traction as Ramos became increasingly focused on curtailing what he saw as an ‘imperial’ and ‘intrusive’ judiciary, especially after Supreme Court decisions threatened to derail his economic deregulation agenda (Magno, 1998: 204–205).
Ramos' push to amend the Constitution ultimately focused on lifting presidential term limits. The People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization, and Action (PIRMA), was launched by former National Security Advisor Jose Almonte in 1997, just one year before the next presidential election. This initiative would remove term limits for all elected officials. The highly contentious initiative prompted critics to accuse Ramos of trying to extend his stay in power.
There were also growing fissures within the oligarchic ruling coalition. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, who had lost to Ramos in the previous presidential election, challenged the initiative in the Supreme Court. The Court sided with the opposition, ruling that there was insufficient enabling legislation to allow constitutional amendments via a people's initiative, stalling PIRMA's efforts.
Following the Court's decision, Ramos pushed to fast-track a bill addressing a legal gap in people's initiatives (Samonte, 2023). Simultaneously, allies in the House of Representatives moved to convene a Constituent Assembly to amend the Constitution. While passage in the lower house was likely, support in the Senate was uncertain, with debates over whether the two chambers should vote together or separately to convene as a Constituent Assembly (Magno, 1998).
As discussions on constitutional amendments intensified, so did public opposition. Widespread perceptions saw altering the Constitution as a strategy to extend power, echoing Marcos’ use of martial law under the 1973 Constitution.
Former President Corazon Aquino led the opposition to these reforms, along with the Catholic Church, civil society groups and traditional political dynasties. Prominent presidential hopefuls such as Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Joseph Estrada, Edgardo Angara, and Francisco Tatad joined in, highlighting not only public dissatisfaction but also significant fractures among the ruling oligarchy (Magno, 1998: 210). Amid mounting opposition from both the public and political elites, Ramos relented and announced that he would not seek re-election in the May 1998 elections.
Estrada Administration, 1998–2001
An actor-turned-politician who built his brand on pro-poor populism. President Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) had previously opposed charter change under the Ramos administration. Nevertheless, Estrada himself mobilised considerable efforts to amend the Constitution, focusing primarily on its economic provisions. He established a preparatory committee for constitutional reform, led by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, and later launched the Constitutional Correction on Constitutional Reform (Concord) initiative. Concord aimed to amend key constitutional prohibitions, in particular restrictions against foreign ownership of land, public utilities, schools, mining firms, mass media and advertising agencies. The proposal suggested that these changes would be pursued through a Constituent Assembly.
This push for constitutional amendments reflected not only economic liberalisation as advocated by Estrada's technocrats but also an alignment with the interests of his oligarchic supporters. Estrada's backers included influential billionaire tycoons and figures associated with the Marcos regime, such as Eduardo Cojuangco (food and beverages), Manuel Zamora (mining), Lucio Tan (tobacco) and bankers George Ty and George Go.
However, the perception that the constitutional amendment process could also be manipulated to extend term limits sparked opposition from a coalition of civil society groups from across the political spectrum (Arugay, 2004). This included previous critics of charter change, such as the Catholic Church hierarchy, former President Corazon Aquino, and even former President Fidel Ramos, who had initially supported charter change (Lopez, 1999).
The oligarchic ruling class was also concerned with Estrada's erratic policy decisions, many of which were influenced by a circle of cronies known as the notorious ‘midnight cabinet’ (Reyes and Luz, 2000). Amid growing scandals and plummeting popularity, Estrada ultimately shelved his plans for constitutional amendments. Former political allies from influential political dynasties such as vice president and Social Welfare Secretary Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Trade Secretary Manuel Roxas resigned from their cabinet posts, and Speaker of the House Manuel Villar led the impeachment charges against Estrada. An impeachment trial was commenced in the Senate, which was cut short by public protests that ultimately forced Estrada to vacate Malacañang.
Macapagal Arroyo Administration, 2001–2010
Under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, efforts to change the constitution intensified again. In fact, under Arroyo's 10-year long term – the longest since Marcos Sr. – there were several attempts to revise the Constitution by all three modes of amendments and revisions.
Heralding from one of the Philippines’ most prominent political dynasties, Macapagal Arroyo created a consultative commission to study possible revisions to the Constitution, headed by former University of the Philippines President Jose Abueva. The report recommended shifting from a unitary presidential system to a parliamentary federal form of government, and to open up the economy to foreign ownership and participation (Abueva et al., 2002). However, Arroyo opted to push for a unicameral parliamentary government instead, claiming this would reduce government gridlocks. In practice, it would further entrench political families in their districts against potential challengers (Coronel, 2007).
In 2006, a signature campaign called ‘Sigaw Ng Bayan’ sought to amend the constitution via a People's Initiative. The campaign sought to shift to a unicameral parliamentary government and to remove provisions hindering economic growth. Despite garnering the required number of votes, the Supreme Court questioned the legitimacy of the campaign in failing to disclose the full text of the proposed changes to the signatories and to comply with the requirements of the people's initiative. Moreover, the Court ruled that a people's initiative would only apply to amendments and not revisions as in this case. 2
Subsequent efforts to push for constitutional changes through Congress also revealed fractures among the political elites. A joint resolution filed by then-Speaker Jose De Venecia, Congressman Prospero Nograles and Senator Aquilino Pimentel to convene both Houses of Congress as a Constituent Assembly to revise the Constitution failed to garner support from the Senate. Additionally, the Lower House argued that the Constitution's three-fourths voting requirement for amendments should be interpreted as a joint vote by both Houses. In effect, this would dilute the influence of the twenty-four senators against the 316 members of the House, prompting fierce opposition from civil society groups, including the Catholic Church (Salazar, 2006: 232–236). As a result, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appeared to back down in this instance, even while maintaining her commitment to charter change.
By 2009, however, a year before the next presidential election, Arroyo-allied lawmakers led by De Venecia began lobbying for a Constitutional Convention. Despite its expense, the Constitutional Convention was potentially more acceptable to critics. Despite having served as Speaker of the House for five terms and president of the dominant political party, De Venecia lost his presidential bid against Estrada in 1998 and never won a nationwide election. His staunch support for a shift to a parliamentary form of government was seen as a political bargain with Arroyo and a means to install him as prime minister without the need for a popular nationwide vote (Coronel, 2007).
The push for a Constitutional Convention was questioned by then-opposition Senator Benigno Aquino III, the son of former President Corazon Aquino (and who would eventually succeed Arroyo as president). In light of ongoing public opposition, increasing rifts within the oligarchy, large-scale corruption, political violence and considerable patronage implicating Arroyo herself, efforts to change the constitution via a constitutional convention ultimately failed.
Aquino Administration, 2010–2016
Reflecting his long-held views as a Congressman and Senator, President Benigno Aquino III firmly rejected the idea of changing the Constitution. Aquino perceived the Constitution as a legacy of his late mother, the former president and democracy icon Corazon Aquino. Instead, under Aquino the ruling oligarchy experienced renewed stability, and no serious efforts were made to amend the Constitution.
With stability creating a more credible environment to embark on reforms, the Makati Business Club (the leading business organisation in the country) lobbied to make use of the ‘narrow window’ to amend restrictive economic provisions (Rivas, 2024). Support for constitutional reforms came from various oligarchic-political actors, including allies such as Speaker of the House Feliciano Belmonte and Interior Secretary Manuel Roxas, and surprisingly, prominent opposition figures such as Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile and then Senator Ferdinand Marcos.
Aquino maintained his steadfast opposition to charter change. However, in 2014, following a series of Supreme Court rulings against his administration, Aquino expressed openness to the possibility of exploring constitutional changes. The Court's declaration of the government's stimulus economic package, the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), as unconstitutional frustrated Aquino, who voiced concerns about the Court's perceived lack of judicial restraint in interfering with the executive and legislative branches. He admitted to considering constitutional amendments to curb judicial powers.
However, among those in power, divisions in the pursuit of constitutional change remained. While Aquino's ally Manuel Roxas supported calls for charter change, Vice President Jejomar Binay remained opposed. Both Roxas and Binay were presidential hopefuls. Without any support from the president, discussions surrounding charter change diminished and no formal steps were taken to amend the Constitution during Aquino's presidency.
Duterte Administration, 2016–2022
In 2016, former Davao mayor Rodrigo Duterte became president. Duterte ran on a platform of law and order as well as to transition from a unitary government structure to federalism. According to Duterte, these policies were to address regional inequities and the concentration of power in ‘imperial Manila’ (Breen, 2019).
Although Duterte belonged to and had been supported by political dynasties (including the Marcoses), Duterte highlighted his outsider status and showed contempt for traditional oligarchs. Duterte used his popularity to call for a consultative committee on constitutional reform. Under former Chief Justice Renato Puno, the committee conducted consultations to revise the 1987 Constitution. The group enjoyed buy-in from well-known political actors such as former Senate President Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel, Jr., founder of Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN), a pro-federalism political party and father of then-Senate President Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III (Yusingco et al. 2023).
Business oligarchs appeared to support amendments to the Constitution. In 2016, Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala called for economic amendments to create a better investment climate while Enrique Razon called the Constitution a mere document that should be open to change (Rivas, 2024). Midway through Duterte's administration, the Makati Business Club also called on the need to update the ‘outdated economic restrictions in our Constitution’ (Rivas, 2024).
Two years into Duterte's administration, in July 2018, the committee submitted its proposal. This draft included significant changes, such as dividing the country into eighteen federated regions, establishing four High Courts at the federal level, and granting each region its own Supreme Court, appellate and trial courts. The proposed constitution also devolved taxation powers and banned political dynasties, which aligned with the interests of regional oligarchic-political families likely to benefit from these changes (Ranada, 2018).
The proposed Constitution was unpopular with the public and also failed to convince Congress. Critics characterised the proposed changes as a ‘populist authoritarian project’ (Teehankee, 2019). This perception was fuelled by Duterte's controversial human rights record and his administration's efforts to challenge established oligarchs such as the Lopez family and their media empire ABS-CBN while favouring others such as the Villars (Marasigan, 2024).
Concerns over the proposed constitution were further heightened by the diminishing democratic space, leading to apprehensions about the ambiguous provisions regarding the transition government. Notably, these provisions raised fears that incumbent elected officials might maintain their positions beyond their term, while the transition commission could wield excessive power to remove tenured public officers. Interestingly, some of the strongest opposition came from Duterte's own economic managers, who highlighted significant concerns about its cost and economic feasibility (Teehankee, 2019).
Despite Duterte's initial support for constitutional reform, his commitment waned, especially as the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded and public acceptance of charter change diminished. With only fifteen months until the next presidential election, support from the business community waned when the Makati Business Club opposed charter change. There were also growing fears that changing the Constitution at this time would open the door to term extensions (Rivas, 2024). Moreover, with many oligarchs remaining either largely unaffected or supported by Duterte (such as the Villar, Conjuangco, Uy and Ang dynasties), oligarchs showed little urgency to support far-reaching constitutional reform. Ultimately, these factors contributed to dwindling momentum for constitutional change during the latter part of Duterte's presidency.
Marcos Jr. Administration, 2022–Present
Under the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the debate on charter change remains highly contentious. In February 2023, House Speaker Martin Romualdez, a cousin of Marcos, led the filing of a resolution to amend the economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution. A year later, in February 2024, another resolution was introduced, this time to amend the Constitution through a Constituent Assembly.
While President Marcos emphasised that the amendments would be limited to economic provisions, widespread concerns persist. For one, Marcos is burdened with his father's legacy and the 1973 constitution, which kept him in power for decades. Marcos’ critics fear that the amendment process could be used to push for broader changes, including extending term limits or introducing modifications that might benefit those currently in power (De Guzman, 2024). These fears were exacerbated by a conflict between House Speaker Romualdez and former Senate President Miguel Zubiri over whether the two Houses of Congress should vote jointly or separately on proposed amendments.
In addition to legislative tensions, the process has been undermined by allegations of oligarchic manipulation and corruption. One signature campaign for a people's initiative was conducted amid accusations of bribery and local mayoral collusion, as well as reports that the campaign was closely coordinated, if not funded, by the Romualdez family. 3 This initiative advocated for joint House and Senate voting on constitutional amendments, which would effectively marginalise the Senate in favour of the larger House of Representatives. These revelations sparked outrage in the Senate, leading to a manifesto signed by all Senate members opposing the initiative. The Senate also launched a legislative inquiry to investigate the allegations, further deepening the oligarchic divide over the charter change process.
Persistent efforts to amend the constitution have also strained the alliance between the Marcos and Duterte families. Initially, Sara Duterte, the daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte, was leading in the polls for the last presidential elections but agreed to run as Marcos’ vice president. Their partnership helped secure Marcos’ victory, and the Dutertes had anticipated that Sara would be the coalition's candidate in the next presidential race. However, current efforts to shift to a parliamentary system are seen as a way for Marcos to bypass this expectation and position his cousin, House Speaker Martin Romualdez, as prime minister, and to eliminate the need for a nationwide vote against the more popular Sara Duterte. Consequently, despite having supported constitutional reform in the past, former President Duterte has become a vocal opponent of charter change under the Marcos administration.
Table 2 summarises the attempts to change the 1987 Constitution under each administration, including the mode of amendment or revision, the key issues of reform, and the outcome of these efforts.
Attempts to Change the 1987 Constitution by Administration.
Note: Data compiled by authors from news reports, public statements, Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia surveys (September 1992; December 1997; June 1999; February 2009; September 2014; September 2018; March 2023), Congressional records, and Supreme Court decisions related to charter change.
While recent debates on charter change under the Marcos Jr. administration have centred on the rivalry between the Marcos and Duterte families, the broader pathways and political dynamics surrounding constitutional reform remain largely consistent across administrations. These patterns – outlined in greater detail in the following section – highlight the structural and strategic continuities that transcend individual political rivalries.
Across administrations, efforts to amend the 1987 Constitution reveal a recurring pattern: while there is broad elite consensus on easing restrictive economic provisions, more ambitious proposals – such as shifting to federalism or adopting a parliamentary system – have gained far less traction. Moreover, the chosen method of pursuing constitutional change often varies depending on the nature and ambition of the proposed reform. These variations reflect how both the substance of reform and the surrounding political configurations shape the strategies employed to pursue change.
Comparing Cha-Cha Through the Years: Interests, Actors, and Pathways
Several patterns have emerged from the attempts to amend the Constitution throughout administrations. First, although the scope and focus of constitutional reforms have varied across administrations, the self-serving motives of political elites to entrench their power have been a consistent driving force, often provoking resistance from civil society. Second, although certain political families have taken prominent roles in charter change efforts, competition and political alliances among oligarchic factions have shaped their positions, leading to strategic flip-flopping on key issues. Finally, institutional pathways for reform allow political actors to hijack and derail the process, resulting in repeated failures despite some agreement among oligarchic groups on shared interests.
Actors: Political Families
A closer examination of key political families that have played prominent roles in supporting or opposing constitutional reform across various administrations reveals the strategic nature of such decisions (see Table 3). Table 3 illustrates the families of all presidents, former Senate Presidents, and Speakers of the House of Representatives since 1987, each of which wields significant leverage.
Stance on Charter Change of Political Families Under Each Administration.
Note: Data compiled by authors from Congressional records of sponsorships and votes in House or Senate Resolutions related to constitutional amendments and revisions, public statements, news reports, and being parties in cases filed questioning charter change.
Sitting presidents hold considerable power in advocating for constitutional change. Not only can they marshal substantial financial resources to promote their reform agenda, but the hyper-presidential system in the Philippines also grants presidents undue influence over the legislative branch, particularly the House of Representatives (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2011) but also over the heads of local governments. Former presidents retain considerable popularity and influence in party matters as well. Additionally, legislative resolutions often originate within Congress or in coordination with external allies. Consequently, the Senate President and Speaker of the House are crucial in either advancing or obstructing reform agendas as these individuals generally lead the most powerful political parties and can mobilise members.
There are several key insights to be drawn from Table 3. First, except for the Aquino family, presidential families tend to advocate for charter change during their own administrations, even if they do not support similar reforms under other presidencies. Equally interesting is that while certain political families demonstrate consistent support (such as the Pimentel, Marcos and Enrile dynasties) or opposition (like the Aquino and Binay dynasties) to charter change, the majority of political families shift their positions across administrations. This often appears to be driven by strategic calculations related to whether they are in or out of power.
Indeed, presidents who were staunch advocates for significant reforms – Macapagal Arroyo and Duterte – have opposed or failed to support charter change once they were no longer in power or aligned with those in power. For instance, despite having vowed to rewrite the Constitution and having urged his successor to do the same, Duterte now vehemently opposes charter change efforts under Marcos following the breakdown of their alliance. Duterte now asserts that the Constitution is in perfect condition and has even threatened secession over any proposed changes.
Similarly, while Macapagal Arroyo was initially a critic of charter change before assuming the presidency, she became one of its strongest advocates during her ten-year rule and later contributed to the drafting of a proposed constitution under Duterte's administration. This raises questions not only about the sincerity of the reform agenda promoted by political elites but also suggests that their positions are primarily driven by strategic considerations, including the alliances they are part of.
In contrast, the positions of Senate Presidents’ families on charter change have been less consistent across different administrations. Interestingly, they do not always support constitutional reforms, even when serving as Senate President during a particular administration. This is significant given that the Senate is often viewed as an obstacle to charter change.
Meanwhile, Speakers of the House consistently favour charter change, with all having supported it during the administration in which they held office. The backing of the Speaker is crucial in any constitutional reform effort, but their consistent support also highlights the strong influence of the President over the Lower House, where administrations typically enjoy supra-majorities.
Pathways of Oligarchic Influence
Efforts to change the constitution consistently rely on oligarchic patronage, a hallmark of the country's patronage-based politics and weak political parties, which contribute to the hyper-presidential system (Rose-Ackerman et al., 2011). This ensures that the president often enjoys majority support and undue influence over both Houses of Congress as well as over local government leaders. Under almost every administration, allies of the president have filed multiple Senate and House Bills proposing constitutional revisions via a Constituent Assembly.
While these revisions typically enjoy broad support in the House, there is often significant resistance in the Senate. This resistance stems from concerns over perceived threats to the institution, particularly the potential abolition of the Senate in favour of a unicameral legislature, which was originally considered in drafts of the 1987 Constitution. Additionally, unlike district-based House representatives, senators are elected nationally and are often viewed as potential presidential candidates. Changes to the government structure could threaten their political ambitions.
However, oligarchic patronage is often paired with oligarchic drafting, particularly in the filing of proposed constitutional amendments via a Constituent Assembly. In some instances, such as when the mode of amendment has been via a People's Initiative, questions have arisen about whether grassroots support was genuine. For example, in 2024, a Senate hearing investigated accusations of bribery and collusion with local government officials in promoting a People's Initiative for charter change. This was reminiscent of similar accusations in 2006 during the Arroyo administration, when local politicians were accused of coordinating with national leaders to gather signatures.
In cases where the Supreme Court ruled against proposed amendments, Congress has often stepped in to support the administration's charter change efforts. After a negative 1997 ruling, Ramos’ allies filed a bill for a Constituent Assembly. Similarly, during the Arroyo administration, when the legitimacy of a signature campaign was questioned, key political figures pushed for amendments via a Constituent Assembly, though these efforts again faced limited Senate support.
In some cases, oligarchic lobbying can be observed, where economic oligarchs have pushed for changes that benefit their business interests. Under the Estrada administration, members of his ‘Midnight Cabinet’, made up of business tycoons, pushed for constitutional changes. Meanwhile, business groups under both the Aquino and early Duterte administrations lobbied for revisions to the Constitution's restrictive economic provisions.
In short, the pathways for oligarchic influence often overlap, with political actors strategically navigating and exploiting avenues to reshape the Constitution in their favour within the broader framework of intra-oligarchic competition.
This is not to say that charter change in the Philippines is solely elite-driven. Although often initiated by those in power, proposals for constitutional reform have also drawn support from technocrats, academics and civil society. These advocates typically frame their arguments around two main objectives: enhancing state capacity and improving government responsiveness (Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 290; Abueva, 2007). For example, long-standing critiques of the bicameral legislature emphasise how it fosters legislative gridlock and sluggish policymaking, prompting figures like Hilario Davide to advocate for a unicameral system (Go et al., 2003). Others raise concerns about the representativeness of the Senate, where national-level positions are largely accessible only to the wealthy or highly popular (Quezon III, 2004).
Likewise, federalism has been championed as a solution to regional inequality, poor service delivery and the dominance of Manila-centric policymaking (Abueva et al. 2002). However, while such reforms have gained traction, they often do so for narrow political reasons. Some administrations have used them to advance self-serving goals: extending presidential term limits (Ramos), introducing prime ministerial roles (Macapagal Arroyo, de Venecia), or empowering regional dynasties (Duterte, Marcos). Proposals to amend economic provisions or remove anti-dynasty rules have similarly attracted elite support for their potential to increase access to rents and deepen state capture.
Reforms that threaten entrenched power structures in the Philippines routinely face resistance. The Senate, whose existence would be jeopardised by unicameral proposals, has repeatedly blocked ambitious reforms. Senators, often eyeing higher office, see the chamber as critical to their political futures. Even modest proposals – such as easing economic restrictions – face civil society scepticism, with fears they could open the door to term extensions or weakened checks and balances. Historical memory amplifies this caution: Marcos Sr.'s use of constitutional change to entrench authoritarian rule continues to cast a long shadow (Tamase, 2024; Tomacruz, 2018). Under Marcos Jr., a recent people's initiative to clarify voting thresholds for constitutional change via constituent assembly has again faced strong Senate opposition. This reflects enduring distrust among elite factions, who seek to protect their influence under current arrangements (Arao, 2024). As this analysis shows, constitutional reform in the Philippines hinges on a volatile mix of oligarchic interests, institutional barriers, and the presence – or absence – of mass mobilisation.
Conclusion
The Philippines remains a compelling case for scholars of constitutional politics. It stands apart from its regional peers due to its formal constitutional stability over the past thirty-five years, despite volatile political dynamics. Repeated attempts at constitutional reform have taken place, yet none have succeeded. This has resulted in ongoing constitutional contestation without meaningful change, leaving many to argue that reform is necessary, though there is little consensus on how these reforms should occur.
The barriers to constitutional change are high, intentionally set by the drafters in response to the authoritarian abuses under Marcos Sr.'s regime. These obstacles, combined with checks and balances and low public enthusiasm, have significantly hindered reform efforts. However, these factors alone do not tell the full story. In the Philippines’ hyper-presidential system, institutional majorities and public opinion can be easily swayed, as the separation of powers often collapses in practice. Against this backdrop, examining the dynamics of the oligarchic ruling coalition offers a fresh perspective on the nature of constitutional politics in the Philippines. Historically, traditional elites captured state institutions during the post-independence period, and to this day, political office and access to state institutions remain key to both wealth defence and accumulation.
This analysis illustrates how the competitive and often unpredictable nature of oligarchic rule has fostered deep suspicion among elite factions regarding the motives behind constitutional change. Patterns under various administrations reveal how political actors strategically choose among different pathways to advance their interests in shaping the Constitution. While no attempt to amend the Constitution via an oligarchic coup or martial law has succeeded, elite influence through the three other pathways remains a persistent feature of Philippine politics.
A case in point is the Marcos-Duterte feud, which underscores how intensifying intra-elite rivalries increasingly shape the calculus around charter change. Marcos Jr.'s ambivalent stance on constitutional reform – shaped by political pragmatism and his family's historical legacy – reflects the strategic caution with which elite actors approach such initiatives. The results of the 2025 midterm elections illustrates this shifting calculus. With Marcos Jr. and his allies failing to increase their Senate majority, it is almost certain that they will not garner sufficient support for far-reaching constitutional amendments. At the same time, the persistent appeal of anti-system candidates across electoral cycles may open new – if unpredictable and faction-driven – pathways for constitutional change.
Yet even as some actors pursue constitutional change through oligarchic drafting, lobbying, or patronage, others resist, fearing reforms might consolidate power in the hands of rivals or reduce their own future access to state resources. This drives shifting and often contradictory elite positions on charter change – manifested through proxies, direct interventions, institutional resistance via the Senate or the Supreme Court, and even extra-constitutional mobilisation. Paradoxically, this competitive impasse has contributed to a fragile yet enduring constitutional order that proves remarkably resistant to change.
In summary, viewing constitutional change through an oligarchic lens significantly enhances our understanding of these processes, not only in the Philippines but across the region and beyond. It pushes us to consider how constitutional and institutional changes unfold in political systems where oligarchic interests dominate. Further research focusing on how social structures and their transformations over time can shape and influence constitutional norms in weakly institutionalised settings could provide valuable insights into how entrenched elites impact governance and reform efforts globally.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council (grant number DP230102553).
